Last news. Ukrainian invasion of Crimea: they can poke their heads, but they will get it in full

HOW THE US GATHERED THE RUSSIAN INVASION IN THE CRIMEA. HOW OUR GENERAL STAFF OUTSTANDED 16 AMERICAN INTELLIGENCES

(Excerpt from the documentary and fiction story of the military observer "KP" Viktor Barantz "The Return of Crimea")

MARCH 24, 2014 THE WALL STREET JORNEL NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE HOW THE US HAS SCATCHED THE RUSSIAN INVASION IN THE CRIMEA. JOURNALISTS Anam ENTUS, DZHULIANBARNS And Siobhan Gorman echidnas admire the Kremlin, which has managed to cleverly cheat the White House and the Mother ANALYSTS impressively CORPORATION American intelligence following the peninsula and the Russian Army maneuvers near the border of Ukraine.

On the same day, on his way to the White House, US President Barack Obama listened to a Washington radio station in his car. The Cheerful Announcer announced a press review. And her partner began to read excerpts from fresh newspapers. He began with quotes from the Wall Street Journal:

✔ “US military satellites spied on the milling Russian troops within range of Crimea last month. But intelligence analysts were surprised by the ensuing events: after all, they did not intercept any messages that Russian leaders and the military would exchange on the eve of the "invasion."

✔ "Representatives of the American intelligence have come to a disappointing conclusion: Russian experts may have advanced in technology and hid from American wiretapping."

At that moment, the government communication telephone began to buzz in the president's limousine. The call was from James Clapper, director of US National Intelligence. He asked to appoint him an audience:

This is a very serious matter, Mr. President. I need to inform you today, Mr. President ...

"BARAK, I HAVE BAD NEWS ..."

Obama made an appointment for Clapper for the afternoon. Arriving at the White House, the first thing the president did was to look through the digest of the latest American press (it was prepared by the assistants to the White House press secretary, Jay Carney). The President wanted to read the very article in the Wall Street Journal, which got into the radio station's review, about how the Russians managed to fool the United States and recapture Crimea with a sudden military invasion.

Obama ordered no one to bother him until noon. Then he took off his jacket, relaxed his tie, and began to read. A burning feeling of wounded pride and the obsessive thought that Crimea had become his defeat tormented the president since late February, when Secretary of State John Kerry called in the middle of the night and said:

Barack, I have bad news. We are late. Putin took Crimea.

And for almost a month now, Obama has been trying to figure out how this humiliating bummer came about? Why didn't the giant American intelligence apparatus work? (See KP Help below.)

How did it happen that he, the president, was constantly kept abreast of Ukrainian events by dozens of assistants, advisers, consultants, ministers, politicians, ambassadors, military men, intelligence officers, and as a result - such a shameful loss to the Russians?

But in recent years, in the same Oval Office, scouts, army generals and naval admirals have repeatedly convinced the US president that the Russian army is a tattered bear with a rusty nuclear club, and arrogantly - right and between the lines - made it clear, if anything, we Let's make these Russians one left ...

And how many times last February Obama inquired from both James Clapper and Defense Minister Chuck Hagel whether Putin would risk sending his troops to Ukraine, but he never got a clear answer.

"NOT A WHITE HOUSE, BUT A PASSAGE YARD SOME."

The Wall Street Journal rustles under Obama's hand. The presidential finger slides along the lines. These journalists dug the problem well. We got to the knowledgeable informants. Here they write:

✔ “Interestingly enough, some senior intelligence officials told Barack Obama three days before the Crimean operation that Russia could take the peninsula so quickly that Washington would only know about it when everything was over.”

How would they know this? But it's true. How did the scribblers find out this? After all, the briefing with the heads of intelligence was closed ... Not the White House, but some kind of entrance. The next two paragraphs confirmed this:

✔ “On February 26, at a meeting with Obama, the Director of US National Intelligence James Clapper, and with him other intelligence leaders, put Crimea at the top of the agenda. According to their estimates, the Russian military is most likely preparing for an operation in Crimea. True, the American intelligence services had no evidence. The few intercepted messages from V. Putin and other Russian officials yielded nothing. Either the Russian leaders deliberately avoided the topic of "invasion", or they simply found a way to do it unnoticed by the United States. Another version: Mr. Putin decided to "seize Crimea" at the last minute and did not tell almost anyone about this, except those responsible for the operation. However, some officials from the United States and Great Britain believe that the plan for the seizure by Russia was prepared in advance. "

After reading this, Obama, irritated, as if these very officials were sitting in front of him in the Oval Office, said:

But if the capture plan was prepared in advance, then why did you idiots know nothing about it ?!

And the article in the Wall Street Journal ended like this:

✔ “The scouts and the military agreed that Moscow used complex tactics and outwitted American simpletons, who were apparently accustomed to their companions, NSA wiretapping and drones so much that the Pentagon heads completely lost the habit of thinking. Eavesdropping is easier, of course! The NSA might be advised to develop a special program to read Putin's thoughts from a distance. In the meantime, congressmen and corporations are once again sawing billions, the Russians may end up in Alaska. Last minute, yes, Mr. Obama? .. "

"WE HAVE A SECOND SNOWDEN"

As the president was finishing reading the article, his press secretary called him on the internal phone and said that Clapper was already in the waiting room. He appeared in Obama's office with a face like he was invited to the morgue for identification. Clapper brought bad news to the president - a mole has turned up at the NSA. Perhaps the "second Snowden".

And there is strong evidence, James? ”Obama asked.

Clapper replied with a sigh:

Yesterday, our employee in Berlin received from his agent in the BND (BND - Federal Intelligence Service of Germany, Bundesnachrichtendienst. - Author) a complete recording of your conversation with the intelligence leaders ...

Obama interrupted Clapper:

Are you saying that they listen to me in my office?

I want to say, Mr. President, that you ... All of us were bugged at the meeting on February 26, where there was a conversation about Crimea ... You, Mr. President, were reprimanding Alexander that day especially strongly. (Keith Alexander - Director of the National Security Agency and Chief of the US Cyber \u200b\u200bCommand. - Ed.)

Yes, I remember that. And what do you think, Alexander and? .. This cannot be!

To my great regret, maybe Mr. President. After all, someone recorded your voice. Here's a snippet.

Clapper took a dictaphone out of his briefcase, turned it on and put it on the table in front of the president.

Obama heard his own voice: “Mr. Alexander, you still cry to me that it is absolutely impossible to follow Putin! That he doesn't have a social media account, that he doesn't tweet, that he doesn't use email! That he doesn't even have a cell phone! That he did not discuss with Defense Minister Shoigu the plan for the invasion of Crimea in the middle of Red Square! .. "

Obama was dumbfounded:

What do you suggest?

Clapper:

Initiate an immediate investigation of the NSA's leak. Replace the entire electronic security system in your office and the entire White House.

"PUTIN IS NOT YELTSIN"

On the same day, NSA chief Keith Alexander was summoned to the White House. Obama started the conversation again with something that tormented his pride - why was it not possible to eavesdrop on the Kremlin?

Alexander answered grimly:

Because it is not Yeltsin who is sitting there now, but Putin. During the Yeltsin era, we managed to introduce our agent into a German company that installed communications equipment in the Kremlin.

Was Yeltsin such a simpleton to let the Germans into the Kremlin? Obama was surprised.

And so it was. Yeltsin was then persuaded by his own people, who had business in Germany, to install the German communications system. The Russians, of course, reconfigured the German equipment, installed many interlocking devices. But our man left so many bugs there that the NSA heard, sorry, even how Yeltsin sneezes ...

I heard that the NSA did a good job in the Kremlin even when the Italians were doing repairs there.

Keith Alexander:

During the Yeltsin era, we had no problems with wiretapping the Kremlin and the Russian government. I myself worked in Moscow in those years and was amazed that the Russians allowed to build another building for our embassy right across the street from the building of the Russian government! There the distance is fifty meters. I was sitting in headphones, with my feet on the table, smoking a cigar, drinking coffee and listening to Russian secrets! It was a golden time!

But why are we in trouble now?

Alexander:

Our problems began when Putin came to the Kremlin. Under him, the entire German communications system was ripped out and a Russian one was installed. From under the Italian stucco molding in the Kremlin, all our bugs were picked out. And when Putin became prime minister, the Russians installed powerful anti-resonators on the glass and walls. And they entangled the White House with a powerful cable. The Russians have grown wiser. And our sweet life is over. Now we mainly listen to the Russian mobile phones ... We sit in their gadgets and ...

