KRYUCHKOV Vladimir Alexandrovich
(02/29/1924). Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee from September 20, 1989 to July 13, 1990. Member of the CPSU Central Committee since 1986. Member of the CPSU since 1944.
Born in Tsaritsyn (now Volgograd) into a working-class family. Birthdays were celebrated, with the exception of leap years, on February 28 or March 1. Russian. He began his career in 1941 as a marker at plant No. 221 of the People's Commissariat of Defense in Stalingrad. In 1942 - 1943 marker at plant No. 92 of the People's Commissariat of Defense in Gorky, then again at plant No. 221 in Stalingrad. Since 1943, Komsomol organizer of the Komsomol Central Committee in the Special Construction and Installation Unit No. 25 of the People's Commissariat for Construction in Stalingrad. Since 1944, first secretary of the Barricade District Committee of the Komsomol of Stalingrad. In 1945 - 1946 student at the Saratov Law Institute. In 1946, second secretary of the Stalingrad city committee of the Komsomol. In 1946 he moved to the prosecutor's office: he was a people's investigator in the prosecutor's office of the Traktorozavodsky district of Stalingrad, in 1947 - 1950. Prosecutor of the investigative department of the Stalingrad City Prosecutor's Office, in 1950 - 1951. Prosecutor of the Kirovsky district of Stalingrad. In 1949 he graduated from the All-Union Correspondence Law Institute. In 1951, with the direction of the Stalingrad Regional Party Committee, he entered the Higher Diplomatic School of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was the only listener who studied Hungarian. Since 1954, in diplomatic work: third secretary of the 4th European Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since 1955, third secretary of the USSR Embassy in the Hungarian People's Republic, which was headed by Yu. V. Andropov, who played a key role in his fate. Together they survived the Budapest uprising of 1956. On the recommendation of Yu. V. Andropov, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor for his work in combat conditions. V. A. Kryuchkov considered one of the reasons for those events, in addition to the indecisiveness of the Hungarian communists, to be the actions of the “fatal figure” - Imre Nagy, who was pulled into the political arena by A. I. Mikoyan. In 1959, Yu. V. Andropov, who had left Hungary two years earlier and worked as head of the Department of the CPSU Central Committee for Relations with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, offered him a position as a referent in the sector of Hungary and Romania. In 1963 - 1965 head of this sector. In 1965 - 1967 Assistant Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Leaving Staraya Square for Lubyanka in 1967, Yu. V. Andropov took him with him as his assistant. Since 1967, head of the KGB secretariat under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Yu. V. Andropov and V. A. Kryuchkov had a common reception room, the offices were opposite, V. A. Kryuchkov was always at hand - reliable, efficient, obedient. Since 1971, first deputy head of the 1st Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (foreign intelligence), acting head of the department, head of the KGB department under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He did not make independent decisions; for any reason, even insignificant, he consulted with Yu. V. Andropov - this was an effect of many years of institutional habit. The transition to a new office, far from the chairman's, coincided with an unprecedented failure of Soviet intelligence in England. At the beginning of September 1971, an officer from the London station of Soviet intelligence, O. Lyalin, defected to the British side. Despite his modest position as an ordinary operational worker, acting under the cover of a senior engineer at a trade mission, he knew a lot. England expelled 105 Soviet citizens from the country, suspected of espionage and declared persona non grata. There has never been an action of this magnitude in the history of the world's intelligence services. Since November 1978, V. A. Kryuchkov has been the head of the 1st Main Directorate, and at the same time the deputy chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. According to the former head of intelligence of the GDR, Markus Wolf, this appointment was logical, but not very wise, because V. A. Kryuchkov was not a leader by nature and without the instructions of his mentor, the competent and reasonable “number two” was lost. Conducted several successful operations in Afghanistan. I read a lot personally: newspapers, magazines, special information - I marked interesting things with ticks, bookmarks, and the secretary then retyped them. For 20 years I kept a file cabinet on various problems. Neat guy. He lived only for work. He didn’t have a notebook, he kept names, surnames, and phone numbers in his memory. He lived in a dacha in the village of the 1st Main Directorate, got up at a quarter to six and did exercises outside for an hour - in any weather, regardless of the time he went to bed the night before. A teetotaler, he practically did not drink alcohol. At formal dinners, he filled a glass with ice, poured soda water, and flavored it with a sip of whiskey. In a non-work environment, he was a sociable, cheerful person, and played funny pranks with people close to him, possessing a subtle and kind humor. Since November 1, 1988, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, replaced V. M. Chebrikov in this post. M. S. Gorbachev, making the decision on the appointment, proceeded from the fact that he was completely devoted to the owner and did not seek to pursue his own line in politics. Simultaneously with his appointment, he received the military rank of army general. In October 1989, he became a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. From March 1990 he was a member of the Presidential Council, and from March 1991 to the USSR Security Council. He was a member of the USSR Defense Council. In a speech at the last, XXVIII Congress of the CPSU (July 1990), he said: “The question is often asked: where is the KGB looking? Generally speaking, we look where we need to. (Laughter. Applause.).” Passed through the Supreme Council the first law on state security bodies in the history of Soviet security officers, prepared at Lubyanka, which came into force in May 1991. Deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR of the 11th convocation. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Red Banner, two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, and the Order of the Badge of Honor. On 02/07/1991 he sent a note to M.S. Gorbachev “On the political situation in the country”, in which he proposed a program of action for the Union leadership for 1991. He warned that due to the acute political crisis there was a threat of the collapse of the USSR, the dismantling of the socio-political and economic system. He declared “Democratic Russia” and the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR to be his main political opponent. Considering the depth of the crisis and the likelihood of complications in the situation, he did not rule out the possibility of forming temporary structures at the appropriate moment as part of the implementation of measures provided to the president by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This was an idea that was embodied in the State Emergency Committee six months later. On June 17, 1991, at a closed meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he made a famous speech about “agents of influence,” but did not name a single name; published a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU of his predecessor Yu. V. Andropov on this topic dated January 24, 1977, warning about the danger of implementing a line to change the socio-political system. He supported Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, who asked the Supreme Council for emergency powers in connection with the threat of the collapse of the USSR. The speech was actually directed against perestroika and the reforms of M. S. Gorbachev. At a confidential meeting between M. S. Gorbachev and B. N. Yeltsin and N. A. Nazarbayev in Novo-Ogarevo on July 29, 1991, an agreement was reached to remove V. A. Kryuchkov from the leadership of the new Union. The conversation was recorded by the technical services of the KGB and became known to its leader. 08/06/1991 V. A. Kryuchkov instructed a group of his close employees to predict the consequences of introducing a state of emergency. On August 14, 1991, he told them that M. S. Gorbachev was not able to adequately assess the situation, he had a mental disorder and a state of emergency would be introduced. On August 17, 1991, at a closed facility, the KGB held a secret meeting with D. T. Yazov, O. S. Shenin and the head of the USSR Presidential Administration V. I. Boldin, at which an agreement was reached on introducing a state of emergency in the country and sending them to Foros , where M. was resting. S. Gorbachev, delegation with a proposal to the president to agree to this measure. On August 18, 1991, the delegation arrived in Foros, but M. S. Gorbachev did not give consent. V. A. Kryuchkov was a member of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP). On the night of August 19, 1991, at 3:30 am, in his office on Lubyanka he held a meeting of the heads of the central apparatus, where he announced that M. S. Gorbachev refused to sign the decree introducing a state of emergency and was therefore isolated: “Perestroika, as it is thought about it, it’s over.” He was invited by B. N. Yeltsin to speak at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, but received reliable information that they were going to arrest him there, so he did not go. On August 21, 1991, after the failure of his speech in Moscow, together with other members of the State Emergency Committee, he flew to Foros to see M. S. Gorbachev. He was returning to Moscow on his plane - the only member of the State Emergency Committee who was taken with them so that the plane would not be shot down by the conspirators. In the presidential compartment they drank champagne, said toasts in honor of the release of the Foros prisoner, and the KGB chairman sat dejectedly in the back under the supervision of police officers with machine guns in their hands. After landing at Vnukovo airport, he was arrested, searched and taken to the government sanatorium "Senezh", where he was kept in custody for some time before being transferred to the "Matrosskaya Tishina" detention center. He discouraged the investigators with an extraordinary request: “You know, I’m used to relieving stress with a small amount of whiskey - 50 grams with the addition of water. Is it possible to meet me halfway regarding this small thing?” (Stepankov V.G., Lisov E.K. Kremlin conspiracy. M., 1992. P. 227). On August 22, 1991, he wrote a letter of repentance to M. S. Gorbachev, admitting that he was ashamed and that he should not be kept in prison, but it would be better to replace the preventive measure with strict house arrest. On August 23, 1991, by a resolution of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the CPSU, he was expelled from the party “for organizing a coup d’etat.” The resolution noted that he and other “communist leaders who were part of the anti-constitutional State Emergency Committee... grossly violated the fundamental requirement of the CPSU Charter, according to which all party organizations, every communist are obliged to act within the framework of the Constitution and Soviet laws. They forcibly removed M. S. Gorbachev from the leadership of the country and the party, and trampled on the decisions of the 28th Congress of the CPSU.” During the investigation, he spent 17 months in the Matrosskaya Tishina detention center and was seriously ill. In December 1992, due to health reasons, the preventive measure was changed to a written undertaking not to leave the place. Since April 1993, he served as a defendant in the trial in the State Emergency Committee case. Charged under articles 64 (treason) and 260 (abuse of power) of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. On May 6, 1994, on the basis of the resolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation “On declaring a political and economic amnesty,” the criminal case was terminated. On October 4, 1994, he was retired from the state security agencies. Author of the memoirs “Personal Affair” in 2 volumes (M., 1996). Appears on television and gives interviews to the press. According to the head of the MGB of the GDR M. Wolf, the August events of 1991 were staged by V. A. Kryuchkov, a protege of M. S. Gorbachev (Wolf M. Game on someone else’s field. Thirty years at the head of intelligence. M., 1998. P. 348 ). Analysts draw attention to the difference in the wording of the dismissal of V. A. Kryuchkov and other members of the State Emergency Committee. Regarding V. A. Kryuchkov it is said: “Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov has been relieved of his duties as chairman of the State Security Committee.” Regarding V. S. Pavlov: “In connection with the initiation of a criminal case by the USSR Prosecutor’s Office against V. S. Pavlov for participation in an anti-constitutional conspiracy, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov was relieved of his duties as Prime Minister of the USSR.”
