As a result of the entire land company, Japan was able to retain almost the entire southern part of Manchuria.
The failures of the Russian troops in the distant Far East caused anger and pain among the entire people. The terrible news of the defeats of the Russian troops stirred up the Russian public in protest. The majority of sane people could clearly see all the perniciousness of the unleashed massacre, the whole weight of which fell with an unbearable burden on the shoulders of a simple Russian artisan and peasant.
Trying to somehow calm public opinion, the tsarist government was forced to admit the mediocrity of the Russian high command and, first of all, General A.R. Kuropatkin. He was even tried after the war, but he got off with a slight fright, being dismissed. The Japanese, too, were mortally tired of bloody battles with Russian soldiers. After the battle of Mukden, General Kuropatkin A.N. was replaced by Linevich N.L. But by that time, none of the belligerents was already physically unable to conduct active hostilities.
Back in October 1904 and February 1905, in order to support our forces in the Far East, the 2nd Pacific squadron was sent from the city of Liepaja in the Baltic to the theater of operations. The squadron went to sea on October 2 under the command of Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. The squadron consisted of different types of ships: both combat and auxiliary. In the wake formation were 7 squadron battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 5 cruisers, 5 auxiliary cruisers, which were just lightly armed commercial steamers and 8 destroyers.
The squadron of Rozhdestvensky Z.P., having passed along the shores of Western Europe and rounded the western coast of Africa, on March 3, 1905, stood at the island of Madagascar to replenish fuel and water supplies. Here the squadron of Rozhdestvensky Z.P. already awaiting a detachment of ships under the command of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. consisting of 4 battleships, 3 cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers and 2 destroyers, which by a shorter route through the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea arrived in Madagascar on January 27, 1905.
In connection with the dramatically changed situation after the surrender of Port Arthur, without taking into account the real situation that had developed by that time in other sectors of hostilities, the squadron was assigned a task that did not correspond to its capabilities: to break through to Vladivostok and ensure dominance not only in the battle area, but also in the whole Sea of Japan.
Having united and replenished the holds with coal and fresh water, the second Pacific squadron crossed the Indian Ocean, passed along the coast of Indonesia, and in 7 months of an unprecedented campaign for that time, having overcome over 18,000 miles of water space in May 1905, approached the Korea Strait, separating Korea and Japan ... In the narrowest part of it, between the islands of Tsushima and Iki, the squadron was already awaiting the Japanese ships deployed for battle under the command of Admiral Togo. Haihachiro Togo was not a genius of naval combat, but the circumstances and military strength, as well as the proximity of his native shores, which allowed his squadrons to replenish their resources, made his naval armada a formidable force capable of successfully resisting the 2nd Pacific squadron of the Rozhdestvensky Z.P. In addition, the Japanese ships had a higher speed, and therefore more maneuverability. Their personnel were better trained, while the Russian sailors in a hastily formed squadron had only about two months to train. The fatigue from the long swimming also affected. The Japanese gunners had at their disposal shells stuffed with shimosa. Exploding inside the ship, they not only hit people with fire and shrapnel, but also emitted a suffocating gas. Russian artillerymen, glorified throughout the world for their accuracy, used shells with a Brink fuse,
who assured: "Regarding our artillery, you can be calm - it is certainly higher than the Japanese."
But in reality, in battle, everything turned out to be different. The accuracy of the Russian gunners was much higher than that of the Japanese, but Russian shells, hitting the enemy, for the most part pierced the ship through and through and only then exploded. This greatly reduced their destructive power. The Japanese themselves later admitted: "If your shells had the same explosive power as ours, the result of the battle could end in disaster for us." The Japanese were amazed at the resilience of the Russian ships, which continued to fight, with terrible destruction of the hulls and fires in the superstructures.
In addition, the Russian squadron was tied in a maneuver by a detachment of transports, auxiliary and hospital ships. The Japanese squadron, being near its bases, was not burdened with all this. In this battle, two seemingly incompatible extremes were combined: the general weakness of Russian equipment, in comparison with the Japanese, and the heroic valor of Russian naval crews.
Commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron, Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky together with his headquarters and the commanders of the flagships, he did not have the necessary training to lead a combat operation on such a scale as the Battle of Tsushima. And he did not believe in victory. Even before the squadron left Liepaja, he said: “The Russian public, excited by newspaper insinuations, blindly believed in my success. But I am aware of what fate has in store on the paths of our wanderings. You shouldn't have started this hopeless business at all. But how can I refuse to lead the squadron if the whole country believes in my victory? " And the squadron withdrew from anchors and went on a long voyage towards death.
The battle of Tsushima began on May 27, 1905 at about 2 pm The Japanese, moving in wake formation led by the battleship Mikaza, on which Admiral Togo held his flag, concentrated all their firepower on the Russian battleships. Within half an hour, the battleship "Oslyabya" was out of action and soon died. The Japanese concentrated their fire on the battleship "Suvorov", where the squadron commander ZP Rozhdestvensky was stationed. The Russian battleship fought back courageously, causing significant damage to the Japanese ships. But the forces were not equal and, having lost control, the battleship left the battle formation. In addition, Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was seriously wounded. Because of this, the Russian squadron lost its harmony of control and the battle was broken up into duels of individual Russian ships with superior enemy forces. The battle continued even at sunset. At night, the attacks of the Japanese destroyers inflicted especially heavy damage on the Russian squadron. As a result of day and night battles, the Russian squadron as an organized, combat-ready force ceased to exist. 4 newest battleship battleships and one old one were sunk. 4 battleships and 1 destroyer from the detachment under the command of N.I. Nebogatov. They were forced to surrender to the superior forces of the enemy. 1 destroyer and 3 cruisers went to foreign ports and were interned there. Only 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers broke through to Vladivostok.
As a result of the Tsushima battle, the Russian squadron lost over 5 thousand people killed. 27 warships were sunk, surrendered and interned. The Japanese squadron also suffered serious losses, but they were significantly less. The Battle of Tsushima is the largest defeat of the Russian fleet in the entire history of its development. And although the Russian sailors showed unparalleled heroism, dedication and fearlessness in the Tsushima battle, fighting in difficult conditions against a well-prepared and numerically superior enemy, the inept leadership of the high command, backwardness in weapons and technical support led to such a deplorable result. The Tsushima battle was defeated, first of all, by the tsarist government with its military department, but not by the heroism and staunchness of the Russian sailor. Lenin V.I. quite accurately described the Tsushima battle as a military collapse of the Russian autocracy.