But was it really impossible to overhear anything when the Russians were preparing to seize Crimea? There were also troops, many troops, there was probably a lot of this on the air, from which one could understand the intentions of the military. Didn't Putin talk with the Defense Minister, with his General Staff? I do not believe!!!

Alexander:

We well heard the negotiations of the Russian military when they had maneuvers near the borders of Ukraine, in the west, in the center of Russia, in the Far East, on the Black Sea. The usual staff negotiations. But our computers never recorded the word "Crimea". Not a single cell phone spoke that word. Never! The Russians camouflaged their Crimean operation well on the air. At that time, Putin only spoke three times on his mobile, which he probably took from his assistants. We have not heard any instructions to the Minister of Defense or the General Staff. I am sure that they are using means of communication that we do not know about yet ...

I envy Putin. Nobody hears him. But they hear me.

Keith Alexander was soon fired. And along with him, and eight more heads of various departments of American intelligence.

REFERENCE "KP"

The US intelligence community includes 16 services:

3. Information and Intelligence Directorate of the State Department.

4. Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Finance.

5. Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

6. National Security Agency.

7. Intelligence Directorate of Ground Forces.

8. Air Force Intelligence.

9. Intelligence Directorate of the Naval Forces.

10. Marine Corps Intelligence

11. Office of space reconnaissance and cartography.

12. Office of satellite electronic intelligence.

13. Office of Intelligence, US Department of Energy.

14. Intelligence Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.

15. Intelligence Directorate of the Coast Guard.

16. Intelligence Directorate of the US Department of Justice.

The main and only independent service is the CIA, the government's political intelligence service. The remaining 15 members of the intelligence community are part of various federal ministries and departments.

The community's annual budget is about $ 30 billion.

The total number of employees is over 100 thousand people.

Weakening of the Ottoman Empire

In the 1820s and 1830s, the Ottoman Empire suffered a series of blows that called into question the very existence of the country. The Greek uprising, which began in the spring of 1821, exposed both the domestic political and military weakness of Turkey, and led to terrible atrocities by the Turkish forces. The dispersal of the Janissary corps in 1826 was an undoubted boon in the long term, but in the short term it deprived the country of the army. In 1827, the combined Anglo-French-Russian fleet at the Battle of Navarino destroyed almost the entire Ottoman fleet. In 1830, after a 10-year war of independence and the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829, Greece became independent. According to the Adrianople Peace Treaty, which ended the war between Russia and Turkey, Russian and foreign ships gained the right to freely pass through the Black Sea straits, Serbia became autonomous, and the Danube principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia) passed under the protectorate of Russia.

Taking advantage of the moment, in 1830 France occupied Algeria, and in 1831 its most powerful vassal, Muhammad Ali of Egypt, broke away from the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman troops were defeated in a series of battles, and the inevitability of the capture of Istanbul by the Egyptians forced Sultan Mahmud II to accept military assistance from Russia. The 10-thousandth corps of Russian troops, landed on the shores of the Bosphorus in 1833, prevented the capture of Istanbul, and with it, probably, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The Unkar-Iskelesi treaty concluded as a result of this expedition, favorable for Russia, provided for a military alliance between the two countries in case one of them was attacked. A secret additional article of the treaty allowed Turkey not to send troops, but required the closure of the Bosphorus for ships of any country (except Russia).

In 1839, the situation repeats itself - Muhammad Ali, dissatisfied with the incompleteness of his control over Syria, resumes hostilities. In the battle of Nizib on June 24, 1839, the Ottoman troops were again utterly defeated. The Ottoman Empire was saved by the intervention of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, who signed a convention in London on July 15, 1840, which guaranteed Muhammad Ali and his descendants the right to inherit power in Egypt in exchange for the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Syria and Lebanon and the recognition of formal subordination to the Ottoman sultan. After Muhammad Ali refused to comply with the requirements of the convention, the combined Anglo-Austrian fleet blocked the Nile Delta, bombarded Beirut and stormed Acre. On November 27, 1840, Muhammad Ali accepted the terms of the London Convention.

On July 13, 1841, after the expiration of the Unkar-Iskelesi treaty, under pressure from the European powers, the London Convention on the Straits (1841) was signed, depriving Russia of the right to block the entry of warships of third countries into the Black Sea in case of war. This opened the way for the fleets of Great Britain and France to the Black Sea in the event of a Russian-Turkish conflict and was an important prerequisite for the Crimean War.

The intervention of the European powers, thus, twice saved the Ottoman Empire from collapse, but led to the loss of its independence in foreign policy. The British Empire and the French Empire were interested in preserving the Ottoman Empire, for which the appearance of Russia in the Mediterranean was not profitable. Austria also feared the same.

Growth of anti-Russian sentiment in Europe

An essential prerequisite for the conflict was that in Europe (except for the Kingdom of Greece - "the only European country on the side of Russia" since the 1840s, there was an increase in anti-Russian sentiments.

The Western press emphasized Russia's desire to seize Constantinople. In reality, Nicholas I did not initially set the goal of annexing any Balkan territories to Russia. Nicholas' conservative-protective principles of foreign policy dictated to him restraint in encouraging the national movements of the Balkan peoples, which caused discontent among Russian Slavophiles.

Immediate causes of war

The prelude to the war was the conflict between Nicholas I and Napoleon III, who came to power in France after the coup on December 2, 1851. Nicholas I considered the new French emperor illegitimate, since the Bonaparte dynasty was excluded from the French succession by the Vienna Congress. Aware of the fragility of his power, Napoleon III wanted to divert the attention of the French with the popular war against Russia at that time and at the same time satisfy the feeling of personal irritation against Emperor Nicholas I. Having come to power with the support of the Catholic Church, Napoleon III sought to repay his ally, defending the interests of the Vatican in the international arena, in particular in the issue of control over the Church of the Nativity of Christ in Bethlehem, which led to a conflict with the Orthodox Church and, directly, with Russia. France demanded that the keys to the church (which at the time belonged to the Orthodox community) be given to the Catholic clergy. Russia demanded that the keys remain with the Orthodox community. Both sides backed up their words with threats. The Ottomans, unable to refuse, promised to fulfill both French and Russian demands. When this trick, typical of Ottoman diplomacy, was discovered, in the late summer of 1852, France, in violation of the London Convention on the Status of the Straits of July 13, 1841, brought an 80-gun battleship under the walls of Istanbul. Charlemagne". In early December 1852, the keys to the Church of the Nativity of Christ were handed over to France. In response, Russian Chancellor Nesselrode, on behalf of Nicholas I, declared that Russia “will not tolerate the insult received from the Ottoman Empire. The concentration of the Russian army began on the border with Moldova and Wallachia.

Nicholas I counted on the support of Prussia and Austria and considered an alliance between Britain and France impossible. However, the British Prime Minister Aberdeen, fearing the strengthening of Russia, went to an agreement with the French Emperor Napoleon III on joint actions against Russia.

On June 1, the Russian government issued a memorandum on severing diplomatic relations with Turkey.

After that, Nicholas I ordered the Russian troops (80 thousand) to occupy the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia subordinate to the Sultan "as a pledge, until Turkey satisfies the just demands of Russia." In turn, the British government ordered the Mediterranean squadron to go to the Aegean Sea.

Trying to use the opportunity to "teach a lesson" to Russia by the hands of the Western allies, the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Majid I on September 27 (October 9) demanded the cleansing of the Danube principalities within two weeks, and after Russia did not fulfill this condition, on October 4 (16), 1853 declared war on Russia. On October 20 (November 1), Russia replied with a similar statement.

Russia's goals

Russia sought to secure its southern borders, secure its influence in the Balkans and establish control over the Black Sea straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, which was important both from a military and economic point of view. Nicholas I, realizing that he was a great Orthodox monarch, strove to continue the work of liberating the Orthodox peoples under the rule of Ottoman Turkey.

Objectives of Great Britain and its Allies

United Kingdom

Great Britain in 1838 concluded a free trade agreement with Turkey, which granted Great Britain the most favored nation treatment and exempted the import of British goods from customs duties and taxes. As the historian I. Wallerstein points out, this led to the collapse of Turkish industry and to the fact that Turkey found itself in economic and political dependence on Great Britain. Therefore, unlike the previous Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829), when Great Britain, like Russia, supported the liberation war of the Greeks and Greece's independence, now it was not interested in separating any territories from the Ottoman Empire, which was actually a dependent state and an important market for English goods.

In addition, Great Britain was worried about Russia's expansion in the Caucasus, the strengthening of its influence in the Balkans and feared its possible advance into Central Asia. In general, she viewed Russia as her geopolitical adversary.

