When Gorbachev became. Biography of Mikhail Gorbachev

As the date of the GKChP putsch approaches, or it is easier to say the finalized collapse of the USSR, materials for the future court on the fact of high treason by citizen Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev.

The iconic "kiss of Judas" Gorbachev and the head of East Germany Erich Honecker October 7, 1989. Eleven days later, Honecker was removed from the presidency. The Berlin Wall fell, marking the end of the GDR

In continuation of the above, let me remind you of the assessment of Gorbachev's activities, which Putin gave in the book "From the First Person" (2000). In it, Vladimir Vladimirovich, referring to a conversation with former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, quoted the latter's words about Gorbachev's policy: “I thought that the Soviet Union should not leave Eastern Europe so quickly. We very quickly changed the balance in the world, and this could lead to undesirable consequences. And now they blame me for it ... To be honest, I still don't understand why Gorbachev did it? "

Summing up this conversation, Putin wrote: “To him (Kissanger) I said and now I say:“ Kissinger was right. We would have avoided so many problems if there had not been such a hasty flight. "

It can be added that this was not just an escape, it was the actual surrender of the USSR, expressed in the destruction of the "security belt" created along the western borders of the Union after the Great Patriotic War and the rejection of the Potsdam agreements.

As a result, today Russia has NATO on its borders, and the United States is intensively forming its security belt, but on a global scale.

BREACHING ... AS A MODEL OF BEHAVIOR

The beginning of the track record of betrayal was laid when he was the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU for agriculture. Thanks to the support of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, he positioned himself as the second person in the party. However, after Andropov's death, Mikhail Sergeevich's star began to fade rapidly in the political sky of the USSR.

In December 1984, Gorbachev had a chance to demonstrate his importance at the international level. He was sent to Great Britain by the head of a minor delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Nevertheless, Mikhail Sergeevich decided to impress British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

During one of the meetings with the "Iron Lady", as Thatcher was then called, Gorbachev "pulled out on the table a map of the General Staff with all the secrets that indicated that the card was genuine. It depicted the direction of missile strikes against Britain. This is how Aleksandr Yakovlev described this episode in his memoirs "The Pool of Memory". Gorbachev's press secretary Andrei Grachev also wrote about him in the book “Gorbachev. A man who wanted the best ... "And Mikhail Sergeevich himself confirmed this fact in his memoirs" Life and Reforms ".
In London, or rather in the Chekkers' special residence, Gorbachev, not having the authority from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to make a statement on behalf of the USSR and show a top-secret map, suggested Thatcher put an end to this situation. The premier was so impressed by the desire of the Soviet politician to please his Western partners that she immediately flew to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, to inform her that this person could be dealt with. Unfortunately, this fact of Gorbachev's obvious betrayal remained unnoticed.

No less scandalous is the situation with two maps of the USSR air defense of the western and northwestern directions of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which in February 1987 the USSR Minister of Defense Sergei Leonidovich Sokolov was forced to leave to the General Secretary Gorbachev at his request. This information is known from the words of Colonel General Leonid Grigorievich Ivashov, who in 1987 was responsible for the secrecy regime in the General Staff.
The issue of transferring top-secret maps to Gorbachev becomes especially acute if we recall that three months later, in May 1987, Matthias Rust's mysterious flight over the USSR took place. Moreover, Rust flew as if he had a thorough knowledge of the location of Soviet radar tracking stations in the northwest direction. The situation with the passage of Rust and the maps is still unclear.

Speaking about Gorbachev's treacherous behavior, one should recall the situation with the destruction of the Soviet tactical missile system "Oka". The precision of this complex was incredible. He almost completely hit targets at a distance of 400 km. The Americans were terribly nervous about Oka. And it was from what.
According to the designer of the Oka, Sergei Pavlovich Invincible, American experts estimated the preparation of an adequate response to neutralize the Oka at $ 150 billion. Gorbachev donated these funds with one stroke of the pen to the Americans, signing the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate and Short-Range Missiles (INF) in Washington in December 1987. Oka, by its parameters, did not fall under the scope of this Treaty. But she was there. This is how it happened.

In April of the above-mentioned year, US Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in Moscow to agree on the main provisions of the INF Treaty. As the former secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Anatoly Fedorovich Dobrynin writes in the book "Purely Confidential ...", on the eve of Schultz's arrival, he and Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the USSR Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev prepared a memorandum for Gorbachev. It was especially emphasized that in no way can one agree with Schultz's demands on the reduction of SS-23 missiles, that is, "Oki".

However, the next day, Gorbachev, when meeting with Schultz, unexpectedly agreed with the latter's proposal to include the Oka complex in the agreement. In return, the USSR received nothing from the Americans. When Akhromeev asked what caused such a decision, Gorbachev replied that he simply “forgot”.

In this case, it remains only to believe in the version that Raisa Maksimovna at one time had a confidential conversation with Nancy Reagan. The wife of the American president said that if the SS-23 (Oka) missiles are included in the agreement, then "Roni (Ronald Reagan) will provide Gorbachev with the Nobel Prize." It is said that a diamond necklace was added to this for Raisa Maksimovna. But perhaps these are just rumors. Although on October 15, 1990, Mikhail Sergeevich was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

GORBACHEV'S FATAL BLOWS ON THE UNION

A vivid manifestation of Gorbachev's treacherous attitude to the fate of the USSR was his behavior on June 12, 1990. On this day, the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Russia. The example of Lithuania, which declared state sovereignty on May 18, 1989, and already on March 11, 1990, announced its secession from the USSR, clearly showed that this threatens the Union with a constitutional crisis.

According to the testimony of the first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Philip Bobkov, before voting for the draft Declaration, he and Colonel-General Konstantin Kobets went to Gorbachev with this document. The President of the USSR, who was standing next to the chairman of the KGB V. Kryuchkov, read the draft and said that he saw "no reason for the Union authorities to react to this." Bobkov and Kobets were amazed. The President could not help but understand that the supremacy of the laws of Russia over the allies means the collapse of the Union. Kryuchkov in this situation modestly kept silent.

This indicates that Gorbachev was interested in the collapse of the USSR.
In December of the same year, a terrible bell rang for Gorbachev at the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Deputy Sazhi Umalatova called for the discussion of the Congress on the issue of no confidence in the President of the USSR. Gorbachev was rescued by the presiding officer Anatoly Lukyanov, who actually failed Umalatova's proposal.

