During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. in the rear of the German troops, under the conditions of the most severe occupation regime, a people's war unfolded and was waged in the form of a partisan and underground movement. This was a unique phenomenon. In terms of its scope and effectiveness, it turned out to be unexpected both for the leadership of their own country and for the enemy. In the USSR, there was neither a pre-developed concept of partisan and underground warfare, nor personnel trained to conduct it. According to the Soviet pre-war doctrine, in the event of aggression, the enemy was to be defeated in a decisive counter-offensive on his own territory. Many military leaders who were involved in the issue of interaction between regular troops and partisans were unreasonably repressed in the 1930s, and the hidden bases that were created in advance in the western regions of the USSR to organize a partisan movement in case of war were liquidated.
The German command assumed the likelihood of Soviet resistance in the territory occupied by the Wehrmacht, but only on an insignificant, limited scale. However, a week after the start of Operation Barbarossa, it began to realize that it had miscalculated, and to solve the “problem of pacifying the rear area”, the security divisions alone would not be enough and the combat divisions would have to be withdrawn from the front.
Berlin pinned hopes that the intensification of terror would nip in the bud the resistance movement in the occupied Soviet lands. The Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht High Command, Field Marshal V. Keitel, issued an order on September 16, 1941, according to which, for an attempt on one German, it was ordered to take hostage and destroy in a way that increased the "frightening effect", from 50 to 100 men and women from among the local residents. At the same time, the invaders, who used the carrot and stick method, carefully concealed their villainous plans to transform the territory of the USSR into a colony of the "Third Reich" and to massacre its population, carried on propaganda that Germany was waging a war against the USSR for some "liberating purpose." This propaganda has had its effect on some citizens. By the beginning of 1942, more than 60.4 thousand people entered the service of the invaders as policemen, village heads, and minor officials of the German administration. A large number of patriots died at their hands. The majority of the population despised the traitors from among their fellow citizens and treated them the same as the invaders.
But at the beginning of the occupation, the possibilities for resisting the enemy were extremely insignificant - people simply did not have weapons. In addition, the majority of the population remaining under the yoke of the invaders were women, children, adolescents and elderly men who, due to their age, were not subject to conscription. But their hatred of the enemy was no less than that of the Soviet people who were at the front or in the Soviet rear. Part of the population joined the underground organizations created by the communists in cities and towns or, having obtained weapons, went into the forests to join the partisans. Many people did this on the basis of their moral and political convictions, seeking to fulfill their patriotic duty to the Motherland and continue the struggle against the inhuman Nazi "new order". An important role in the development of the resistance movement was played by the desire to protect their relatives from the atrocities of the occupiers, or to take revenge on the invaders for the ruined lives of their loved ones. The motives were different, but the partisan war soon turned into a real fact, which became very worried about the German command.
An important role in the deployment of the Soviet partisan and underground movement was played by the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of June 29, 1941 to Soviet and party organizations in the front-line regions, as well as the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of July 18, 1941 on the deployment of the struggle in behind enemy lines. However, both of these documents were classified. Their content was known only to a narrow circle of party and Soviet workers, who were mainly in the Soviet rear. The bulk of the population of the occupied territories did not know about them. In their actions and behavior, they were guided, first of all, by the measure of awareness of personal responsibility for protecting their home, city, village and country as a whole from the invasion of foreign invaders.
July 3, 1941 from the speech of I.V. Stalin, sounded on the radio, the calls of the party and government to deploy partisan and sabotage activities behind enemy lines became known. However, neither the secret directives nor Stalin's speech touched on the practical organization of the partisan movement, support for the struggle behind enemy lines with weapons, communications, interaction between the partisan and underground movement with the Red Army. At that time, only the NKVD could provide real support to the partisans, which threw their special units behind enemy lines, engaged in sabotage activities against enemy forces. But most of the partisans acted independently at this stage of the war. The bulk of the detachments arose spontaneously. In the future, the number of partisan formations grew thanks primarily to the support of the local population.
In July 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the General Staff, and the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army obliged the military councils and political directorates of the fronts to provide all-round support to the republican and regional party committees in the creation, arming and training of partisan detachments and groups, as well as their transfer to the rear of the enemy. At the end of 1941, 3,500 partisan detachments and groups, in which there were about 90 thousand people, managed to gain a foothold in the occupied territory. An important role in the organization and formation of partisan formations was played by Soviet servicemen, who found themselves surrounded during the retreat, but escaped captivity. Among the partisans of the Leningrad region, their number in 1941 was 18%, in the Oryol region - 10%, in the Lithuanian SSR - 22%, in Belarus - 10%. They brought discipline, knowledge of weapons and military equipment to partisan units. Relying on their combat experience, the partisans were more confident in solving the assigned tasks. During the Battle of Moscow, they actually disorganized the supplies of the German Army Group Center, destroying sections of railways, bridges and blockages in its rear. In January-February 1942, partisans of the Smolensk region liberated 40 villages and villages in the rear of Army Group Center, where Soviet troops were landing. They recaptured Dorogobuzh from the enemy and united with the Red Army formations, which raided the rear of the German troops. In the course of this raid, about 10 thousand square meters were freed. km. The German command was forced to throw 7 divisions against them. In the Moscow battle, the partisans interacted with the special detachments of the NKVD, which also actively operated behind enemy lines, trashing its garrisons, destroying the equipment and personnel of the Wehrmacht formations.