For these reasons, Great Britain sought to prevent any increase in Russian influence in Ottoman affairs. On the eve of the war, she increased diplomatic pressure on Russia in order to dissuade her from any attempts to divide the Ottoman Empire territorially.

Also the closest and cheapest trade route to Iran passed through the Black Sea. In Trebizond, British goods were unloaded for shipment to Iran. The threat that the path would be closed caused great alarm in England.

France

In France, a significant part of society supported the idea of \u200b\u200brevenge for defeat in the Napoleonic wars and was ready to take part in the war against Russia, provided that England would side with them.

Sardinia

Sardinia had no territorial or political claims to the Russian Empire. However, the kingdom, led by the Savoyard dynasty, was the center for promoting the ideology of uniting the Italian states into a unified Italy. Wanting to expand the list of allies in the fight against Russian influence in the Balkans, as well as to strengthen their positions in Italy, the French emperor Napoleon III invited the Sardinian king Victor Emmanuel II to become an ally of the coalition and take part in the war against Russia, in return for which he promised to promote the unification of Italy under the Savoyard crown ... In addition to him, the prime minister, Count Cavour, also had a significant influence on Victor Emmanuel, who wanted to raise the international importance of Sardinia and sought allies against Austria in the person of Great Britain and especially France.

Austria

Since the Vienna Congress, Russia and Austria have been members of the Holy Alliance, the main purpose of which was to prevent revolutionary situations in Europe.

In the summer of 1849, at the request of the Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph I, the Russian army under the command of Ivan Paskevich took part in the suppression of the Hungarian National Revolution.

After all this, Nicholas I counted on Austria's support in the Eastern question:

But Russian-Austrian cooperation could not eliminate the contradictions that existed between the two countries. Austria, as before, was frightened by the prospect of the appearance in the Balkans of independent states, probably friendly to Russia, the very existence of which would cause the growth of national liberation movements in the multinational Austrian empire.

The state of the Russian armed forces

Russia was not organizationally and technically ready for war. The combat strength of the army (which included the corps of the internal guard, which was not capable of fighting) was far from a million people and 200 thousand horses, which were listed on the lists; the reserve system was unsatisfactory. Average mortality among recruits in the years of peace between 1826 and 1858 was 3.5% per year, which was explained by the disgusting sanitary condition of the army.

Russia was forced, due to the threat of intervention in the war of Austria, Prussia and Sweden, to keep a significant part of the army on the western border, and in connection with the Caucasian War of 1817-1864 to divert part of the ground forces to fight the mountaineers.

The technical backwardness of the Russian army and navy, associated with radical technical re-equipment in the middle of the 19th century, acquired a threatening scale. armies of Great Britain and France, which carried out the Industrial Revolution.

In the 1840s-1850s, the process of replacing outdated smooth-bore guns with new rifled ones was actively going on in the European armies: by the beginning of the Crimean War, the share of rifled guns in the small arms of the Russian army did not exceed 4-5%, in the French, rifled guns were about a third of small arms , and in English - more than half.

The infantry, armed with rifled guns, in the oncoming battle (especially from cover), had significant superiority due to the range and accuracy of their fire: rifled guns had an effective firing range of up to 1200 steps, and smoothbore guns - no more than 300 steps while maintaining a lethal force of up to 600 steps.

The Russian army, like the allies, had smooth-bore artillery, the effective range of which (when firing buckshot) reached 900 steps. This three times exceeded the range of the actual fire of smooth-bore guns, which inflicted heavy losses on the advancing Russian infantry, while the allied infantry, armed with rifled guns, could shoot the artillery crews of Russian guns, remaining out of the reach of grape-shot fire.

It is also worth noting that until 1853, the Russian army used to release 10 rounds of ammunition per person per year for training infantry and dragoons.

The future Minister of War during the reign of Alexander II, DA Milyutin, writes in his notes: “... Even in the military business, which the emperor was engaged in with such a passion, the same concern for order and discipline prevailed, they were not chasing after the essential improvement of the troops, not for its adaptation to a military purpose, but for its external only harmony, for a brilliant appearance at parades, pedantic observance of countless petty formalities that blunt the human mind and kill the true military spirit. "

The Allies had a significant advantage in all types of ships, and there were no steam battleships in the Russian fleet at all. At that time, the English fleet was the first in the world in terms of numbers, the French was in second, and the Russian in third.

The course of the war

Danube campaign

On September 27 (October 9), the Russian commander, Prince Gorchakov, received a message from the commander of the Turkish troops Omer Pasha, which contained a demand to clear the Danube principalities within 15 days. In early October, before the deadline indicated by Omer Pasha, the Turks began to fire at the Russian front pickets. On the morning of October 11 (23), the Turks opened fire on the Russian steamships Prut and Ordinarets passing along the Danube past the Isakchi fortress. On October 21 (November 2), Turkish troops began to cross over to the left bank of the Danube and create a bridgehead for an attack on the Russian army.

On the Danube in March 1854, Russian troops crossed the Danube and besieged Silistria in May. At the end of June, due to the increased danger of Austria entering the war, the siege was lifted and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldavia and Wallachia began. As the Russians retreated, the Turks slowly moved forward, and on August 10 (22), 1854 Omer Pasha entered Bucharest. At the same time, Austrian troops crossed the border of Wallachia, which, by agreement of the allies with the Turkish government, replaced the Turks and occupied the principalities.

In early July 1854, the allied forces of 40 thousand French, under the command of Marshal Saint-Arno, and 20 thousand English, under the command of Lord Raglan, landed near Varna, from where part of the French troops undertook an expedition to Dobrudja, but cholera, which developed in terrible proportions to French airborne corps, forced to abandon any offensive actions for a while. Failures at sea and in Dobrudja now forced the Allies to turn to the implementation of a long-planned enterprise - the invasion of Crimea, especially since public opinion in England loudly demanded that, in reward for all the losses and costs caused by the war, the naval institutions of Sevastopol and the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Caucasian campaign

In the Caucasus, the Turkish army of Abdi Pasha attacked Akhaltsykh, where the Russian garrison of General Andronikov was located, but was defeated, and a week later another from the 10-thousandth army of Prince Bebutov near Bashkadyklar.

On October 20 (31), a battle of the steamer "Kolkhida", which transported a company of soldiers to reinforce the garrison of the St. Nicholas post located on the Caucasian coast. When approaching the coast, the Kolkhida ran aground and came under fire from the Turks, who seized the post and destroyed its entire garrison. She repulsed an attempt at boarding, went aground and, despite the losses among the crew and the received injuries, came to Sukhum.

On November 4 (15), the capture of the Turkish steamship Medjari-Tejaret by the Russian steamship Bessarabia, cruising in the Sinop region, without a fight (became part of the Black Sea Fleet under the name Turk).

On November 5 (17), the world's first battle of steam ships. The Russian steamer "Vladimir" captured the Turkish steamship "Pervaz-Bahri" (became part of the Black Sea Fleet under the name "Kornilov").

On November 9 (21), a successful battle in the area of \u200b\u200bCape Pitsunda of the Russian frigate "Flora" with 3 Turkish steamships "Taif", "Feyzi-Bahri" and "Saik-Ishade" under the general command of the British military adviser Slade. After a 4-hour battle "Flora" forced the ships to retreat, taking the flagship "Taif" in tow.

In the Caucasus, on July 19 (31), 1854, Russian troops occupied Bayazet; on July 24 (August 5), 1854, they fought a successful battle at Kyuryuk-Dar, 18 km from Kars, but have not yet been able to begin the siege of this fortress, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich 60 -the thousandth Turkish army. The Black Sea coastline was abolished.

In September 1855, the Turkish detachment of Omer Lutfi Pasha was sent on ships to the shores of Asia Minor, landed in Batum and moved to the rescue of Kars, but returned to Batum and on September 21 landed in Sukhum-Kale, from where he invaded Mingrelia and took possession of the crossings on the Inguri River. At the end of February 1856, stopping further actions, the detachment sailed to Trabzon.

In the Caucasus, the capture of Kars was a major victory for Russia in 1855. The first attack on the fortress took place on June 4 (16), its siege began on June 6 (18), and by mid-August it had acquired a total character. After a large but unsuccessful assault on September 17 (29), N.N. Muravyov continued the siege until the capitulation of the Ottoman garrison, which took place on November 16 (28), 1855. The garrison commander Vassif Pasha handed over to the enemy the keys to the city, 12 Turkish banners and 18.5 thousand prisoners. As a result of this victory, Russian troops began to successfully control not only the city, but also its entire region, including Ardahan, Kagyzman, Olty and Nizhne-Basensky Sanjak.