On the evening of November 23, 2007, ex-chairman of the USSR KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov died at the age of 84. For a long time the head of Soviet foreign intelligence (the First Main Directorate of the KGB), he remained in memory as in fact the last head of the KGB (his successors - Leonid Shebarshin and Vadim Bakatin - occupied only a nominal post at the head of the dismantled organization) and one of the leaders of the State Emergency Committee.
The future head of the most powerful of the Soviet intelligence services was born on February 29, 1924 in Tsaritsyn (Volgograd). Kryuchkov did not take part in the Great Patriotic War, working at artillery factories No. 221 in Stalingrad, and then No. 92 in Gorky. At the end of the war, he began his political career, becoming the first secretary of the Komsomol district committee.
After the war, Vladimir Kryuchkov received a higher legal education. In 1949, he graduated from the All-Union Correspondence Law Institute (now the Moscow City Law Academy). Then he went to work in law enforcement agencies - in 1946-51 he successively held the positions of investigator, prosecutor of the investigative department and, finally, district prosecutor in Stalingrad.
Soon he moved to the state security system. Vladimir Kryuchkov received his second higher education at the Higher Diplomatic School of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he graduated in 1954. Since 1954 he was on diplomatic work. The first significant event in his intelligence career was the 1956 unrest in Hungary, where Kryuchkov worked together with the future KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, then the USSR Ambassador to the Hungarian People's Republic.
Since 1959, Kryuchkov, following his boss, switched to party work, successively holding the positions of assistant, sector head and assistant secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1967, he returned to the KGB system, becoming an assistant to Andropov, who took the position of chairman of the committee, which then still bore the modest prefix “... under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.”
In 1971, Vladmir Kryuchkov became deputy head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, or, as it was called, PGU. This department was in charge of all foreign intelligence of the USSR, with the exception of specific military issues, which were under the jurisdiction of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).
In 1978, Kryuchkov received the post of head of foreign intelligence and Andropov's deputy. The KGB then lost the prefix “...under the Council of Ministers”, becoming an independent agency, controlled only by the Central Committee of the CPSU.
As head of Soviet foreign intelligence, Kryuchkov took an active part in the foreign policy activities of the USSR. Thus, he was directly involved in organizing the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the formation of the KGB representative office in Kabul and in preparing the storming of Amin’s palace by the KGB special forces “Grom” and “Zenith”. Directly on the spot, the operation was led by Major General Yuri Drozdov, head of Directorate S, head of the “illegal wing” of Soviet foreign intelligence.
Under Kryuchkov's leadership, Soviet intelligence achieved a number of outstanding successes. Among them is the 1985 recruitment of Aldrich Ames, a high-ranking CIA officer responsible for countering Soviet intelligence operations.
...in December 1990, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov. instructed the former deputy head of the PGU KGB of the USSR V.I. Zhizhin. and assistant to the former first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.F. Grushko. - Egorov A.G. to carry out the study of possible initial measures to stabilize the situation in the country in the event of a state of emergency. From the end of 1990 to the beginning of August 1991, Kryuchkov V.A. together with other future members of the State Emergency Committee, they took possible political and other measures to introduce a state of emergency in the USSR by constitutional means. Having not received the support of the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from the beginning of August 1991 they began to implement specific measures to prepare for the introduction of a state of emergency by illegal means.
With the help of Ames, the KGB gained access to many of the most important CIA documents and managed to expose a number of its employees recruited by American intelligence. Ames was discovered only in 1994 and, according to the Americans themselves, managed to inflict enormous damage on the CIA.
In 1988, Vladimir Kryuchkov became chairman of the KGB. During this period, the processes that subsequently led to the collapse of the USSR were already in full swing - unrest on ethnic grounds broke out on the outskirts, the country's economy was increasingly in a fever, and at the top they were thinking about ways to reform the Soviet political system. The reform, for a number of reasons, turned into a collapse. By the beginning of the 90s, the impending catastrophe was obvious to the KGB chairman, and in these conditions, Army General Kryuchkov decided to try to preserve the USSR by introducing a state of emergency in the country.
The coup attempt, now known as the August Putsch, was unsuccessful. The indecisiveness of the actions of the putschists, combined with the defection of a number of key commanders to Boris Yeltsin’s side (Konstantin Kobets, Alexander Lebed and others), led to the failure of the plans of the Emergency Committee.
After the failure of the coup, Vladimir Kryuchkov was arrested and put on trial on charges of treason (Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). In 1994, the former chairman of the KGB of the USSR was granted amnesty.
In retirement, Army General Kryuchkov took up literary activity, writing and publishing the books “A Personal File. Three Days and the Whole Life,” “On the Edge of the Abyss,” “Personality and Power,” and “Without a Statute of Limitations.” These books became the memoirs of the former KGB chairman.
Evaluation of the activities of Soviet and Russian state security forces and their leaders in our country, and beyond its borders, too often depends on the personal emotions of the assessor. The real and mythical capabilities of the KGB, its active intervention in various political processes in the USSR and abroad led to the fact that there are almost no people left who are indifferent to the “Kontora”. On the other hand, it would be incorrect to avoid evaluation by acting according to the principle “de mortius aut bene aut nihil.” Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov is too large a figure in Russian history for an obituary about him to be reduced to simply listing the basic facts of his biography. Under these conditions, one can cite the opinion of people who personally knew Kryuchkov. For example, the words of Army General Philip Bobkov, who held the position of head of the fifth directorate of the KGB of the USSR (fighting dissidents) during Soviet times, were quoted by the Kommersant newspaper: “Vladimir Alexandrovich has always been a very integral person, a sincere and consistent communist. I communicated with him until the very last his days and I can testify: he remained true to his convictions to the end."
Assessing the activities of Vladimir Kryuchkov as chairman of the State Security Committee of the USSR, it will be enough to say the following: the leadership of the organization designed to protect the country from political disasters and ensure its peaceful existence turned out to be obviously not up to the task.
KGB. Chairmen of state security agencies. Declassified destinies Mlechin Leonid Mikhailovich
Chapter 17 VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH KRYUCHKOV
VLADIMIR ALEXANDROVICH KRYUCHKOV
Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov was born in Tsaritsyn into a working-class family on February 29, 1924, so he was congratulated on his birthday (in a non-leap year) either on February 28 or March 1, as you wish.
The future head of state security did not get to the front; he was more needed in the rear. In 1941, Kryuchkov entered Plant No. 221 of the People's Commissariat of Defense in Stalingrad as a marker worker - workers at military enterprises were not subject to mobilization. During the days of fierce fighting, he was evacuated to Gorky - to plant No. 92.
In 1943, Kryuchkov was returned to Stalingrad, but he quickly switched to the liberated Komsomol work: he was approved as a Komsomol Central Committee member of the Special Construction and Installation Unit No. 25, and in 1944 he was already the first secretary of the Barricade District Committee of the Komsomol in Stalingrad.
In 1946, Kryuchkov was made second secretary of the Stalingrad city committee of the Komsomol. He graduated from the school for working youth, already being the secretary of the district committee.
From the Komsomol, Kryuchkov was taken to the district prosecutor's office. The lack of not only legal knowledge, but also higher education in general did not interfere. But Vladimir Aleksandrovich immediately began studying - albeit in absentia. He worked as an investigator for a year and as a prosecutor for another four. In 1949, while holding the position of prosecutor of the Kirov district of Stalingrad, he graduated from the All-Union Legal Correspondence Institute.
LUCKY CASE
In 1951, in the direction of the Stalingrad Regional Party Committee - his Komsomol past played a role here - Kryuchkov was sent to Moscow to study at the Higher Diplomatic School. It was a high honor and an opportunity to start a new life and go abroad.
The Higher Diplomatic School was opened in order to train diplomats not from green youth, yesterday's schoolchildren, but from people with experience, mainly yesterday's party workers.
Vladimir Aleksandrovich recalled with pleasure how he was accepted into the Higher Diplomatic School in the old building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Kuznetsky Most - next to the monument to Vorovsky and the future new KGB building, in which he would work as chairman.
Of the entire stream, only Kryuchkov dared to take up the study of the very difficult Hungarian language. Everywhere I carried with me cards with words that I had to remember. Learning Hungarian means showing character, perseverance and perseverance. Kryuchkov had no time for all this.