This was followed by the January events in Vilnius. They dealt a serious blow to Gorbachev's authority. After that, the prospects for the President of the USSR began to look very sad.

Another alarm bell rang for him at the April (1991) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. On it, two-thirds of the speakers harshly criticized him. But the main holder of facts about Gorbachev's treacherous activities, the head of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov, again, as at the Congress of People's Deputies, remained silent. As a result, the question of resignation was removed from the agenda of the Plenum.

At the same time, former US President Richard Nixon visited Moscow on an "inspection trip" on behalf of the White House. The conclusion that Nixon reported to Washington was unambiguous: "The Soviet Union is tired of Gorbachev." Well, at the end of the summer of 1991, a strange August putsch took place, the scenario of which was very reminiscent of Vilnius. Everything indicated that Gorbachev was behind the coup.

The December gathering of Yeltsin, Shushkevich and Kravchuk in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, where these "chief executives" dealt a mortal blow to the USSR, became a real salvation for the President of the USSR. They perfectly understood that they had committed a crime and were awaiting arrest. The President of the USSR had more than weighty reasons for this: the Constitution of the USSR and the results of the March (1991) all-Union referendum on the preservation of the Union.

However, Gorbachev, in the name of saving his own skin, did not act as the President, the guarantor of the territorial integrity of the USSR, but as an outside observer. As a result, the second most powerful power in the world ceased to exist.

Betrayal by kebabs

Gorbachev's attitude to the political allies of the USSR was most clearly manifested in the situation with the shameful surrender and subsequent liquidation of the German Democratic Republic.
On December 9, 1989, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the General Secretary loudly declared: “We strongly emphasize that we will not give offense to the GDR. It is our strategic ally and a member of the Warsaw Pact. It is necessary to proceed from the reality that developed after the war - the existence of two sovereign German states, members of the UN ... "
But already in February 1990, under US pressure, Gorbachev began to secretly change his position. Gorbachev's Kremlin entourage was silent about this, and Great Britain and France were extremely worried about the unification of Germany on American terms. Margaret Thatcher twice sent Foreign Minister Douglas Heard to Moscow to stop the "surrender" of the Russians, more precisely, Gorbachev. At that moment, Gorbachev was mesmerized by the approaching Nobel Prize, which the Americans had promised him. For this, he was ready for anything.
At the end of May 1990, the President of the USSR, while on a visit to the United States, agreed with the American proposal that a united Germany should decide for itself whether to join NATO or not. This was tantamount to recognizing Germany's right to remain in NATO.

Gorbachev's statement so alarmed Thatcher that already on June 8, 1990, she flew to Moscow on purpose. Thatcher told Gorbachev that "no reasonable person can fail to feel uneasy seeing the prospect of an immense united German power in the heart of Europe." Nevertheless, on August 30, 1989 in Berlin, the Unification Treaty on American terms was signed, as a result of which the FRG absorbed the GDR.

Gorbachev betrayed not only the GDR, but also its leadership. It happened in July 1990 when Gorbachev and the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl were eating Caucasian kebabs at a government dacha in Arkhyz (North Caucasus).

According to the testimony of the former secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Valentin Mikhailovich Falin, Kohl then asked Gorbachev what to do with the former members of the SED Politburo and other senior functionaries of the former GDR. Gorbachev replied: “You are Germans. You know better what to do with them! " Thus, he gave the go-ahead for the criminal prosecution of the allies and friends of the USSR.
In Arkhyz, Gorbachev also made incomprehensible concessions to Kohl in terms of material compensation for the reunification of Germany and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, who had the right to remain there for another twenty years. In 1993, the Minister of Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany Theodor Weigel told the Bundestag deputies that the unification of Germany cost the German government only 15 billion marks.

The answer to the question of whether Gorbachev acted in the interests of the United States is obvious. The Americans were amazed at how quickly the Soviet leader surrendered position after position to the West. As Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott acknowledged, the Americans were looking for a way to reward Gorbachev "for his willingness to come to terms with the preservation of a united Germany within NATO." And since Gorbachev's visit to the United States was scheduled for June 1990, Robert Blackwell suggested: "The meeting should turn into a 'June Christmas' for Gorbachev."

“Gorbachev literally reveled in his success when the crowd began to cheer and applaud him. Through an interpreter, he exclaimed:“ I really feel at home here! ”It was a strange, but very telling phrase: in his homeland his own people would not suit him such a meeting.
Gorbachev had such a great thirst for feeling the public's favor and seeing evidence of his importance in the West that the next day he set aside four hours of his time and took five awards from various organizations in turn ...

Gorbachev, smiling broadly, greeted the representatives of each organization who solemnly entered the magnificent reception hall of the Soviet embassy; they hung their emblem on the wall and praised Gorbachev to the skies in front of the cameras of Soviet and American television ... "

The next gift had to wait for two years. In 1992, when the Soviet Union was over, Reagan invited the former president of the USSR to his ranch and presented him with a cowboy hat. Gorbachev writes about this in his memoirs. Commenting on this, political scientist Sergei Chernyakhovsky subtly noted that the "former" Caesar of half the world "is still proud of this. Russian courtyards were proud when the tsars gave them fur coats from their shoulders. Richard the Third York, in a moment of danger, promised to give half his kingdom for a horse. This" Nobel Prize " the laureate "is proud of the fact that he profitably exchanged his half of the world for a hat from the former American president. Then Reagan's guests paid 5 thousand dollars for a photograph of the former secretary general wearing a hat of Texas shepherds. Gorbachev proudly writes about this. Not realizing that they were paying for his photo in a jester's cap. "

These are far from all the materials by which one can judge the betrayal of citizen Gorbachev. But this is enough to understand that in world history there is simply no other such case of betrayal, which could be compared in scale and consequences with this.

Good evening, gracious sovereigns and gracious ladies!

In this post, I will briefly touch on a topic closely related to the 80th birthday of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev.

So, after the events referred to in Russian historiography as a putsch and which took place from 19 to 22 August 1991, the collapse of the Tri-series became a fait accompli. However, there were still several months left before the legalization and this political fact. Therefore, formally, until December 1991, the USSR existed as a state recognized by the notorious international community. And the pivot of the Soviet Union since its inception has been the Communist Party.
I would like to recall the outline of events preceding the aforementioned coup. So in July 1991, the last XXVIII Congress of the CPSU was held, which adopted a new party program and, thereby, determined new vectors for the development of the Tri-series.
Structurally, the party by this time was already not an integral organization, but a set of parties of the Union republics, which was recorded in the new changed composition of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, which consisted of the General Secretary (Gorbachev), his deputy (Ivashko) and the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Union republics.