In the land theater of operations, after Mukden, there were practically no active hostilities. Both opposing sides by this time were exhausted both morally and financially. This was especially felt among the Japanese. In the Russian army, moreover, after a series of defeats caused primarily by inept command, a noticeable decay and growth of anti-government sentiments began not only among the soldiers, but also among the officers. The obvious uselessness of this war, which was being waged far from Russia, in unfamiliar territory, was becoming clearer and clearer.
In Japan, they realized the futility of the planned enterprise much earlier. Back in the summer of 1904, even before the fall of Port Arthur, Tokyo, sensing the threat of impending crises, both military, financial, and, what was especially frightening, political, secretly began to probe the ground for peace. Through secondary channels of diplomacy, the Russian minister Witte was invited to meet with Japanese representatives somewhere in a European resort and start negotiations for peace. And although the Japanese victory at Tsushima further revived the spirit of the most vulgar chauvinism in the country, the Japanese government realized that their policy had reached a dead end. And not only entered, but also began to offend the political interests of powerful patrons, who throughout the entire period of hostilities provided Japan with significant assistance, both with strategic materials and military.
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, the White House in Washington began to feel more and more anxiety. President of the United States Theodore Roosevelt has always really wanted Russia and Japan to fight "until both powers are completely exhausted, and then peace will come on conditions that will not create any yellow or Slavic danger." Many years later, his words were almost exactly repeated by the British leader Winston Churchill when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. Theodore Roosevelt, supporting Japan, wished to weaken Russia's positions in the Far East, which he considered a zone of his interests. But when Russia lost almost all of its navy, it became unprofitable for the United States to strengthen Japan in this area of the globe. In a historical perspective, Roosevelt already saw the future Japanese naval threat to both Russia and America, which happened during the Second World War.
Immediately after the Tsushima battle, Japan turned to the United States with a request for mediation from the world. The Russian autocracy, frightened by the impending revolution and general discontent in the country with the results of the Far Eastern campaign, agreed to sit down at the negotiating table. The negotiations took place in the American city of Portsmouth. On September 5, 1905, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was signed between Russia and Japan. Under this agreement, the Russian government ceded the southern part of Sakhalin Island to Japan and renounced the right to lease the Kwantung Peninsula with Port Arthur and the South Manchurian Railway. Likewise, the Russian government recognized the "special" interests of Japan in Korea. As you can see, the signing of such an agreement did not bring victory laurels to the Russian state and did not raise its prestige in the world.
If we judge the Russo-Japanese war from the point of view of tactics and strategy of military operations, then it showed that by that time significant changes had taken place in this direction in the art of war, which were not taken into account in time by either the tsarist government or the military department.
The conduct of hostilities in a theater of war so remote from the center showed the significantly increased role of the rear and the reliability of railway transport.
The experience of the war has shown that the number of armies involved in hostilities has increased dramatically. The width of the front of hostilities also increased. In battle, the value of the fire strike has increased. Especially machine guns, as a mobile means of fire impact on the infantry. Artillery has learned to hit the enemy from closed positions, the importance of heavy artillery has grown, capable of crushing enemy fortifications with its shells.
The war no longer required the troops to bury themselves in the ground, digging trenches, but also to build complex engineering positions, which required greater mechanization of troops and the creation of fairly large engineering units.
In the course of hostilities, the infantry abandoned the closed formation and began to use the loose formation, adapting to the surrounding terrain. The special benefit of such a system became clearly visible with the massive use of machine guns.
In naval combat, high-speed cruisers and destroyers began to play an important role. The tactics and strategy of naval combat have also undergone significant changes.
The bitter experience of the Russian-Japanese war was taken into account in the reorganization of the army and navy, which was carried out in 1908-10.
The weakness of the military-economic potential of tsarist Russia, the backwardness of the army and navy from the advanced military technologies of that time, mediocrity and poor training of the senior command personnel - these are the main reasons for Russia's defeat in this, short in time, but very large in terms of the damage suffered and the country's prestige, war ...
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Kemerovo Technological Institute of Food Industry
Department of Russian History
abstract
Topic: "Russian - Japanese War 1904-1905."
Completed:
Checked:
Kemerovo 2011
Content.
Introduction ……………………………………………………………… ..... ..... 3
- Russia by the beginning of the war …………………………………………………… 5
Events of the Russo-Japanese War:
b) naval battles (Tsushima) ……………………………………… ...… ... 12
c) results (Portsmouth world). ………………………………………………… .16
Conclusion ……………………………………………. ……………………… ... 18
References. ……………………. ……………………………………… .20
Appendix ………………………………………………………………… .21
Introduction.
On January 26 (February 8), 1904, the Japanese navy made a surprise attack on the ships of the Russian army near Port Arthur. This was the beginning of one of the most unsuccessful military campaigns in Russian history. In a matter of days at the end of January, the young Japanese Empire managed to gain a total advantage over the Pacific squadron of the Russian army. I think that it was this war that marked the beginning of the collapse of our country as an autocratic empire. No matter how loud it sounds, it seems to me that it was with the beginning of the Russian-Japanese war that a series of terrible wars began. This war lasted only a year and a half, but how many lives it took (220 thousand people). Many historians argue that the scale and world significance of the Russo-Japanese War is inferior to the First and Second World Wars. What were the reasons for the war?
The main reason for the war was the contradictions between the imperialist powers in the Far East. The governments of Russia and Japan sought to seize Korea, Manchuria and other strategically and economically important territories. To stop Russia from advancing in the Far East, to break the established Russian-Chinese ties, to subordinate Korea and, in the future, China to its autocratic control - these are the main reasons for the Russian-Japanese war.
The Japanese Empire, which was born on November 9, 1867, was a young, rapidly developing state at the end of the 19th century. In Japan, by this time, the new government set a course for the modernization of the country. The cabinet of Taro Katsura came to power, which was more belligerent towards Russia. By the mid-1890s, she switched to a policy of foreign expansion. During the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan inflicted a crushing defeat on China. The Shimonoseki Treaty, signed at the end of the war, recorded China's renunciation of all rights to Korea and the transfer of a number of territories to Japan, including the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria.
