Brusilov Aleksey Alekseevich (1853-1926) - general of the cavalry (1912), adjutant general (1915). He studied at the Corps of Pages. He served in the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment. Member of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878. From 1883 he served in the Officer's Cavalry School, assistant to its chief (1898) and chief (1902). Commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division (1906) and the 14th Army Corps (1909), assistant commander of the Warsaw Military District (1912), commander of the 12th Army Corps (1913). During World War I, commander of the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front (1914), commander in chief of the Southwestern Front (1916), supreme commander (May-July 1917), then - military adviser to the Provisional Government. From 1919 he collaborated with the Red Army.

The name index of the book was used: V.B. Lopukhin. Notes of the Former Director of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SPb, 2008.

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (1853-1926) was born into the family of a general. Graduated from the Corps of Pages. A participant in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, he served for more than 15 years in the officer's cavalry school, starting as a riding instructor and finishing as its chief. In 1906 - 1912. commanded various military units. In 1912 he received the rank of general from the cavalry. From the beginning of World War I, he was appointed commander of the 8th Army, from March 1916 - commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front. He was promoted to the ranks of the best generals of the First World War, gained particular fame for the development and conduct of the offensive of the Russian army in the summer of 1916. February revolution - a supporter of the continuation of the war to a victorious end. In May 1917, he was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. After being removed from this post in July 1917, he remained at the disposal of the Provisional Government. In 1920 he joined the Red Army.

One of the military operations he developed during the First World War, the Brusilov Breakthrough, is named after Brusilov: on May 22, 1916, after a massive artillery strike, Russian troops launched an offensive and in a number of places immediately broke through the Austrian positions. On May 25, Russian troops occupied Lutsk, on June 5 they captured Chernivtsi. The front was broken through for 340 km, the depth of the breakthrough reached 120 km. In these battles, the Austrians suffered heavy losses - about 1.5 million killed, wounded and captured.

The Brusilov breakthrough put Austria-Hungary on the brink of a military and political catastrophe. To save the Austrian front from total collapse, Germany transferred large forces from the west, stopping the offensive at Verdun.

However, the success of the Southwestern Front did not give decisive strategic results, since it was not supported by the offensive operations of other fronts. And after the approach of large enemy reserves, the war here again acquired a positional character.

Brusilov Alexey Alekseevich (1853, Tiflis - 1926, Moscow) - military leader. Rod. in the noble family of a lieutenant general. He lost his parents early and was brought up by relatives. Received a good education at home. In 1867 he was sent to St. Petersburg, pages corps, and in 1872 he was accepted into the service of an ensign in the 15th Dragoon Tver Regiment. He took part in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, earning three military orders. He distinguished himself during the assault on the Ardahan fortress and the capture of Kars. In 1881-1906 Brusilov continued to serve in the officer's cavalry school in St. Petersburg, which he completed with the rank of lieutenant general. In 1908 he became a corps commander. In 1912 he was appointed assistant commander of the Warsaw Military District and promoted to general from the cavalry for service distinction. From the beginning of the First World War he commanded the 8th Army. On the very first day of the offensive, his troops utterly defeated the Austrian cavalry division and, advancing westward, took a large number of prisoners. Brusilov's tactics consisted of active defense and a swift offensive. In Brusilov he was appointed commander-in-chief of the South-West. front, which allowed him to act relatively independently. “We have every chance of success, which I am personally convinced of,” he argued Nicholas II ... Brusilov planned Lutsk as the place of the main blow. On May 22, 1916, thanks to careful preparation, a relatively small force broke through the defense of the Austro-German troops (later called the "Brusilov breakthrough"), which became one of the largest operations on the Russian-German front, inflicting huge losses on the enemy (up to 1.5 million killed , wounded and prisoners) and forced the Germans to transfer from Zap. front to the east of 17 divisions. But this brilliant maneuver was not strategically developed. The headquarters of Nicholas II was unable to fulfill its purpose. After the February Revolution of 1917, Brusilov, as a supporter of the continuation of the war to a victorious end, was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but due to the lateness of his demand for the introduction of the death penalty at the front and the failure of the June offensive, he was replaced by Kornilov. In the early years of the civil war, he was out of work: " At the very beginning of the revolution, I firmly decided not to separate from the soldiers and stay in the army as long as it exists or until I am replaced. Later I told everyone that I consider it the duty of every citizen not to abandon his people and live by them, no matter what the cost.". During the battles in Moscow, Brusilov was wounded in the leg by a shell fragment that fell into his washing. Apartment. Brusilov refused to go to the Don and join M.V. Alekseev , A.I. Dutov , A.M. Kaledin ... The brief arrest of the Cheka in 1918 did not turn Brusilov away from the Bolsheviks. It was not easy for him, a monarchist and a believer, to accept the new power, but he was convinced of the necessity of everything that happened. The only son of Brusilov, Alexei, who served in the Red cavalry, was taken prisoner by the Whites and shot. In 1920, Brusilov began to serve in the Red Army: he led the pre-conscription cavalry training, was an inspector of the cavalry; from 1924 he carried out especially important assignments at the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR. He died of pneumonia. Author of valuable memoirs.

Used materials of the book: Shikman A.P. Figures of national history. Biographical reference book. Moscow, 1997

During the revolution

Brusilov Alexey Alekseevich (August 19, 1853, Tiflis, - March 17, 1926, Moscow). Of the nobles. In 1872 he graduated from the junior special, class of the Corps of Pages: for transfer to the senior, special. class based on the results of studies is not admitted. Russian-tour participant. wars 1877-78. After graduating from the Officer Cav. school (1883), taught there (in 1902-06 elementary school). In 1906-1912, commander of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division, commander of the 14th Army Corps; gene. from the cavalry (1912). During the 1st world. wars in 1914-1916 commands, 8th army; gene adjutant (1915). On March 17, 1916, the commander-in-chief. armies of the South-West, front; in May - Aug. led the offensive, later called. " Brusilov breakthrough "- one of the largest operations on the Russian-German front. He believed in the inevitable predetermination of events (he was fond of occultism and mysticism; he was strongly influenced by the ideas of the founder of the Theosophical Society, E. L. Blavatskaya).

Works:

Brusilov A.A. My memories. [Ch. 1] / Preface. P.A. Zhilina. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1983 .-- 256 p.

Brusilov A.A. My memoirs, M .. 1963;

Brusilov A.A. My memories. [Ch. 2] // Military-ist. zhurn. - 1989.-No. 10,12; - 1990.-No. 2; - 1991.-No. 2.

Literature:

General of the cavalry A.A. Brusilov // Portuguese R.M., Alekseev P.D., Runov V.A. The First World War in the Biographies of Russian Military Leaders / Under total. ed. V.P. Mayatsky. - M .: Elakos, 1994 .-- S. 113-158.

Kersnovsky A.A. The fourth Battle of Galicia (Brusilov offensive) // Kersnovsky A.A. History of the Russian army: In 4 volumes. T. 4. - M .: Golos, 1994. -S. 32-64.

F.E. Kuznetsov Brusilovy breakthrough. - M .: Gospolitizdat, 1944 .-- 38 p.

World War I: Sat. / Comp., Foreword, comments. S.N. Semanov. - M .: Mol. Guard, 1989 .-- 606 p. - (History of the Fatherland in novels, stories, documents. XX century).

Rostunov I.I. General Brusilov. - M .: Military Publishing, 1964 .-- 245 p .: ill.

Semanov S.N. Brusilov / Preface. K.S. Moskalenko. - M .: Mol. Guard, 1980. - 318 p .: ill. - (Life of people noticed. Ser. biogr .; Issue 8 (604)).