Such a structure was already a harbinger of the collapse of the Tri-series, and the main role in this fact was played by the formed Communist Party of the RSFSR. It was she who became the factor that finally broke off allied relations within the CPSU, making it the sum of allied communist parties. The superstructure was no longer needed.
At the same time, within the framework of the entire quasi-state structure of the Tri-Serie, the process of developing a new order of internal political interaction was taking place, the basis of which was to be a new Union Treaty. The old one, signed in 1922, no longer met the new realities. The signing of this agreement was scheduled for August 20, 1991 ...

It is difficult to say with complete certainty what this putsch was. I, like many of my politically engaged colleagues, believe that M. Gorbachev himself was the main customer of this. As evidence, one can cite, firstly, the indecision of the actions of the putschists, and secondly, their flight to M. Gorbachev after the failure of the putsch itself. It seemed that they simply did not follow the order, and now they were eager for new instructions. But be that as it may, the failure of the event and the collapse of the USSR that followed it became historical facts.
Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation from the post of President of the USSR happened after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements, but from the post of General Secretary of the Bolshevik Party - already on August 22, 1991 from the birth of Christ! Moreover, M. Gorbachev not only left the party, but also offered the party to dissolve. Why?
Let's try to figure it out.

All activities of M. Gorbachev in the post of general secretary of the Bolshevik party were reduced to reforming it and, as a result, reforming the entire quasi-state structure of the Council of Deputies.
The reforms of the last secretary general were comprehensive.
First of all, they concerned the political sphere and represented a large-scale democratization of the entire social and political structure of the Tri-series. In the Bolshevik language, this phenomenon was denoted by the word "perestroika".
Perestroika touched upon the issues of party building, changes in the national-state structure of the Tri-series, breaking up the party and state apparatus. Particularly significant was the change in foreign policy, which turned into a means of saving the USSR itself and its transformation into a more mobile modern society.
The mass media received great openness. Television, radio and newspapers gradually began to more objectively consider not only historical events, but also contemporary events for their readers, radio listeners and viewers.
Freedom touched theater, cinema, literature, painting.
Celebration of the 1000th anniversary of the baptism of Rus became an unprecedented affair for the atheist Council of Deputies. As well as the relatively independent elections of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia (one official of the Council for Religious Affairs told the author an interesting detail of these elections. In particular, the Central Committee received a unique order for the first time: not to interfere in the elections, just watch).
Secondly, the economic sphere was reformed. This process was named “acceleration”.
The acceleration was aimed at developing the industrial and agrarian potential of the Soviet Union. However, industrial acceleration was followed by a rethinking of industrial development from military to civilian sphere (conversion). As a result, market relations, enshrined in the law on cooperation, were officially introduced in the Council of Deputies. Previously, this relationship was a criminal offense and existed only clandestinely (black market, shop assistants, etc.).
Finally, in the third head, the spiritual realm was reformed. The name of this trend is “glasnost” and “new thinking”.
Glasnost has opened many historical archives of past eras. As a result, whole oceans of new information were sent to the zombie Soviet slaves. Particularly painful was the information concerning the period of the rule of I. Dzhugashvili (driven by Stalin). The cult of V. Ulyanov (drove - Lenin) was still afraid to plan. After all, they were still following the "faithful Leninist course." However, other historical periods of the Council of Deputies were subjected to an unprecedented ideological reevaluation. Perhaps the second historical myth, which was touched on to a lesser extent during the reign of M. Gorbachev, was the myth of the so-called “Great Patriotic War”.
The new thinking related more to the foreign policy of the Tri-series and was a way to inspire confidence in the normal highly developed countries of Western Europe, the USA and Japan. They even started talking about convergence, by which they understood the mutual absorption of the Council of Deputies and Europe. For this purpose, nuclear tests were suspended, negotiations on disarmament began, and all-round relations between the USSR and the United States improved.

All three directions not only constituted a whole, but were also generated by one team, or, if you like, the matrix of the development of the Bolshevik Party and the Council of Deputies created by it.
The reforms affected all the diversity of Soviet life. Moreover, new ideas were followed by even newer and more radical ones. As a result, each year of M. Gorbachev's rule brought new results.

In particular, perestroika very quickly became not only a household word, but also made global changes in the entire "socialist camp". One after another, the Bolshevik regimes collapsed in Eastern Europe, and the Bolshevik regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America were looking for new patrons (mainly in the person of China) and also began timid transformations.
But if in Czechoslovakia it rather peacefully collapsed into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, then the collapse of the SFRY was accompanied by long ethno-confessional conflicts, the centers of which still exist.
Within the Tri-series itself, delimitation on ethnic and ideological grounds also began to take place. Like mushrooms after the rain, national movements grew in the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Turkestan. Soon, these nationalist sprouts bore fruit.

As a result, by 1991, a huge power was concentrated in the hands of M. Gorbachev: the general secretary of the Bolshevik party and the president of the Tri-series. But the very mechanism of control of these two monsters began to get out of hand. This led to an irreversible denouement.

As I wrote earlier about the essence of the Council of Deputies, the party was the very core around which everything existed.
Moreover, the merger of the party and quasi-state structures was so multi-level that a significant number of top leaders held simultaneously the highest party and state posts.
This influence allowed party leaders to always remain in the shadows. Whatever happened, the responsibility fell on the state. And within the party itself, mutual responsibility flourished.
We can say that it was the Bolshevik Party that was the living tissue of the entire Soviet slave society. Cancer tissue. But still alive. But the quasi-state organization was just a shell that protected Bolshevism from external and internal threats.