In 1895, a program for the accelerated development of the armed forces was adopted in Japan. In 1897-1899, the cost of building a navy reached astronomical levels - one third of the state budget. The main problem of the state was its small territory. Hence the main direction of foreign policy - wars of conquest. The first such campaign was carried out by the Japanese already in 1894, having won several islands from neighboring China.
At this very time, the internal political situation in Russia was heating up - the first Russian revolution was not far off. The well-being of the people did not increase, but dissatisfaction with the authorities grew. Naturally, in Japan, knowing this, they went to extreme measures - military action. Another important reason was the desire of the government of the Land of the Rising Sun to win back Russian Empire strategically important ports on the Pacific coast.
Russia by the beginning of the war.
For Nicholas II, the war with Japan was an inevitable milestone in the development of Russia's fundamental interests in the Far East. In the XIX century. Russian pioneers began active development of the Far East. In 1858, the right bank of the Amur was officially ceded to Russia under the Aigun Treaty concluded with the Qing Empire. This agreement recorded the transfer of the modern Primorsky Territory to Russia, on the territory of which Vladivostok was founded in 1860. In 1855, the Shimoda Treaty was concluded with Japan, according to which the Kuril Islands north of Iturup Island were declared the possessions of Russia, and Sakhalin was declared joint possession of the two countries.
After defeating China in 1895, Japan's ruling circles sought to strengthen their presence in Korea. Therefore, the end of the Japanese-Chinese war (1894-1895) gradually developed into preparations for a war with Russia.
Japan hoped to oust Russia from Korea and Manchuria, to secure the Liaodong Peninsula, which it received from China as a result of the war.
However, the strengthening of Japan under the roof of England and the United States did not suit not only Russia, but also France and Germany. As a result, Russia, Germany and France achieved changes in the terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty. The Tripartite Intervention, undertaken with the participation of Russia, led to Japan's abandonment of the Liaodong Peninsula, and then to the transfer of it to Russia in 1898 for lease use. On March 15, 1898, a convention was signed between Russia and China, according to which the ice-free ports of the Liaodong Peninsula, Port Arthur and Dalny were leased to Russia. In addition, it was allowed to lay a railway to these ports from one of the points of the Chinese-Eastern Railway (K.V.Zh.D.). Both sides benefited substantially from the construction of the railway. Russia significantly strengthened its positions in the Far East, and China, receiving firm guarantees of armed protection against a real new aggression by Japan, could begin the economic development of the vast Manchurian region.
Regular traffic along the entire highway began on July 13, 1903. The city of Harbin became the administrative and technical center of the CER.
In early 1896, Russia and the Chinese Empire entered into a defensive alliance against Japan.
The construction by Russia of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway, the lease of Port Arthur and the strengthening of the general influence of Russia were equally contrary to the interests of Japan and Great Britain.
Of course, Great Britain was not going to fight Russia itself, this "honorable role" was left to Japan. On January 30, 1902, England and Japan signed a treaty of alliance, which became a major victory for Japanese foreign policy. The treaty gave Japan the opportunity to start a war with Russia, confident that no power would provide Russia with armed support. Many countries rightly feared war not only with Japan, but also with England. At the same time, financial assistance from England was also provided to Japan. As a result of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, England was able to deliver a serious blow to Russia with the help of Japan. But it wasn't just Britain that helped Japan. The United States also viewed Russia as its main rival in the Pacific. It was with these allies that Japan received the necessary neutrality. Even Germany longed for a war between Russia and Japan, because she hoped that the war would divert the forces of the Russian army from Europe.
Nevertheless, Russia found an ally. France, which did not approve of the diversion of Russian forces to the Far East. As a result, on March 20, 1902, Russia and France published a general declaration, which, however, did not oblige France to anything serious.
But Japan did not calm down - it received powerful support. Therefore, it demanded that not only Korea, but also Manchuria be recognized as a sphere of "special" interests. It is clear that this was a provocation. Of course, the Russian side could not satisfy this demand. Russia still didn’t want to see any serious enemy in Japan.
However, at that time a very difficult situation developed in Russia.
The country was in a fever, it was on the verge of a civil revolution. The government actually split into two camps - "aggressive" and "moderate". The first of them, among whose members were the Minister of Internal Affairs VK Pleve, the Secretary of State A. M. Bezobrazov, the governor of the tsar in the Far East E. I. Alekseev, was called the “Bezobrazovskaya clique”. These persons, who had tremendous influence and power, openly pushed Nicholas II on the path of seizing the territories of China and believed that the war with Japan would be in Russia's favor, as it would strengthen the position of power within the country. Perhaps, if Russia won the war, this would have happened, but, unfortunately or fortunately, Japan's victory led to completely different consequences.
Another camp, the core of which was the chairman of the committee of ministers S. Yu. Witte, the minister of foreign affairs V. N. Lamzdorf, the minister of war A. N. Kuropatkin, believed that the time of war for Russia, due to the unpreparedness of the country and the armed forces, was not yet has come, it is necessary to make temporary concessions to Japan. These contradictions deprived Russia's policy of integrity, and although, after a long debate, Russia agreed to make a number of concessions and continue negotiations, it was already too late. In Japan, by that time, the "war party" had won. Otherwise, everything is trite. A note sent by the Russian government on February 3 was deliberately delayed by telegraph in Nagasaki until February 7, and on February 6, in accordance with the decision on January 30 to start the war, the Japanese fleet entered the Yellow Sea.
Military operations on land.
By the beginning of the war, Russian troops in the Far East numbered only about 100 thousand people, including in the regular troops: officers - 2 thousand 985 and lower ranks - 89 thousand 470, in the Cossack troops: officers - 264 and lower ranks - 5 thousand 116. The troops of the Amur District were brought together in the 1st and 2nd Siberian corps.
Unlike Russia, by 1904 Japan was ready for action. By this time it was already a completely renewed state. Japan had a developed industry and transportation. With the help of its Western allies, Japan has built a strong navy. In general, the Japanese army and navy, with proper training, significantly outnumbered the Russian forces.
Taking advantage of the insufficient preparedness of the Russian army and navy for combat operations, the Japanese fleet on the night of January 27 (from February 8 to 9), 1904, without declaring war, suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, knocking out the battleships "Retvizan", "Tsesarevich" and the cruiser "Pallada". This was the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.