Sokolov Yu.V. Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov // Vopr. stories. - 1988.- No. 11.- S. 80-97.

Shabanov V.M. A.A. Brusilov: [The fate of the gene. Russian army, later owls. military leader A.A. Brusilov] // Military-ist. zhurn. - 1989. - No. 10. - S. 63-65.

DL, Brusilov about himself and his judges, "Will of Russia", 1924, N 18/19;

Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (August 19, Tiflis - March 17, Moscow) - Russian and Soviet military leader and military teacher, general of the cavalry (from December 6, 1912), adjutant general (from April 10, 1915), chief inspector of the Red Army cavalry (1923).

Encyclopedic YouTube

1 / 5

✪ Brusilov Alexey - Faberlic important dates calendar

✪ The first electric tram in Moscow - Faberlic calendar

✪ At the headquarters of General Brusilov

✪ The truth about the October Revolution and the First World War. An excerpt from the biography of Levashov volume 2

✪ Constantin Balmont - Faberlic important dates calendar

Subtitles

Biography

Comes from the Brusilov noble family. Born in Tiflis in the family of Russian general Alexei Nikolaevich Brusilov (1787-1859). Mother - Maria-Louise Antonovna, was a Polish woman and came from the family of the collegiate assessor A. Nestomsky.

On June 27 (July 9), 1867, he entered the Corps of Pages. He graduated from it on July 17 (29), 1872, and was released into the 15th Dragoon Tver Regiment. In 1873-1878 - adjutant of the regiment. Member of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 in the Caucasus. He distinguished himself in the capture of the Turkish fortresses of Ardahan and Kars, for which he received the Order of St. Stanislav of the 3rd and 2nd degrees and the Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree. In 1879-1881 he was squadron commander, head of the regimental training team.

In 1881 he arrived for service in St. Petersburg. In 1883 he graduated from the course of sciences of the department of squadron and centenary commanders in the category of "excellent". From 1883 he served in the Officer's Cavalry School: adjutant; since 1890 - assistant to the head of the riding and dressage department; from 1891 - head of the squadron and centenary commanders department; since 1893 - head of the dragoon department. From November 10, 1898 - assistant chief, from February 10, 1902 - head of the school. Brusilov became known not only in Russia, but also abroad as an outstanding connoisseur of cavalry riding and sports. K. Mannerheim, who served at the school under his command before the Russian-Japanese war, recalled:

Having no prior experience in commanding either a regiment or a brigade, only thanks to the patronage of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had an exceptional influence on the appointment of senior cavalry commanders before the war, was appointed on April 19, 1906, head of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. From January 5, 1909 - commander of the 14th Army Corps. On May 15, 1912 - Assistant Commander of the Warsaw Military District. From August 15, 1913 - commander of the 12th Army Corps.

World War I

On the day of Germany's declaration of war on Russia, July 19 (August 1) 1914, A.A. Brusilov was appointed commander of the 8th Army, which took part in the Battle of Galicia a few days later. On August 15-16, 1914, during the Rogatinsky battles, he defeated the 2nd Austro-Hungarian army, taking 20 thousand people and 70 guns prisoner. Galich was taken on 20 August. The 8th Army takes an active part in the battles at Rava-Russkaya and in the Gorodok battle. In September 1914, he commanded a group of troops from the 8th and 3rd armies. September 28 - October 11, his army withstood the counterattack of the 2nd and 3rd Austro-Hungarian armies in the battles on the San River and near the city of Stryi. In the course of successfully completed battles, 15 thousand enemy soldiers were captured, and at the end of October 1914 his army entered the foothills of the Carpathians.

In early November 1914, pushing back the troops of the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army from positions on the Beskydy ridge of the Carpathians, he occupied the strategic Lupkovsky Pass. In the Krosno and Limanov battles, he defeated the 3rd and 4th Austro-Hungarian armies. In these battles, his troops took 48 thousand prisoners, 17 guns and 119 machine guns prisoner.

In February 1915, at the battle of Boligrod-Liski, he thwarted the enemy's attempts to unblock their troops besieged in the Przemysl fortress, taking 130 thousand prisoners. In March, he seized the main Beskydy ridge of the Carpathian Mountains and by March 30 completed the operation to force the Carpathians. German troops pinned down his troops in the hardest battles near Kazyuvka and, thereby, prevented the offensive of Russian troops into Hungary.

When a catastrophe broke out in the spring of 1915 - the Gorlitsky breakthrough and the heavy defeat of the Russian troops - Brusilov began an organized retreat of the army under the constant pressure of the enemy and led the army to the San River. During the battles at Radymno, in the Gorodok positions, he opposed the enemy, who had an absolute advantage in artillery, especially heavy. On June 9, 1915, Lviv was abandoned. Brusilov's army retreated to Volyn, successfully defending itself in the Sokal battle from the troops of the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies and in the battle on the Goryn River in August 1915.

In early September 1915, in the battle of Vishnevets and Dubno, he defeated the 1st and 2nd Austro-Hungarian armies opposing him. On September 10, his troops took Lutsk, and on October 5 - Czartorysk.

In the summer and autumn of 1915, at his personal request, repeated attempts were made to expand, geographically and numerically, the scale of deportations of the local German population west of Sarn, Rovno, Ostrog, Izyaslav. Since October 23, 1915, the expulsion of such categories of German colonists as old people over 60 years old, widows and mothers of those killed at the front, disabled, blind, crippled people who still remained in their places by decision of the Special Meeting was carried out. According to Brusilov, they "undoubtedly spoil the telegraph and telephone wires." 20 thousand people were deported within 3 days.

From March 17, 1916 - Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front.

In June 1916, he carried out a successful offensive of the Southwestern Front, using a previously unknown form of breaking through the positional front, which consisted of simultaneous the offensive of all armies. The main attack was planned in the sector of one of the four armies that were part of the front, but preparation was carried out in all four armies and, moreover, along the entire front of each of them. The main idea of \u200b\u200bdeception is to make the enemy expect an attack along the entire length of the front and thereby deprive him of the opportunity to guess the place of a real strike and take timely measures to repel it. Along the entire front, stretching for several hundred kilometers, they dug trenches, communication trenches, machine-gun nests, built shelters and warehouses, laid roads, and erected artillery positions. Only the army commanders knew about the place of the actual strike. The troops brought in for reinforcement were not withdrawn to the front lines until the very last days. To get acquainted with the terrain and the location of the enemy from the newly arriving units, it was allowed to send forward only a small number of commanding persons and scouts, soldiers and officers continued to be dismissed on leave, so that even in this way they would not discover the proximity of the day of the offensive. Holidays were terminated only a week before the attack, without announcing this in the order. The main blow, in accordance with the plan developed by Brusilov, was delivered by the 8th Army under the command of General A.M. Kaledin in the direction of the city of Lutsk. Having broken through the front on the 16-kilometer section of Nosovichi - Koryto, the Russian army occupied Lutsk on May 25 (June 7), and by June 2 (15) defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and advanced 65 km.

This operation went down in history as the Brusilov Breakthrough (also found under the original name Lutsky breakthrough). For the successful conduct of this offensive, A. A. Brusilov was nominated for the award of the Order of St. George, 2nd degree, by a majority vote of the Georgievsk Duma at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. However, Emperor Nicholas II did not approve the submission, and A. A. Brusilov, along with General A. I. Denikin, was awarded the St. George weapon with diamonds.