This real state of affairs explains why in the Council of Deputies it was possible to reform everything, but not the Bolshevik Party itself.
Look for yourself: during the period from 1917 to 1991, when the openly outright Bolsheviks were in power, they managed to carry out various "transformations".
The Bolsheviks managed to destroy millions of people, break the backbone of the Russian peasantry in the course of collectivization, expel or deprive the intelligentsia of death, at the cost of incredible efforts and victims to win with the help of the Anglo-Saxon peace in the Soviet-German war, carry out numerous reforms and repressions in the so-called Red Army, up to the reduction of officers, several times to break the system of workers 'and peasants' militia, to reduce and transform the KGB apparatus.
But nobody succeeded in reforming the Bolshevik Party itself!
In the 1920s, those who wanted a different path quickly went to the Lubyanka basement. Some got in the equatorial country with an ice pick on the head.
I. Dzhugashvili himself could have destroyed thousands of party workers, but he did not change the essence of the Bolshevik party.
N. Khrushchev's attempts to reform it led to his imminent resignation!
Leonid Brezhnev did not reform the party - he ruled calmly.
For Y. Andropov and K. Chernenko, history has given up very little time for the Bolshevik Olympus.

M. Gorbachev became the last reformer of the Bolshevik party. It was the reforms in the party itself that led to its death and the death of the state it created.
I dare to suggest that such a reformer as M. Gorbachev simply understood the impossibility of changing this particular organization. And therefore he offered to destroy it, which later happened.

The ideology born in hell itself, through the Jewish retrospectives K. Marx and F. Engels, slowly crept into the heads of the Russian revolutionaries. Having passed the incubation period in the minds of the Russian intelligentsia, the satanic ideology was born as a terrible Bolshevik godless monster, ready to swallow the entire human world. The edge of the sting of this monster was directed against our Lord Jesus Christ himself and the entire Holy Trinity.
The members of the party became the cells of this terrible monster, and the party itself became the body. It was she who, having created a protective shell from the Soviet state, absorbing the human, technical and natural resources of Russia, became the most poisonous squad of the owner of hell! The real head of the Bolshevik Party is the devil himself.
It was precisely the fact that the party itself belonged to hell and its master, Satan, that did not allow any leader to change the imprisonment of the Bolshevik party for a world revolution. It was this confinement and its real curators from hell that did not allow the Council of Deputies to be turned into a normal state (and this was what N. Khrushchev, and L. Brezhnev, and M. Gorbachev tried to do), and the Bolshevik Party was not transformed into a normal political organization.

After the breakup of the Tri-series, the body of the party disintegrated into its cells. These cells have partially merged into various communist organizations in the former USSR, the largest of which is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
But after the death of the party, the skeleton of the Council of Deputies itself remained. Since this skeleton reproduces precisely the party structure, it is sharpened to fulfill the same goals that the Bolshevik Party pursued, or rather its demonic masters.
As a result, the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the Council of Deputies, inheriting from the latter the walls, ceilings and other frames of the building itself. Unfortunately, the current inhabitants of the Kremlin do not understand this. Therefore, they are trying to fill the quasi-state soviet structure with a new liberal-democratic content (and often they do not try, they simply go with the flow, plundering the natural and technical resources remaining from the Tri-series).
Thus, the creation of United Russia was an attempt to recreate the CPSU. But hell doesn't need United Russia. The owner of hell - Satan - needs members of this party, but not herself. That is why the “help” is sluggish.
Symbols (mausoleum, red stars, eternal fire, toponymy, architecture, sculpture, etc.) remained from the Bolshevik Council of Deputies in the Russian Federation, which at the mystical level create an inevitable conflict with Divine Energies emitted by Orthodox Temples.

As a result, the collapse of the current unviable regime of the Russian Federation is inevitable, unless a miracle happens and a renewed Russian Orthodox Kingdom does not arise on the ruins of the Tri-series!

God bless you!

Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich - Soviet and Russian politician. Held positions: Co-Chairman of the SDPR, President of the USSR, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 5th General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU.

Biography of Gorbachev: early years

Mikhail Sergeevich was born on March 2, 1931, in the village of Privolnoye, Russia. Dad and mom of the future politician were ordinary people, they worked on the ground. The boy's childhood and adolescence passed without luxury and surplus. In the early years, he went through the occupation of Stavropol by the Nazis. This terrible time has long postponed its imprint on his life. The young man began to combine his studies with work on the collective farm. First, he mastered the profession of a tractor driver, then a combine operator. The teenager's hard work was rewarded. In particular, in 1949, Gorbachev received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor.

Mikhail finished school with a silver medal. He entered the Faculty of Law at Moscow State University. At Moscow State University, he headed the Komsomol organization. Gorbachev joined the party in 1952, received the post of the first city committee of the Komsomol of Stavropol.

In the party and state service

After Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev got to the Komsomol work, he decided to connect his life with politics. He turned down a job offer. He was offered a job in the local prosecutor's office in order to break into politics.

In 1967 he graduated from the correspondence department of the Stavropol Agricultural Institute. Received a diploma in agronomist.

The growth of the political career of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev took place in 1962. He took up the post of party organizer of the Stavropol agricultural administration. In this post, he showed himself more than competently, found the glory of an active and young politician. In his region, in the Stavropol Territory, there were always good harvests. This allowed him to become the ideologue of the Communist Party in the development of the agricultural area. In 1974 he was elected to the USSR Armed Forces. He became the head of the commission that dealt with youth problems. In 1978 he was transferred to the capital, with the subsequent appointment of the secretary of the Central Committee. This initiative was shown by the former leader of the USSR Andropov. He saw in the future the politics of an experienced specialist and active figure. Two years later, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev became a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Under his leadership were reforms related to the economic field, as well as the political sphere. In 1984, he read the report "Living Creativity of the People". This was the first stone in the development of perestroika. The report was received positively by his colleagues.

So, Mikhail Sergeevich found the glory of a reformer. In 1985 he was elected General Secretary of the CPSU, after which the process of universal democratization began in society. This was the beginning of perestroika.

Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich became the leader of a huge country that fell into stagnation. But the trouble was that the politician did not have a clear restructuring plan. Unfortunately, this resulted in irreversible processes. Conventionally, we can say that these actions led to the collapse of the USSR.

Activities as Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU and President of the USSR

On his account there are many reforms, including a little strange from an economic point of view. This is "dry law", the exchange of banknotes, cost accounting. Actions related to the weakening of the nuclear threat and friendship with the West can be called conditionally positive. Undoubtedly, the moment when the local military conflict in Afghanistan ended was positive.

Gorbachev eased censorship. Experts assess its role in the life of the country ambiguously. Everyone has their own opinion. Some say that he brought a lot of benefits, others believe - harm.