In 1954, a graduate of the Higher Diplomatic School, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, was hired at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the third secretary of the IV European Department.
His senior colleague from a prosecutorial background, Andrei Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, was no longer in the ministry. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov was again appointed minister. After Stalin's death, Molotov received his ministerial portfolio back, along with a fair amount of criticism. His comrades on the Presidium of the Central Committee called him a hopeless scribbler.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gathered activists, and First Deputy Minister Andrei Andreevich Gromyko criticized his boss, who sat on the presidium and obediently listened. Everyone applauded the speaker, and Molotov himself, who always observed party discipline, clapped. Molotov tried to correct himself, soften his line, and not be so rude and harsh.
Kryuchkov recalled that the atmosphere in the ministry was changing. The working day became normal. People felt more relaxed and there was a sparkle in their eyes. But the diplomats themselves were still relegated to the position of simple clerks, on whom nothing depended. They were assigned only small tasks.
At the end of the summer of 1955, the young diplomat Kryuchkov went to Budapest. He was appointed to the Soviet embassy as third secretary. The ambassador was a young party worker, Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov - a happy occasion for Kryuchkov. Then they walked through life together until Andropov’s death.
While they are working in Hungary, two foreign ministers will change in Moscow. In the summer of 1956, Molotov was removed from the Foreign Ministry, and Dmitry Trofimovich Shepilov, a charming man, completely different from his predecessors, would appear in the minister’s office. He is the only minister who never yelled at anyone, respected the work of diplomats, and did not find fault with his subordinates.
But the Soviet embassy in Hungary did not have time to feel this favorable climate, because an uprising began there. And when Kryuchkov returned to Moscow, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko had already taken Shepilov’s place in the Foreign Ministry.
The Hungarian uprising was forever remembered by Kryuchkov, as well as Andropov. Kryuchkov wrote about this in his book “Personal Affair”: the embassy was under siege, every attempt to leave the building was fraught with danger. He recalled sleepless nights, going out into deserted streets to gather information, secret meetings with loyal Hungarian comrades, sometimes under very unsafe circumstances...
According to Kryuchkov, the cause of all the troubles was the indecisiveness of the Hungarian leaders, and Anastas Mikoyan also made a mistake: he pulled Imre Nagy, a “fatal figure”, into the political arena... Even many decades after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by tanks, Kryuchkov was sure that everything was done correctly.
For work in combat conditions, according to the ambassador, Kryuchkov received the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. Andropov left for Moscow in 1957. But Kryuchkov remained at the embassy. But Yuri Vladimirovich did not forget the promising employee.
Two years later, having settled in and taken root on Old Square, he invited Kryuchkov to join him: a position had been prepared for him as a referent in the Hungary and Romania sector of the CPSU Central Committee department for relations with communist and workers' parties of socialist countries.
The transition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Central Committee was a good start for a career. But no one yet suspected how brilliant this career would be.
Kryuchkov worked with Andropov for more than a quarter of a century, and Yuri Vladimirovich was not disappointed in him. Andropov needed different people. But using the example of Chebrikov and Kryuchkov, we can try to understand what qualities he valued most. What Kryuchkov and Chebrikov had in common were diligence and devotion. Andropov's entourage included stronger figures, brighter intellectuals. But he nominated Chebrikov and Kryuchkov for the first roles.
In 1963, Kryuchkov became the head of the sector, and in 1965 he rose one more step and, finally, took the position for which he was most inclined - he became assistant secretary of the Central Committee of Andropov.
Leaving Staraya Square for Lubyanka, Andropov took his personal device with him. Kryuchkov first received his former position as an assistant, but in the same year, 1967, he became the head of the secretariat of the KGB chairman.
His office was located directly opposite the chairman’s; they shared a common reception area. Kryuchkov was always at hand, ready to give information, remind, carry out any instructions, monitor the movement of papers, a diligent, reliable, helpful and reliable performer.
Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov worked in the KGB for 24 years and 3 months. By the way, Kryuchkov was fired from the state security agencies not after the August 1991 coup, when he was removed from the post of KGB chairman and arrested, but on October 4, 1994.
BAD START
In the summer of 1971, Andropov transferred Kryuchkov to intelligence as the first deputy head of the First Main Directorate. This was a transition to more independent work, a step towards even greater positions. But it was difficult for Kryuchkov to move into reconnaissance. He recalled how he was “uneasy at the thought that he would have to work at some distance” from Andropov. Kryuchkov idolized his boss and knew his poems by heart.
By that time they had worked together for seventeen years. Kryuchkov was accustomed to the role of first assistant, but here he had to make decisions himself. But Vladimir Alexandrovich found a way out. His employees quickly noticed that he consulted Andropov on every little detail. Kryuchkov, by character, way of thinking and behavior, remained an assistant.
The then intelligence chief, Alexander Mikhailovich Sakharovsky, an experienced professional, was wanted by the committee leadership to be replaced by a younger man. Semichastny nominated Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin for this position, who at that time worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (later he became the general director of TASS, head of the department of the Central Committee). Semichastny even discussed this appointment with Brezhnev, and some members of the Politburo managed to congratulate Zamyatin on his new chair.
But Semichastny was replaced by Andropov, and the question of changing the intelligence chief was postponed for several years.
The beginning of Kryuchkov’s service in intelligence coincided with sad events for the KGB. As soon as he moved into a new office, now terribly far from Andropov’s (intelligence moved from a building on Lubyanka to a newly built complex in Yasenevo in the southwest of Moscow), an unprecedented failure occurred in England.
In early September 1971, an officer from the London station of Soviet intelligence, Oleg Lyalin, left for the British. This became a welcome occasion for the British. They had long expressed dissatisfaction with the bloated staff of Soviet missions in London.
There were many more Soviet diplomats in England than English ones in Moscow. The British rightly suspected that there were few real diplomats among them. And it’s true - the residencies of the KGB and GRU, military intelligence, grew to a large extent due to people who wanted to live in the beautiful city of London.
General Viktor Georgievich Budanov was in London in 1971 on his first trip abroad. He said:
After Lyalin went over to their side, we knew that something would follow, but we never thought that an action of such magnitude would be taken against us. This has never happened in the history of intelligence. And I was sent from England even before the official announcement of the expulsion.
Did you work directly with Lyalin?
Not in this case. The trouble was that Lyalin knew more than I would like about my work. And my work was interesting. It’s not for nothing that the British don’t let me in to this day...
And you up and left?
It was not I who left, but our comrades who sent me. On September 3, Lyalin disappeared. And on September 11th I sailed away on the ship “Estonia”. The weather was stormy.
Did you feel any special interest from the British? Have you been followed more than usual?
I was not left unattended. There were cases when up to nine British counterintelligence vehicles were simultaneously involved in surveillance, and we were able to identify all nine. I worked at the embassy, but I did not have diplomatic cover, because in 1969 the British had already limited our diplomatic staff, and I went not with a diplomatic, but with a service passport. So he was vulnerable to local counterintelligence.
Did Lyalin hold a major post in the station?
He was an ordinary operational officer, officially working at the trade mission as a senior engineer. But it so happened that he knew about one of my important connections, which we were developing quite successfully...
What was the reason for his departure to the British?
Later, when I became involved in intelligence security issues, we worked on a portrait of a potential defector from our midst, using information that, unfortunately, we already had a lot in this area.
Lyalin, unlike, say, Gordievsky, was not an established agent. He was a very impulsive person and drank a lot. And when a person constantly drinks, the entire mental structure undergoes changes. He is characterized by an inadequate reaction and increased excitability.
Lyalin was detained by British police for violating traffic rules. I think it was an excuse. If we are talking about an employee of a foreign embassy, such detentions rarely occur without the participation of counterintelligence. Or counterintelligence officers are immediately notified and get involved.
British counterintelligence could have known - yes, they certainly knew! - about his affair with an employee of the trade mission, a married woman...
They detained him and talked to him, I think, thoroughly. Such conversations follow the usual pattern. Now we know that you are having an affair. If this becomes known, you will be returned home, fired from the KGB, thrown out onto the street, your entire career will collapse...
I don't think he made a decision right away. Rather, he promised to think about it. He was kept in police custody until the morning. If he had made up his mind, he would have been released immediately. Because time matters: it is impossible for an agent to fall out of sight of his service so that the station staff starts looking for him.
And they kept him until the morning. Our consul went after him, picked him up, and brought him to the embassy. As luck would have it, the person Lyalin respected was not in the position of the head of the station. And his deputy was biased towards him - sometimes people didn’t get along in character. This was clearly the case.
And the deputy resident told him what the British had warned Lyalin about: “You are such and such, you have nothing to do here, pack your things, in twenty-four hours we will return you to your homeland.” This was exactly what should not be done. Even if a person gets into trouble, even if he is on the hook, we must treat him humanely. My work has shown that in such situations you need more trust, it pays off. And after such a conversation, Lyalin made the final decision - oh so! And left…
The British expelled one hundred and five Soviet citizens from the country. Lyalin betrayed everyone, and the residency had to be formed anew. The British introduced quotas for Soviet workers, and they were unable to send as many people to London as there were there. Following the British, the French sent a large group of scouts, and then some other countries.
Kryuchkov was not to blame for the failure. On the contrary, this story paved the way for him to become the head of intelligence. General Sakharovsky was sent into early retirement. Fyodor Konstantinovich Mortin, who came from the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, was appointed head of the First Main Directorate, but it became clear that this was an interim decision.