Revolutionary years

On May 22, 1917, he was appointed by the Provisional Government as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief instead of General Alekseev. After the failure of the June offensive, Brusilov was removed from his post as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and replaced by General Kornilov. After retirement he lived in Moscow. During the October Revolution, he was accidentally wounded by a shell fragment that hit his house during the battles between the Red Guards and the cadets.

In the Red Army

Since 1921, Aleksey Alekseevich is the chairman of the commission for organizing pre-conscription cavalry training. In 1923-1924 he was an inspector of the cavalry of the Red Army. From 1924 he was at the Revolutionary Military Council for especially important assignments.

A. A. Brusilov died on March 17, 1926 in Moscow from pneumonia at the age of 72 years. He was buried with all military honors at the walls of the Smolensk Cathedral of the Novodevichy Convent. The grave is located next to the grave of A.M. Zayonchkovsky.

Brusilov and "Brusilovsky breakthrough", from the point of view of Brusilov

Events immediately preceding the offensive

At the end of August 1915, it was officially announced that Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich had been removed from the post of supreme commander in chief. The duties of the Supreme were assumed by Emperor Nicholas II. In his memoirs, A.A. Brusilov wrote that the impression in the troops from this replacement was the most negative. "The whole army, and the whole of Russia, undoubtedly believed Nikolai Nikolaevich." Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich undoubtedly possessed a military leadership gift. This change was not very clear: “It never occurred to anyone that the tsar would take over the duties of the supreme commander in this difficult situation at the front. It was common knowledge that Nicholas II in military affairs absolutely did not understand anything and that the title he has assumed will only be nominal. " The absence of a real supreme commander "had a profound effect during the hostilities of 1916, when, through the fault of the supreme command, we did not achieve those results that could easily lead to the end of a completely victorious war and to the strengthening of the monarch himself on the vacillating throne."

i absolutely didn’t solicit anything, I didn’t look for any promotions, I never left my army anywhere, I’ve never been to Headquarters and I didn’t talk about myself with any special persons, then for me personally, in essence, it was absolutely all the same, whether to accept a new position or stay on the old one

Nevertheless, Brusilov resolved the resulting conflict: he asked Dieterikhs to convey to Ivanov that he had not surrendered the post of commander-in-chief and was “my direct superior”, and that “without his order, I would not go to Berdichev and I warn that, without legally accepting the post , I will not go to Kamenets-Podolsk for the review of the 9th army either. Brusilov's statement plunged Ivanov into "great confusion", and he informed the headquarters of the 8th Army that he had been waiting for Brusilov for a long time

In Kamenets-Podolsk, Brusilov met the tsar, who, bypassing the guard of honor, invited Brusilov to an audience. Nicholas II asked "what kind of collision I had with Ivanov and what disagreements were clarified in the orders of General Alekseev and Count Fredericks regarding the replacement of General Ivanov." Brusilov replied that there were no "clashes and misunderstandings" with Ivanov and I do not know what the "disagreement between the orders of General Alekseev and Count Fredericks" was. Brusilov told Nicholas II that the opinion about the impossibility of advancing at the moment by the armies of the Southwestern Front is wrong: “After several months of rest and preparatory work, the armies entrusted to me are in excellent condition in all respects, have a high fighting spirit and by May 1 will be ready for offensive ". Moreover, Brusilov asked the supreme for the provision of initiative for actions coordinated with the actions of neighboring fronts. Brusilov emphasized that if his opinion is rejected, he will resign as commander

The sovereign shuddered a little, probably due to my harsh and categorical statement, while by the nature of his character he was more inclined towards indecisive and indeterminate positions. He never liked to put dots over i, and even more so he did not like to be presented with statements of this nature. Nevertheless, he did not express any displeasure, and only offered to repeat my statement at the military council, which was to be held on April 1, and said that he had nothing for or against, and that I should come to an agreement with his chief of staff at the council and other commanders

At the military council on April 1, 1916 in Mogilev, it was necessary to work out the order of hostilities for 1916. General Alekseev reported that the armies of the Western Front, together with the armies of the North-Western Front, should deliver the main blow in the direction of Vilna. It was decided to transfer most of the heavy artillery and the general reserve troops at the disposal of the Supreme Commander to the disposal of the Western and Northwestern Fronts. With regard to the Southwestern Front, Alekseev said that the troops of the front must remain in their positions. An offensive is possible only when both of its northern neighbors firmly indicate their success and move sufficiently to the west. General Kuropatkin said that it was difficult to count on the success of the North-Western Front. It is impossible to break through the perfectly fortified German front. Evert said that he fully subscribes to Kuropatkin's opinion, does not believe in the success of the offensive and believes that it is better to stick to a defensive course of action. Brusilov declared that he was firmly convinced of the success of the offensive. He does not undertake to evaluate others. However, the troops of the Southwestern Front can and should advance. Brusilov turned to Alekseev with a request:

to allow my front to act aggressively at the same time as my neighbors; if, contrary to hopes, I didn’t even have any success, then at least I would not only detain the enemy troops, but also attract part of his reserves to myself and in this way would significantly facilitate the task of Evert and Kuropatkin

Alekseev replied that, in principle, he had no objections. However, he considers it his duty to warn that Brusilov in this case will not receive anything in addition to the troops he has: "no artillery, no more shells." Brusilov replied:

i don’t ask for anything, I don’t promise any special victories, I will be content with what I have, but the troops of the Southwestern Front will know with me that we are working for the common good and facilitate the work of our comrades in arms, giving them the opportunity to break enemy

After Brusilov's answer, Kuropatkin and Evert somewhat modified their statements and said that "they can attack, but with the proviso that one cannot guarantee success."

Preparing for the offensive

Immediately after the military council in Mogilev, Brusilov spoke at a meeting of the commanders of the armies of the Southwestern Front with the decision "to go over to the offensive in May without fail." However, Shcherbachev, the commander of the 7th Army, reported that currently offensive actions are very risky and undesirable. Brusilov replied that "he gathered the army commanders not in order to decide the question of an active or passive course of action," but in order to give an order to prepare for an attack. Brusilov then outlined the order of the attack, which was at odds with that which was considered extremely suitable for breaking through the front in trench warfare. Brusilov's plan was to prepare not one, but all the armies of the Southwestern Front, including the corps, one strike sector each. In all these areas, urgently start excavation work to get closer to the enemy. Thanks to this, the enemy will see earthworks in 20-30 places and will be deprived of the opportunity to know where the main blow will be delivered. It was decided to deliver the main blow by the 8th Army in the direction of Lutsk. The rest of the front armies were to deliver "although minor, but strong blows." Each army corps also "concentrated as much of its artillery and reserves as possible in some part of its combat sector" in order to "attract the attention of the opposing troops to itself in the strongest way and attach them to its sector of the front."