Foreign policy

Soviet diplomacy under Gorbachev is on the rise. The politician began to meet annually with US presidents. Agreements were concluded related to the destruction of medium and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty 1987), limitation of strategic offensive weapons (1991).

Important! Now the INF Treaty is at the stage of rupture. The United States and Russia withdraw from the treaty, this.

In 1988-89 Soviet troops left Afghanistan. In addition, politicians under the leadership of Gorbachev have made a lot of efforts to end the conflicts in Angola and Nicaragua. Relations with China improved, since the condition of this state - the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan - was met.

In 1989-90 in European countries with a socialist form of government, popular riots are taking place, which can be safely called revolutions. As a result, power passed to democratic rulers. In Yugoslavia, this led to the disintegration of the state, in Romania - to bloodshed. Croatia and Slovenia became free and independent, Bosnia and Herzegovina began to fight on the basis of territories: what belongs to whom.

Tragedy in Katyn

On February 2, 1990, V. Falin sent a report to Gorbachev, in which he reported on the archives that were found in connection with the sending of the Poles to the camps. This happened in 1940. Then they were shot. He pointed out that the archival documents found would undermine the position of the Soviet government about the lack of proof of this case and the absence of official papers. It was recommended that a new position on this matter be determined, which Gorbachev did. In particular, in the spring of 1990, Jaruzelski arrived in Moscow. He was the Polish leader at the time. A TASS statement was published, which stated that the death of the Poles in Katyn was a crime committed by the NKVD at the head of Beria and Merkulov.

Thus, behind Gorbachev is the official recognition of the responsibility of the leaders of the USSR for the tragedy in Katyn.

Interesting fact: Gorbachev is the first leader of the country to visit the Vatican and Italy. In 1989, negotiations were held in Italy. They drew a line over the strained relations between Italy and the USSR. In part, this relationship was associated with Italy's participation in the war against the USSR, along with Hitler. In 1990, the Vatican and the USSR established diplomatic relations. This became possible thanks to Gorbachev.

Gorbachev did not consider himself a believer. This was influenced by his party work, as well as his upbringing. However, it officially introduced January 7, 1991 as a holiday. Let's remind that on this date the Orthodox celebrate Christmas.

The results of Gorbachev's foreign policy

The years of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev's rule in foreign policy were marked by the following results:

  1. The democratization of the country has forced a new look at human rights. A unified perception of the world as a unified whole appeared. This raised questions related to the country's integration into the world economic system.
  2. The confrontation between world systems: socialism and democracy has ceased to exist.
  3. In 1986, in January, the USSR put forward the idea that the planet should be free of nuclear weapons by 2000.
  4. At the 27th Congress of the CPSU, a movement was formed aimed at the peaceful existence of countries with each other. A universal principle of interstate relations was determined.
  5. Creation of a unified program of general international security. The program is based on the fact that the security of the planet is common; it can be based exclusively on political means. The USSR addressed the program to the entire world community and political parties.
  6. In December 1988, Gorbachev speaks at the UN. There he presented his vision of new political thinking, designating it as a concept. In particular, the politician said that the vitality of the world lies in the multivariance of its development, diversity, as well as in the combination of various spheres of the life of society as a whole. Each of the countries of the world space must choose its own path along the path of progress.
  7. Gorbachev insisted on abandoning his own development at the expense of backward countries, nationalities, infringement of their national and religious interests.
  8. The politician emphasized that the joint efforts of states will lead to the fact that there will be no more hunger and wars on Earth.

New thinking in the foreign policy of the Soviet country led to the fact that the USSR began to be perceived as a safe and civilized state. But further history showed a somewhat opposite. Gorbachev sincerely believed that the image of an enemy, of undeveloped socialism, had collapsed in the eyes of the Western countries. Cold war will not return anymore. Military conflicts will not arise.

The collapse of the USSR

The great power of the USSR was buried in 1991 on December 26. There are many studies that identify the causes of this situation. Of course, Gorbachev made a significant contribution to the collapse. Unconsciously, he led the country to such an indicator when - as it was, it is no longer possible, but it is not clear how to live on. And, despite the fact that in 2019 we live in a democratic society, each of us sees the finest threads connecting this regime with authoritarianism. The State Emergency Committee (GKChP) forced the Russian people to take to the streets and build barricades. But the change of power in all countries is accompanied by rebellion and disorder. Just, the State Emergency Committee was predetermined by history and the failure of this event as well.

On March 15, 1990, the III Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR elected Mikhail Gorbachev the President of the country. He managed to work only a third of the established five-year term.

The congress opened on March 12. In addition to establishing the presidency, he introduced another historic change to the constitution: he abolished Article 6 on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU.

17 deputies spoke in the debate. Opinions ranged from “We see the presidency as an important guarantee of the unity of our federation” (Nursultan Nazarbayev) and “Our country has raised a global leader, the author of new political thinking, a leader advocating for disarmament and peace” (Fedor Grigoriev) to “Perestroika will drown presidency "(Nikolai Jiba).

We will not play hide and seek, today we are talking about the election of a specific leader - Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev as the president of the country Alexander Yakovlev

"An attempt to hastily, here, at the congress, to introduce the presidency is a gross, grave political mistake that will multiply aggravate our difficulties, worries and fears," said Yuri Afanasyev, co-chairman of the Interregional Deputy Group. Academician Vitaly Goldansky objected: “We cannot wait, we need resuscitation, not sanatorium treatment.”

The proposal to prohibit the combination of the presidency and the leader of a political party, supported by both radical democrats and orthodox communists, who dreamed of seeing Alexander Yakovlev and Yegor Ligachev or Ivan Polozkov in the role of general secretary, respectively, received 1,303 votes and would have passed if it had not been for a constitutional amendment , which required two-thirds of the votes.

On March 14, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place, which nominated Gorbachev as a presidential candidate. A number of congress deputies nominated Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin, but they refused, and the elections were uncontested.

We were in a hurry to elect the President. But, perhaps, having chosen, it was not worth it right here, on the stage of the Kremlin Palace, to erect him to this post. It should have been postponed for one day, announcing that the ceremony would take place, for example, in the St. George Hall of the Kremlin. In the presence of deputies, the government, representatives of the capital's workers, soldiers, the diplomatic corps, the press, the Pravda newspaper

Of the 2,245 deputies (five seats were vacant at that time), exactly two thousand took part in the congress. 1329 votes were cast for Gorbachev (59.2% of the total number of deputies). 495 were against, 54 were spoiled. 122 people did not vote.