The Japanese military command believed that it was necessary to destroy the Russian Pacific Fleet and seize its main base in the Far East - Port Arthur. Therefore, the first part of the Japanese war plan was the blockade of Port Arthur from land and sea, its capture and destruction of the Port Arthur squadron. The second part of the Japanese plan was to destroy the Russian ground forces in Manchuria and thereby force Russia to abandon the further continuation of hostilities.
Russia's plan was passive. The Russian command assumed to defend for a long period (7 months), and then, after concentrating superior forces in Manchuria, go on the offensive. The plans of action of the Russian land army and the navy were not coordinated.
On August 6, the first assault began, which lasted 5 days. Hot fights
deployed in the Western sector behind the Uglovaya mountain, in the Northern - at the Vodoprovodny and Kuminersky redoubts, and especially in the Eastern - behind redoubts No. 1 and No. 2. On the night of August 10-11, Japanese units broke through to the rear of the main line of the Russian defense. Russian infantry and companies of sailors swiftly counterattacked from different directions. After about half an hour, the remnants of the Japanese troops were forced to flee. Thus, the first assault on Port Arthur ended in the defeat of the Japanese, one of the reasons for which was the remarkable accuracy of the night firing of Russian artillery. Noga's army lost 15 thousand soldiers, some parts ceased to exist. The Japanese were forced to go over to a long siege of the fortress.
On August 12, enemy engineering battalions entered the front lines. In late August - early September, siege work made significant progress. During this time, the enemy's artillery regiment was replenished with eleven-inch siege howitzers. The Nogi divisions, which had thinned out during the August assault, were replenished with 16 thousand soldiers and officers and, in addition, 2 sapper companies. In turn, the defenders of Port Arthur improved their defenses. Thanks to the installation of new naval batteries, the number of artillery in September increased to 652 barrels. The expenditure of shells was reimbursed by the fleet, and on September 1, 1904, the fortress had 251,428 rounds. A stubborn struggle unfolded for the dominant heights Long and High,
which were important in the defense system of the fortress. The assaults on these heights followed one after another. The enemy's human forces in the main direction of the strike outnumbered the defense by about 3 times, and in some areas - up to 10 times. When repelling attacks, the Russians widely used a number of new means of struggle, including mortars invented by midshipman S.N. Vlasyev. After four days of fierce fighting, the Japanese managed to capture the Long Mountain.
The attacks on Mount Vysokaya on September 6-9, during which the losses of the Japanese amounted to 5 thousand soldiers and officers, ended in vain. The Russians lost 256 people killed and 947 wounded. This ended the second assault on the fortress.
On October 17, after a 3-day artillery preparation, the Japanese carried out the third assault on the fortress, which lasted 3 days. All enemy attacks were repulsed by Russian troops with huge losses for him.
On November 13, Japanese troops (over 50 thousand people) undertook the fourth assault. They were courageously opposed by the Russian garrison, which by this time totaled 18 thousand people. Particularly heavy fighting took place over Mount Vysokaya, which fell on November 22. Having occupied the Vysokaya mountain, the enemy proceeded to shell the city and the harbor from 11-inch howitzers. Having received numerous damages, the battleship "Poltava" sank on November 22. November 23 - the battleship Retvizan. November 24 - battleships Peresvet and Pobeda, cruiser Pallada. The cruiser "Bayan" was badly damaged. On December 2, the hero of the defense, General, was killed with a group of officers.
Kondratenko. This was a great loss for the defenders of the fortress. Although after the death of the squadron, the situation of the besieged greatly deteriorated, the garrison was ready to continue the struggle. The combat-ready units were still holding the defense, 610 guns (of which 284 were naval) could fire, there were 207 855 shells (there was not enough large caliber), there was no acute need for bread and breadcrumbs, out of 59 fortified units of the fortress no more than 20 were lost (Sorokin A.I. Foka December 20, 1904 (January 2, 1905 new style) Port Arthur was handed over to the Japanese, for no apparent reason.
After the fall of Port Arthur, the Japanese command concentrated all troops (five armies) against the main forces of the Russian army located south of Mukden. The Japanese command planned to cover the Russian troops from both flanks, surround them and destroy them. On February 23, 1905, Japanese troops launched an offensive and forced the Russian army to retreat in the general battle at Mukden, which was fought on more than a 100-kilometer front and lasted three weeks. The Battle of Mukden was the last battle in this war. The Russian high command was in complete confusion. By March 7, the Russians had lost hope of renewing their offensive and fought for Mukden. The 3rd Japanese Army advanced north of Mukden to cut General Kuropatkin off the railroad linking the Manchu armies with European Russia. If you cut this line, the war will be lost for the Russians.
On March 9, Thursday, the decisive phase of the battle began. A violent storm broke out. By the end of the day, the Russian positions were almost hopeless. The attacks were weak and late, and the Japanese boldly went hand-to-hand. In the east, the troops of General Kuroki's 1st Army approached the railway, which meant for the Russians the danger of encirclement in Mukden, from where they could not leave or receive reinforcements. At six forty-five in the evening on March 9, General Kuropatkin ordered the Russian armies to make a general retreat along the railway to Telin. The Russian army reached Telin with terrible human and property losses. The Japanese continued to put pressure on the entire front, and on March 12, General Kuropatkin ordered to continue the retreat to the city of Sypingai. It lasted ten days. The Japanese now stopped pursuing and took up positions several miles north and east of Thelin. In heavy battles, the Russian army lost 90 thousand people (killed, wounded and captured) out of 350 thousand who participated in the battle; the Japanese army lost 75 thousand people (killed, wounded and captured) out of 300 thousand. After that, the war on land began to subside and took on a positional character.
“From the first day I was outraged by this coup in the hearts of our army, it did not want to resist! .. She retreated without looking back! .. World War - Chief of Staff of Commander-in-Chief Nicholas II).
The plan of the Japanese command was not implemented: instead of the defeat of the Russian army, it was forced out to the north. At the same time, the Japanese army suffered such heavy losses that it turned out to be completely incapable of further active actions. After the Mukden battle, active hostilities on land ceased.
Naval battles. Tsushima.
The last hope of the Russian government for success in the war was the transfer of a squadron of ships from Baltic Sea under the leadership of the chief of the main naval headquarters Vice-Admiral ZP Rozhdestvensky to the Pacific Ocean.