Brusilov, in his memoirs, described in detail the work done by the armies of the front in preparation for the offensive. Thus, through reconnaissance, including air reconnaissance, reliable data were obtained about the location of the enemy, about the construction of fortifications. It was possible to establish exactly which enemy units are in front of the troops of the Southwestern Front. On the basis of the collected data, it became known that the Austro-Germans were in front of the front with a force of 450 thousand rifles and 30 thousand sabers. Aerial reconnaissance from aircraft photographed enemy fortified positions:

The photographs were turned into a plan using a projection lamp and placed on the map; photographically, these maps were easily brought to the desired scale. I have ordered all armies to have plans of 250 fathoms per inch, with the exact marking of all enemy positions on them. All officers and commanders from the lower ranks were supplied with similar plans for their section

The enemy positions consisted of three fortified strips, spaced from each other from 3 to 5 versts. Each strip consisted of no less than three lines of trenches, spaced from each other at a distance of 150 to 300 paces. As a rule, the trenches were of a full profile, taller than a person, and "heavy dugouts, shelters, fox holes, nests for machine guns, loopholes, canopies, and a whole system of numerous communication routes for communication with the rear were arranged in abundance." Each fortified strip was thoroughly braided with barbed wire: “in front of the front there was a wire net that consisted of 19-21 rows of stakes. In places there were several such strips, at a distance of 20-50 steps from one another. Some areas were mined or electric current was passed through them. As Brusilov noted, the work of "the Austro-Germans to create fortifications was thorough and was carried out by the continuous labor of troops for more than nine months." However, Brusilov was confident that the armies of the Southwestern Front had the ability to successfully break through the enemy's "heavy" front, using the element of "surprise":

On the basis of general reconnaissance, based on the totality of all the data collected, each army identified areas for a breakthrough and presented its views on the attack for my approval. When these sectors were finally approved by me and the places of the first strikes were quite accurately established, ardent work began on the most thorough preparation for the attack: troops intended to break through the enemy front were secretly drawn to these areas. However, so that the enemy could not guess our intentions in advance, the troops were located in the rear behind the battle line, but their commanders of various degrees, having plans of 250 fathoms per inch with the detailed location of the enemy, were always in front and carefully studied the areas. where they were to act, they personally got acquainted with the first line of enemy fortifications, studied the approaches to them, chose artillery positions, set up observation posts, etc.

In the selected areas, the infantry units carried out trench work, which made it possible to get closer to the positions of the Austro-Germans by only 200-300 steps. For the convenience of the attack and the covert location of the reserves, parallel rows of trenches were arranged, interconnected by communication trenches.

Only a few days before the start of the offensive, unnoticed at night, the troops intended for the initial attack were introduced into the battle line, and artillery, well disguised, was placed in selected positions, from which it made a careful zeroing at the intended targets. Much attention was paid to the close and continuous communication of infantry with artillery

Brusilov noted in his memoirs that the preparation for the offensive was "extremely difficult and painstaking." The front commander, as well as the front chief of staff, General Klembovsky, and other officers of the General Staff and the front headquarters personally checked the work being carried out, leaving for positions. By May 10, 1916, the preparation of the front troops for the attack was "in general terms completed."

While the front command was making every effort to prepare the troops with special care for an offensive of "grandiose scale", the tsar on April 30 with his entire family arrived in Odessa for a review of the "Serbian division". Brusilov was forced to leave the front headquarters and meet the emperor. By these actions, the tsar once again confirmed the fact of a complete lack of desire to fulfill the duties of the supreme commander in chief. He, only every day at 11 o'clock in the morning, accepted the report of the chief of staff and the quartermaster general on the situation at the front, and "this was the end of his fictitious command and control of the troops." The people of his retinue - "had nothing to do with the war." According to Brusilov, the tsar at Headquarters was bored and he "just to kill time" tried all the time "to travel to Tsarskoe Selo, then to the front, then to different places in Russia, without any specific goal." And this time, as his associates explained, "this trip to Odessa and Sevastopol was undertaken by him mainly in order to entertain his family, who were tired of sitting in one place, in Tsarskoe Selo." As Brusilov recalls, for several days he invariably had breakfast at the tsar's table in the absence of the tsarina. The queen did not come to the table. On the second day of his stay in Odessa, Brusilov was invited to her carriage. Alexandra Feodorovna greeted Brusilov coldly and asked if the troops were ready to go on the offensive.

I replied that not quite yet, but I hope that this year we will defeat the enemy. To this she did not answer, but asked when I thought I would go on the offensive. I reported that I do not yet know this, that it depends on the situation, which is rapidly changing, and that such information is so secret that I myself do not remember it.

She bade farewell to Brusilov dryly. Alexey Alekseevich saw her for the last time.

Offensive

On May 11, 1916, Brusilov received a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Alekseev, in which it was reported that the Italian troops were defeated and unable to hold the front. The command of the Italian troops asks for the transition of the Russian armies to the offensive in order to draw off part of the forces. Given the current situation, by order of the sovereign, Alekseev asked Brusilov to report on the readiness of the armies of the Southwestern Front for an offensive. Brusilov immediately replied that the front armies were ready to go on the offensive on May 19, but "on one condition, on which I especially insist, that the Western Front also move forward at the same time in order to pin down the troops located opposite him (Brusilov)." Alekseev told Brusilov by phone that he was asking to start the attack not on May 19, but on May 22, since Evert could only launch an offensive on June 1. Brusilov replied that he could "put up" with this, provided that there would be no more delays. Alekseev replied that he "guarantees." On the evening of May 21, Alekseev told Brusilov by telephone that he doubted the success of the "enemy attack simultaneously in many places, instead of one strike with all the assembled forces and all the artillery that I have distributed among the armies." Alekseev conveyed the Tsar's desire: to change the "unusual method of attack", to postpone the offensive for several days in order to arrange one strike site, as has already been worked out by the practice of a real war. Brusilov flatly refused:

i do not find it possible to postpone the day and hour of the offensive again, for all the troops are in the starting position for the attack, and until my orders to cancel reach the front, artillery preparation will begin. With frequent cancellations of orders, the troops inevitably lose confidence in their leaders, and therefore I urge you to replace me

Alekseev replied that the supreme commander-in-chief had already gone to bed and was uncomfortable to wake up. He asked Brusilov to think. Brusilov writes in his memoirs that he was very angry at this and sharply replied: “The dream of the Supreme does not concern me, and I have nothing else to think about. I ask for an answer now. " In response, Alekseev said: "Well, God be with you, do as you know, and I will report our conversation to the Emperor tomorrow."

At dawn on May 22, 1916, heavy artillery fire began on the selected sections of the breakthrough along the entire South-Western Front: numerous passages in barbed wire were arranged by light artillery fire. Heavy artillery and howitzers were assigned the task of destroying the front line trenches and suppressing enemy artillery fire. Part of the artillery, which had completed its task, had to transfer its fire to other targets and thereby help the infantry to move forward, preventing the approach of enemy reserves with its barrage fire. Brusilov singled out the special role of the chief of artillery in organizing artillery fire: “as a conductor in an orchestra, he must conduct this fire”, provided that the telephone communication between artillery groups should work smoothly. Our artillery attack, Brusilov wrote, was crowned with complete success:

In most cases, the passages were made in sufficient quantity and thoroughly, and the first fortified strip was completely swept away and, together with its defenders, turned into a heap of rubble and torn bodies.

However, many shelters were not destroyed. The units of the garrison who had taken refuge there had to surrender, since “as soon as one grenadier stood at the exit with a bomb in his hands, there was no escape, because in case of refusal to surrender, a grenade was thrown inside the shelter”.