At the suggestion of Anatoly Lukyanov, who replaced Gorbachev as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the elected president immediately took the oath - stepping onto the podium and laying his hand on the text of the constitution, uttered the only phrase: “I solemnly swear to faithfully serve the peoples of our country, strictly follow the USSR Constitution, guarantee rights and freedoms citizens, conscientiously fulfill the high duties of the President of the USSR entrusted to me. "

The overseas reaction was overwhelmingly optimistic.

"The Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union made the greatest revolutionary transformations in the life of Soviet society, which have not been equal in Russia since the 1917 revolution," pointed out Japanese television. "The decisions of the Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR consolidated perhaps the most important changes in the political and economic system of the USSR since the Bolshevik revolution in 1917," echoed the Washington Post.

At the pace of a military operation

It is not known who the idea of \u200b\u200bintroducing the presidency came from.

The topic has been discussed in the media since December 1989, but in the order of hypotheses and discussions.

Gorbachev's assistant Anatoly Chernyaev wrote in his memoirs that in January 1990, the "architect of perestroika" and secretary of the Central Committee, Alexander Yakovlev, told him under a terrible secret: Gorbachev once entered his office, upset, anxious, lonely. Like, what to do? Azerbaijan, Lithuania, economy, Orthodox, radicals, people at the limit. Yakovlev said: "We must act. The most important obstacle to perestroika and your entire policy is the Politburo. It is necessary to convene a congress of people's deputies in the near future, let the congress elect you as president." And Gorbachev agreed.

The decision on the presidential rule matured so urgently that they decided to call for an extraordinary congress. I did not understand such urgency, because after the II Congress of People's Deputies, where this issue was not even discussed, only two and a half months passed Nikolai Ryzhkov

Anyway, on February 14, unexpectedly for everyone, Gorbachev voiced the idea at a session of the Supreme Soviet, and on February 27 the parliament decided to convene an extraordinary congress. To put it bluntly, there was not enough time for preparation and public discussion.

The haste drew criticism from both the left and the right, who suspected some kind of trick and persistently but unsuccessfully tried to get a clear explanation from Gorbachev why he needed it.

The official version, set out in the draft law on the establishment of the presidency and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the constitution: "In order to ensure the further development of the deep political and economic reforms carried out in the country, strengthen the constitutional order, rights, freedoms and security of citizens, improve interaction between the supreme bodies of state power and the management of the USSR "did not satisfy anyone. You'd think Gorbachev didn't have enough power before!

According to historians, the leading reason lay on the surface: the leader wanted, while remaining the secretary general of the CPSU, to weaken his dependence on the Central Committee, which could at any moment gather not in a plenum and deal with it, as in his time with Khrushchev.

After Gorbachev was elected president and the abolition of Article 6, he no longer needed a party for his own legitimacy, but rather a party in him.

Using the powers of the secretary general, Gorbachev just strengthens the power of the Communist Party. Including her power over the General Secretary himself. The two ideas - the abolition of Article 6 and the introduction of the presidency - are closely related. Only after receiving the fullness of state, and not party power, can Gorbachev carry out the abolition of the party monopoly. Otherwise, he will simply lose power Anatoly Sobchak

Since the CPSU had lost its official powers of power, the vacuum needed to be filled.

After the events in Tbilisi and Baku, it turned out to be difficult to find out who made the decisions to use the army, and talk intensified that "a person who is responsible for everything" was needed. However, the presidency did not prevent Gorbachev from evading responsibility for the Vilnius drama.

There were also other practical considerations.

According to the tradition laid down by Leonid Brezhnev, the secretary general at the same time headed the supreme representative body. But, starting in the spring of 1989, the Supreme Council moved to work on a permanent basis. Gorbachev, who chaired it, had to spend a lot of time at meetings. Other members of the leadership did the same, always copying the behavior of the first person.

I urge you to vote for the presidential power and I believe that under this condition there will be social justice, national protection, including the Russian people Deputy Ivan Polozkov, an orthodox communist

Naturally, this made it difficult to govern the country. And in society, the question arose: who is doing business while the debate is going on?

Meanwhile, the opinion was expressed that Gorbachev, in his character, was more suited to the role of a speaker than a head of state. He was brilliant at manipulating a large, diverse audience and achieving the voting results he needed.

Anatoly Sobchak in his book "Walking into Power" noted that in personal communication, the magic of Gorbachev's influence was irresistible. "Give in to this charm, and you will begin to act as if under hypnosis," he wrote.

The main mystery

The main question that researchers are still racking their brains over is why Gorbachev did not go to the popular elections? Moreover, this was provided for by the law on the introduction of the presidency, and only for the first case they made a special reservation.

Many consider this to be a fatal mistake. As Boris Yeltsin later proved, it is very difficult to legally remove a popularly elected president from power.

According to a number of historians, Gorbachev did not want to directly measure his popularity with Yeltsin.

The election, not by citizens, but by deputies made Gorbachev's status insufficiently convincing, since the legitimacy of the congress itself was tarnished. He was elected under Article 6, in the absence of an organized opposition everywhere, except for Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and the Baltic States, a third of the deputy corps were representatives of public organizations.

Some historians suggest that Gorbachev, even with an objective advantage, experienced a mystical fear of Yeltsin, who somehow succeeded. Others - that he followed the lead of the nomenklatura environment, which in principle did not like direct democracy and feared that the election campaign would give the reformers an additional opportunity to propagate their views.

In conditions of political and economic instability, once again to tempt fate and go to national elections is a risk, and a considerable Anatoly Sobchak

In public speeches, Mikhail Sergeevich mainly emphasized that the situation was difficult, and the country would not do without an extra day without a president.

"They [interregional deputies] also spoke in favor of the presidency, but conditioned it with such reservations and such approaches that it is possible to slow down for a long time, if not to bury this process. In this situation, serious decisions cannot be postponed. The introduction of the institution of presidency is now necessary for the country," he said at the session of the Supreme Soviet on February 27.

Position of the Democrats

Supporters of perestroika and renewal have split over the Gorbachev presidency.