Kryuchkov served as deputy for three years - that’s how long it took him to get comfortable and understand the new business. And the story of the mass expulsion from England helped him understand what damage just one defector could cause to his department and to him personally.
A DIPLOMAT OPENED A NEWSPAPER...
Such mass expulsions also occurred later. In April 1983, almost fifty Soviet diplomats were expelled from France overnight on charges of espionage. The action was approved by the then French President Francois Mitterrand. They say that he even himself selected forty-seven names from hundreds of “candidates” presented to him by counterintelligence.
Moscow refrained from retaliatory action. The blow was strong, but I didn’t want to spoil the special relationship with France. When it came to other countries, Soviet leaders were not so lenient.
In 1976, opening the next issue of the then popular Literary Newspaper, the young press attache of the German Embassy in the USSR, Eberhard Heiken, saw his name. The newspaper reported that the German diplomat was an intelligence officer hiding behind diplomatic immunity.
But Eberhard Heiken did not work for West German intelligence! And the KGB knew about this: not a single embassy is able to keep secret who is a real diplomat and who is a disguised spy. Heiken was sacrificed to the spy-diplomatic game between Moscow and Bonn.
West German television then made the film “Moscow Spies” about Soviet diplomats. They knew about his upcoming show in Moscow. One well-known Soviet journalist, a Germanist by training, was asked by the KGB to go to the West German embassy and notify the ambassador on behalf of the Soviet leadership that the appearance of the film on television would be interpreted as a hostile act. Warn that there will be consequences.
The quite surprised journalist said that to carry out such a delicate mission he needed a written assignment. He received an unsigned text from the KGB, which said: “You are instructed to visit the German Embassy in Moscow and inform the ambassador...”
The journalist arrived at the embassy late in the evening. The vigilant policeman at the gate, who in those days, checking the previously compiled list, checked the documents of everyone who wanted to enter the embassy, this time, without asking anything, instantly let the visitor through, following him with a curious look.
The ambassador, who knew and highly valued the journalist, listened to him with attention. He said that he would convey his words to Bonn. But the German Foreign Ministry has no power over television. The film was shown. The KGB wanted an atoning sacrifice. Press attaché Heiken was declared a spy.
The evil irony of fate was that Heiken was almost friends with the very Soviet journalist who was asked to influence the Germans...
Why did you choose Eberhard Heiken? Why didn’t they name a real employee of the Federal Intelligence Service, who was working in Moscow at that time, as a spy?
This is common practice. Contrary to popular belief, counterintelligence rarely turns to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a request to expel an identified intelligence officer. It is much more practical to monitor him, determine his methods of work, connections, and try to play with him. If a decision has already been made to create a small public scandal, then a person who has nothing to do with intelligence is selected to play the role of the victim.
Eberhard Heiken had to return to Bonn in any case, because his four-year assignment to Moscow had expired. The date of his departure was known in advance. So he was chosen as a sacrifice. The KGB and the USSR Foreign Ministry did not even rush the German press attaché. And if so, then the Germans had no reason to take a retaliatory step and expel the Soviet diplomat. An exchange of blows took place.
But what was it like for Heiken himself, who was run over by the vengeful KGB?
He wanted to forget about Russia forever and do something else. And yet I forced myself to consider this sad story an industrial accident. Heiken spent four years at the German embassy in Washington. And yet he returned to Russian affairs. In 1989, he again came to work in Moscow. He was appointed minister plenipotentiary of the German embassy in Moscow - this is the second person after the ambassador. He was given a visa immediately. Nobody ever mentioned that story. However, there were no people willing to apologize either.
Working in the Soviet Union was attractive for a German diplomat even in the 70s, Heiken told me, recalling his first assignment.
Heiken studied Pravdin's editorials and all the speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, learning the art of reading between the lines, known only to Soviet citizens.
The diplomats understood that they had to judge the life of a huge country only from the few fragments available to them. This was the heyday of Kremlinology, a science useful, according to Eberhard Heiken, as an auxiliary tool, but which does not give an exact answer, leaving a constant feeling of uncertainty.
A select society of Soviet Germanists met in the old embassy building on Bolshaya Gruzinskaya - a privilege which was greatly valued. And not only because the embassy provided great food. For a few hours you could be in a different normal world. The traditions of the embassy are evidenced by the monument to Count Friedrich Werner von Schulenburg, who, as the inscription says, “gave his life for the honor of the German people.” The last pre-war ambassador to Moscow participated in a conspiracy against Hitler and was executed.
Heiken never knew how frank his interlocutors were. Are they carrying out someone's instructions - to convey certain information to him - or are they, on their own initiative, trying to help him understand what is really happening?
The press attache and future minister plenipotentiary did not suspect that some visitors to the embassy really wanted to talk frankly with the Germans, but they were afraid that they would be overheard. At receptions, Soviet Germanists looked with suspicion not at foreigners, but at their own: which of their colleagues would snitch tomorrow about a too long and frank conversation with a diplomat? More knowledgeable guests were afraid of the KGB equipment installed in the embassy premises...
WHERE IS THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL?
On the last day of March 1978, Deputy Secretary General of the UN Arkady Nikolayevich Shevchenko arrived at the building of the USSR Mission to the United Nations. He was invited by the Soviet representative Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky and gave him a coded telegram from Moscow. Shevchenko was urgently called home.
This telegram plunged Shevchenko into panic. He returned to his UN building and called his contact, an officer in the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Shevchenko did not say anything to his wife - he left her a note, which she will see in the morning. He put in his briefcase a photograph of his daughter, a photograph of his wife with the wife of Foreign Minister Gromyko, and a large group photo with Brezhnev.
Then he went down the fire escape, crossed the street and got into a waiting car. He was hidden in a house owned by the CIA.
The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and the UN representative, Oleg Troyanovsky, demanded that the Americans arrange a meeting with Shevchenko. They wanted to make sure that he really asked the Americans for asylum and was not kidnapped by the intelligence services. But it was a useless conversation. Two ambassadors tried to persuade him to change his mind, and Shevchenko repeated that he had decided to stay, period.
After Shevchenko escaped, Andrei Gromyko irritably told KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov that he had many assistants and he simply did not remember such a person as Shevchenko.
The counterintelligence officers who searched Shevchenko's Moscow apartment brought Andropov photographs in which the foreign minister was captured together with his fugitive assistant in the home interior.
But this does not mean that Shevchenko was close to the minister. He was close to the minister's son Anatoly Gromyko, the future director of the academic Institute of African Studies.
Shevchenko met the younger Gromyko while studying at MGIMO. They wrote an article together. After which Shevchenko was hired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Arkady Shevchenko quickly made a career; in 1969 he became one of Gromyko Sr.’s assistants. And before his escape, for five years he held the pleasant and honorable position of UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.
Shevchenko asked for asylum in the United States more than a year before he actually escaped. They promised him to organize everything, but in the meantime they asked him to work a little for the American government, that is, for the CIA.
What exactly could Shevchenko convey to the Americans?
Instructions from Moscow on what position to take in the UN. Some information materials that were sent to foreign missions. Could convey conversations with high-ranking guests from Moscow. Name the employees of the KGB stations and military intelligence - everyone he knew.
He was not allowed to know the main secrets.
For many years, Arkady Shevchenko lived in fear. Working for the CIA, he was mortally afraid that the KGB would suspect him, force him onto a plane, take him home and shoot him. He was not far from the truth: they would have done the same with him, but for some reason in Moscow they did not listen to the resident who suspected something was wrong.
The then resident of Soviet foreign intelligence in New York, General Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, who later became the head of all illegal intelligence, later assured that he immediately felt that there was a spy in the Soviet colony in New York.
Although the station rather drew attention to Shevchenko’s wild lifestyle. This is not how Soviet people behave, the vigilant security officers decided.
The new intelligence chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, did not pay attention to the resident’s first signal from New York and did not give permission to organize Shevchenko’s immediate return home.
After the second message from the resident - General Drozdov wrote that Shevchenko was drinking and did not communicate with people - it was finally decided to recall him to Moscow. But the text of the telegram was drawn up so ineptly that the Deputy Secretary General got scared and went to the Americans.
Why did Shevchenko run away? Political motives are difficult to guess. He was not the right person. Rather, he really liked the lifestyle of the UN Deputy Secretary General and the honor, privileges and comfort associated with this position. He didn’t want to return to Moscow again.
Apparently, something went wrong in his personal life. He was forty-seven years old. Men after forty often experience something of a crisis. The Americans found him a woman, a professional. Then she wrote memoirs, from which it followed that she was shocked by the inexperience of the Soviet diplomat. She was amazed how it was possible to live a whole life and not suspect its joys.
The discovered joys of life helped Shevchenko adapt to the USA. But, apparently, it’s difficult to call his life in America particularly happy...
"I WOULD KILL HIM WITH MY OWN HANDS"
One of the Soviet intelligence officers fled to the West, one might say, before my eyes. In February 1979, while still a student at Moscow State University, I went to work for the magazine “Novoe Vremya”, and in the fall our own correspondent in Japan, Stanislav Aleksandrovich Levchenko, also a foreign intelligence major, fled.
There were various rumors. Some said that he did not get along with his boss, the deputy resident, who ate him out. Others insisted that after Japan he did not want to return to Soviet life. He himself, already in America, wrote a book, setting out in it the complex religious and ideological motives of his escape.