By noon on May 24, we had captured 900 officers, over 40,000 lower ranks, 77 guns, 134 machine guns and 49 bombs; by May 27, we had already taken 1240 officers, over 71,000 lower ranks and captured 94 guns, 179 machine guns, 53 bomb and mortars and a huge amount of any other military booty

On May 24, Alekseev again conveyed to Brusilov that, due to bad weather, Evert could not attack on June 1, but postponed his blow to June 5. Brusilov was extremely dissatisfied with Evert's actions and asked Alekseev to confirm the transition on June 5 to the offensive by the armies of the Western Front. Alekseev replied that there can be no doubt about this. Nevertheless, on June 5, Alekseev again informed Brusilov by telephone that, according to Evert, "huge enemy forces and numerous heavy artillery were assembled against his strike sector" and the attack on the chosen site could not be successful. Alekseev also said that Evert received permission from the emperor to transfer the attack to Baranovichi.

something that I feared happened, that is, that I would be abandoned without the support of my neighbors and that, thus, my successes would be limited only to a tactical victory and some progress forward, that would have no influence on the fate of the war. Inevitably, the enemy from all sides will withdraw his troops and throw them against me, and it is obvious that in the end I will be forced to stop. I believe that it is impossible to fight in this way and that even if the attacks of Evert and Kuropatkin were not crowned with success, the very fact of their offensive with significant forces for more or less a long time pinned the enemy troops against them and would not allow the sending of reserves from their fronts against my troops

To create a new strike group, in order to successfully attack the enemy's fortified zone, as noted by Brusilov, it will take at least six weeks. During this time, the armies of the Southwestern Front will suffer significant losses and may be defeated. Brusilov asked Alekseev to report to the sovereign about the need to immediately attack the enemy with Evert's armies. Alekseev objected: "It is no longer possible to change the decisions of the sovereign emperor" - Evert was ordered to attack the enemy near Baranovichi no later than June 20. At the same time, Alekseev assured that he would send two corps of reinforcements. Brusilov replied that two corps would not be able to replace the missed attacks of Evert and Kuropatkin, and their imminent arrival would disrupt the supply of food and ammunition and would allow the enemy, using the developed network of railways, to "bring ten corps against me, not two." Brusilov ended the conversation with a statement that Evert's belated attack would not help me, and "the Western Front will again fail due to lack of time to prepare a strike, and that if I knew ahead of time that this would be so, I would flatly refuse to attack alone." Brusilov understood that "the tsar had nothing to do with it, since in military affairs he can be considered a baby." Alekseev perfectly understood the state of affairs and the criminality of the actions of Evert and Kuropatkin. However, as "their former subordinate during the Japanese war, he did his best to cover up their inaction."

In June, when the successful actions of the Southwestern Front became obvious, Headquarters, in order to develop the offensive and seeing the passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, began to transfer troops first from the Northwestern, and then from the Western fronts. At the same time, the Stavka persistently demanded that the Southwestern Front take Kovel, which indicated a desire to "push the Western Front, that is, Evert." As Brusilov wrote: "The matter came down, in essence, to the destruction of the enemy's manpower, and I hoped that I would smash them near Kovel, and then my hands would be untied, and wherever I wanted, I would go there." However, I made mistakes and mistakes:

i should not agree to the appointment of Kaledin as commander of the 8th Army, but insist on my choice of Klembovsky, and it was necessary to immediately replace Gillenschmidt from the post of commander of the cavalry corps. There is a high probability that with such a change, Kovel would have been taken immediately, at the beginning of the Kovel operation

Brusilov noted that Kaledin's desire "to always do everything himself, completely not trusting any of his assistants, led to the fact that he did not have time to be at all places of his large front at the same time and therefore missed a lot."

By June 10, the troops of the Southwestern Front had captured 4,013 officers and about 200,000 soldiers. It was captured: 219 guns, 644 machine guns, 196 bombs and mortars, 46 charging boxes, 38 searchlights, about 150,000 rifles. On June 11, 1916, General Lesch's 3rd Army became part of the armies of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov set the task for the 3rd and 8th armies to capture the Gorodok-Manevichi area. The 7th and 9th armies of the left flank of the front continue the offensive against Galich and Stanislavov. Central 11th Army - to hold its position. Taking advantage of the passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin, the Germans and Austrians pulled up their reserves and stopped the offensive of the armies of the Southwestern Front in the Kovel and Vladimir-Volyn axes. In the Manevichi area, there was a threat of an enemy strike on the right flank of the 8th Army. It was necessary to take decisive actions to nullify the enemy's Kovel-Mnevichevsk flank position. To this end, on June 21, Lesch's 3rd Army and Kaledin's 8th Army went over to a decisive offensive and by July 1, consolidated on the Stokhod River: in many places, vanguards crossed Stokhod and established themselves on the left bank of the river. With this operation, the front troops strengthened their positions in Volhynia and neutralized the possible threat. At this time, the units of General Sakharov's 11th Army had a very hard time:

several persistent attacks by the Austro-Germans were made on him, but he repulsed them all and retained his positions. I highly appreciated this success, since, naturally, I sent all my reserves to the shock sectors, while Sakharov had to act with this defensive task, having a relatively small number of troops.

By July 1, the 3rd Army and the right flank of the 8th Army fortified on the Stokhod River. The 7th Army advanced west of the Yezerzhany-Porkhov line. The 9th Army occupied the Delatyn area. For the rest, wrote Brusilov, the position of our armies remained unchanged. From July 1 to July 15, the 3rd and 8th armies regrouped and prepared for a further offensive in the direction of Kovel and Vladimir-Volynsky. At the same time, additional units arrived: a guards detachment, which consisted of two guards corps and one guards cavalry corps. Brusilov added two army corps to the arrived units. The unit was named "Special Army", which entered the battle line between the 3rd and 8th armies in the direction of Kovel. At the same time, General Sakharov's 11th Army delivered three strong, short blows to the enemy. As a result of the attack, Sakharov advanced his right flank and center to the west, occupying the Koshev - Zvenyach - Merva - Lishnyuv line. 34,000 Austro-Germans, 45 guns and 71 machine guns were captured. The actions of the army with a relatively "modest" composition were excellent. The enemy realized that it was dangerous to withdraw his troops from the front of this army. At this time, the troops of the 7th and 9th armies regrouped to deliver a powerful blow along the Dniester River, in the direction of Galich. On July 10, both armies were to go on the offensive. However, due to heavy rains that rained continuously for several days, they were forced to postpone the offensive until July 15. This pause in the actions of the armies led to the disruption of the element of "surprise". The enemy managed to pull his reserves to threatened areas.

In his memoirs, A.A. Brusilov described in detail the offensive actions of the troops of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916, the coordinated interaction of brilliant Russian generals: Shcherbachev, commander of the 7th army, Lechitsky commander of the 9th army, Sakharov, commander of the 11th army, Lesha commander 3rd Army, Kaledin commander of the 8th Army. Excellent use of artillery with the "transfer of fire" and linking its work with the offensive actions of the infantry, with the obligatory condition of stable operation of telephone lines. Brusilov especially noted the role of sanitary trains and mobile baths, sapper troops and personally actions of the military engineer General Velichko in the construction of engineering fortifications of the front line, crossings. However, all this turned out to be insufficient for the final victory over the enemy. Affected by the "treacherous" passivity of Evert and Kuropatkin. In his memoirs, Brusilov cites the memoirs of the commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, General Ragoza. The 4th Army was entrusted with the task of attacking a fortified enemy position near Molodechno. The preparation for the attack was excellent and Ragoza was convinced of victory. He and the troops were shocked by the cancellation of a long-planned offensive. Ragoza went to the front headquarters for an explanation. Evert said that this is the will of the sovereign emperor. Brusilov writes that later rumors reached him that Evert allegedly once said: "Why on earth would I work for the glory of Brusilov."