May 30, 1942 I.V. Stalin gave instructions to create the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. This headquarters was headed by a prominent state and political figure P.K. Ponamorenko, whose deputies were approved by representatives of the General Staff and the NKVD. TSSHPD, subordinate to the Headquarters, which carried out the general leadership of the partisan movement, worked in close contact with the General Staff, military councils of fronts and armies, leaders of party bodies of republics and regions. He performed a wide range of tasks in organizing, planning and directing the combat actions of partisans, establishing contacts with the underground and partisan formations, their material support from the mainland, training personnel and specialists, and organizing intelligence. In the operating fronts with similar functions, republican and regional partisan headquarters began to operate, which were operatively subordinate to the Central Headquarters, and in the armies - the operational groups of these headquarters. Their chiefs were included in the military councils of the fronts and armies.
The activities of the headquarters of the partisan movement and the patriotic upsurge among the population of the occupied regions caused by the defeat of the Germans near Moscow had a great impact on the growth of resistance behind enemy lines and the increase in the effectiveness of partisan actions. The large losses of partisans during the armed struggle in the winter of 1941/42 were quickly recovered. In May 1942, the number of partisan detachments and groups began to grow. If in May 1942 there were 500 partisan detachments operating in the rear of the enemy, including 72 thousand people, by mid-November 1942 there were already 11,770 detachments, in which 125 thousand partisans fought, and by the beginning of 1944 their number was doubled and amounted to 250 thousand people. In this case, we are talking only about those partisans with whom the TSSHPD kept in touch. The number of partisans began to grow especially rapidly in 1944, when there was a struggle for the complete liberation of the country from the invaders. In total, over the years of the war, over 6 thousand partisan detachments, in which there were 1 million people, operated in the rear of the enemy.
The activities of the partisans were multifaceted. They disrupted enemy communications, carried out deep raids into its rear, provided the Soviet command with valuable intelligence information, etc. The largest operation in 1943 was the "Rail War" operation carried out by the partisans, which was an integral part of the Battle of Kursk. During the operation, 215 thousand rails were blown up, which amounted to 1,342 km of single-track railway. In Belarus alone, 836 echelons and 3 armored trains were derailed. Some railways were disabled, which created many problems for the German troops.
Partisan territories were evidence of the strength and scope of the people's war - large territories reclaimed from the occupiers and held by the partisans in the Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk and Kursk regions, in Belarus, in northern Ukraine, in the Crimea, etc. In the summer of 1943, the partisans became full masters of one-sixth (over 200 thousand sq. Km) of the entire occupied territory. About 4 million people worked and fought here in the name of victory over the enemy. These edges limited the enemy's lines of withdrawal, made it difficult to maneuver and regroup his troops, reserves, supply bases and command posts.
The partisans did a lot to prevent the mass hijacking of Soviet people by the invaders for forced labor in Germany. At the end of 1943 - the beginning of 1944, up to 40% of the citizens forcibly taken out by the invaders were liberated by the partisans and the advancing Red Army.
The underground movement also gained momentum in the enemy rear. Its members distributed among the population newspapers and leaflets that they received from behind the front line or published them themselves, provided the partisans with intelligence data, supplied them with medicines, destroyed the most cruel representatives of the German administration and traitors, organized sabotage at industrial enterprises seized by the Germans, etc. etc.
The mass sabotage by the population of the activities of the occupation authorities, the actions of armed partisan formations and underground organizations - all this turned the occupied territory into an arena of a fierce battle with the invaders. The partisan and underground movement was of great military, economic and political importance. The partisan movement was taken into account when the Soviet command prepared strategic operations. In this case, the partisan formations were assigned specific combat missions.
During the war, the partisans diverted up to 10% of the German troops operating against the USSR. They thwarted the plans of the Nazi leadership to use the material and natural resources of the occupied territory to provide Germany and its armed forces, inflicting great damage on the enemy. He derailed 20 thousand military echelons, blew up 120 armored trains, put 17 thousand locomotives and 171 thousand carriages out of order, blew up 12 thousand bridges on railways and highways, destroyed and seized 65 thousand vehicles.
Thousands of foreign citizens - Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Spaniards, Yugoslavs and others - fought alongside Soviet partisans and underground fighters in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR. At the same time, up to 40 thousand Soviet citizens who found themselves outside their homeland took part in the European Resistance Movement.
The temporarily occupied Soviet territory did not become a secure and calm rear for the invaders. Their calculations to force the citizens of the USSR to work meekly for Germany did not come true. This was, first of all, the merit of the partisans and the underground, which the state highly appreciated. More than 300 thousand partisans were awarded orders and medals. 249 partisans were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and two leaders of the partisan movement S.A. Kovpak and A.F. Fedorov was awarded this high title twice.
Kulkov Evgeny Nikolaevich,
Ph.D., military historianThe partisan movement became one of the forms of armed struggle of the Soviet people against the enemy. The program of its deployment was contained in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of June 29, 1941. Soon, on July 18, the Central Committee adopted a special resolution "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops." These documents gave instructions on the preparation of the party underground, on the organization, manning and arming of partisan detachments, and also formulated the tasks of the movement.