Sinop battle

On November 18 (30), the squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov during Sinop battle destroyed the Turkish squadron of Osman Pasha.

The Sinop incident served as a formal basis for the entry of England and France into the war against Russia.

Upon receiving news of the Battle of Sinop, the British and French squadrons, together with a division of the Ottoman fleet, entered the Black Sea on December 22, 1853 (January 4, 1854). The admirals in command of the fleet informed the Russian authorities that they have the task of protecting Turkish ships and ports from attacks from the Russian side. When asked about the purpose of such an action, the Western powers replied that they had in mind not only to protect the Turks from any attack from the sea, but also to assist them in supplying their ports, at the same time preventing the free navigation of Russian ships. On January 17 (29), the French emperor issued an ultimatum to Russia: withdraw troops from the Danube principalities and begin negotiations with Turkey. On February 9 (21), Russia rejected the ultimatum and announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain and France.

At the same time, Emperor Nicholas turned to the Berlin and Vienna courts, inviting them, in case of war, to observe neutrality, supported by weapons. Austria and Prussia declined from this proposal, as well as from the alliance proposed to them by England and France, but concluded a separate treaty between themselves. A special article of this treaty stipulated that if the Russians from the Danube principalities did not appear soon, Austria would demand their cleansing, Prussia would support this demand, and then, in case of an unsatisfactory answer, both powers would start offensive actions, which could also be caused by the annexation of the principalities to Russia or the transition of the Russians across the Balkans.

On March 15 (27), 1854, Great Britain and France declared war on Russia. On March 30 (April 11), Russia responded with a similar statement.

The bombing of Odessa

In April 1854, the allied fleet of 28 ships conducted bombing of Odessaduring which 9 merchant ships were burned in the harbor. The Allies had 4 frigates damaged and taken to Varna for repairs. In addition, on May 12, in conditions of dense fog, the English steamer "Tiger" landed aground 6 miles from Odessa. 225 crew members were taken prisoner by the Russian, and the ship itself was sunk.

September 22nd. An attack by an Anglo-French detachment of 4 steam frigates (72 guns) on the Ochakov fortress and the Russian rowing flotilla located here, consisting of 2 small steamers and 8 rowing gunboats (36 guns) under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Endogurov. After a three-hour long-range firefight, the enemy ships, having received damage, went to sea.

The invasion of Crimea and the siege of Sevastopol

On June 3 (15), 1854, 3 Anglo-French steam-frigates approached Sevastopol. On June 14 (26), 1854, a battle of the Anglo-French fleet of 21 ships took place against the coastal fortifications of Sevastopol.

On September 2 (14), 1854, the landing of the coalition expeditionary corps began in Evpatoria. In total, in the first days of September, about 61 thousand soldiers were sent to the coast.

8 (20) September 1854 in the battle of the Alma the allies defeated the Russian army (33 thousand soldiers), which was trying to block their path to Sevastopol. The Russian army was forced to retreat.

On October 5 (17), the first bombing of Sevastopol took place, during which Kornilov was killed. On the same day, the Allied fleet tried to make a breakthrough on the internal raid of Sevastopol, but was defeated.

On October 13 (25), battle of Balaklava, as a result of which the Allied troops (20 thousand soldiers) thwarted the attempt of the Russian troops (23 thousand soldiers) to unblock Sevastopol. During the battle, Russian soldiers managed to capture some of the allied positions defended by Turkish troops, which they had to leave, consoling themselves with trophies captured from the Turks (a banner, eleven cast-iron guns, etc.).

November 5 held Inkerman battle, where Russian troops once again tried to unblock Sevastopol. The arrival of French reinforcements (8 thousand people) turned the tide of the battle in favor of the Allies. The French artillery was especially effective. The Russians were ordered to retreat. The withdrawal of Russian troops to Sevastopol was covered with their fire by the steam frigates Vladimir and Chersonesos.

On November 14, a severe storm off the coast of Crimea led to the loss of more than 53 ships by the allies (of which 25 transports). Additionally, near Evpatoria, two battleships were wrecked (French 100-gun "Henry IV" and Turkish 90-gun "Peiki-Messeret") and 3 steam corvettes of the allies. In particular, the supplies of winter clothing and medicines sent to the allied landing corps were lost, which in the conditions of the impending winter put the allies in a difficult situation. The storm of November 14, for the heavy losses it inflicted on the Allied fleet and the supply transports, was equated by them with a lost naval battle.

On February 5 (17), 1855, Russian troops made an attempt liberation of Evpatoria, however, the Turks thwarted the offensive with powerful artillery fire.

· On May 12 (24), the Anglo-French fleet occupied Kerch, the garrison of which went to Feodosia. Caught up in the Kerch harbor, 3 steamers, 10 transports and small vessels were burned by their crews. The screw schooner of the Separate Caucasian Corps "Argonaut", having entered the battle with the English steam schooner "Snake", which had superiority in the power of the machine and weapons, caused the latter several damage, broke away from the enemy and went to Berdyansk.

· On May 22-24 (June 3-5), the third bombardment took place, after which the allies captured the Selenginsky and Volyn redoubts and the Kamchatka lunette and went close to the Malakhov Kurgan - the key to the defense of Sevastopol.

16 August 1855 occurs battle on the Black River, during which Russian troops unsuccessfully try to lift the siege of Sevastopol.

· August 17-20 - the fifth bombing of Sevastopol. The losses of the Russian troops were 900-1000 people a day. Enemy fire from August 21 to September 3 was weaker, but incapacitated 500-700 people daily.

Baltic campaign

With the ice clearing of the sea, a strong Anglo-French fleet (11 propeller-driven and 15 sailing battleships, 32 steam-frigates and 7 sailing frigates) under the command of Vice-Admiral Ch. Napier and Vice-Admiral A.F. Parseval-Deschenes entered the Baltic and blocked the Russian Baltic Fleet (26 sailing battleships, 9 steam frigates and 9 sailing frigates) in Kronstadt and Sveaborg.

Not daring to attack these bases due to Russian minefields, the Allies began a blockade of the coast and bombarded a number of settlements in Finland. On July 26 (August 7), 1854, an 11,000-strong Anglo-French landing landed on the Aland Islands and laid siege to Bomarsund, which surrendered after the destruction of the fortifications. Attempts by other landings (in Ekenes, Ganges, Gamlakarlebu and Abo) ended in failure. In the fall of 1854, the allied squadrons left the Baltic Sea.

Arctic campaign

On the White Sea, the actions of the allied squadron of Captain Omaney were limited to the seizure of small merchant ships, the robbery of coastal residents, the two-time bombing of the Solovetsky Monastery. There were attempts to undertake a landing, but they were abandoned. During the bombing of the city of Kola by enemy fire, about 110 houses, 2 churches (including the Resurrection Cathedral of the 17th century, a masterpiece of Russian wooden architecture), shops were burned.

Peter and Paul defense

In the Pacific Ocean, the garrison of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky under the command of Major General V.S. Zavoiko on August 18-24 (August 30-September 5), 1854, repulsed an attack by an Anglo-French squadron of 6 ships under the command of Rear Admiral David Price, defeating the landing on Nikolskaya Sopka

Kinburn Campaign

After the seizure of the southern part of Sevastopol, the allied commanders-in-chief, who did not dare to move with the army inside the peninsula due to the lack of convoys, began to threaten the movement to Nikolaev, which, with the fall of Sevastopol, became important, since there were Russian naval institutions and reserves. To this end, the strong allied fleet on October 2 (14), 1855, approached Kinburn and, after a two-day bombardment, forced it to surrender.

For the bombardment of Kinburn by the French, for the first time in world practice, armored floating platforms were used, which turned out to be practically invulnerable to the Kinburn coastal batteries and the fort, the most powerful weapons of which were medium-caliber 24 pound guns. Their cast-iron cannonballs left dents no more than an inch deep on the 4½-inch armor of the French floating batteries, and the fires of the batteries themselves were so destructive that, according to English observers present, the batteries alone would have been enough to destroy the walls of Kinburn in three hours.

Leaving Bazin's troops and a small squadron in Kinburn, the British and French sailed to Sevastopol, near which they began to settle for the upcoming winter.