If there had been another supreme commander-in-chief, for such indecision, Evert would have been immediately removed and replaced accordingly, while Kuropatkin would not have received any position in the army in the field. But under the regime that existed at the time, in the army, impunity was complete, and both continued to be favorite military leaders of the Headquarters

Results of the offensive

The Austrians stopped their advance on Italy and went on the defensive. Italy was spared the invasion of the enemy. The pressure on Verdun decreased, as the Germans were forced to withdraw part of their divisions for transfer to the Southwestern Front. By July 30, 1916, the operation of the armies of the Southwestern Front was completed "to capture the winter, extremely strongly fortified enemy position, which was considered by our enemies to be absolutely impregnable." Part of Eastern Galicia and all of Bukovina were conquered again. The immediate result of these successful actions was Romania's exit from neutrality and its annexation to the Entente countries. Brusilov wrote in his memoirs:

it must be admitted that the preparation for this operation was exemplary, for which the full exertion of the forces of chiefs of all levels was required. Everything was thought out and everything was done on time. This operation also proves that the opinion, which for some reason spread in Russia, that after the failures of 1915 the Russian army had already collapsed, is wrong: in 1916, it was still strong and, of course, combat-ready, for it defeated a much stronger enemy and scored such successes that no army had until that time

By the end of October 1916, hostilities ended. From the day of the offensive on May 20 to November 1, 1916, more than 450,000 officers and soldiers were taken prisoner by the troops of the Southwestern Front, "that is, as many as at the beginning of the offensive, according to all the fairly accurate information we have, there were enemy troops in front of me." ... During the same time, the enemy lost over 1,500,000 killed and wounded. By November 1916, over a million Austro-Germans and Turks stood in front of the Southwestern Front. Brusilov concludes: "therefore, in addition to 450,000 people who were at first in front of me, over 2,500,000 fighters were thrown against me from other fronts" and further:

It is clear from this that if other fronts were moving and did not allow the possibility of transferring troops against the armies entrusted to me, I would have had the full opportunity to advance far to the west and mighty influence both strategically and tactically on the enemy standing opposite our Western Front. With a united influence on the enemy, our three fronts had a full opportunity - even with the insufficient technical means that we possessed in comparison with the Austro-Germans - to push all their armies far to the west. And everyone understands that the troops that have begun to retreat are discouraged, their discipline is upset, and it is difficult to say where and how these troops will stop and in what order they will be. There was every reason to believe that the decisive turning point in the campaign along our entire front would be in our favor, that we would emerge victorious, and there was a possibility that the end of our war would be much faster with fewer casualties.

Family

General Brusilov owned the Glebovo-Brusilovo estate near Moscow.

Memoirs

Brusilov left behind a memoir entitled "My Memories", dedicated mainly to his service in Tsarist and Soviet Russia. The second volume of Brusilov's memoirs (the authorship of the second volume is doubtful) was transferred to the White émigré archive in 1932 by his widow N.V. Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who, after her husband's death, went abroad. It touches on the description of his life after the October Revolution and has a sharp anti-Bolshevik character. This part of the memoirs was dictated by Brusilov to his wife during treatment in Karlovy Vary in 1925 and left for safekeeping in Prague. According to the will, it was subject to publication only after the death of the author.

After 1945 it was transferred to the USSR. The sharply negative assessment of the Bolshevik regime in the second volume led to the fact that in 1948 in the USSR the publication of the collection “A. A. Brusilov "and his name was removed from the guidebook of the Central State Military Archive:

The manuscript "Memoirs", which we received in the archive, written by the hand of Brusilov's wife (N. Brusilova) and signed by A. Brusilov with his own hand during his and his wife's stay in Carlsbad in 1925, contains sharp attacks against the Bolshevik party, personally against V. I. Lenin and other party leaders (Dzerzhinsky), against the Soviet regime and the Soviet people, leaving no doubt about the double-dealing of General Brusilov and his counter-revolutionary views, which did not leave him until his death.

Soviet editions of "Memories" (1929; Voenizdat: 1941, 1943, 1946, 1963, 1983) do not include the 2nd volume, the authorship of which, according to a number of Soviet scientists, belonged to Brusilov's widow Brusilova-Zhelikhovskaya, who thus tried to justify her husband before White emigration, and the 1st volume was censored in places where Brusilov dealt with ideological issues. A complete edition of the memoirs of A. A. Brusilov has now been published.

Military ranks

• Lieutenant - April 2, 1874
• Staff Captain - October 29, 1877
• Captain - December 15, 1881, renamed to Captain - August 18, 1882
• Lieutenant Colonel - February 9, 1890
• Colonel - August 30, 1892
• Major General - May 6, 1900, birthday of Nicholas II
• Lieutenant General - December 6, 1906, the day of the namesake of Nicholas II
• General of the cavalry - December 6, 1912, the day of the namesake of Nicholas II

Svitsky title

• Adjutant General - April 10, 1915

Awards

Russian:

• Order of St. Stanislaus 3rd class with swords and bow (01.01.1878)
• Order of St. Anne 3rd class with swords and bow (16.03.1878)
• Order of St. Stanislaus 2nd class with swords (09/03/1878)
• Order of St. Anne, 2nd degree (03.10.1883) - "for distinction in service was awarded outside the rules"
• Order of St. Vladimir, 4th degree (06.12.1895, the day of the namesake of Nicholas II)
• bukhara Order of Noble Bukhara 2nd degree (1896)
• Order of St. Vladimir, 3rd degree (06.12.1898, the day of the namesake of Nicholas II)
• Order of St. Stanislav 1st degree (06.12.1903, the day of the namesake of Nicholas II)
• Order of St. Anne 1st degree (06.12.1909, the day of the namesake of Nicholas II)
• Order of St. Vladimir, 2nd degree (03.16.1913)
• Order of St. George 4th degree (08/23/1914) - "for the battles with the Austrians, the result of which was the capture of the city of Galich on August 21st"
• Order of St. George 3rd degree (09/18/1914) - "for repulsing attacks on the Gorodok position from 24th to 30th last August"
• Order of the White Eagle with Swords (01/10/1915)
• Georgievsk weapons (High pr. 27.10.1915)

The Brusilov Breakthrough of 1916 is still considered one of the best military operations in history. But on the account of its author there are many other achievements.

Cavalry Trainer

Aleksei Alekseevich Brusilov (1853-1926) came from a noble family, his father was a general. A wealthy family sent their eldest son to the most prestigious educational institution in the country - the Corps of Pages. They taught more than one secular etiquette there, so the future commander became a very educated person. But after graduation in 1972, he had to decide on service in the Tver Dragoon Regiment - there were not enough funds for the Guard.

Then Brusilov showed himself excellently during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, was promoted, and in 1881 he was sent to serve in the capital. In St. Petersburg, he completed the course of squadron commanders (with honors) and was sent to work at the Cavalry School.

Brusilov served in it for over 20 years - until 1906. He was considered a very competent specialist, strict and demanding, but fair. Brusilov prepared cavalrymen for war in unfavorable conditions, making them not ceremonial horsemen, but soldiers. He also developed the details of the strategy and tactics of cavalry units, and was the first to suggest the use of large cavalry units in battles. During the Civil War, this technique was used by some famous red horsemen (in particular, Budyonny and Dybenko). Brusilov was also a well-known connoisseur and master of equestrian sports.

World War I and intrigue at Headquarters

In 1906, Brusilov asked for a transfer and was sent to the Warsaw Military District. There he quickly became convinced of the unpreparedness of the troops for the expected war. The general did not hide his opinion, but did not find support at the "top". He himself was also critical of the Russian leadership, and considered Tsar Nicholas II a "baby" who knew absolutely nothing about military affairs.

At the beginning of the war, the 8th Army under the command of Brusilov distinguished itself in the Battle of Galicia (August 1914). Then there were several more successful operations in the Carpathians (including against the background of the retreat of 1915), and in March 1916 Brusilov was appointed commander of the Southwestern Front. There he made his famous breakthrough.

At the same time, the merit of the operation belongs almost exclusively to the general himself, since the rest of the military leadership mostly interfered with him. Neighbors on the front, Evert and Kuropatkin (those still strategists), who were supposed to advance according to the plan, at first refused to do this, and when Brusilov took the main blow, they were "late" to support him.