Our editorial management was dragged to the Lubyanka. The editors were reproached for not following up and for making such a mistake, although they were not the ones who selected the correspondent and they were not the ones who sent him abroad. As always in such cases, the editor-in-chief received a call from the KGB and said: so-and-so will come to you, make him a correspondent in Tokyo.
Levchenko did not turn to the Japanese, knowing that they do not give political asylum to anyone, but contacted the Americans. They immediately took him out of Japan. He gave loud testimony, naming the names of prominent Japanese politicians and leading journalists who worked for the Soviet Union. They were not spies because they did not possess state secrets. In politics and in the press they pursued a line favorable to Moscow. In other words, they belonged to the “agents of influence” that KGB Chairman Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov would later talk about.
Levchenko claimed that Soviet intelligence had two hundred agents in Japan. Among them were a former member of the government, leaders of the Socialist Party, several members of parliament and experts on China: the station in Tokyo was required to prevent the rapprochement between Japan and China at all costs.
According to Levchenko, Soviet intelligence officers persuaded one member of parliament to organize a deputy friendship association with the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He received money from the KGB to publish a monthly magazine. Levchenko also stated that the Japanese Socialist Party is subsidized by the KGB. This is done through “firms of friends,” which received lucrative contracts from Soviet foreign trade organizations, and in return transferred 15–20 percent of the profits to the Socialist Party account.
At the same time, Levchenko said that in Japan, Soviet intelligence officers handed over cash to a representative of the illegal Philippine Communist Party in a suitcase with a double bottom, like in bad novels...
After Levchenko’s escape, Kryuchkov had to completely change the composition of the residency in Tokyo and the Japanese department in the central office. This happened after every failure.
I knew young Japanese intelligence officers who, thanks to this, were able to go to Tokyo to take up vacant positions in the residency. And I met experienced employees of the Japanese direction of Soviet intelligence whose careers were ruined by Levchenko’s flight: they lost the opportunity to travel abroad, they were removed from operational work, and transferred to uninteresting work. They considered their life to be broken. One former boss of Levchenko told me:
If I had caught him, I would have killed him with my own hands.
In the 50s, after another security officer escaped to the West, successive KGB chairmen gave the order to destroy the traitor. But committing a murder in another country, especially if the person is being guarded, is not at all easy. Then such orders were canceled.
Kryuchkov preferred not to punish those intelligence officers who were guilty but corrected themselves. He was very lenient towards his people if they, having defected to the West, then returned. It was more profitable for him to pretend that his intelligence officer had been kidnapped than to admit that proven security officers could easily betray their duty. Intelligence officers were told that they would not be punished if they repented.
This is what they did with foreign intelligence officer Vitaly Yurchenko, who, while on a business trip in Italy, contacted the Americans. They took him to the USA. But apparently something didn’t work out for him, because in the strangest way he ran away from the Americans and showed up at the Soviet embassy.
Kryuchkov chose to make him a courageous hero who withstood all the tests and escaped from enemy captivity, although the scouts did not like this. They considered Yurchenko a traitor and did not understand how he could be rewarded and encouraged...
CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE
In the last days of December 1974, Brezhnev agreed with Andropov’s proposal to appoint Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov as head of the First Main Directorate and at the same time deputy chairman of the KGB.
Former GDR intelligence chief, Colonel General Markus Wolf, believes that the appointment of Kryuchkov as intelligence chief was logical, but not very wise.
In addition to Kryuchkov, there was another first deputy in intelligence - Boris Semenovich Ivanov, a former resident in New York, a skilled professional, whom his colleagues highly respected. But Andropov, for obvious reasons, preferred to see his assistant in this post. Boris Ivanov was sent to Afghanistan a few years later.
Kryuchkov lacked not so much professional experience as a depth of understanding of what was happening, and he was not a leader by nature, says General Markus Wolf. Kryuchkov was Andropov's trusted assistant. And without the instructions of his mentor, the competent and reasonable “number two” was lost.
When Markus Wolf came to Moscow, Kryuchkov always accompanied him to the rest room, poured him a large portion of whiskey and said:
Well, tell me what's happening.
Kryuchkov treated other guests to tea or coffee. But in any case, he spoke in a soft manner. He is one of those who lays softly...
Yuri Mikhailovich Solonitsyn was the head of Kryuchkov’s intelligence secretariat for seven years. He told:
We met every day, including Saturday, I came to his dacha. He is an extraordinary person. Smart, well-read, erudite. Many said that he was a party official and didn’t know this and that. But this is not a detective officer, this is a political position. However, I know cases when he could break a person in terms of recruitment...
An exceptionally hardworking person. For example, they were preparing a performance for him. Intelligence has powerful analytical services. A team was assembled and it prepared the text. He read it, there seemed to be no comments, then you listen to the speech and he speaks completely differently. So, I rewrote it myself.
He is a man who only thought about work. You arrive at a reconnaissance holiday village. Someone plays dominoes, someone plays cards... He didn’t even play chess. He probably knew how, but he never played.
His character is, of course, complex. It was not easy to work with him. A little capricious, touchy. But not vindictive. External dryness, it frightened many. Maybe it was the service that forced him to be too dry, and he remained that way.
There were people who, with extensive life experience, felt insecure with him. In his reception room you could see a general, a resident in a large country, whose voice was trembling - he was afraid to go into his office... There was something so... Stalinist about him. Not in actions, but in the manner of conversation. Not everyone could bear his gaze. Maybe the work was leaving its mark. I saw him in other situations, when he was gentle, simple, knew how to treat, poured it himself...
He was proud of intelligence, especially since Andropov also emphasized intelligence... By the way, he is one of the few who could object to Yuri Vladimirovich. That is, he had his own opinion. And he expressed it, without fear, to Andropov’s eyes! I'm not even talking about Chebrikov. Andropov was offended. Vladimir Alexandrovich told me this. So he told Andropov that such and such a thing was being done incorrectly. Andropov does not speak to him for some time. Then he calls: Volodya, come...
Kryuchkov did not allow disorder in intelligence. Everything worked smoothly for him - secretaries, duty service. He read a lot - newspapers, magazines, special information. When I read, I marked everything interesting with ticks and bookmarks. The secretary then retyped it. He kept a file cabinet on various problems. Otherwise, sometimes you read something interesting, and then you can’t remember where you saw it.
And he has everything in his file cabinet. He performs, takes these cards and begins to scribble quotes and numbers. Impressive. In fact, one person cannot read all the information received by intelligence. There is an information and analytical service, all telegrams come there, including from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff - military intelligence.
Analysts sit there, they look through it all and select the most interesting, important, and necessary things to the intelligence chief. Then the assistants look at it and put it on his table. There are, of course, operational telegrams addressed only to him. Or there is information that, bypassing everyone, comes to his address.
Did he receive information about the situation inside the country?
Through the KGB chairman,” explained Yuri Solonitsyn. - Each department of the committee sent information to the chairman, and he wrote a resolution: “Inform the members of the board.” Or personally - to Comrade Kryuchkov, to someone else...
Kryuchkov impressed those around him with his concern for his own health. Every morning he got up at a quarter to six and did exercises outside for an hour in any weather, no matter when he went to bed. He lived only in a dacha in the village of the First Main Directorate of the KGB, which was built for foreign guests of the KGB, and was used as a dacha for the intelligence leadership.
He took vacations in the winter because he loved skiing. I went to the steam room, although not to a Russian bathhouse, but to a sauna. Swimmed in the pool. He drank little, preferred whiskey and beer, but very moderately...
Kryuchkov was an inveterate theatergoer and did not miss a single interesting premiere. I myself first saw it in the theater in the mid-70s. My father said: “Look, here is the head of Soviet intelligence.” A short, expressionless man with glasses sat somewhere in the second row.
In August 1991, during a search in Kryuchkov’s apartment, they looked for his notebook. His wife said that he managed without a book. He remembered all the names, surnames, telephone numbers. He didn't even need a computer.
MAIN OPPONENT
Like the entire KGB under Andropov, foreign intelligence under Kryuchkov reached its peak in a certain sense. Residencies all over the world, large staffs, large intelligence networks, a solid budget, new operational equipment and, of course, the special position of intelligence within the KGB: the intelligence officers felt Andropov’s special favor.
At the headquarters of the First Main Directorate of the KGB in Yasenevo, Andropov had his own office. From time to time he came for reconnaissance and met not only with Kryuchkov, but also with other generals. Andropov was even registered with the party intelligence organization.
Later, however, Kryuchkov will be reproached for being carried away by big numbers. Intelligence, like a giant vacuum cleaner, tried to collect as much information as possible from all countries. For example, even in Zimbabwe or Malaysia, some military documents were stolen and local officials were recruited. There was little real benefit for the country, but it created a pleasant feeling of complete control over the world.
An experienced operative proceeds from the fact that it is necessary to have not many agents, but they provide valuable information. Kryuchkov demanded that the residencies increase the pace of recruitment. They took in quantity. First of all, they tried to recruit Americans all over the world. In all the residencies there were people involved in the GP - the main enemy. Our intelligence officer is, for example, in New Zealand, but is actually working against the Americans, that is, he is trying to recruit one of the American embassy employees or correspondents.
They recruited any American - even a cook at the embassy, even a maid of a military attaché: if they themselves could not tell anything, then at least they would try to install eavesdropping equipment.