The scope of the partisan struggle was largely predetermined by the scale of the occupied territory of the USSR. Despite the measures taken to evacuate the population to the eastern regions of the country, over 60 million people, or about 33% of the pre-war population, were forced to remain in the territory occupied by the enemy.
Initially, the Soviet leadership (L.P. Beria) relied on regular partisan formations formed with the participation and under the leadership of the NKVD. The most famous was the "Winners" detachment, commander D.N. Medvedev. He operated in the Smolensk, Oryol and Mogilev regions, and then in Western Ukraine. The detachment consisted of athletes, employees of the NKVD (including scouts), verified local personnel. A member of the scout unit N.I. Kuznetsov, fluent in German, with documents addressed to Ober-Lieutenant Paul Sieber, conducted intelligence activities in Rovno: he obtained valuable intelligence information, destroyed the chief judge of Ukraine Funk, the imperial adviser to the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine Gell and his secretary, the vice-governor of Galicia Bauer.
At the head of the partisan movement in the localities were, as a rule, the chairmen of regional, city and district executive committees of the party, as well as secretaries of regional, city and district Komsomol committees. The general strategic leadership of the partisan movement was carried out by the Supreme Command Headquarters. Direct interaction with detachments in the field is the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsSHPD). It was created by the decision of the State Defense Committee on May 30, 1942, and operated until January 1944. The head of the TSSHPD was P.K.Ponomarenko, who since 1938 was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus. The TSSHPD was supposed to establish communication with partisan formations, direct and coordinate their actions, supply weapons, ammunition, medicines, train personnel and carry out interaction of partisans with units of the regular army.
Of particular importance among the headquarters of the partisan movement belonged to the Ukrainian headquarters, which since 1943 was directly subordinate to the Supreme Command Headquarters. In Ukraine, even before the occupation of its territory by the Nazis, 883 detachments and over 1,700 sabotage and reconnaissance groups were prepared for the deployment of the partisan movement. The center of concentration of the partisan forces of Ukraine was Spadshchansky Forest, where the Putivl detachment under the command of S.A.Kovpak was based. During the war years, he raided over 10 thousand km, defeating the enemy garrisons in 39 settlements. At the same time, the Kovpak detachment absorbed a number of other partisan groups, for example, the 2nd Putivl detachment under the command of S.V. Rudnev. In 1941, over 28 thousand soldiers fought in partisan detachments in Ukraine. On May 1, 1942, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine had information about 766 partisan formations and 613 sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Created in 1942, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement was headed by T.A. Strokam, who since March 1941 held the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, and then led the formation of fighter battalions. By the end of 1943. the total number of partisans in the republic was about 300 thousand people, and by the end of the war, according to official data, reached 500 thousand people. Among the leaders of the partisan movement in Ukraine, in addition to S.A. Kovpak and S.V. Rudnev, A.F. Fedorov (since 1938 was the first secretary of the Chernigov regional committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine) and P.P. Vershigor. The struggle against the Nazis was also widespread on the territory of Belarus, where it was led by V.Z. Korzh, T.P. Bumazhkov, F.I. Pavlovsky and other well-known party workers.
In total, during the war there were more than 6 thousand partisan detachments in the rear of the enemy, in which more than 1 million people fought. In the course of the operations, the partisans destroyed, captured and wounded 1 million fascists, disabled 4 thousand tanks and armored vehicles, 65 thousand vehicles, 1,100 aircraft, destroyed and damaged 1,600 railway bridges, and derailed 20 thousand trains.
A large role in the development of the partisan movement was played by the meeting of the leading workers of the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Central School of the Defense Forces with representatives of underground party bodies, commanders and commissars of large partisan formations. The meeting was held on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in late August-early September 1942. As a result, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense Stalin of September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement" was formulated.
Communications, especially railways, became the main object of the partisans' combat activities. For the first time in the history of wars, a number of large operations were carried out in a centralized manner to disable enemy communications over a large territory, which were closely connected with the actions of regular army units. From August 3 to September 15, 1943 in the occupied territory of the RSFSR, Belarus and part of Ukraine, the operation "Rail War" was carried out to assist the Soviet Army in completing the defeat of the German troops in the Battle of Kursk. On the ground, areas and targets for action were identified for each of the 167 partisan formations designated for this. The guerrillas were provided with explosives, mine-blasting equipment, experts-demolition specialists were sent to them. The partisans of Belarus derailed 761 enemy echelon, Ukraine - 349, Smolensk region - 102. As a result of the operation of the Mogilev-Krichev, Polotsk-Dvinsk, Mogilev-Zhlobin highway, the whole August did not work. On other railways, traffic was often delayed by 3-15 days. The actions of the partisans made it much more difficult to regroup and supply the retreating enemy forces.
The experience of the "Rail War" was used in another operation, code-named "Concert", which was carried out from September 19 to the end of October 1943. 193 partisan formations of Belarus, the Baltic states, Leningrad and Kalinin regions participated in it. The length of the operation along the front was about 900 km, and 400 km deep. Its implementation was closely connected with the upcoming Soviet offensive in the Smolensk and Gomel directions and the battle for the Dnieper.