Brusilov breakthrough

The offensive began on the night of 22 May 1916 and continued through June. To start unauthorized is the only permission that Chief of Staff Alekseev could give Brusilov.

Before that, meticulous preparation was carried out. The troops knew their task, the artillery was moved to combat positions. Intelligence has gathered the necessary information. Brusilov's innovation consisted in delivering strong blows simultaneously in several directions, which disorientated the enemy and did not allow him to properly dispose of reserves and resources. Then this technique was used during the liberation of the territories seized by the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War.

The Austrians lost 1.5 million people, the Russians - 3 times less. But Brusilov was forced to stop, because he did not receive help, reinforcements and supplies. This finally turned him into an opponent of Nicholas II. In 1917, the general insisted on his abdication.

Red cavalry

No, the general was not a revolutionary. He was a monarchist and hoped for the appearance in Russia of "his own Bonaparte." But the monarchy of Nicholas II did not suit him. And in 1920 (after the start of the Soviet-Polish war) he offered his services to the Red Army.

In 1916, the world applauded the little dry general Brusilov. "Here he is a new hero, worthy of Suvorov's glory, who broke the course of the First World War with his breakthrough!" - repeated the journalists and public figures of the allied countries of the Entente. However, Aleksei Alekseevich himself had no illusions on this score and complained in letters to his wife Nadezhda Zhelikhovskaya: "In general, our offensive made such a noise all over the world, and Russia and its allies were so happy that I feel uncomfortable and I am afraid they will jinx it." And after some two years, Brusilov was already hated by many officers, his former subordinates, imputing to him the guilt of betrayal of the homeland. After all, he was the most authoritative of the tsarist generals who went over to the service of the Soviet government ...
Alexey Brusilov was born on August 31, 1853 in Tiflis. A hereditary military man, he received his baptism of fire in the Caucasus, participating in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. For bravery Brusilov received three orders (for seven months of the war!).

Later, Alexei graduated with honors from the Officer Cavalry School in St. Petersburg ("Horse Academy", as it was jokingly called in the army), and became an adjutant of the school. For his abilities and enviable energy, Brusilov was appointed head of the St. Petersburg cavalry school. By that time, in the ranks, he had grown to major general. He was entrusted with the command of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division.

Family matters
It seemed that everything in the general's life was going well - an excellent career, a happy family. But everything changes overnight.
In 1908, Brusilov's wife Anna Nikolaevna dies. The general was grieving at the loss. Having applied for a new appointment, he leaves for Lublin as commander of the 14th Army Corps, already with the rank of lieutenant general. Four years later, Aleksey Alekseevich accepted an offer to take the post of assistant commander of the Warsaw Military District and the rank of cavalry general.
In Lublin, a 57-year-old widower offered his hand to 45-year-old Nadezhda Vladimirovna Zhelikhovskaya, whom he secretly fell in love with in his youth, but then "lost sight of him for almost 20 years."

War
With the announcement of the general mobilization on July 17, 1914, Brusilov was appointed commander of the 8th Army of the Southwestern Front. For two months of hostilities, Russian troops occupied a huge territory, took Lvov, Galich and reached the Carpathians. The main contribution to this success was made by the 8th Army.
Brusilov often appeared in the advanced units, not caring about personal safety. In his orders, the "primary duty" of the commanders subordinate to him, he put care of the soldier and his provisions.
Then a major success followed - the capture of the powerful Austrian fortress of Przemysl. Unfortunately, the Russian army did not have more impressive victories in 1915, and by the summer the troops were retreating along the entire front. Brusilov's army left Galicia. By the fall of 1915, the front had stabilized, and the armies spent the winter in positional defense, preparing for new battles. In March 1916, Brusilov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front. He decided to challenge the opinion of his predecessor and the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, according to which the troops of the Southwestern Front were assigned a passive, defensive role. A week after his appointment, the general told Nicholas II that if he was not given the initiative for offensive actions, in this case he would consider his stay as commander-in-chief of the front not only useless, but also harmful and would ask for a replacement.
As a result, on April 5, Aleksey Alekseevich gathered the commanders of the armies of the Southwestern Front to personally inform his comrades-in-arms about the decision to attack and explain the chosen method of action. The commander-in-chief of the front proposed an original plan for breaking through the enemy's defensive lines. Everything was thought out to the details, the order of actions of artillery and its interaction with infantry formations was strictly determined, the organization of infantry attacks by the most effective method - waves of chains. The main feature of the plan was that it was planned to break through the deeply echeloned enemy defense in several sectors of the front at once in order to disperse the enemy's attention, forces and means.

Military science did not know this before
The front offensive began on 22 May with a strong and effective artillery barrage. In May - July, a breakthrough was made of the enemy's positional defense in a strip of 550 kilometers to a depth of 60 - 150 kilometers! Austro-Hungarian troops lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured, a large number of weapons; losses of Russians - about 500 thousand. The German and Austro-Hungarian command was forced to transfer dozens of divisions to the Russian front from the west; neutral Romania decided to enter the war on the side of the Entente.

As a result of the Brusilov breakthrough, the scales tipped in favor of the Entente, and this success became the pinnacle of Brusilov's military leadership.
Nicholas II awarded the hero with "Georgievsk weapons adorned with diamonds." The French government awarded Alexei Alekseevich the Order of the Legion of Honor 1 class and a military medal. Newspapers and magazines of the Entente countries responded with delight about Brusilov. Hopes were pinned on his talent not only of the mighty of this world, but also of ordinary people awaiting the end of an exhausting war. By 1917, Brusilov's fame reached its climax. However, the general did not enjoy recognition for long ...

Supreme commander
Brusilov perceived the events of the February Revolution of 1917 as "a strange crisis during such a terrible war." The crisis, which must be overcome "as soon as possible, so that the external enemy could not take advantage of our devastation ..." This war must be won by all means, otherwise Russia will disappear, the general believed. On June 4, Brusilov was appointed supreme commander-in-chief - the aura of the hero and his position regarding the continuation of active hostilities by the Russian army, which coincided with the line of the Provisional Government on preparing the offensive, played a role.

The appointment of the popular general to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was commented in the newspapers "as the first step towards going over to the offensive." Brusilov was actively preparing an offensive operation, trying to restore order in the troops. All in vain, the offensive failed. On July 31, Brusilov received an order from the Provisional Government to immediately hand over the cases and leave Headquarters. The disgraced general arrived in Moscow. Here he was caught by the October events. In the last days of October, the so-called Moscow week began, when the cadets and students tried to resist the Bolsheviks. At a meeting of officers and public figures, it was decided to send a delegation to Brusilov. “I am at the disposal of the Provisional Government, and if it orders me, I will take command,” Brusilov said in response to the ardent pleas to him.

The messengers left with nothing. The general's refusal was a blow to the participants in the Moscow battles, who had a faint hope that one of the major military leaders would appear in Moscow, who "would take matters into their own hands." But there was none. Brusilov himself was soon arrested on suspicion of involvement in a conspiracy against the Soviet regime, organized by the British diplomat and intelligence officer Lockhart, and was kept in the guardhouse in the Kremlin for two months. The suspicion was not confirmed, and the general was released. Painful thoughts led him to the Bolsheviks.