The idea of strengthening our fleet in the Pacific Ocean arose with the beginning of the war.
According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table:
From a comparison of these figures, it can be seen that the Japanese ships were better armored and had a higher speed. The artillery on Japanese ships was twice as fast as the Russian, which allowed the Japanese to throw out significantly large quantity shells in one minute.
On April 12, 1904, Adjutant General Vice Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky was appointed to command the Russian squadron. A hero of the Russo-Turkish war, he enjoyed a reputation in the navy as a man with a difficult but strong character as a commander, who knew his job, a stern but just executor of the law.
Qualitatively, the squadron of Admiral Rozhdestvensky was weak. In its composition, she had old ships of various types and unarmored cruisers, half of which, in terms of their slow speed, were not suitable even for reconnaissance. The 3rd Squadron was even worse, and its ships, even older, even more diverse, were justly called "galoshes" by someone.
In Tangier, the 2nd squadron split up: 5 battleships and 2 armored cruisers went around Africa, and the rest of the ships headed through the Suez Canal. The entire squadron reunited in Nossibey, Madagascar, on December 24, 1904. Here it was already awaited by the sad news of the fall of Port Arthur and the destruction of the entire 1st Pacific squadron.
On April 25, off the coast of Anam, the 3rd squadron linked up with the 2nd. Having replenished coal reserves, the squadron moved north, heading for the Korea Strait. The passage through the Korea Strait had only the convenience that already near Shanghai it was possible to release all the transports that linked the speed of the squadron and required a strong convoy in battle. Probably, this consideration also tilted the course of the squadron to the Korea Strait. Unfortunately, the habit of half-measures affected and here and destroyed, and this is the only advantage of the chosen path. On May 12, only a few transports were released to Shanghai; some of them ("Anadyr", "Irtysh", "Kamchatka", "Korea", tugboats "Rus", and "Svir") remained with the squadron and to protect them, in case of battle, Admiral Rozhestvensky separated all the cruisers and thus weakened combat forces of the squadron for 36 6 "" guns and 29 120-mm.
The next day after that, May 13, the presence of enemy ships near the enemy was first discovered. Mine attacks were expected at night; but the Japanese took care of their destroyers "to finish us off after the battle."
And then his day has come. At 5 o'clock in the morning on May 14, our squadron entered the Tsushima Strait in two columns. The squadron was already in battle formation north of the island of Tsushima. At 1 hour 55 minutes. of the day he gave her the order to start the battle and raised the signal: “The fate of the empire depends on the result of the battle. Let everyone exert all their strength. "
And while our squadron was beginning to rebuild from a marching formation into a combat formation - in one column, the Japanese ships had just opened their fire, concentrating it on our lead ships, and confused our entire maneuver. On our ships, littered with coal and having a lot of wood in their composition, fires began. The head of the squadron, Admiral Rozhestvensky, who was on it, was seriously wounded in the head at the very beginning of the battle and, in a semi-conscious state, was transferred to the destroyer "Buyny". The command of the squadron passed to Rear Admiral Nebogatov, but it was no longer possible to control the battle. The order of battle did not exist. Our ships rushed about under a hail of enemy shells, burned and sank. The ships fought honestly to the last opportunity and died heroically.
By the morning of May 15, under the command of Admiral Nebogatov, only 1 cruiser - "Izumrud" and 4 battleships remained. The rest of the surviving ships separately broke through either to Vladivostok or to neutral ports.
At dawn on May 15, the ships of Nebogatov's detachment noticed haze on the horizon. It was assumed that these were our lagging ships. But at about 8 o'clock in the morning it became clear that the "haze" were enemy ships. There were 28 of them. Some of them, having rounded our detachment, crossed its course and by 10 o'clock surrounded it. The Japanese were the first to open fire from a distance of about 60 cables. Our ships did not answer: their guns were powerless for this distance. The Japanese, however, did not come closer. Then, after a short meeting of the admiral with the ranks of his staff and the officers of his flagship, on the "Nicholas I", and after him on other ships, white flags were raised. And the remnants of our "armada" surrendered.
In this battle, the failure of the high command of the squadron was fully revealed.
1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, did not prepare his ships for battle.
2) There was no battle plan.
3) There was no intelligence.
4) The leadership of the battle and the transfer of command were not organized.
5) The Russian squadron entered the battle at a disadvantage, only the lead ships could shoot.
6) The combination of new and old ships in one wake column made it impossible to use the most powerful ships.
7) Maneuvering in one wake column, allowed the Japanese to carry out head coverage.
8) Incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron helped the Japanese destroyers successfully attack the Russians.
9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having made a seven-month transition.
With regard to the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:
1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modern technically equipped and faster and better trained.
2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.
However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in battle:
1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized. Because of this, the Russian battleships broke away from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.
2) The deployment of the Japanese destroyers was incomplete. Admiral Nebogatov's maneuver brought down their crews, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.
The results of the attacks show insufficient training of destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three hit the same ship.
So, as a result of the Tsushima battle, almost all Russian ships were sunk. The outcome of the war became obvious. The Tsushima disaster made the most difficult impression on everyone. The Russian fleet was virtually destroyed. Tsushima became a shameful page in Russian military history and hurt the national pride of the people.
The Japanese lost only 3 destroyers, 116 killed and 538 wounded; the rest of their ships were more or less seriously damaged, but none of them was rendered unusable. This is how the superiority of the Japanese squadron over ours really affected the battle.
However, Japan was economically depleted. Human resources have been exhausted, among the prisoners there were old people and children. Japan was unable to continue hostilities. Russia could not continue them either.
Results. Portsmouth Peace Treaty
Everyone understood that peace talks were needed. They began immediately after Tsushima. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, assumed the role of mediator.
The first commissioner of Nicholas II was S. Yu. Witte. And the very next day, he received the appropriate instructions: in no case to agree to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia has never paid in history, and not to give "an inch of Russian land." The tsarist government was in a hurry to make peace with Japan in order to free its hands to fight the revolution.
The entire Japanese press dictated the following peace terms: three billion in indemnity, the annexation of Sakhalin, Kamchatka, the Ussuriysk Territory, the Primorsky Region, the lease of Liaodong and Port Arthur, the demolition of the Vladivostok fortifications, and the ownership of the East China Railway. etc.