War and propaganda

Propaganda was an integral part of the war. F. Engels in several articles in the English press, published in March-April 1853, accused Russia of striving to seize Constantinople, although it was well known that the Russian ultimatum of February 1853 did not contain any territorial claims of Russia itself against Turkey. In another article (April 1853), Marx and Engels scolded the Serbs for not wanting to read books printed in their language in the West in Latin letters, but read only books in Cyrillic printed in Russia; and rejoiced that an "anti-Russian progressive party" had finally appeared in Serbia.

In the same year 1853, the English liberal newspaper Daily News assured its readers that Christians in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed greater religious freedom than in Orthodox Russia and Catholic Austria.

In 1854, the London Times wrote: "It would be nice to return Russia to the cultivation of internal lands, to drive the Muscovites deep into the forests and steppes." In the same year, D. Russell, the leader of the House of Commons and the head of the Liberal Party, said: "We need to pull the bear's fangs ... Until its fleet and naval arsenal on the Black Sea is destroyed, Constantinople will not be safe, there will be no peace in Europe."

It had long been possible to predict that this rabid hatred, which every year was kindled more and more strongly in the West against Russia, would one day break loose. This moment has come ... It was the entire West who came to show their denial of Russia and block her path to the future - F. I. Tyutchev

Widespread anti-Western, patriotic propaganda began in Russia as well, which was supported by both official speeches and spontaneous speeches of the patriotic part of society. In fact, for the first time since the Patriotic War of 1812, Russia opposed itself to a large coalition of European countries, demonstrating its “special become”.

Results of the war

The Paris Congress began on February 13 (25), 1856, and a peace treaty was signed on March 18 (30).

· Russia returned the city of Kars with the fortress to the Ottomans, receiving in exchange the seized Sevastopol, Balaklava and other Crimean cities.

· The Black Sea was declared neutral (that is, open to commercial and closed to warships in peacetime), with the prohibition of Russia and the Ottoman Empire to have navies and arsenals there.

· Navigation along the Danube was declared free, for which the Russian borders were moved away from the river and part of Russian Bessarabia with the mouth of the Danube was annexed to Moldavia.

· Russia was deprived of the protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia, granted to it by the Kuchuk-Kainardzhiysk peace of 1774, and of Russia's exclusive patronage over the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

· Russia pledged not to build fortifications on the Aland Islands.

During the war, the participants in the anti-Russian coalition failed to achieve all their goals, but they managed to prevent the strengthening of Russia in the Balkans and deprive it of the Black Sea Fleet for a long time.

Aftermath of the war

Russia

· The war led to the disruption of the financial system of the Russian Empire (Russia spent 800 million rubles on the war, Britain - 76 million pounds): to finance military spending, the government had to resort to printing unsecured bank notes.

· The war became the impetus for economic reforms and, in the future, for the abolition of serfdom.

· The experience of the Crimean War partially formed the basis of the military reforms of the 1860s-1870s in Russia (replacing the outdated 25-year military service, etc.).

The government of the Russian Empire begins to revise its policy in the field of railway construction, which previously manifested itself in the repeated blocking of private projects for the construction of railways

Britannia

Military setbacks prompted the resignation of the British government of Aberdeen, who was replaced by Palmerston. The viciousness of the official system of selling officers' ranks for money, which has survived in the British army since medieval times, was revealed.

Ottoman Empire

During the Eastern Campaign, the Ottoman Empire made a loan in England of £ 7 million. In 1858, the Sultan's treasury was declared bankrupt.

In February 1856, Sultan Abdul-Majid I was forced to issue a hatt-i-sheriff (decree), which proclaimed freedom of religion and equality of subjects of the empire, regardless of nationality.

Austria

Austria found itself in political isolation until October 23, 1873, when a new alliance of three emperors (Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary) was concluded.

Influence on military affairs

The Crimean War gave impetus to the development of the armed forces, military and naval art of European states. In many countries, the transition from smooth-bore weapons to rifled weapons began, from a sailing wooden fleet to an armored steam fleet, positional forms of warfare arose.

In the ground forces, the role of small arms increased and, accordingly, the preparation of fire for an attack, a new battle formation appeared - a rifle chain, which was also the result of the sharply increased capabilities of small arms. Over time, it completely replaced the columns and loose structure.

· Marine barrage mines were invented and applied for the first time.

· The use of the telegraph for military purposes was initiated.

Florence Nightingale laid the foundation for modern hospital care and sanitation - less than six months after her arrival in Turkey, hospital mortality dropped from 42% to 2.2%.

· For the first time in the history of war, sisters of mercy were involved in caring for the wounded.

· Nikolai Pirogov was the first in Russian field medicine to use a plaster cast, which made it possible to speed up the healing process of fractures and saved the wounded from ugly curvature of the limbs.

According to estimates of military losses, the total number of those killed in battle, as well as those who died from wounds and diseases in the Allied army was 160-170 thousand people, in the Russian army - 100-110 thousand people.

Heroes of the Crimean War

Pro-Russian activists try to unfold the flag of the Russian Federation in the courtyard of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea during clashes with the Crimean Tatars. February 26, 2014, Simferopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

People carry a badly wounded man who was injured during clashes near the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea. February 26, 2014, Simferopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Servicemen of the Naval Forces of Ukraine stand outside the headquarters door and watch the seizure of the military unit. March 19, 2014, Sevastopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

One of the participants in the seizure of the headquarters of the naval forces of Ukraine enters the building through the broken wall. March 19, 2014, Sevastopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Participants in the seizure of the headquarters of the Ukrainian naval forces in Sevastopol remove state symbols in one of the headquarters offices. March 19, 2014.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

An officer of the Ukrainian naval forces collects his personal belongings at the captured headquarters. March 19, 2014.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

"Little green men" at the entrance to the military unit No. 2382 (State Border Guard Service of Ukraine). Balaclava.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Ukrainian Armed Forces sailors lie face down on the deck of the Khmelnitsky corvette during the seizure of the vessel by the Sevastopol people's vigilantes.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Members of the Sevastopol people's squad lead to the deck of the captain of the captured corvette of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Khmelnitsky".

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

One of the participants in the seizure of the headquarters of the Ukrainian naval force in Sevastopol cuts off the Ukrainian flag from the flagpole. March 19, 2014.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Members of the Sevastopol people's squad and self-defense of Crimea seize the military base "Belbek" in Kach. March 22, 2014, Sevastopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

The crew of the reconnaissance ship of the Naval Forces of Ukraine "Slavutich" leaves the ship after a long resistance. March 22, 2014, Sevastopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

A Ukrainian soldier is sitting on his things near the Belbek military base, waiting for a truck to leave Crimea.

A woman walks along a street in the town of Balaklava past the so-called "green men" who are located near the entrance to military unit No. 2382 (State Border Guard Service of Ukraine).

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

An employee of the Ukrainian naval forces looks out of the window of the checkpoint of the Headquarters of the Ukrainian naval forces at the "little green men". March 03, 2014, Sevastopol.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Residents of Sevastopol rejoice at the announcement of the President of the Russian Federation on the annexation of Crimea to Russia. March 18, 2014.

Photo: Andrey Lyubimov

Fence of the headquarters of the Ukrainian naval forces in Sevastopol 5 months after the annexation of Crimea to Russia. August 29, 2014.

For almost a year and a half in Ukraine, an inexhaustible fountain of ideas has been beating on how to return Crimea back to the Independent. The loss of the peninsula was not resigned by either official Kiev or the Ukrainian society, in the depths of which, time after time, space power projects are born to "turn" the Crimea under the red-black flag. The dismal trade blockade arranged by the "Crimean Tatar renegades" together with the "right-wing" people at Chongar and Perekop is just one of such projects. But there are other plans, more vigorous and thoughtful. Including those related to the use of military force. Ukraine will attack Crimea? How real is it? Is it possible that Ukrainian warriors, thrown out of the peninsula in shame during the Russian Spring and repeatedly battered in the battles for Donbass, today pose some kind of danger to the Crimeans? Let's talk about this.