Considering in the Principle the institution of the presidency as progressive in comparison with the current form of government, the issue of the President of the USSR and the procedure for his election cannot be resolved hastily, without the participation of the new Supreme Soviets of the republics, without a developed multi-party system in the country, without a free press, without strengthening the current Supreme Council. ... This issue should be linked with the constitutions of the republics, with the new Union Treaty. Without these indispensable conditions, the adoption of a decision on the presidency will undoubtedly lead to a new aggravation of relations between the Center and the republics, to the limitation of the independence of local Soviets and self-government, to the threat of the restoration of the dictatorial regime in the country. From the statement of the Interregional Deputy Group

Some continued to see him as the only chance and believed that Gorbachev should be supported in everything, because he knows what he is doing, and because otherwise it would be even worse. The point of view of these people was expressed in a remark from a place at the congress by a deputy who did not introduce himself: "Is it because we have no food? The most important thing is that we have found in history someone like Gorbachev, a pure person whom we will no longer find."

Some were simply impressed by the word "president": here, and we will have, as in civilized countries!

Others pointed out that this term is associated not only with America and France, but also with Latin American and Asian dictators, and, most importantly, demanded popular alternative elections.

"I believe that only the people can make the appropriate decision," said Alexander Shchelkanov, a member of the Interregional Group, during the debate at the congress.

On the opening day of the congress, a resident of Zelenograd, Shuvalov, went on a hunger strike on Teatralnaya Square "in protest against the election of the president only by deputies."

Anatoly Sobchak was a supporter of Gorbachev's presidency on the conditions he put forward, while Yuri Afanasyev and Yuri Chernichenko were opponents. The latter, in particular, feared that "we will again allow ourselves to be cheated; if the deputies cannot really control the actions of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, then it will not be possible to keep track of the president."

One of the main opponents of Gorbachev at the congress was the deputy Yuri Afanasyev

Boris Yeltsin, as far as is known, did not speak publicly on this issue.

Sobchak wrote in his memoirs that shortly before the death of Andrei Sakharov, he tried to discuss with him the prospects for Gorbachev's presidency, but the academician did not show interest in the topic, considering the issue insignificant in comparison with the development of a new constitution.

Not a new idea

We need to cast aside fears and despondency, gain faith in our strengths and capabilities. And they are huge. The Russian people and all peoples who have united with them into a great multinational state will be able to revive their common homeland. And they will certainly achieve this on the path of perestroika and socialist renewal From the speech of Mikhail Gorbachev at the congress after the election

The idea of \u200b\u200bestablishing the post of a popularly elected president in the USSR was discussed quite seriously in the past: during the preparation of the "Stalinist" constitution of 1936, in the last years of Nikita Khrushchev's rule and at the dawn of perestroika.

Why Stalin rejected it is not entirely clear. For him, 99.99% of the votes were guaranteed, and the nationwide expression of support for the "beloved leader" could be turned into a powerful educational and propaganda event.

Khrushchev, according to researchers, simply did not have enough time, and his successors were guided by their deep conservatism and dislike of innovation.

According to the testimony of people who knew him, Leonid Brezhnev, during his foreign visits, liked the address "Mr. President", but he did not legitimize the title.

Third attempt

In 1985, the "architect of perestroika" Alexander Yakovlev suggested that Gorbachev begin political reform with the party and put forward a detailed plan: to arrange a general party discussion, following its results, to divide the CPSU into two parties - the reformist people's democratic and conservative socialist - to hold elections to the Supreme Soviet and instruct the winners government formation.

Now, as I see it, Gorbachev is pressing the gas and simultaneously pressing the brake. The motor roars to the whole world - this is our publicity. And the car stands still Olzhas Suleimenov, deputy, Kazakh poet

According to Yakovlev's plan, both parties had to declare their adherence to the basic values \u200b\u200bof socialism, join an alliance called the Union of Communists, delegate an equal number of members to its Central Council, and nominate the chairman of the council as a joint candidate for the presidency of the USSR.

A political structure in which two parties, vying with each other in the elections, simultaneously enter into a kind of coalition with a single leader, would show the world another "Russian miracle". At the same time, some researchers believe that the implementation of the "Yakovlev plan" would allow a smooth transition to multiparty democracy and avoid the collapse of the USSR.

Then Gorbachev did not support the idea. Five years later, it was too late.

Pyrrhic victory

Gorbachev rushed about in search of alternatives, compromises, an optimal combination of old and new methods of leadership. There were mistakes, miscalculations, delays, and just absurdities. But they are not the reason for the beginning of the decomposition of society and the state. It was inevitable by the very nature of the transition to freedom, unique in world history, of a society notorious and corrupted by a long dictatorship Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev's assistant

Historians believe that the peak of Gorbachev's political career was the 1st Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989, and his election as president was the beginning of its end. Soon, the leader's rating went down rapidly and irreversibly.

This was the last credit of trust issued by society.

Conservatives hoped that Gorbachev needed presidential powers to "restore order," while democrats needed bold reformatory steps. When neither happened, although he got everything he wanted, the disappointment was universal and devastating.

The prediction made at the congress by deputy Teimuraz Avaliani has come true: "You will rush here and there, and at this time what we have now will happen."

After 660 days, Gorbachev resigned (more precisely, was forced to resign).

The opinions of experts on the reasons for perestroika differ in many respects, but experts agree on one thing - the need for change was ripe long before the beginning of Gorbachev's reforms. Not everyone agrees that Gorbachev was the initiator of Perestroika. For some, he was only a pawn in the hands of Western elites.

Complete what we started

According to the former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, Yuri Andropov first came up with the idea of \u200b\u200bPerestroika. The Soviet leader stated that fundamental problems had accumulated in the economy that needed to be urgently addressed. However, the death of the General Secretary interrupted his endeavors. One of the first trends of Perestroika was the rejuvenation of the Soviet Politburo. The weak party elders began to gradually give way to young, energetic cadres, among whom came the chief ideologist of changes, Gorbachev. However, at first, the new Secretary General did not think about global changes. In April 1985, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev confirmed the continuity of the party's course and its general line, aimed "at improving the society of developed socialism." The secretary general either really believed or was lying that our country "made an ascent to the heights of economic and social progress, where a working man became the master of the country, the creator of his own destiny." Historian Vladimir Potseluev is sure that such words were intended for the still strong conservative environment. Knowing the true state of Soviet society, Gorbachev nevertheless cautiously introduced the idea of \u200b\u200bsmall economic reforms. He continued to operate with old nomenclature theses, such as: "The main content of the modern era is the transition from capitalism to socialism and communism." On the other hand, Gorbachev really believed that reforms could not only eliminate the imbalance in Soviet society, but also bring it to a new round of social prosperity. Thus, the ideologists of Perestroika, discussing the country's development plan for the next 15 years, were going to provide each family with a separate apartment or house, which would be a vivid indicator of the growth of the well-being of the Soviet people. Gorbachev was determined to use the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution to bring the forms of socialist management "in line with modern conditions and needs." He stated that the country must achieve “a significant acceleration of socio-economic progress. There is simply no other way. " It is known that Gorbachev's idea of \u200b\u200bconducting shock socio-economic therapy arose back in 1987, i.e. five years before Yeltsin and Gaidar used it. However, in the late 1980s, this proposal did not go beyond the inner circle and did not receive wide publicity.