As a result of partisan operations in 1943, the throughput of the railways decreased by 35-40%, which led to the disruption of the enemy's plans to accumulate material resources and concentrate troops. In addition, the Germans were forced to use large forces to guard the railways, and their length in the occupied territory of the USSR was 37 thousand km. In the summer campaign of 1942 alone, the actions of the partisans diverted 24 enemy divisions, 15 of which were constantly engaged in the protection of communications.
During the war years, partisan territories and zones were created in the occupied territory of the USSR - territories in the rear of the German troops, where the organs of Soviet power were restored, collective farms, local industry enterprises, cultural, household, medical and other institutions were being re-established. Such territories and zones existed in the Kalinin, Smolensk and other regions of the RSFSR, in Belarus, in the north-west of Ukraine. In the spring of 1942 there were 11 of them, and later this number was constantly increasing. In the partisan region in the Bryansk region, there were up to 21 thousand partisans.
The partisans actively disrupted the sending of large groups of the population to Germany for forced labor. In the Leningrad Region alone, attempts to hijack 400,000 Soviet citizens were prevented. It is no coincidence that Hitler's command and control bodies in the occupied territory, as well as the military command, were actively fighting the partisans. For example, in one of the districts of the Leningrad Region, the fascist authorities appointed a reward for the capture of "the leader of the partisans" Mikhail Romanov in "6 cows or 6 hectares of plowing, or half of both." In addition to this, the local commandant promised "30 packs of tobacco and 10 liters of vodka." For the dead partisan, "half of the specified reward" was promised.
Residents of the villages, who knew about the whereabouts of the partisans and did not report it, were threatened with charges of "banditry" and execution. In a number of cases, the Nazis tried to create "self-defense detachments" from the peasants, which were supposed to, armed with axes, knives and clubs, "destroy the attacking gangs", that is, the partisans.
The interaction of the partisans with units of the regular army was extremely important. In 1941, during the defensive battles of the Red Army, this was expressed mainly in the conduct of intelligence. However, in the spring of 1943, the systematic development of plans began using partisan forces. The most striking example of effective interaction between partisans and units of the Soviet Army was the 1944 Byelorussian operation, codenamed "Bagration". In it, a powerful grouping of Belarusian partisans was, in essence, one of the fronts, coordinating its actions with four other advancing fronts of the regular army.
The activity of partisans during the Great Patriotic War was highly appreciated. More than 127 thousand of them were awarded the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" 1st and 2nd degree; over 184 thousand were awarded other medals and orders, and 249 people became Heroes of the Soviet Union, and S.A. Kovpak and A.F. Fedorov twice.
Every year we celebrate Victory Day. Fireworks are thundering, people with gray hair on their temples and only orders on their chests are walking along the streets of cities - mute witnesses of what they had to endure. Every year there are fewer of them - veterans of the Great Patriotic War. And yet they are alive, and along with them are the memories of that most terrible in the history of world bloodshed. Each such anniversary is a new immersion in history, in memory.
The most important component of the struggle of the Soviet people against Hitlerite Germany was the partisan movement, which developed in the occupied territories and became truly universal.
By its nature, scope and losses inflicted on the invaders, the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear had no equal in history. By the spring of 1942, it covered a huge territory - from the forests of Karelia to the Crimea and Moldova. By the end of 1943, there were over a million armed partisans and underground fighters. The composition of the partisan detachments clearly reflected the national character of the partisan movement: more than 30% were workers, about 41% were collective farmers, and over 29% were employees. Representatives of all nationalities of the Soviet Union fought in partisan formations. Firmly believing in victory over the enemy, millions of people who found themselves in the occupied territory have shown dedication and will in the struggle to drive out the invaders. The scale of the popular movement, the exploits and self-sacrifice in the name of a great victory, performed by ordinary people, the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of the freedom of other people, delighted and amazed me. This was the reason for choosing the topic of my essay.
In this work, I set myself the goal of studying the history and nature of the partisan movement and investigating the problem of the effectiveness of popular struggle.
The question of the effectiveness of movement interested me because it is usually not covered in reference books and textbooks. Could a guerrilla movement have been more effective? Why was so little attention paid to the struggle of the people in the rear in the early stages of the war? Why were not all reserves involved? I will try to answer these questions in Chapter IV of the abstract.
The significant contribution of the partisans to the Great Victory over a cruel enemy has long been recognized. Studying this issue, I came across different points of view, sometimes polarizing on many facts of partisan warfare. So in the historical, memoir documentation of the 70s, 80s, there is an undeniable point of view that interprets the unequivocally positive role of partisans during the war years. The role of the party in the organization of partisan detachments and their activities is emphasized. More historically reliable, in my opinion, are the sources of information of the 90s, where the history of the front behind enemy lines is revealed in many ways, where a person with his sometimes dramatic fate is not lost behind festivity and heroism. For myself, I first learned about the shady, sometimes unpleasant aspects of the life of partisans, about some facts of the preparation of the partisan movement before the war, which are usually not mentioned in textbooks.