They most diligently looked for opportunities to recruit employees of the local CIA station. This was considered the highest achievement. For recruiting an American they were given an order. True, recruitment is a rare success. Over the course of your entire life, you can recruit one or two people who will work for quite a long time.
What did you try to catch on? Not because of troubles in his personal life: drunkenness and women in themselves do not compromise; something like that was dangerous for Soviet intelligence officers.
They caught us making mistakes at work. For example, if you managed to detect a meeting between an American intelligence officer and his agent. Unsatisfied ambitions, resentment towards superiors, dissatisfaction with one’s life, and material factors could all have worked. It was not only Soviet citizens who associated certain material hopes with traveling abroad. CIA employees also needed to earn money to educate their children, buy a house, and so on...
A recruitment offer to any foreigner was made with the approval of the KGB chairman. He was given a memo, very short - less than a page, which said that such and such an American had been noticed in this and that and that a recruitment offer could be made to him.
The fact is that this is also a political issue. There is always a danger that the one to whom the offer is made will be indignant, go to his ambassador, and a note of protest will be sent to the Soviet Union. It is not convenient to start such a scandal at every moment - you cannot do this, for example, on the eve of a summit meeting.
Usually, if the center gave the go-ahead, a special recruiter would come to the country for several days with perfectly prepared documents and an impeccable legend. This is a standard precaution. If an American raised a scandal, the recruiter simply left the country, and the local station did not suffer.
In rare cases, if the resident gave guarantees that there would definitely not be a scandal, then the station employee was allowed to conduct the first conversation. It is an honor. If the American gives his consent, then no matter how many people in Moscow and locally prepare this operation, the laurels will go to the one to whom the American says “yes.”
How was this done? The recruiter was helped to formally meet the American and enter into a conversation with him, so that under some pretext he could set up a meeting in a pre-selected cafe.
If an American went to his superiors and honestly told him that the Russians were trying to recruit him, they shook his hand, thanked him for his dedication to his homeland... and immediately returned him home. They will not send him on any more business trips: he has been decrypted and is not suitable for operational work. Or, at best, he will have to wait several years for a new business trip.
If the recruitment was successful, a small celebration was held at the station, usually celebrated with Moscow vodka, Armenian cognac or Scotch whiskey. You shouldn’t think that the intelligence officers gathered in the embassy premises, inaccessible to others, behind three castles, are so different from ordinary people.
Of course, not everyone agreed. What happened in this case? Scandal? Fight? No, usually both scouts parted quite amicably.
Some of the recruits answered evasively:
I need to think, consult.
With my wife.
Not worth it. Let's decide now.
Then I don't accept your offer.
In this case, both scouts stood up and said goodbye:
It's all nonsense. Shall we forget?
Let's forget.
But no one forgets anything.
In principle, there was no threat to an American refusing to work for Soviet intelligence. Intelligence would never blackmail him, send incriminating materials to his superiors, or make them public. There is no need for this.
But such a person will no longer be let out of sight; his personal file will be constantly updated. Intelligence will wait: what if some changes happen in his life? For example, he desperately needs money, but has nowhere to get it. Or the idealism of youth will go away, and a person will begin to look at many things differently. Then perhaps they will propose to him again...
The intelligence chief received a huge amount of information. The main thing is what conclusions he drew from it.
In his memoirs, Kryuchkov writes that “the materials obtained by intelligence spoke about the preparation of NATO countries for war... We were also preparing for war, although we never had the intention of starting it... We were drawn into one or another costly round of the arms race. The vicious circle of this endless marathon was tightening the noose around our neck.”
It turns out that Kryuchkov really believed that NATO was preparing to attack the Soviet Union? And that someone forcibly dragged the country into the arms race, and not the Soviet leadership itself, primarily KGB Chairman Andropov and Defense Minister Ustinov, demanded that all forces and resources be given to the army?
With such a meager level of understanding of the surrounding reality, no intelligence apparatus will help...
Kryuchkov himself was quite proud of one Soviet intelligence operation. In August 1974, a military coup took place in Cyprus, which ended in the division of the island because Turkish troops landed in the north. The presidential palace in Nicosia was bombed, and the putschists reported that the president himself, Archbishop Makarios, had been killed.
But the KGB radioed on behalf of Makarios that the president was alive and was calling on everyone to fight the conspirators. The putsch failed, and Makarios, as it later turned out, to the surprise of the Soviet intelligence officers themselves, actually survived. Kryuchkov calls this the successful use of service “A” - “active measures”. It is usually called a disinformation service...
In June 1978, Kryuchkov, at the head of a KGB delegation, came to Afghanistan for the first time. He played an active role in the Afghan campaign. Then, when they tried to establish who made the decision to send troops to Afghanistan, everyone refused, and it turned out that this happened sort of by itself.
In reality, intelligence, with its reports from Kabul, its assessment materials and forecasts, contributed to the decision to invade. Reports that the Americans intend to penetrate Afghanistan and turn it into an outpost against the Soviet Union, the version that the leader of Afghanistan Hafizullah Amin is in reality an American spy - all this is the work of intelligence.
However, intelligence was unable to predict the rise of popular indignation against the Soviet troops. Although Kryuchkov himself has now admitted that in April 1978 in Afghanistan there was only a palace coup, and not at all a popular revolution expressing the interests of the broad masses of working people.
CHAIRMAN OF THE KGB
After Chebrikov left in September 1988, Kryuchkov was appointed in his place. On October 1, he took up his duties as chairman of the State Security Committee.
Why did Gorbachev choose Kryuchkov? For example, he was offered the candidacy of Philip Denisovich Bobkov, the former head of the Fifth Directorate. It can be assumed that he chose a person from intelligence, believing that he would be less likely than the heads of the internal divisions of the KGB to oppose perestroika.
Kryuchkov was brought closer to Gorbachev by Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev. After Andropov's death, Kryuchkov felt extremely insecure. He lost his support and began to look for someone to lean on. Even during Chernenko’s life, he believed in Gorbachev’s fate, but did not know how to approach him. He tried to do this through Yakovlev. Alexander Nikolaevich recalls how “Kryuchkov aggressively tried to become my friend, literally sucked up to me, constantly called, invited me to the sauna, and in every possible way pretended to be a reformer.”
Kryuchkov made it clear in all conversations that he was exactly the person Gorbachev needed.
“He scolded Viktor Chebrikov in every possible way for his conservatism,” writes Yakovlev, “he claimed that he was a professionally weak person, and he reviled Philip Bobkov with the last words and presented him as a man untrustworthy, a strangler of dissidents.”
Kryuchkov begged Yakovlev to introduce him to Valery Ivanovich Boldin, Gorbachev’s chief assistant, “explaining his request by saying that sometimes documents appear that can only be shown to Gorbachev, bypassing KGB Chairman Chebrikov.”
Gradually, Kryuchkov achieved his goal and replaced Chebrikov.
Yakovlev recalls that before retiring, Chebrikov, as always, very calmly told him:
I know that you supported Kryuchkov, but remember - this is a bad person, you will see it.
After the putsch, at the exit from the Kremlin Palace of Congresses, Chebrikov caught up with Yakovlev, patted him on the shoulder and said:
Do you remember what I told you about Kryuchkov?
Gorbachev was probably captivated by Kryuchkov’s quality, his undivided devotion to his master, and his lack of independence in politics. Mikhail Sergeevich knew what a faithful assistant Kryuchkov was for Andropov, and wanted to find an equally intelligent and efficient assistant.
Kryuchkov’s successor as intelligence chief, Leonid Vladimirovich Shebarshin, writes: “Apparently, Kryuchkov seemed to Mikhail Sergeevich to be a more flexible, dynamic and pliable person... It seems that the General Secretary was greatly mistaken and did not notice Kryuchkov’s iron will and stubbornness, ability, behind his gentle manner, external flexibility and obedience for a long time, in a roundabout way, but still certainly achieve the goal.”
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author Strigin Evgeniy Mikhailovich From the book From the KGB to the FSB (instructive pages of national history). book 1 (from the KGB of the USSR to the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation) author Strigin Evgeniy Mikhailovich author Strigin Evgeniy MikhailovichGusinsky Vladimir Aleksandrovich Biographical information: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Gusinsky was born in 1952 in Moscow. “Gusinsky’s patron was the Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov... Gusinsky met Luzhkov in the late 80s, when he began selling clothes and
From the book From the KGB to the FSB (instructive pages of national history). book 2 (from the Ministry of Bank of the Russian Federation to the Federal Grid Company of the Russian Federation) author Strigin Evgeniy MikhailovichKryuchkov Vladimir Aleksandrovich Biographical information: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, born February 29, 1924, native of Volgograd. From a working-class family. In 1949 he graduated from the All-Union Correspondence Law Institute, in 1954 from the Higher Diplomatic School of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Member of the CPSU
From the book Doctors Who Changed the World author Sukhomlinov KirillVladimir Aleksandrovich Negovsky 1909–2003 In the book “Great Names of the 20th Century: Doctors” published in Italy in 1974, among the names of outstanding doctors of the century there is the name of Vladimir Negovsky. It calls him Padre della Rianimazione, or “father of resuscitation.” Bringing the deceased back to life
From the book Soviet Aces. Essays on Soviet pilots author Bodrikhin Nikolay GeorgievichLutsky Vladimir Aleksandrovich Born on May 21, 1918 in Sevastopol. He graduated from the 3rd year of the railway technical school in Simferopol. After graduating from the Kachin Military Aviation School in 1938, Lutsky served there as an instructor for 3 years, then as a flight commander. At the front from June
From the book Life and Deeds of Prominent Russian Lawyers. Ups and downs author Zvyagintsev Alexander GrigorievichVladimir Aleksandrovich Antonov-Ovseenko (1883–1938) “I feel the tension of the struggle” Vladimir Aleksandrovich Antonov-Ovseenko was born on March 9, 1883 in Chernigov into the family of a hereditary nobleman. At the age of eleven, the boy was sent to the Voronezh Cadet Corps,
From the book Alexander I author Fedorov Vladimir AlexandrovichVladimir Alexandrovich Fedorov Alexander I The eldest son of Paul I and grandson of Catherine II was born on December 12, 1777. Catherine II named it in honor of Alexander Nevsky, the patron saint of St. Petersburg. Alexander was her favorite grandson, and she herself supervised his upbringing. Russian
author Yazov Dmitry TimofeevichVladimir Kryuchkov Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov - Born in 1924. In 1944–1945 he was the first secretary of the Komsomol Republic of Komsomol of the Barrikadny District (Volgograd). In 1945–1946 he studied at the Saratov Law Institute. In 1946 he became the second secretary of the Stalingrad City Committee
From the book of the State Emergency Committee. Was there a chance? author Yazov Dmitry TimofeevichVladimir Kryuchkov about the KGB, the Emergency Committee and Putin - In one of your interviews, you said that during the events of August 1991, your department even protected Yeltsin so that he would not be killed by other figures interested in his death. Was Yeltsin as indispensable in these years as he is today?