The news of such demands from Japan worried, of course, Russian society. To all their patriotic appeals, the Sovereign Emperor deigned to answer: “The Russian people can rely on Me. I will never conclude a world that is shameful or unworthy of great Russia. "
Meanwhile, Roosevelt, from a letter from the Emperor of Japan, knew very well
how much Japan needed an early peace. Only the firm position of our delegation forced Japan to moderate its demands. And in view of the depletion of its resources, Japan feared a resumption of hostilities.
And so, after numerous disputes and discussions, on August 23, at 15.47, the peace treaty was signed by the representatives of both parties.
Under this agreement, Japan received freedom of action in Korea, the southern part of Liaodong with Port Arthur and Dalny, the southern part of Sakhalin, fishing rights north of Vladivostok and reimbursement of the costs of maintaining prisoners of war. Manchuria is subject to its simultaneous purification, and commercial equality of all nations is established in it; East China Railway is divided between Russia and Japan and a trade agreement is renewed between them.
Many in Japan were dissatisfied with the peace treaty: Japan received less territory than expected - for example, only part of Sakhalin, and not all, and most importantly, did not receive monetary contributions. Japan was dealing with a country that, throughout its history, had never paid an indemnity.
In his memoirs, Witte admitted: "It was not the Japanese who defeated Russia, not the Russian army, but our order, or, more correctly, our boyish management of the 140 million population in recent years."
The terms of the treaty were much closer to the Russian than the Japanese peace program, so in Japan this peace treaty was greeted with open discontent. But the European powers and the United States were pleased with the conclusion of the treaty.
And only after the defeat of Japan in World War II and its surrender on September 2, 1945, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty became invalid.
Conclusion.
Yes, Russia suffered a severe defeat in the war with Japan. The underestimation of the opponent's forces and the mediocrity of the command also affected this. Everything is in it - and the unparalleled heroism of the soldiers, and the bitterness of defeat, and the betrayal of the top military leadership, and the shameful surrender of Port Arthur by General Stoessel. Russia found itself in diplomatic isolation. Britain and the United States took a pro-Japanese position, France declared neutrality and did not support its ally, Russia. The Russo-Japanese War drew a line under Russia's long-term geographic expansion. Japan's victory in the war put it on a par with the great European powers.
However, one cannot fail to note the fact that there were still advantages. The war had a great influence on the development of the art of war.
At the same time, despite the seemingly obvious defeat of Russia, even today there is no single answer among historians to the question: was Russia defeated? Many argue that this was not the surrender of Russia, but the signing of an equal treaty
etc.................
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905
| Parameter name | Meaning |
| Topic of the article: | Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 |
| Rubric (thematic category) | History |
In search of an immediate pretext for the outbreak of war, the Japanese government, in agreement with Britain, proposed that Russia begin negotiations on the state of affairs in the Far East. The tsarist government agreed, not realizing that Japan was going to unleash a war. The military-feudal and capitalist elements, interested in new concessions and enterprises in the northeastern provinces of China and Korea, did not want to make concessions to Japan.
January 24, 1904 ᴦ. Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and actually began hostilities on the same day: the Japanese fleet entered the Yellow Sea on a combat mission. The Japanese command, taking into account the experience of the Sino-Japanese war, provided for the active development of operations at sea in order to achieve an advantage in forces and thereby ensure the unhindered transfer of its ground forces to the mainland. Great importance added surprise to the attack, although the Japanese fleet was already superior in strength, number and artillery weapons to the Russian Pacific squadron.
The war was lost. Having seized the Liaodong Peninsula, Korea and part of Manchuria in the first period of the war, Japan began to take measures to consolidate its military successes in a treaty manner, which cost it a colossal effort and huge losses. Even before the start of the peace talks in Portsmouth, Japan undertook a number of diplomatic actions in order to enlist the support of Britain and the United States in matters related to its demands on tsarist Russia, especially since, by providing Japan with loans and giving it political support, Britain and the United States acquired the right to a decisive vote also on issues of war and peace.
On the eve of the peace talks, the Japanese-American Katsura-Taft agreement was signed. Taft assured the Japanese side that the United States could not agree to an alliance, but even without such an agreement, the American people are so unanimous with the peoples of Japan and Great Britain in preserving peace in the Far East, and that under any circumstances Britain and Japan can count on concerted action with parties of the US government, as if the US were obliged to take these actions according to the treatyʼʼ. Korea was one of the main targets of Japanese claims. Japan had the official consent of the United States to seize Korea under a secret agreement. There was also an Anglo-Japanese deal on the question of Korea. Japan also pledged to guarantee the borders of India.
Long before the peace conference between Britain and the United States, the question of transferring the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur to Japan was also agreed. In August 1904 ᴦ. the Japanese government has developed a program of peaceful conditions: Russia recognizes Japan's right to freedom of action in Korea, Russian troops are withdrawn from Manchuria, Japan receives the Harbin-Port Arthur railroad and the Liaodong Peninsula. Depending “on the situation,” it was decided to insist on the coverage of military expenses by Russia, the cession of Sakhalin Island and the granting of Japan's rights to fish in the waters of Primorye. This maximum program with minor changes was preserved until the peace conference.
American diplomacy was actively preparing for the opening of Russian-Japanese talks. T. Roosevelt sought to ensure himself a leading role in the settlement of the Far East conflict, so that the peace treaty would meet the interests of the American monopoly to the greatest extent. After the defeat of Russia at Mukden, Japan's financial difficulties forced it to ask the United States to provide mediation services to it and achieve the opening of peace negotiations. Russia was in a different position.
In the context of the growing aggressiveness of German policy, the French government considered the further participation of Russia in the war in the Far East dangerous for France and was interested in an immediate end to the Russo-Japanese war. In January 1905 ᴦ. she made a proposal to convene an international conference, trying to play the role of a mediator in the settlement of the military conflict. But the French proposal was not supported by other powers. The de facto isolation of Russia in the international arena aggravated the difficulties facing the Russian delegation and could not but affect the results of the peace talks.