The main source for writing my abstract was the book by M.A. Drobova "Small war (partisanship and sabotage)", from which I learned about the nature of the activities of partisans, the composition of partisan detachments, the first decrees on the organization of war behind enemy lines. Among the literature that has become the subject of my study, I would especially like to mention the "Dictionary of the Great Patriotic War" edited by V.V. Karpov, who served as a source of information for me about the partisan lands and the names of prominent and famous partisans. A valuable source was the book by A.I. Balashov, G.P. Rudakov. "History of the Great Patriotic War", which told me about the first partisan detachments, their basing areas and major operations. Interesting information about the measures taken by the Germans against the partisans was provided to me by the book of A.N. Mertsalov. "WWII in the historiography of the FRG". The material for the 4th chapter of the abstract was taken by me from articles authored by the candidates of historical sciences A.S. Knyazkov, V. Boyarsky and K. Kolontaev, published in the newspapers "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" and "Duel", in which the authors note some miscalculations and failures in organizing the struggle, analyze mistakes and give their assessment of the effectiveness of partisan war.
Let us first give a list of the largest partisan formations and their leaders. Here's the list:
Sumy partisan unit. Major General S.A. Kovpak
Chernihiv-Volyn partisan formation Major General A.F. Fedorov
Gomel partisan formation Major General I.P. Kozhar
partisan unit Major General V.Z. Korzh
partisan formation Major General M. I. Naumov
partisan unit Major General A.N. Saburov
partisan brigade Major General M.I. Duka
Ukrainian partisan division Major General P.P. Vershigor
Rivne partisan unit Colonel V.A. Begma
Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, Major General V.A. Andreev
In this work, we will restrict ourselves to considering the action of some of them.
5.1 Sumy partisan unit. Major General S.A. Kovpak
The leader of the movement Kovpak, Soviet statesman and public figure, one of the organizers of the partisan movement, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (18.5.1942 and 4.1.1944), Major General (1943). Member of the CPSU since 1919. Born into the family of a poor peasant. Participant in the Civil War of 1918-20: he headed a partisan detachment that fought in the Ukraine against the German invaders together with the detachments of A. Ya. Parkhomenko, fought against the Denikinites; participated in battles on the Eastern Front as part of the 25th Chapayev Division and on the Southern Front against Wrangel's troops. In 1921-26 he was a military commissar in a number of cities in the Yekaterinoslav province. In 1937-41 the chairman of the Putivl city executive committee of the Sumy region. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, Kovpak was the commander of the Putivl partisan detachment, then the formation of partisan detachments of the Sumy region, a member of the illegal Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. In 1941-42, Kovpak's unit carried out raids behind enemy lines in the Sumy, Kursk, Oryol and Bryansk regions, in 1942-43 - a raid from the Bryansk forests to the Right Bank Ukraine in the Gomel, Pinsk, Volyn, Rivne, Zhitomir and Kiev regions; in 1943 - the Carpathian raid. The Sumy partisan unit under the command of Kovpak fought over 10 thousand km in the rear of the Nazi troops, defeated the enemy garrisons in 39 settlements. Kovpak's raids played a large role in the deployment of the partisan movement against the German fascist invaders. In January 1944, the Sumy unit was renamed the 1st Ukrainian Kovpak Partisan Division. He was awarded 4 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1st degree, orders of Czechoslovakia and Poland, as well as medals.
In early July 1941, the formation of partisan detachments and underground groups began in Putivl. One partisan detachment under the command of S.A. Kovpak was to operate in the Spadshchansky forest, another, commanded by S.V. Rudnev, in the Novoslobodsky forest, the third, led by S.F.Kirilenko, in the Maritsa tract. In October of the same year, at a general meeting of the detachment, it was decided to unite into a single Putivl partisan detachment. S.A. Kovpak became the commander of the combined detachment, S.V. Rudnev became the commissar, and G.Ya.Bazyma became the chief of staff. By the end of 1941, there were only 73 people in the detachment, and by the middle of 1942 - already more than a thousand. Small and large partisan detachments from other places came to Kovpak. Gradually, a union of the people's avengers of the Sumy region was born.
On May 26, 1942, the Kovpakites liberated Putivl and held him for two days. And in October, having broken through the enemy blockade created around the Bryansk forest, the formation of partisan detachments made a raid on the right bank of the Dnieper. For a month, the Kovpak team covered 750 km. On the rear of the enemy through Sumy, Chernigov, Gomel, Kiev, Zhytomyr regions. 26 bridges, 2 echelons with manpower and equipment of the fascists were blown up, 5 armored cars and 17 vehicles were destroyed.
During the period of its second raid - from July to October 1943 - the formation of partisan detachments fought four thousand kilometers. The partisans disabled the main refineries, oil storage facilities, oil rigs and oil pipelines located in the Drohobych and Ivano-Frankivsk regions.
The newspaper Pravda Ukrainy wrote: “Telegrams flew from Germany: to catch Kovpak, to lock up his troops in the mountains. Twenty-five times the ring of punishers closed around the areas occupied by the partisan general, and the same number of times he left unharmed.
Being in a difficult situation, and waging fierce battles, the Kovpak people made their way from their last encirclement shortly before the liberation of Ukraine.
). The central headquarters were operatively subordinate to the republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement, which were headed by secretaries or members of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the republics, regional and regional committees. The creation of headquarters of the partisan movement with clear functions and improved communication with the "mainland" gave the partisan movement an increasingly organized character, ensured greater coordination of the actions of the partisan forces and contributed to the improvement of their interaction with the troops.