Facebook maneuvers

On March 18, 2014, Russia and Crimea signed an agreement on reunification, according to which new subjects were formed within the Russian Federation - the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. Exactly from that moment on, the idea of \u200b\u200breturning the lost territories turned for Ukraine into a real idée fixe, elevated to the rank of a national idea. Representatives of the post-Maidan government did not get tired of repeating "Krim - tse Ukraine!" Defense Minister Valery Geletay announced the victory parade in Sevastopol. Ukrainian bloggers enthusiastically posted on Facebook “top-secret” maps of victorious anti-Russian operations. Here, for example, is a map of Operation Oksamitiy Season for 2014. Fat red arrows dashingly burst through Perekop and Chongar into the Crimea, in order to then "liberate" Sevastopol and Kerch. 2015 is the time of the next Facebook operation under the even louder name "Reconquista". All the same red arrows from the territory of the "pacified" Donbass rip open the territory of the Russian Federation in the direction of Voronezh and Rostov-on-Don, playfully cross the Kerch Strait and seize the Taman Peninsula. It is felt that only the edge of the map, suddenly caught in the path of the red arrows, prevented the soldiers from reaching Kamchatka and the Kuriles. What is characteristic, judging by the legend, this whole Armageddon was to be accompanied by continuous strikes of NATO ships and aircraft along the coast of the Russian Federation. Why "typical"? Because this testifies to the fact that even on virtual pages, Ukrainian revanchists do not believe in the ability of their armed forces to independently cope with the Russian army. However, the Ukrainian side did not limit itself to one virtual waving of fists. All memorable attempts of "water" and "electric" blockade of Crimea followed. Taking into account the thesis constantly proclaimed by Kiev that the population of Crimea is Ukrainians suffering under the Russian yoke, the logic of such actions remained beyond the understanding of the Crimeans. The residents of the peninsula were left in exactly the same bewilderment by the last such action, initiated on September 20 by the deputies of the Verkhovna Rada. Mustafa Dzhemilev (former head of the Crimean Tatar "Mejlis" 1) and Refat Chubarov (the current chairman of the same Mejlis) together with Ukrainian right-wing radicals. The action was expressed in blocking trucks with Ukrainian food products intended for Crimea at border checkpoints. On this occasion, I recall how on July 20, 2014, a certain Svidomo patriot Andrey Klimenko wrote: “Let's just say - yes, you have to beat, including your own. But it is surprising that their own, Crimean "political Ukrainians" (and among them are Crimean Tatars, and Ukrainians, and Jews, and a lot of ethnic Russians and mixed families), vividly and rapidly manifested themselves in these dramatic months, not only understand this need ... They literally cause fire on themselves, asking every day of us who have left for the mainland - when, finally, will Ukraine begin a tough economic blockade of the peninsula? Adding: "We will tolerate, just return us faster ..." As they say, "to tears" ... But it's already September 2015, and all attempts by Ukraine to arrange something similar to a "tough economic blockade of the peninsula" invariably lead to one and the same. Firstly, such a "blockade" is quickly fading away. Secondly, the number of supporters of the return of the territory under the jurisdiction of Ukraine in Crimea is becoming less and less. It couldn't be otherwise. Because, firstly, Crimea is not only a natural place for mass recreation of Ukrainians, but also a sales market that is just as natural for Ukraine. It is, of course, possible to give up profits in the name of the political conjuncture. But not endlessly. In addition, it is only in the proverb that says: "Beats - it means loves." In practice, any sanctioning action aimed at causing damage will not at all make you feel sympathetic to the initiators. This is what the Crimeans are demonstrating in response to the next wave of some Ukrainian "blockade". Realizing this, once again one is surprised at the unpredictable zigzags of Ukrainian politics. Indeed, even during his election campaign, the future president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko His main thesis of the plan for the peaceful return of Crimea to Ukraine was voiced as follows: "Crimea must be returned with intelligence!" Where is the mind?

Mejlis card bit

Almost from the very beginning of the so-called "Crimean crisis", that is, from the spring of 2014, Kiev has been unsuccessfully trying to play the "Crimean Tatar card" as an anti-Russian means. However, vigorous actions taken by local and federal authorities made it possible, if not to win over the entire Crimean Tatars community to the side of Moscow, then at least to achieve its neutrality. The words of the president addressed to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation played a huge role in this process Vladimir Putin that “the Crimean Tatars have returned to their land” and that it is necessary to take “all the necessary decisions” that “will complete the process of rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar people”, as well as “restore their rights, good name in full”. Supplemented by the guarantees of the President of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov, the State Council of Tatarstan and the World Congress of Tatars, the speech of the President of the Russian Federation in the eyes of the Crimean Tatars turned out to be a much more weighty argument in favor of recognizing the reunification of Crimea with Russia than all the calls of the leaders of the Mejlis to prevent it. Actually, since the reunification of Crimea with Russia, the influence of the Mejlis among the Crimean Tatars has been steadily decreasing. That, perhaps, ultimately prompted the leaders of this "public organization" to participate in the food blockade of Crimea. On this occasion, the political scientist Vadim Mordashov In an interview with Krymskie Novosti, he spoke directly: “Dzhemilev and his company have gone into oblivion. Nobody needs them here in Crimea, people began to forget about them. Therefore, this action is nothing more than an attempt to remind you of yourself. Of course, the hand of the official Kiev is visible behind this blockade. After all, the Ukrainian authorities cannot simply take and refuse trade with Russia, since Ukraine has not officially declared war. In this situation, the uncontrollable Mejlis and Right Sector 1 play into the hands of Ukrainian politicians, but they run counter to the position of entrepreneurs, whose rights are now grossly violated. " Well. Neither the various "blockades" by Ukraine, nor the "mutiny of the Crimean Tatars" that never happened, forced the Crimea to "moor" again to the Ukrainian coast. It seems that Kiev should not hope for outrage at the actions of the Russian authorities from other ethnic communities in Crimea. The economic situation on the peninsula is quite stable. Large Russian investments in the reconstruction of the peninsula's infrastructure are evident. There are no significant interruptions in water, gas and electricity. The tourist season was quite successful. The construction of a strategically important bridge across the Kerch Strait is going according to plan. What else can Kiev hope for? Is it a military invasion?

The last argument of the hetmans

It appears that the only option that Ukraine has not yet used to return the rebellious peninsula is the use of brute force. Let's not deceive ourselves: the armed forces of Ukraine, by the fall of 2015, having survived several waves of mobilization, passed training camps with foreign instructors and recaptured in the ATO, noticeably increased their fighting qualities compared to the Ukrainian Armed Forces of the spring of 2014. In addition, according to information from competent sources available to the Federal News Agency, the command of the armed forces of Ukraine has by now turned the Nikolaev area into a large army logistics center. Its task is to provide, train and supply a strike force focused on a breakthrough in the Crimea. The core of the group is the Marine Corps, well equipped and more than motivated. Despite the general sad state of the Ukrainian Air Force, witnesses note the regular appearance of Ukrainian combat aircraft over Nikolaev, practicing coordination with the ground forces ... Let's leave aside the very idea of \u200b\u200bthe illusory nature of direct military operations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Now, after a year of civil war in Donbass, such an idea does not at all cause complete rejection among Russians. Moreover, the "Svidomo" residents of Ukraine do not believe in the impossibility of a Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. Let us also not brush aside the war, appealing to the thesis about the utopian nature of the confrontation between a power that possesses atomic weapons and a state that does not possess them. For all the seemingly admitted suicidal nature of such an undertaking for the second party to the conflict, this did not prevent the “non-nuclear” Argentina from attacking the possessions of the “atomic” Great Britain in 1982. More recently, in 2008, Georgia also attacked Russian citizens and peacekeepers in South Ossetia, somehow "forgetting" about our Strategic Missile Forces. So, yes, a hypothetical Russian-Ukrainian war over Crimea is not incredible. But is Ukraine's victory possible in it?