The conference opened on July 27, 1905 ᴦ. in Portsmouth. At the first business meeting, the Japanese side presented the terms of peace to the Russian commissioner. These conditions included the requirement to grant Japan a `` free hand '' in Korea, evacuation from Manchuria, transfer to Japan of the rights to lease the Liaodong Peninsula with Port Arthur and Dalny, transfer of Sakhalin, the South Manchurian Railroad, reimbursement of Japan's actual costs for the war, issuance of - all Russian warships stationed in neutral ports, limiting the naval forces in the Far East, granting Japanese nationals full fishing rights along the coast, in bays, harbors, bays, rivers of their possessions and in the Japanese, Okhotsk and Bering seas.
July 30, 1905 ᴦ. The Russian delegation submitted its response to the Japanese demands. He rejected four Japanese demands, namely, the concession of Sakhalin, the payment of military costs, the transfer of Russian warships that were in neutral ports, and the limitation of the naval forces in the Far East. The acceptance of the remaining points was also subject to a number of reservations. In the course of sharp and lengthy negotiations, the Japanese delegation agreed to conclude a peace without indemnity and leave the northern part of Sakhalin Island in the possession of Russia.
At a conference meeting in Portsmouth on 23 August 1905 ᴦ. the signing of the contract took place. It was ratified by both the Russian and Japanese emperors on October 1, 1905 ᴦ. Thus ended the war started by the Japanese militarists. Having previously established themselves on the Kuril Islands, this time, they tore away from Russia the southern half of Sakhalin - primordially Russian territory, an important outpost of Russia's defense in the Pacific Ocean. By attacking Russia, Japan tore up the treaties of 1855 ᴦ. and 1875 ᴦ. provided for the maintenance of good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries, thereby she lost any right to refer to them.
The transfer to Japan of the southern part of Sakhalin, an important strategic border of Russia in the Pacific Ocean, meant a serious defeat for the tsarist government. Along with this, Japan has consolidated its position in Korea. Japan-Korea Convention 1905 ᴦ. on Japan's control over foreign relations, Korea issued a Japanese protectorate over it. Later in 1910 ᴦ. the Japanese-Korean treaty on the annexation of Korea was signed.
The defeat of Tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War and the Portsmouth Peace Treaty led to significant changes in international relations and necessary predetermined the international situation in the Far East. Japanese militarism created the basis for its expansionist policy in the Far East.
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905." 2017, 2018.
history, with Stalin. It's no secret that the Westerners never loved us. But Khrushchev gave them such material, such arguments that discredited us for many years. " USSR. Poet A. Tvardovsky wrote in his diary: “A terrible month after the report on the cult - the head did not contain everything ... at least to the extent that it is accessible to people. "Whose position do you share? Write a short essay (essay-reflection) on the topic" Truth in history: "The darkness of low truths is dearer to us than we are elevating deception"
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Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905
In the 1904-1905 war, Russia and Japan fought for dominance in Northeast China and Korea. Japan started the war. In 1904, a Japanese fleet attacked Port Arthur. The defense of the city continued until the beginning of 1905. During the war, Russia suffered defeats in the battles on the Yalu River, near Liaoyang, on the Shahe River. In 1905, the Japanese defeated the Russian army in a general battle at Mukden, and the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The war ended with the signing of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905. Under the terms of the treaty, Russia recognized Korea as Japan's sphere of influence, ceded South Sakhalin to Japan and the rights to the Liaodong Peninsula with the cities of Port Arthur and Dalny. The defeat of the Russian army in the war was one of the prerequisites for the revolution of 1905-1907.
In the context of world politics:
At the end of the XIX - beginning of the XX century. the contradictions between the leading powers intensified, which by that time had completed mainly the territorial division of the world. The presence in the international arena of "new", rapidly developing countries - Germany, Japan, the United States, which purposefully sought the redistribution of colonies and spheres of influence - became more and more tangible. In the world rivalry of the great powers, Anglo-German antagonism gradually came to the fore. It was in this difficult situation saturated with international crises that Russian diplomacy acted at the turn of the century.
The basis of the autocracy's foreign policy was the Franco-Russian alliance, which guaranteed the western borders of the empire against the German threat and played the role of one of the most important elements of political equilibrium, neutralizing the influence and military power of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) on the European continent. Strengthening contacts with France - the main creditor of the tsarist government - was of significant importance for the autocracy for reasons of a financial and economic nature.
The arms race, which progressed as the contradictions between the great powers intensified, overextended Russia's forces, which forced Russian diplomacy to seek a way out of the current situation. Russia initiated the convening of the Hague "Peace Conference" held in 1899. True, the wishes regarding the limitation of armaments, adopted at the conference, in fact did not oblige its participants to anything. They signed a convention on the peaceful settlement of international disputes, signed a number of conventions and declarations that govern the rules of war.
At the same time, the autocracy took an active part in the struggle of the great powers for colonies and spheres of influence. In the Middle East, in Turkey, he increasingly had to deal with Germany, which chose this region as a zone of its economic expansion. In Persia, the interests of Russia clashed with the interests of England. The most important object of the struggle for the final division of the world at the end of the XIX century. was economically backward and militarily weak China. It is to the Far East that the center of gravity of the autocracy's foreign policy activity has been shifted since the mid-90s. The tsarist government's keen interest in the affairs of this region was largely due to the "appearance" of late XIX v. a strong and very aggressive neighbor in the face of Japan, which has embarked on the path of expansion.
After the victory in the war with China in 1894-1895. Japan, under a peace treaty, acquired the Liaodong Peninsula, Russia, having acted as a united front with France and Germany, forced Japan to abandon this part of Chinese territory. In 1896, a Russian-Chinese treaty was signed on a defensive alliance against Japan. China granted Russia a concession for the construction of a railway from Chita to Vladivostok through Manchuria (Northeast China). The right to build and operate the road was given to the Russian-Chinese Bank. The course towards the "peaceful" economic conquest of Manchuria was carried out in accordance with the line of S.Yu. Witte (it was he who largely determined the policy of the autocracy in the Far East at that time) to seize foreign markets for the developing domestic industry. Russian diplomacy in Korea has also achieved major successes. Japan, which established its influence in this country after the war with China, was forced in 1896 to agree to the establishment of a joint Russian-Japanese protectorate over Korea with the actual predominance of Russia. The victories of Russian diplomacy in the Far East caused widespread irritation in Japan, England and the United States.