The composition and organization of the partisan formations, despite their diversity, had many similarities. The main tactical unit was a detachment, which usually consisted of several dozen people (mainly NKVD officers), and later - up to 200 or more fighters. In the course of the war, many detachments were united in formations (brigades) of several hundred to several thousand people. Armament was dominated by light weapons (machine guns, light machine guns, rifles, carbines, grenades), but many detachments and formations had mortars and heavy machine guns, and some had artillery. All persons who joined the partisan formations took the partisan oath; in the detachments, strict military discipline was established.
In 1941-1942 the mortality rate among the groups abandoned by the NKVD behind enemy lines was 93%. For example, in Ukraine, from the beginning of the war until the summer of 1942, the NKVD prepared and left for operations in the rear 2 partisan regiments, 1,565 partisan detachments and groups with a total of 34,979 people, and by June 10, 1942, only 100 groups remained in touch. That showed the ineffectiveness of the work of large units, especially in the steppe zone. By the end of the war, the mortality rate in partisan detachments was about 10%.
The forms of organization of partisan forces and the methods of their actions were influenced by physical and geographical conditions. Vast forests, swamps, mountains were the main basing areas of the partisan forces. Here, partisan lands and zones arose, where various methods of struggle could be widely used, including open battles with the enemy. In the steppe regions, large formations operated successfully only during raids. The small detachments and groups that were constantly located here usually avoided open clashes with the enemy and caused damage mainly by sabotage.
The most important directions of the struggle behind enemy lines were formulated in the order of the People's Commissar of Defense JV Stalin of September 5, 1942 "On the tasks of the partisan movement."
Elements of guerrilla warfare
1941 poster
In the tactics of partisan actions during the Great Patriotic War, the following elements can be distinguished:
- Sabotage activities, destruction of enemy infrastructure in any form (rail war, destruction of communication lines, high-voltage lines, poisoning and destruction of water pipelines, wells, etc.).
- Intelligence activities, including undercover activities.
- Political activity and Bolshevik propaganda.
- Combat assistance.
- Destruction of enemy manpower.
- The elimination of collaborators and heads of the Nazi administration.
- Restoration and preservation of elements of Soviet power in the occupied territories.
- Mobilization of the combat-ready population remaining in the occupied territory, and the unification of the remnants of the encircled military units.
Territory of Belarus
From the very beginning, the Soviet government attaches great importance to Belarus for the implementation and development of partisan warfare. The main factors contributing to this are the geographical position of the republic, with its forest wilds and swamps, and its strategic location to the west of Moscow.
Territory of Ukraine
Following Belarus, Ukraine is the first and most affected republic after the invasion of the USSR in the summer-fall of 1941. The consequences for Ukraine and for the population, which remained under occupation for a long time, were devastating. The Nazi regime is attempting to exploit anti-Soviet sentiments among Ukrainians. Despite the fact that initially some of the Ukrainians welcomed the Germans, the Nazi leadership took harsh measures against the population: systematic deportation of the local population to Germany as forced labor was carried out and a policy of genocide against Jews was carried out. In these conditions, the overwhelming part of the population, having changed their views, was opposed to the Nazis, in connection with which the partisan movement in the occupied territories developed, which in many places was not pro-Soviet.
Territory of Russia
In the Bryansk region, Soviet partisans controlled vast territories in the German rear. In the summer of 1942, they actually controlled an area of \u200b\u200bover 14,000 square kilometers. The Bryansk partisan republic was formed. The main struggle in this area was conducted not by the partisans against the German occupiers, but against the anti-Bolshevik-minded population of the Lokot Republic. Detachments of Soviet partisans with a total number of more than 60,000 people in the region were headed by Alexei Fedorov, Alexander Saburov and others. In Belgorod, Orel, Kursk, Novgorod, Leningrad, Pskov and Smolensk regions, active partisan activities were also carried out during the occupation. In the Oryol and Smolensk regions, partisan detachments were led by Dmitry Medvedev. In 1943, after the Red Army began the liberation of western Russia and northeastern Ukraine, many partisan detachments, including units led by Fedorov, Medvedev and Saburov, were ordered to continue their operations in the territory of Central and Western Ukraine, which still remained occupied by the Nazis.
Territory of the Baltic
Soviet partisans also operated in the Baltics. In Estonia - under the leadership of Nikolai Karotamm. The detachments and groups that operated in Estonia were very small. In Latvia, partisan detachments were initially subordinated to the commanders of Russian and Belarusian detachments, and from January 1943, directly to the center in Moscow under the leadership of Artur Sprogis. Another prominent partisan commander is Vilis Samson. On account of the detachments headed by him, numbering about 3000 people - the destruction of about 130 German trains.
Jewish guerrilla units
On the territory of the Soviet Union, over fifteen thousand Jews fought against the Nazis in underground organizations and partisan detachments. Jewish partisan units were created by those Jews who fled from ghettos and camps, fleeing destruction by the Nazis. Many of the organizers of the Jewish detachments were previously members of underground organizations in the ghetto.
One of the main goals set by the Jewish partisans was to save the remnants of the Jewish population. Family camps were often set up near partisan bases, in which fugitives from the ghettos, including women, the elderly and children, took refuge. Many Jewish units fought for months, suffered heavy losses, but in the end they were destroyed along with neighboring family camps.