The battle in Crimea is all in smoke

Crimea is a peninsula. It connects with the mainland by a narrow, 8 km wide, Perekop isthmus. Accordingly, one can get to Crimea from Ukraine in three ways: by air, by sea, and by land. Read - according to that very Perekop "corridor" (about Sivash or Arabat arrow is not even worth mentioning). It is possible to imagine - theoretically - the drop of Ukrainian airborne brigades in Crimea. Practically - no, it won't work. Ukraine does not have enough IL-76 for this. Among the Airborne Forces, there is only one brigade that is really prepared for parachuting - the 25th separate. The rest of the units are called not airborne, but airmobile. As the saying goes, "guess why?" The answer is clear. But even if we imagine that five Ukrainian airborne brigades in some incomprehensible way received delivery vehicles to the drop point, this also does not give Kiev any trump cards. The RF Armed Forces' electronic reconnaissance means, coupled with air defense systems, will make such a flight of the Ukrainian airborne forces the last. At the same time, Ukraine does not have the ability to guarantee the destruction of Russian air defense systems on the territory of Crimea. Nor is it able to effectively "extinguish" our ground-based systems for detecting air targets, not to mention reconnaissance satellites and A-50 early warning aircraft. It's still sadder for Ukraine at sea. After leaving the Crimea, and so not striking in its large size, the Independent naval forces shrank to the state of one mixed flotilla, if not a division. True, with 13 admiral's posts. Of all the "wealth" left by the Naval Forces of Ukraine on the move, only two pennants have the ability to carry out landing operations on the unequipped coast. These are the Kirovograd medium landing ship and the Svatovo landing boat. For two they can take on board and drop off as many as five tanks somewhere. The Ukrainians will be able to cover this landing from the sea with the fire of a couple of 76-mm guns with a very doubtful probability of air cover. Add to this naval anecdote the range of Russian surface target detection systems (as well as the firing range of anti-ship missiles of the Black Sea Fleet and ground-based missile systems) - and we will understand that the prospects for a naval invasion of Crimea are really somehow not danced. Remains dry land - the same Perekop Isthmus. It is this "bottleneck" that at all times has become the most serious problem for everyone who tried to seize Crimea. Perekop will not be an exception for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, if they risk encroaching on the Russian Crimea. Let even Kiev forget about Donetsk and Lugansk and drag its entire army to the Crimean borders. Let him carry out 33 more mobilizations ... Perekop will not go anywhere. And the entire attacking group will have to break through a narrow eight-kilometer corridor, from long distances and through and through with artillery and missile systems in service with the Russian army, including the Iskander-M tactical missile systems. The Crimea-based Russian Air Force grouping, already in its current configuration, is capable of ensuring air supremacy over both Perekop and the rest of the peninsula. In the event of a threat, we can quickly build up our air presence not only in Crimea, but at any point on the continental Russian-Ukrainian border. Which, of course, will have the most sad effect on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to attack somewhere. Ukrainian air defense in its current state is not able to provide effective resistance to the actions of Russian aviation. At the same time, even without a functioning bridge across the Kerch Strait, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are capable of quickly transferring as many troops, weapons and equipment as required by air and by sea to Crimea. Moreover, Russia is capable of carrying out a significant part of such a redeployment of troops absolutely secretly. "Polite people" can confirm.

Fighting with Russia is dangerous to health

In the event of an armed conflict with Ukraine through the fault of Kiev, Russia is unlikely to limit itself to local defensive actions in Crimea. It would be logical to assume that Russian troops would enter the Donbass, followed by a blow from there in the back of the Armed Forces group that was storming Perekop. But there is also Kharkov. And Chernigov. And even, scary to say, Kiev, separated from the border of the Russian military-strategic ally in the CSTO by only an eighty-kilometer "gut" of the Kiev reservoir on the Dnieper ... And in general ... Taking into account the large-scale exercises regularly conducted recently by the Russian Armed Forces, as the commander of the Airborne Forces put it colonel general Vladimir Shamanov, "Our adversary can expect many surprises." Of course, there will be a lot of blood, many mistakes and tragedies. There will be killed, there will be maimed. There will be widows and orphans. Real war is not a board game. But a comparison of the modern military capabilities of Russia and Ukraine clearly points to the most likely winner of a potential conflict. And this is not Ukraine. That is probably why Kiev is threatening to return Crimea. Threatening, but in no hurry to move from words to deeds. Moreover, NATO is in no hurry to help either. Proved by the US destroyer Donald Cook, who in April 2014 wished to interrupt its Black Sea mission as soon as possible after a close acquaintance with the Russian Su-24 bomber.

1 The organization is prohibited on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Tatiana Urbanskaya

6241 0

It was worth waiting for the trial of Yanukovych for four long years, if only to hear the truth about how the annexation of Crimea by Russia took place. Because high-ranking witnesses are unlikely to voice fictions under oath, not facts.

Four years ago, events in Ukraine developed so rapidly that it was impossible to keep track of them in real time and not miss anything. While Kiev was trying to realize what a monster one needs to be in order to easily give the go-ahead for the murder of citizens of its country in its very center - a stone's throw from the main square, in Crimea, “on the sly,” the Russian operation Krymnash was launched.

Although Russian propaganda continues to feed Russians with tales that Crimea voluntarily joined Russia, the official date for the start of Russian aggression is enshrined in Ukrainian legislation - February 20. Of course, at first the Kremlin denied this in every possible way. In particular, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on March 14, 2014 that the "little green men" who have been roaming around Crimea since mid-February 2014 are "local self-defense forces." A month later, on April 17 of the same year, Putin said that “our military stood behind the self-defense forces,” and six months later, on November 17, 2014, he admitted that “our armed forces had blocked the Ukrainian armed forces in Crimea” ...

One of the case on Yanukovych's treason, ex-deputy of the Russian State Duma Ilya Ponomarev said in court that the decision to annex Crimea was made “on the initiative of Putin personally on the night of February 22-23, 2014”. And the plan to seize part of the territory "arose from Putin very emotionally." “There was no clear plan. There probably was some kind of plan - but it was not the only plan and events certainly did not develop according to it. The decision that Russia will annex Crimea was made on the night of February 22-23, including military actions, "he said during the court session.

At the same time, of the main evidence of lies both personally by Vladimir Putin and the entire Russian political elite regarding the fact that Russia did not prepare for the annexation of Crimea, but acted spontaneously after "the overthrow of the legitimate President of Ukraine Yanukovych in Kiev" on February 22, 2014, was the departmental the award of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - the medal "For the Return of Crimea". The dates of the operation are clearly engraved on it - "February 20 - March 18, 2014". That is, the "return" was planned before Yanukovych fled.

Over the course of four years, both in Moscow and Kiev, dozens of versions of how the seizure of Crimea took place were announced. I just wanted to believe in some of them, but some looked outright fake ... Today, high-ranking participants in those events, being under oath, testify in court in the case of high treason of ex-President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych who fled to Russia. What gives reason to believe - facts are voiced, not fictions. UNIAN, having analyzed their speeches, tried to recreate the real picture of the annexation of Crimea in order to understand why four years ago the Ukrainian autonomy, as they say, surrendered without a fight.

Where did "polite people" come from?

One of the evidence of the transfer of Russian troops from other regions of the Russian Federation to Crimea was the confessions of the servicemen themselves, made by the Russian media. For example, a year after the annexation, Konstantin Fedorov, a resident of Kambarka (Udmurtia), told the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda that “he served as a marine in the Krasnodar Territory under contract. On February 22 (when Yanukovych, according to the testimony of an employee of the State Security Department, ex-security guard of the fugitive ex-president Viktor Reznichenko, was still in Kharkov, - UNIAN) we were raised on alarm and transferred to Sevastopol in a few days. And then - to Kerch and set the task - to guard the city port and the Ukrainian military unit. "

“We were as polite as possible and did not talk to anyone. And provocations were all too often. Young people organized rallies near us, dummy women shouted: “Bring back our sons!”, One of the “polite people” told Russian journalists.

Agree, the "provocations" to which he draws attention indicate that in Crimea not everyone was happy with the appearance of Russian military men without identification marks and were not very eager to "go to their home harbor."

In addition, in 2015, in an interview with the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti, the ex-commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, retired admiral Igor Kasatonov, admitted that the unknown "green men" in Crimea - "polite people" - were the Russian army special forces. That is, there was no smell of self-defense of Crimea on the peninsula.

According to him, “the Black Sea Fleet prepared a bridgehead, the officers knew what was going on around, where the Ukrainian units were located, scenarios for the development of events were worked out on maps. That is, the Black Sea Fleet coped with its tasks - "polite people" were delivered, from February 27 to 28 the Supreme Council of Crimea was taken. "

He also said that, in fact, the redeployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet military was disguised as the transfer to Crimea of \u200b\u200bsabotage units, gunners, guides who acted together with the fleet grouping: “I was told that the Ukrainians received information that in February, Kacha was declared landing of three helicopters, and six landed, on Gvardeyskoye one IL-76 was ordered, and three landed ... ”.

Now, four years later, the former acting Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Colonel-General Mykhailo Koval, speaks about the same in his testimony. True, with some "amendments". For example, there were not three Il-76 aircraft, but eight, and not six, but eleven helicopters. “One Il-76 plane was announced to the airfield in Gvardeisk, but eight arrived. So much for the "little green men"! The 31st air peacekeeping brigade from Ulyanovsk and the 104th paratrooper regiment from the Pskov region ... A short time passes and instead of the three announced helicopters, the Black Sea Fleet arrives at 11. They just laugh in the face of the border guard girl, ”he said.

According to Koval, the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea made it possible "under the guise of specialists to conduct reconnaissance to their facilities, have guides from the local population and quickly go out to the facilities after they landed."