From the book Russian Explorers - the Glory and Pride of Rus' author Glazyrin Maxim YurievichRusanov Vladimir Aleksandrovich I am guided by only one thought: to do everything I can for the greatness of the Motherland... V. A. Rusanov Rusanov Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1875–1913), Russian explorer of the Arctic, graduated from the Oryol Theological Seminary. 1907. V. A. Rusanov passes through the strait
The first French Empire (1804-1815) was created by Napoleon Bonaparte. By the time he came to power, France had been devastated by a decade of revolts and uprisings. The sad fate seemed predetermined. However, thanks to the will of Napoleon, France within a few years became an empire and the leading power of Europe. And, nevertheless, it was the fatal political mistakes of the same Bonaparte that became the reason for its downfall.
In the 1920s of the twentieth century, Russia, which became the USSR, actually had no chance of survival surrounded by a hostile capitalist world. However, thanks to Stalin's intelligence, will and diplomacy, it made an industrial breakthrough, withstood the invasion of all of Europe in 1941 and turned into a world superpower after the Second World War. However, a hefty price had to be paid for this. But could anyone else have accomplished something similar to what Stalin managed?
Gorbachev tried to repeat Napoleon's success in rebuilding the USSR. But unsuccessfully. He turned out to be completely incapable of anything similar to the Stalinist approach. And the scale is not the same, and the thinking is flawed. All of Mikhail Sergeevich’s undertakings were destructive in nature and corroded the state mechanism like rust. As a result, Gorbachev repeated the fate of the Roman Emperor Honorius (395-423), under whom the collapse of the Roman Empire became uncontrollable.
They say that when Honorius was informed of the death of Rome, he was very upset, because he believed that we were talking about the death of his beloved rooster named Rome. And he was very happy when it turned out that he was alive. The fate of Rome, plundered by the Visigoths of Alaric, did not touch Honorius in any way...
Gorbachev behaved similarly when he learned about the Belovezhskaya Conspiracy, which put an end to the history of the USSR. The only question he asked the conspirators in a telephone conversation concerned the position that they intended to offer him. He never understood that ousted politicians have no political future.
In the USSR there was a person who could change the course of history - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov. It is known that in the period 1989-1991. he had sufficient information about the treacherous activities of both Gorbachev and his closest associates, or rather accomplices, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze.
Vladimir Aleksandrovich had the opportunity to stop this “troika”, but took a very strange position. It all started with Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev. Let me remind you that already in 1989, the Soviet intelligence services became aware that he occupied positions favorable to the West, opposed the “conservative forces” in the USSR, and the West could firmly count on him in any situation.
Kryuchkov reported this information to Gorbachev. But although he “twitched,” he ultimately suggested that the head of the KGB only have a heart-to-heart talk with Yakovlev. The conversation ended in nothing. Yakovlev only remained silent and sighed sadly. Kryuchkov reported the results of the conversation to the Secretary General, but he chose to “hush up” the situation.
Some time later, Vladimir Aleksandrovich again reported to Gorbachev that important materials had been received through intelligence and counterintelligence about the content of his negotiations with President Bush Sr. in Malta in December 1989. KGB and GRU informants claimed that during these negotiations the Secretary General agreed to change the political system in the USSR, radically reconsider the USSR's relations with Western countries, and not interfere with the inclusion of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany and the withdrawal of the Baltic states from the Union. This was confirmed by articles that appeared in Western media. 
Even when it became clear that the President of the USSR was “surrendering” the USSR’s positions to the West, the head of the KGB did not draw the proper conclusions. In this regard, the question arises: how would the director of the FBI or the head of the CIA act in such a situation? There is no doubt that they would immediately inform the US Senate and Congress of the President's obvious disloyalty.
Kryuchkov announced information about the conversation with Gorbachev regarding Malta only in 2001 in an interview with Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent Dmitry Belovetsky. At the same time, he added that “Gorbachev has always been a traitor to the party and country.” A true statement, but, as they say, a spoon is dear to dinner.
STATEMENT BY KGB EMPLOYEES
Strange behavior of Kryuchkov in 1990-1991. They try to explain it in different ways. Including the fact that he had unlimited faith in Gorbachev. However, it is impossible to justify the inaction of the head of the KGB during a period when the obvious betrayal of the head of state became obvious...
Let me note that the situation then became more than strange. The subordinates of the KGB Chairman were well aware of what was happening in the country, and their boss was in holy ignorance. This is evidenced by the following fact. On February 23, 1990, a meeting of representatives of the divisions of the Central Office of the KGB of the USSR addressed the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Council M. Gorbachev with a statement: “... The security forces express bewilderment at the fact that the governing bodies of the country, having proactive information about emerging negative phenomena , are clearly late in making vital political decisions, show slowness and indecisiveness, and do not use the power of currently existing legislative acts.
The adoption of a number of important laws for society is being delayed, including on issues of strengthening the fight against organized crime, on the State Security Committee of the USSR, on crimes against the state, on crimes against the peace and security of mankind. The absence of these laws deprives the fight against the most dangerous forms of organized crime, corruption, and crimes in the field of foreign economic activity of a legal basis, and does not effectively ensure the security of the state and citizens...”
Gorbachev did not honor the statement of the security officers with a response. By the way, Kryuchkov was well aware of this statement, and the Secretary General’s silence gave him the right to publicly raise questions with Gorbachev that were set out in the statement. In the CPSU this practice was quite common. A leader at any level always used the opportunity to publicly support the balanced criticism expressed by his team towards higher authorities. 
This significantly increased his authority and, at the same time, took him out of the “blow”, since he only relayed the opinion of the team. Let me remind you that during the period of perestroika, voicing opinions “from below” seemed to be the most important element of “glasnost”. Therefore, there have been cases when leaders themselves inspired statements from teams.
It should also be borne in mind that Kryuchkov was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which provided him with many opportunities to influence the head of the Soviet state. There is no doubt that if Vladimir Alexandrovich had publicly voiced only some facts of the treacherous policy of the Secretary General and the President, then perhaps the history of our Motherland would have developed differently. And Gorbachev lived out his life not in a luxurious Bavarian castle, but in a prison cell.
"KRYUCHKOV'S LIST"
A few words about Kryuchkov’s public appearances. He spoke with alarm, but in a very streamlined manner at the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU (July 1990), when the question was whether the country was going the right way?
He also spoke at the famous IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 1990), when it became clear that Gorbachev was not only failing to cope with his responsibilities, but was also opposing the improvement of the situation in the country. At this congress, Vladimir Alexandrovich did not dare to support Sazha Umalatova’s speech, although he later regarded it as a feat.
Kryuchkov also spoke at the April (1991) Plenum of the Central Committee, when the question of Gorbachev’s removal from office was raised. But again the question of the Secretary General’s responsibility for what is happening in the Union was ignored.
Finally, on June 17, 1991, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, at a closed meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, again spoke about external forces actively working to create a disastrous situation in the country. He stated that “our Fatherland is on the brink of disaster.”
Confirming his statement, the KGB Chairman announced a secret note from Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov “On the CIA’s plans to acquire agents of influence among Soviet citizens,” dated 1977.
The note stated that “American intelligence sets the task of recruiting agents of influence from among Soviet citizens, training them and further promoting them into the sphere of management of politics, economics and science of the Soviet Union. The CIA has developed a program for individual training of agents of influence, providing for their acquisition of espionage skills, as well as their concentrated political and ideological indoctrination.”
The note also emphasized that the CIA’s main attention would be paid to Soviet citizens: “capable of their personal and business qualities in the future to occupy important administrative positions” in the party and Soviet apparatus.
It is known that by the time Vladimir Aleksandrovich spoke at the Supreme Council, the “agents of influence” had already been trained, installed in the relevant positions and were carrying out the “relevant” work. Therefore, it was necessary to act without delay. However, Kryuchkov limited himself to discussions on general topics.