The Jewish partisans could not, if necessary, mix with the surrounding population and take advantage of its support. The Jewish partisans could not get support from the Jewish population locked up in the ghetto.
Some Jewish units became part of partisan units. Among the detachments of Jewish partisans created by members of underground organizations and fugitives from the ghettos and camps of Lithuania, the most successful were the detachments of immigrants from the ghettos of Vilnius and Kaunas. Jewish partisans under the command of A. Kovner took part in the liberation of Vilnius from the Nazi occupation (July 1944). G. Zimanas (Yurgis, 1910–85) was one of the leaders of the partisan movement in Lithuania.
In the forests of Belarus, within the framework of the general partisan movement, separate Jewish detachments operated, but over time they partially turned into detachments of a mixed national composition. There is a well-known Jewish partisan detachment named after Kalinin, created by the Belsky brothers. In the Belskikh camp there were 1.2 thousand people, mainly fled from the Novogrudok region. A group of fugitives from the Minsk ghetto led by Sh. Zorin (1902–74) created another family camp (Detachment 106), numbering about 800 Jews. In the area of \u200b\u200bDerechin a detachment was formed under the command of Dr. I. Atlas, in the area of \u200b\u200bSlonim - a detachment "Shchors 51"; in the Kopyl region, Jews who fled from the ghetto of Nesvizh and two other ghettos created a "Zhukov" detachment, Jews from the Dyatlovo region - a detachment under the command of Ts. Kaplinsky (1910–42). Fighters from the Bialystok ghetto and underground fighters from adjacent towns and villages created a Jewish partisan detachment "Kadima" and several other small partisan groups.
In Western Ukraine, during the mass extermination of the Jewish population in the summer of 1942, numerous armed groups of Jewish youth were formed, hiding in the forests and mountains of Volyn. 35-40 such groups (about one thousand fighters) fought on their own against the invaders until they joined the Soviet partisan movement at the end of 1942. M. Gildenman ("Uncle Misha", died in 1958) formed a Jewish detachment in partisan formation A . Saburova; the compound of S. Kovpak was joined by the Jewish groups "Sofiyivka" and "Kolka"; several Jewish detachments joined V. Begma's partisan units. In total, about 1.9 thousand Jews took part in the partisan movement in Volyn.
It is known that Jewish partisan groups operated in the areas of the cities of Tarnopol, Borshchev, Chortkov, Skalat, Bolekhiv, Tlumach and others. In the partisan formation of S. Kovpak during his raid in the Carpathians (late summer 1943) a Jewish detachment was created, commanded by Jews from the Sofievka and Kolka groups.
Relations with the civilian population
Civilians and partisans often helped each other. The attitude of the local population towards the Soviet partisans in different regions was one of the main factors in the success of the partisans.
However, in a number of cases, the partisans used violence against the local population.
In the course of work on the book-document "I am fired ..." Belarusian writers and publicists Ales Adamovich, Yanka Bryl and Vladimir Kolesnik received testimony from Vera Petrovna Sloboda, a teacher from the village of Dubrovy near the village of Osveya, Vitebsk region, about the punitive actions of a partisan detachment under the command of Kalaydzhan Vahram Pogosovich, during which civilians were killed who did not want to leave the village before the arrival of German troops. Eighty people were killed, the village burned down.
On April 14, 1943, partisans attacked the village of Drazhno in the Starodorozhsky district of Belarus. The village was almost completely burned down, most of the inhabitants were killed. ... According to other sources, a large German garrison was located in Drazhno, which was destroyed during a partisan operation.
On May 8, 1943, partisans attacked the stronghold of the city of Naliboki, 120 km from Minsk. They killed 127 civilians, including children, burned buildings and stole nearly 100 cows and 70 horses.
Bogdan Muzial, in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, claimed that according to the report of “one high-ranking officer of the Red Army”, made in June 1943, not far from Minsk, the civilian population was terrorized by the Bati partisan detachment. In particular, on April 11, 1943, they
"They shot innocent families of partisans in the village of Sokochi: a woman with a 12-year-old son, whose second son-partisan had died earlier, as well as the wife of one partisan and her two children, two and five years old."
In addition, according to Muzial, partisans of the Frunze detachment operating north of Minsk carried out a punitive operation, during which 57 people, including babies, were shot.
False partisans
There were cases when the Nazis, in order to discredit the partisan movement, created punitive detachments (usually of Russian collaborators), which pretended to be Soviet partisans and committed murders of civilians.