Actually, the fact that the Russians felt themselves in Crimea, in the adjacent regions of Ukraine, almost at home, and allowed two Russian helicopters on the night of February 22-23 to land near Berdyansk to take Yanukovych and his retinue to Crimea. According to UGO employee Viktor Reznichenko, with this "cargo" on board, the helicopters made several flights between the Crimean airfields, which already had Russian military personnel.

It turns out that in Ukraine they knew about the strengthening of the Russian military grouping on the peninsula, but did nothing?

Response to intervention

All the participants in the trial on the case of Yanukovych's treason admit that they knew something and, as best they could, did something.

According to the former chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Vladimir Zamana, intelligence data that Russians have become more active in Crimea began to arrive a month before the "return of Crimea", from January 20, 2014. But the Yanukovych regime ignored the intelligence data. However, even after Yanukovych fled, the situation did not change dramatically. According to Zamana, he personally informed the acting about the situation in Crimea. President Alexander Turchinov and NSDC Secretary Andrei Parubiy: “But I was told, they say, our European partners are telling me not to make sudden moves” ...

Therefore, despite the fact that at that time Russian "green men" were already roaming the peninsula, Kiev, in the first days of the Russian intervention, did not lose hope to come to an agreement with the Crimean authorities and calm the situation. For example, acting Minister of the Interior Arsen Avakov and acting SBU chiefs Valentin Nalyvaichenko told in court that they flew to Crimea on February 23-24 to meet with Yanukovych. But, as already mentioned above, they returned to the capital not salty. The only thing - they tried to calm down the Crimeans, telling at a press conference that "the country is returning to the channel of peaceful dialogue." “Yanukovych knew that I had arrived in Crimea. He avoided meeting, disappeared on the territory of the Russian military base, ”Avakov said.

Avakov told how he flew to Crimea in 2014 to meet with Yanukovych / photo from UNIAN

And according to Nalyvaichenko, it was on February 24, 2014 that the SBU began collecting evidence of the annexation. In particular, we are talking about a letter from Yanukovych to Putin with an appeal to send Russian troops into Ukraine. "This letter formed the basis of those two UN resolutions that recognize Russia as an aggressor," he said.

Unfortunately, the Crimean theme in Kiev in those days was still in the background. The first issue that urgently needed to be addressed in the capital was to prevent anarchy. But while Turchinov managed to somehow keep in working order the highest authority in the country - the Verkhovna Rada, the situation in the regions left much to be desired.

In other words, the few days that the parliament spent on its own reformatting and appointing acting to key positions in the state to replace the officials who fled with Yanukovych were missed, which, as a result, led to the capture of the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Council of Ministers by Russian "polite people" Crimea on the night of February 26-27.

The next day, February 28, while the current President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, and then a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, authorized by his colleagues to negotiate with the leadership of the Crimean parliament, flew to see the closed doors of the Supreme Council of Crimea - “I personally made sure that the building was closed and surrounded by“ green little men "- the military of the regular forces of the Russian Federation and a chain of persons in camouflage, who called themselves" Crimean self-defense ", but were coordinated by officers of the special services of the Russian Federation" - a historic meeting of the NSDC was held in Kiev, the transcript of which was published in the media in 2016 and literally blew up the information space.

Then Turchinov voiced the fear that "the Russian leadership is really considering the issue of annexation" of Crimea. This, in particular, was evidenced by the reports on the transfer by Russia of its military to the Crimea. "The planes land at the airfield under their control, in accordance with the agreement on the basing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet," said then the head of the foreign intelligence service, Viktor Gvozd.

“Write in the decision: immediately close the airspace over Crimea,” Turchinov said.

“It won't help. They will land the planes with the help of military dispatchers. But this must be done, ”said the acting director. Minister of Defense of Ukraine Igor Tenyukh.

It is now, in the court on Yanukovych's treason case, Tenyukh says that his plan to “go for a breakthrough” in Crimea was not supported. However, at the notorious meeting of the National Security and Defense Council on February 28, he also said that "there will be a maximum of 1.5-2 thousand [Ukrainian servicemen] ready to fulfill the order regarding the use of weapons." At the same time, according to him, Russian units, including the special forces of the GRU General Staff of the Russian Federation, at that time already exceeded 20 thousand people. Moreover, he said that the Russian Federation, of course, has no right to increase the size of its military contingent without notice, but "we do not control the increase in their troops either by air corridors or by sea, their landing ships go to any point on the coast."

Yes, indeed, later, in March, in the very first days of March, Tenyukh, according to his testimony, gave the order and permission to open fire on persons who would cross the borders of military units in Crimea. “I set the task to 'keep the defense', to prevent the capture of units, so that we have time to bring our forces to a state of readiness, before the political leadership makes a decision to use the Armed Forces,” he said.

But, for various reasons, this order was not carried out in Crimea.

Chronicles of betrayal

One of the reasons is the lack of an army capable of repelling the Russians. Moreover, from the testimony of the NSDC secretary, and during the seizure of Crimea by the Russians, acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchinov, it follows that there was not a sufficient number of combat-ready units both on the peninsula itself and on the mainland. Although he and other politicians in those days declared about the high combat capability of the army. “I think the court understands. If I went out in those days and said: “Friends, we have no army, there is no one to protect you, there is no one, unfortunately, to carry out my orders,” chaos could begin in the country, ”he said in court.

In fact, the situation, he said, was extremely deplorable. “When in the morning (February 27, 2014, - UNIAN) I was informed that the Russian special forces had seized administrative buildings in Crimea, I immediately gave an order to the leaders of the internal troops based in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to surround the parliament and the Cabinet, prepare its seizure and carry out an operation on it. liberation. A few hours later I was informed that, unfortunately, they could only carry out the encirclement of these buildings, but under pressure from aggressive civilians, they could not complete the task and had to disperse, ”Turchinov said.

In February 2014, according to Turchinov, several factors worked against Ukraine on the peninsula / photo from UNIAN

“We learned about the invasion of Russian troops not on February 24, but on the 27th, when the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea was captured. Although in fact the invasion began on February 20, ”he said and added that officials and officers from Crimea were in no hurry to report this to Kiev.

According to him, in those days on the peninsula, several factors worked against Ukraine. First, the Ukrainian military, surrounded by Russian special forces in their Crimean units, could not at that time overcome the psychological barrier and shoot at the invaders to kill.

The second is that the tactics of the Russian special forces, who, during the seizure of military facilities, put civilians in front of them, did not allow this either. Yes, yes, the same thing voiced by Putin on March 4, 2014, "we will stand behind the backs of women and children."

And the third is the betrayal of the oath of many military personnel who lived and served on the peninsula. In particular, in his testimony, ex-Minister of Defense Ihor Tenyukh noted that out of 12 thousand Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea, 10 thousand were changed. Among the traitors was the former chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Yuri Ilyin. In turn, the ex-commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Serhiy Gaiduk, in court in the case of Yanukovych's treason, said that at that time the commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Denis Berezovsky, was among the traitors, which allowed the Russians to increase the intensity of the seizure of Ukrainian military units.

At that time, the commander of the Ukrainian Navy Denis Berezovsky was among the traitors / photo from UNIAN

As for the claims to the country's political leadership about why they did not ensure the liberation of Crimea with the help of regular units of the Ukrainian army from the mainland, Turchynov explained: in those days, the threat of an invasion of a 200,000-strong Russian army in the north and east hung over Ukraine. “According to Ukrainian intelligence and foreign partners, the concentration of the armed forces of the Russian army has begun on the northern and eastern borders of Ukraine to prepare for an invasion of mainland Ukraine,” he said.

Therefore, according to him, 5 thousand combat-ready troops were transferred to defend these lines.

“Those who fled to the Russian Federation surrendered a lot of classified information ... The head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Viktor Gvozd, told me that according to the information he received from his sources in the Russian Federation, a decision of the parliament (Russian Federation) on the introduction of troops is being prepared on March 1 to Ukraine. He also said that, according to his information, there is an appeal from Yanukovych on this matter, ”Turchinov said.

Actually, all of this, in part, can explain the fact that politicians did not dare to introduce martial law in the country. Firstly, because we will decide there was simply no one to provide. Well, and, secondly, it would not allow holding elections and consolidating the legitimacy of the authorities.

What happened next is no secret. Yanukovych's letter to Putin with a request to send troops was a bad explanation for the annexation of Crimea in the UN Security Council, but a good reason for Russia to continue its aggression under the guise of "protecting the Russian-speaking population" in Ukraine.

Tatiana Urbanskaya

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