Soon, however, the situation in the region began to change. Encouraged by Germany and following its example, Russia seized Port Arthur and in 1898 received it from China for lease along with some parts of the Liaodong Peninsula to set up a naval base. Attempts by S.Yu. Witte to prevent this action, which he regarded as contrary to the spirit of the Russian-Chinese treaty of 1896, were unsuccessful. The seizure of Port Arthur undermined the influence of Russian diplomacy in Beijing and weakened Russia's position in the Far East, forcing, in particular, the tsarist government to make concessions to Japan on the Korean issue. The Russian-Japanese agreement of 1898 actually sanctioned the seizure of Korea by Japanese capital.
In 1899, a powerful popular uprising ("boxing uprising") began in China, directed against foreigners who shamelessly ruled in the state. Russia, together with other powers, took part in suppressing this movement and occupied Manchuria during the hostilities. Russo-Japanese contradictions intensified again. Supported by Britain and the United States, Japan sought to oust Russia from Manchuria. In 1902 an Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded. Under these conditions, Russia agreed to an agreement with China and pledged to withdraw its troops from Manchuria within a year and a half.
Meanwhile, Japan, very belligerently minded, led matters to an aggravation of the conflict with Russia. There was no unity in the ruling circles of Russia on the issues of Far Eastern policy. S.Yu. Witte with his program of economic expansion (which, it is true, anyway pitted Russia against Japan) was opposed by the "obrazovskoy gang" headed by A.M. Bezobrazov, who advocated direct military seizures. The views of this group were also shared by Nicholas II, who dismissed S.Yu. Witte from the post of Minister of Finance. "Bezobrazovtsy" underestimated the strength of Japan. Some of the ruling circles viewed success in the war with their Far Eastern neighbor as the most important means of overcoming the internal political crisis.
Japan, for its part, was actively preparing for an armed clash with Russia. True, in the summer of 1903, the Russian-Japanese negotiations began on Manchuria and Korea, but the Japanese military machine, which had secured direct support from the United States and England, was already launched. On January 24, 1904, the Japanese ambassador presented Russian minister Foreign Affairs V.N. Lamzdorf a note about the break in diplomatic relations, and on the evening of January 26, the Japanese fleet attacked the Port Arthur squadron without declaring war. This is how the Russo-Japanese War began.
The balance of forces in the theater of operations was not in favor of Russia, which was due to both the difficulties of concentrating troops on the remote outskirts of the empire, and the sluggishness of the military and naval departments, and gross miscalculations in assessing the enemy's capabilities. From the very beginning of the war, the Russian Pacific squadron suffered serious losses. Having attacked the ships in Port Arthur, the Japanese attacked the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets in the Korean port of Chemulpo. After an unequal battle with 6 enemy cruisers and 8 destroyers, Russian sailors destroyed their ships so that they would not fall to the enemy. A heavy blow for Russia was the death of the commander of the Pacific squadron, the outstanding naval commander S.O. Makarov. The Japanese managed to win supremacy at sea and, having landed large forces on the continent, launched an offensive against the Russian troops in Manchuria and Port Arthur. The commander of the Manchurian army, General A.N. Kuropatkin, acted extremely indecisively. The bloody battle near Liaoyang, during which the Japanese suffered huge losses, was not used by them to go over to the offensive (which the enemy was extremely afraid of) and ended with the withdrawal of Russian troops. In July 1904, the Japanese laid siege to Port Arthur. The defense of the fortress, which lasted for five months, became one of the brightest pages of Russian military history. General R.I. Kondratenko, who died at the end of the siege, became the hero of the Port Arthur epic. The capture of Port Arthur cost the Japanese dearly, who lost more than 100 thousand people under its walls. At the same time, having taken the fortress, the enemy was able to strengthen his troops operating in Manchuria. The squadron stationed in Port Arthur was actually destroyed in the summer of 1904 in the course of unsuccessful attempts to break through to Vladivostok.
In February 1905, the Mukden battle took place, which took place on a more than 100-kilometer front and lasted three weeks. More than 550 thousand people with 2500 guns took part in it on both sides. In the battles near Mukden, the Russian army suffered a heavy defeat. After that, the war on land began to subside. The number of Russian troops in Manchuria was constantly increasing, but the morale of the army was undermined, which was greatly facilitated by the revolution that began in the country. The Japanese, who had suffered huge losses, were also not active.
On May 14-15, 1905, in the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fleet destroyed the Russian squadron, which had been transferred to the Far East from the Baltic. ZP Rozhestvensky commanded this squadron. The battle of Tsushima decided the outcome of the war. The autocracy, preoccupied with suppressing the revolutionary movement, could no longer continue the struggle. Japan was also extremely exhausted by the war. On July 27, 1905, peace negotiations began in Portsmouth (USA) with the mediation of the Americans. The Russian delegation, headed by S.Yu. Witte, managed to achieve relatively "decent" terms of the peace treaty. Russia ceded to Japan the southern part of Sakhalin, its lease rights to the Liaodong Peninsula and the South Manchurian railroad connecting Port Arthur with the Sino-Eastern Railway. The Russo-Japanese War ended with the defeat of the autocracy. Having undermined the authority of the authorities within the country, it at the same time weakened Russia's position in the international arena.
Used materials of the book: History of Russia from ancient times to the beginning of the XX century. Under. ed. I.Ya. Froyanova.
Notes (edit)
"Guarding" (Russian-Japanese War, 1904-1905). Destroyer of the 1st Pacific Squadron. Distinguished himself in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). February 26, 1904 returned with the destroyer "Resolute" to Port Arthur from naval intelligence... On this day, both ships were discovered and attacked by Japanese destroyers. "Resolute" was able to break away from the pursuit. "Guarding" had a slower speed and was surrounded by 6 Japanese destroyers. For more than two hours the crew of the "Guarding", headed by the seriously wounded lieutenant A.S. Sergeev heroically repelled their attacks. The ship lost its speed from direct hits, but continued to fight back, inflicting heavy damage on 2 destroyers. When almost all the crew members were killed and the artillery went out of order, the Japanese tried to take the half-submerged ship in tow. Russian sailors I. Bukharev and V. Novikov, not wanting to surrender the "Guarding", opened the kingstones and sank the ship (see Port Arthur).
Turenchen (Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905). Chinese settlement near the border with Korea. On April 18, 1904, a battle took place in his area between the Russian Eastern Detachment and the 1st Japanese Army.
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For the preparation of this work were used materials from the site hrono.rspu.ryazan.ru/