In June 1943, Ponomarenko ordered an end to negotiations between the partisans and the AK and imperceptibly eliminate the AK leaders or hand them over to the Germans. He ordered: “Don't be shy about choosing the means. The operation must be carried out broadly and smoothly. "
In December 1943 and February 1944, Captain Adolf Pilch (pseudonym "Gura"), the commander of one of the AK detachments, met in Stolbtsy with SD and Wehrmacht officers and asked for urgent help. He was allocated 18 thousand units of ammunition, food and uniforms. In September 1943 - August 1944, the "Gura" detachment did not fight a single battle with the Germans, while with the Belarusian partisans - 32 battles. Andrzej Kucner ("Small") followed his example until, by order of the headquarters of the AK district, he was transferred to Oshmyany district. In February 1944 SS Obersturmbannführer Strauch reported in his report: “The commonwealth with the White Polish bandits continues. Detachment of 300 people. in Rakov and Ivenets turned out to be very useful. Negotiations with Ragner's (Stefan Zayonchkovsky) gang of one thousand people are over. Ragner's gang pacifies the territory between the Neman and the Volkovysk-Molodechno railway, between Mosty and Ivye. Contact has been established with other Polish gangs. "
Lieutenant Yuzev Svida (Vileika region), the commander of the Nadneman formation of the Lida district of the AK, also collaborated with the invaders. In the summer of 1944, in the Shchuchin region, Polish legionnaires gained control over the townships of Zheludok and Vasilishki, where they replaced the German garrisons. For the needs of fighting partisans, the Germans provided them with 4 cars and 300 thousand cartridges.
Some units of the AK showed great cruelty towards the civilian population, which was suspected of sympathizing with the partisans. Legionnaires burned their homes, stole livestock, robbed and killed partisan families. In January 1944 they shot the wife and child of the partisan N. Filipovich, killed and burned the remains of six members of the D. Velichko family in the Ivenetsky district.
In 1943, in the Ivenets district, a detachment of the 27th lancer regiment of the Stolbtsy formation of the AK Zdislav Nurkevich (alias "Night"), which numbered 250 people, terrorized civilians and attacked partisans. The commander of the partisan detachment them. Frunze I.G. Ivanov, head of the special department P.N. Guba, several soldiers and the commissar of the Furmanova P.P. Danilin, three partisans of the brigade. Zhukova and others. In November 1943, 10 Jewish partisans from Sholom Zorin's detachment became victims of the conflict between Soviet partisans and the lancers of Nurkevich. On the night of November 18, they procured food for the partisans in the village of Sovkovshchizna, Ivenets district. One of the peasants complained to Nurkevich that “the Jews are robbing”. The AK soldiers surrounded the partisans and opened fire, after which they took away 6 horses and 4 carts of the partisans. The partisans who tried to return the property to the peasants were disarmed and, after being mocked, shot. In response, on December 1, 1943, the partisans disarmed Nurkevich's detachment. The Soviet units decided to disarm the "Kmititsa" detachment (400 men) and avenge Zorin.
In 1943 in the area of \u200b\u200bNalibokskaya Pushcha a detachment of AK acted against partisans. During the night checks of the farmsteads by the partisans, it turned out that often Poles-men were absent. The commander of the partisan brigade, Frol Zaitsev, said that if, during the second check, the Polish men are out of their families, the partisans will regard this as an attempt to resist. The threat did not help and farms near the villages of Nikolaevo, Malaya and Bolshaya Chapun of the Ivenets district were burned by partisans.
In the Vilnius region in 1943, in clashes with the AK, the partisans lost 150 people. killed and wounded, and 100 people. missing.
A telegram dated July 4, 1944 from London indicated that as the front approached, the AK commanders were obliged to offer military cooperation to the Soviet side. In the summer of 1944, the AK detachments began to ask for a truce, and announced their readiness to turn their weapons against the Germans. However, the partisans did not believe them and viewed it as a military ruse. Nevertheless, these proposals sounded more and more insistent. On June 27, the commander of the Iskra partisan detachment in the Baranovichi region reported to the command of his brigade that he had received an appeal from the AK from Novogrudok, in which, in particular, it was said that the Poles always wanted to be in friendship with the "blood and big Slavic people", that " the shed blood shows us the road to mutual agreement. " In the Lida region, the proposal for a military alliance was transferred to the command of the brigade named after Kirov, in the Bialystok region - the secretary of the underground regional committee of the CP (b) B Samutin.
The first meeting took place on September 1-3, 1942, on a farm in the village of Staraya Guta, Ludviopol region. From the detachment of NKVD Colonel D. N. Medvedev, 5 officers arrived at the meeting, led by Colonel Lukin and Captain Brezhnev, who were guarded by 15 submachine gunners. On the other side, 5 people also arrived: Bulba-Borovets, Shcherbatyuk, Baranivsky, Rybachok and Pilipchuk.
Colonel Lukin conveyed greetings from the Soviet government and in particular the government of the Ukrainian SSR. He spoke approvingly about the well-known actions of the UPA-Bulba against Hitler, and stressed that the actions could be more effective if they were coordinated with the USSR General Staff. Specifically, it was suggested:
- Amnesty for all members of the Ukrainian formations of T. Bulba-Borovets.
- Stop mutual collisions.
- Coordinate military actions with the Headquarters in Moscow.
- Political issues to be resolved in further negotiations.
- Undertake a general armed uprising against the Germans in the rear. To begin with, conduct a series of actions against the German high officials in order to destroy them, in particular to organize the assassination of Koch, which would be a signal for a general uprising.
Bulba-Borovets and his delegation promised to consider the proposals and give an answer soon. Colonel Lukin was pleased with the meeting. However, from the very beginning, both sides understood that the negotiations had little chance of success due to the complexity of the issues raised and especially the political contradictions. like the OUN, Bulba-Borovets stood for the full independence of Ukraine, which was categorically unacceptable for Moscow.