Publicity policy

One of the goals of Gorbachev's Perestroika was to achieve a certain degree of openness of the leadership to the people. At the January 1987 plenum, the Secretary General proclaimed the policy of openness, about which he spoke so much to the secretaries of the regional party committees. “People, working people, should know well what is happening in the country, what difficulties, what problems arise in their work,” Gorbachev stressed. The General Secretary himself, unlike the past Soviet leaders, boldly went out to the people, spoke about current problems in the country, talked about plans and prospects, willingly entered into discussions with interlocutors. Ryzhkov, a former associate of Gorbachev, was skeptical about such openness. He noted that Gorbachev was more interested not in the country, but in how he himself looks against its background. Nevertheless, the policy of publicity has borne fruit. The process of critically rethinking the past has affected almost all public spheres. Glasnost was catalyzed by the films "Agony" by Elem Klimov and "Repentance" by Tengiz Abuladze, the novels "Children of the Arbat" by Anatoly Rybakov and "White Clothes" by Vladimir Dudintsev. One of the manifestations of glasnost was the acquisition of freedoms unthinkable in the "era of stagnation." It became possible to openly express one's opinion, publish literature banned in the USSR, and return dissidents. In April 1988, Gorbachev received the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Pimen in the Kremlin, which was a turning point in deciding the return of her property to the Church and the adoption of the law on freedom of religion (published in 1990).

Power crisis

According to historian Dmitry Volkogonov, Perestroika and the subsequent collapse of the USSR were a foregone conclusion. According to him, the last "leader" of the Soviet Union only "boldly outlined the end of the totalitarian system" which was initiated by Lenin. Thus, for Volkogonov, the "tragedy of Soviet history", the final stage of which was Perestroika, which in turn ended in the collapse of the country, was "predetermined by Lenin's experiment." Some researchers see Perestroika as a “post-communist transformation”, which in all respects resembles classical revolutions. Thus, Irina Starodubrovskaya and Vladimir Mau, in their book Great Revolutions: From Cromwell to Putin, compare Gorbachev's transformations with the socialist revolution of 1917, claiming that they have no fundamental differences in terms of external parameters.

The crisis of power, according to many sociologists, has become almost the most important reason that prompted the new leadership of the country to radically restructure party structures. The subsequent disintegration of the system, from the point of view of some, was due to a confluence of subjective factors and a lack of understanding by the party leaders of the essence of the Soviet system. Others insist that attempts to preserve the Soviet system were initially doomed to failure, since the CPSU, having “usurped power,” turned “into a brake on social development,” and therefore left the historical arena. In other words, no one and nothing could save the USSR from disaster. Academician Tatiana Zaslavkaya believed that Gorbachev was late with the reforms. The country could still be kept afloat if these transformations were carried out earlier. By the mid-1980s, in her opinion, the Soviet system had already worked out all its social resources, and therefore was doomed.

Forward to capitalism!

As historian Alexander Barsenkov notes, the prerequisites for Gorbachev's reforms were based on technological innovations that appeared in developed countries and marked the entry of world civilization into a new era. These new trends demanded that the Soviet leadership search for an "adequate reaction" to what was happening in order to finally keep up with the advanced public. Many historians have drawn attention to the fact that initially the changes took place on the political basis developed in the early 1980s, and only after an increase in the number of economic problems did the Soviet leadership set a course for "priority transformation". A number of other researchers see the essence of perestroika in the transition from a centrally planned economy to capitalist relations. In their opinion, by the mid-1990s, transnational corporations began to create a new world legal order. Their goal was to maintain control over natural resources and concentrate them in the hands of the world's industrial and financial elite. The Soviet party elite did not stay away from these processes. There is an even more daring assumption that Perestroika was conceived with the active participation of the World Bank and envisaged: at the first stage, the initial accumulation of capital through a total sale of national wealth and scarce goods, at the second - the seizure of land and production. It was then that the social position of people in the USSR began to be determined by the thickness of the pocket. Some economists believe that Perestroika and the subsequent reforms of the 1990s did not lead to capitalism, but only helped "feudalize the country, transferring all past" socialist gains "to a narrow stratum of the highest nomenklatura clan."

Sabotage of the West

Foreign experts often point to the multifaceted nature of Perestroika in the USSR. From the point of view of the Spanish sociologist Manuel Castells, it had four vectors. The first is the "liberation of the countries of the Soviet empire" in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War; the second is economic reform; third, gradual liberalization of public opinion and the media; fourth, "controlled" democratization and decentralization of the communist system. All this could not but lead to the undermining of the foundations of the Soviet state structure, which, according to some Russian experts, was beneficial to the West. According to one of the conspiracy theories, the collapse of the USSR was the result of an information-psychological war waged by the United States against the Soviet Union. A major role in this process, based on the assertions of conspiracy theorists, was assigned to the fifth column - to individual ideologues of the USSR, who “turned scientific communism into a parody of science” and “covered up the Soviet past of the country with black paint”. In order to destroy the most important link in government, the CPSU, the fifth column carried out an intensive campaign to discredit the party, and the "Gorbachev group" organized a "massive change of personnel", placing their people in key positions in all government bodies.

Publicist Leonid Shelepin emphasizes that with the destruction of the CPSU, the creation of a network structure of democrats began with the active participation of the West. After the dismemberment of the country, its wealth passed into the hands of an "insignificant group of oligarchs", and the bulk of the population was "on the brink of survival." Thus, the result of Perestroika was a forcibly imposed socio-political system "imitating the Western".