If his speech had been followed by KGB actions to neutralize agents of influence, then the position of Vladimir Alexandrovich could be understood. On the eve of an operation to neutralize enemies, it is unacceptable to disclose their names. But even after the KGB chief’s speech at a closed meeting of the Supreme Council, nothing followed.
The conclusion suggests itself. Apparently, the agents of influence were too powerful people. One of the former Deputy Chairman of the KGB once hinted to me about this. This conclusion was indirectly confirmed by KGB General Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, mentioned in the previous article. He, referring to an American intelligence officer, told a Rossiyskaya Gazeta correspondent (August 31, 2007) that the CIA and the US State Department had “agents at the very top” in the USSR.
But in this case, the only way to neutralize these agents was to announce their names. Let me remind you that in 1981 in Italy, in this way it was possible to prevent a right-wing coup d'etat, which was being prepared by members of the secret Masonic lodge “P-2”. To do this, it was sufficient to publish a list with the names of 962 members of this lodge.
“P-2” included three ministers of the then Italian government, the heads of all three Italian intelligence services, the political secretary of the Social Democratic Party, the deputy minister of defense, the president of the Confindustria association of Italian industrialists, etc.
The largest part of the lodge were military. For example, the Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Ministry of Defense, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of NATO Naval Forces in Southern Europe and others. And, nevertheless, the announcement of the list of Masonic conspirators put an end to their plans. This scandal in Italy was undoubtedly known to Kryuchkov.
There is no doubt that he also knew about the international meeting of delegations of state security agencies of the socialist states, held in 1974 in Havana. The speech of the head of counterintelligence of socialist Czechoslovakia, Molnar, aroused particular interest. A quote from his speech was given in his book “How traitors were trained: The head of political counterintelligence testifies...” Kryuchkov’s first deputy, Philip Denisovich Bobkov, a participant in the meeting in Havana.
Molnar then stated: “I want to warn you that the real danger will come when representatives of power structures, people in power, cooperate with the enemy. The motives for their rapprochement with the enemy may be different. This may be a desire to find guarantees for strengthening personal power, weak conviction in the socialist worldview, scientific unpreparedness...
I say this from the experience of my Czechoslovakia. We experienced what the leaders of the state did during Dubcek’s time, what he himself did. And the state security agencies could not prevent what led to the death of the system. We could not speak out against the authorities, because the people believed the authorities, and not those who oppose them. Moreover, they covered themselves with oaths of allegiance to the ideas of Marx and Lenin, verbally affirming socialism, fighting the shortcomings of the past. We could not become “turnovers”.
I want to warn and encourage you to think about what to do in such cases. The underground struggle of individuals or group formations who entered into cooperation with the enemy is one thing. And it’s completely different when there is a change in the positions of the leaders of the party and state away from the socialist path of development. Revisionism is reaching the highest echelons of power..."
It is absolutely clear that the situation in 1991 could have been changed only if Kryuchkov had named the names. Moreover, by that time the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR already had a list of agents of Western influence. This was the so-called “List 2200” or “Kryuchkov List”. That's exactly how many agents appeared in it. They claim that it began with the name of A.N. Yakovlev. Usually, when this list is mentioned, many people have a look of skepticism on their faces. However, today there is reliable evidence that such a list existed.
In March 2011, the already mentioned Yuri Ivanovich Drozdov, in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta (September 17, 2010), said that “the so-called “Kryuchkov List” with the names of these people from American agents was not made up out of thin air.” To a clarifying question from RG correspondent Nikolai Dolgopolov, Drozdov replied: “I don’t think so, I’m sure of it. Confirmation is our intelligence materials.”
VOICE IN THE DESERT AND STRANGE State Emergency Committee
Why didn’t Kryuchkov’s public speeches have the desired effect? Why did they turn out to be a voice crying in the wilderness? After all, they seemed to be imbued with concern about the fate of the Soviet Union. First of all, because the problems were presented to them in general terms, without specific facts and names.
I remember my reaction to Kryuchkov’s speeches, and the reaction of those members of the CPSU Central Committee and people’s deputies of the USSR Supreme Council with whom I communicated. During the years of Soviet power, we got used to the fact that the Soviet public was periodically informed about the “insidious” plans of the West. But that was the end of the matter; the machinations of the enemies were always successfully stopped.
In 1990-1991 Everyone was reassured by the fact that the Chairman of the KGB spoke in the presence of the Secretary General. It should be borne in mind that on November 27, 1990, the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Yazov, made a statement on the Central Television about the threat of weakening the country's defense capability. He spoke, as is known, on the instructions of the President of the USSR.
What was the conclusion from this? “At the top” the situation is controlled. Accordingly, everyone was sure that Gorbachev instructed the head of state security to inform the communists and people's deputies of the USSR that the KGB was not “sleeping” and countermeasures would be taken in a timely manner.
Because of this, Kryuchkov’s public speeches about the “intrigues of enemies” were perceived without concern. Why the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR himself did not realize this is still not clear. In this regard, the initiative to create by Kryuchkov in August 1991 the State Committee for Emergency Situations - GKChP, which put a fatal end to the fate of the USSR, looks more than strange.
Moreover, the behavior of the head of the KGB during the period of the State Emergency Committee, namely he was the organizer and the main driving force of this Committee, cannot be regarded as anything other than bordering on treasonous. 
...By July 1991, the Union began to come apart at the seams, despite the fact that the majority of USSR citizens in March of that year clearly spoke out in favor of the Union. Suffice it to say that in October 1990, even the Irkutsk region declared sovereignty. In addition, the economy of the Union actually collapsed.
In an interview with the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper (August 18, 2011), former Russian Minister of Press and Information Mikhail Poltoranin recalled that during this period “people had nothing to eat, wear, or wear shoes. No soap, no towels, sheets, socks. “All this was in warehouses, but for some reason it didn’t make it into stores.” The situation was similar with food.
According to my information, Gorbachev and Kryuchkov were aware that a deficit was being deliberately created in the country. But no measures were taken to eliminate this situation. As a result, July 1991 became a month of rebellious plenums and meetings unprecedented for the CPSU. The same Poltoranin claims that the commission for declassifying documents of the CPSU, which he headed, subsequently discovered in the archives more than ten thousand angry telegrams expressing no confidence in the Politburo and personally in the General Secretary of the Central Committee and demanding the holding of an extraordinary congress of the CPSU.
This congress would be the last for Gorbachev and his team. The prospects for him in this case looked very sad. The Secretary General would not have gotten away with a simple resignation. It became clear to the “Gorbachevites” that the only way out was to liquidate the CPSU. However, a reason was needed, a large-scale provocation, such as the forceful action in Vilnius in January 1991.
This is how a plan emerged to bring the State Emergency Committee into the political arena, which would allegedly try to save the country from collapse. Well, after his fiasco, settle accounts with Gorbachev’s opponents, up to and including banning the CPSU. It is no coincidence that General Alexander Lebed in his memoirs “It’s a shame for the state...” (1995) wrote: “There was no putsch as such. There was a brilliantly planned and brilliantly executed provocation that had no analogues, where the roles were assigned to smart people and fools. And all of them, smart and fools, fulfilled their roles consciously and unconsciously.”
Former USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov directly identified the main organizer of the August putsch with the title of his book “August from the Inside. Gorbachev putsch." In this book, Pavlov cited a number of facts that indicate the President’s direct involvement in the August events.
In 1996, in an interview with the Pravda newspaper (April 12, 1996), Valentin Sergeevich said that the very name of the State Emergency Committee was proposed by Mikhail Sergeevich: “... the personnel of the committee was written by Gorbachev himself with his own hand. It seems like a guess as to who might enter it. A. Lukyanov prudently included the same person in the list under a question mark.”
Pavlov claimed that Gorbachev was constantly in the know regarding preparations for the State Emergency Committee. According to him, the President knew that the future members of the Committee had gathered on August 17 at the “ABC facility” (the KGB official dacha) and called Kryuchkov there to give final instructions. 
Valentin Sergeevich described this situation as follows: “We gathered spontaneously, so to speak, impromptu. About fifteen minutes after my appearance in the garden gazebo, Kryuchkov was asked to come to the phone. As he was leaving, he dropped a strange phrase: “This is Gorbachev calling from Foros. He knows that we have already gathered..."
Apparently, Gorbachev’s parting words explain the strange behavior of the head of the KGB during the state of emergency. He knew very well that the main danger to the State Emergency Committee came from the President of Russia and his team. Nevertheless, Kryuchkov gave Yeltsin the opportunity on the morning of August 19 to leave Arkhangelskoye, where his dacha was located, and freely reach the White House.
Ending in the next issue.
SWEDE Vladislav Nikolaevich, born in Moscow.
Since 1947 he lived in Lithuania. Since 1990, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania/CPSU, member of the CPSU Central Committee. Chairman of the Civil Committee of the Lithuanian SSR, which defended the rights of the Russian-speaking population. Member of the Lithuanian Armed Forces.
In December 1991, he refused to change his citizenship, was deprived of his mandate as a deputy of the Seimas and was arrested. Due to lack of evidence and under the influence of public opinion, he was released.
In 1998-2000 - Chief of Staff of the State Duma Committee on Labor and Social Policy. Active State Councilor of the Russian Federation, 3rd class. In 1996-2000 was deputy chairman of the LDPR. Author of the book “Katyn. Modern history of the issue" (2012).