Moved to the Red camp
A patriot of his country, he decided to support long-suffering Russia in connection with the war with Poland in 1920, to help in the fight against an external enemy. The officers who had gone with Brusilov throughout the First World War were indignant. Their idol moved to the Red camp: he headed a Special Meeting under the Commander-in-Chief. During the fighting for the Crimea, Brusilov was asked to write an appeal to the Wrangelites to end the resistance. Trusting the assurances that all those who voluntarily laid down their arms will be released to their homes, he wrote such an appeal. Many white officers, believing the general, laid down their arms. A significant part of them were shot. Brusilov was very upset about his involvement in their death, but continued his service in the Red Army. In November 1921, Aleksey Alekseevich headed the commission for organizing cavalry pre-conscription training. Then there was the post of chief inspector of the Main Directorate of Horse Breeding and Horse Breeding of the RSFSR. Despite the honorary positions and recognition, by the end of his life the illustrious commander felt physically and mentally broken. At home among strangers ...

These days Russia marks the centenary of the most successful and famous operation of the First World War, which went down in history as the Brusilov Breakthrough. Lenta.ru already spoke about their meaning a year ago. Next in line is the story of the fate of General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov - a bright and tragic figure.

An outstanding commander is always a strong and bright personality, and such people are rarely unambiguous. So Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov left behind a complex and largely contradictory memory - some idolize him, others are skeptical. Probably, this was inevitable, because he had to live in an era that, like a bulldozer, broke the fate of people, overthrew idols, turned upside down seemingly unshakable moral and moral values.

Brusilov served Russia all his life, even when it practically ceased to exist. On this path, he reached the top of his military career - he became the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army. But it turned out that he took command of the already hopelessly sinking ship. The new Russia did not want to continue the great war, which became the work of Brusilov's life, and entered into a battle with itself. For a true Russian general and patriot, this was a terrible tragedy. The last 10 years of Brusilov's life - between the triumphant frontline offensive operation and his departure from earthly life - became the most severe test for the old warrior, but they showed the height of his spirit and true love for the Fatherland, without which he could not imagine himself.

Natural Born Cavalry

Brusilov's life path is just like a cavalry lance, although not as straightforward as it might seem at first glance. He was born into a general's family, from childhood he chose the career of an officer and achieved the greatest success on this path. And in terms of career advancement, and in the greatness of success, and in the recognition of both the superior and the people. He tasted fame, honor and respect, by the way, well deserved. On the other hand, his life was by no means easy. His father died when Alexei was only six years old. And soon his mother also passed away. Alexei, as well as his younger brothers Boris and Lev, were sheltered by the family of their aunt and uncle, who lived in Kutaisi. There, in Georgia, the childhood of the future general passed.

Image: reproduction by Vladimir Boyko / Russian Look / Globallookpress.com

At the age of 14, Alexey went to St. Petersburg to the Corps of Pages, where he was enrolled at the request of his godfather, the Tsar's governor in the Caucasus, Field Marshal Prince A.I. Baryatinsky. He studied not too diligently, but graduated from this elite institution. True, he was released not into the guard, but into the usual 16th dragoon Tver regiment, stationed in the Caucasus. Aleksey Alekseevich himself in his memoirs explains this by the lack of funds for life in the capital, while researchers tend to associate such a distribution with rather mediocre estimates. By the way, the Tverskoy regiment was stationed very close to the native places of the young officer, and, apparently, the desire to be close to his family also played a role.
Soon Brusilov had a chance to take part in hostilities, in which the young officer distinguished himself, earning three military orders and a promotion for his "affairs with the Turks".

After the war, in 1881, a trip to the training squadron of the officer's cavalry school in St. Petersburg followed - a kind of refresher courses for promising officers. Brusilov showed himself to be an excellent specialist in the art of bereiter and received an offer to join the permanent teaching staff of the school. The next quarter of a century of his life and career was associated precisely with the Officer Cavalry School, in which Brusilov made his way from a listener to a commander and from a captain to a general. Only in 1906 he returned to field service, taking command of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division. Then there was the command of the field corps, the army at the beginning of the war, the front from March 1916, and the entire Russian army from May 1917.

His career is not quite typical - for most of it Brusilov taught the cavalry art to the officer elite, and did not "pull the strap" in distant garrisons. He did not go through the usual school of a squadron and regimental commander, did not study tactics at the General Staff academy. He seemed to be a practitioner, but very narrow - cavalry. This narrowness and lack of deep academic training was often blamed for him.

On the other hand, he was devoid of the blinkeredness and dogmatism, which is often inherent in both armchair theoretical generals and provincial garrison officers. Perhaps, it was thanks to this that thoughts arose in Brusilov's head about completely unconventional, even revolutionary offensive tactics, which at first frightened his colleagues so much, and then turned out to be victorious.

Was pedantic and demanded the utmost precision

The character of the future famous commander was not easy. According to the recollections of his contemporaries, he was very direct and harsh in his assessments, and often offended colleagues with harsh responses and judgments. He was pedantic and demanded the utmost precision and concreteness from others. Gentleness and delicacy did not apply to his merits, at least as far as the service was concerned. Brusilov did not hesitate to report the miscalculations of his direct commanders to the higher authorities, for which he was repeatedly accused (indirectly) of intrigue and careerism. With the authorities, especially from the royal family, he was courteous, in the opinion of some, even obsequious. Sometimes he allowed himself unexpected actions.

Sitting: A.A. Brusilov. Standing, from left to right: Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Khabaev (adjutant A.A. Brusilova), Colonel R.N. Yakhontov (staff officer for assignments), staff-captain A.A. Brusilov Jr. (son of A.A. Brusilov), Captain E.N. Baydak (A.A. Brusilov's adjutant). August 1914.

For example, here is what Protopresbyter of the Russian Imperial Army G.I. Shavelsky: “When the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who had just smashed Brusilov (then the head of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Division) during breakfast, addressed him with an affectionate word, Brusilov grabbed the Grand Duke's hand and kissed it. He did the same when in April 1916, near Przemysl, the Tsar congratulated him as Adjutant General. "

Two warriors

Many of Brusilov's actions and behavior patterns evoke involuntary associations with his great predecessor, Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. He was also a hereditary military man and also did not think of another career. They even look similar - both are short, thin and fit, sinewy and hardy. Both Suvorov and Brusilov were extremely demanding of their subordinates, did not shy away from harsh disciplinary measures, at the same time they were loved by the soldiers who followed them into fire and water. Both innovators in military affairs did not hesitate to “break stereotypes” and take responsibility. They had an abundance of ambition, which is characteristic of all real career officers. And at first glance, absurd actions were also inherent in both.

Suvorov, after all, was perceived by contemporaries very ambiguously, almost like a "pea jester." Later, over time, the generally accepted biography of the great commander was cleared of some especially odious stories, acquiring a heroic and even somewhat idealized appearance. Brusilov also had enough ill-wishers, therefore, the interpretations of his actions were different. Moreover, the personality of the commander was not subject to official canonization, and they did not try to make a national hero out of him using propaganda methods. After all, he turned out to be one of his own among strangers and a stranger among his own - neither white nor red, not a monarchist, not a revolutionary. And this explains a lot in the variety of interpretations.

The commander of the 8th Army, Cavalry General Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov (without a headdress) stands in front of the Grand Duke Georgy Mikhailovich (sitting in the Benz car). End of May - July 1915. The place is not specified (the prince came to Brusilov at the headquarters of the 8th Russian army). Probably Sambor.

For the Fatherland without a Tsar

Brusilov was loyal to the tsarist government, at least ideologically. From childhood he absorbed the motto "For faith, Tsar and Fatherland", did not think of any other way for Russia and was faithful to him. Probably, this explains his respect for the imperial family, as for the sacred rulers of the country. Although personal relations with Nicholas II, the commander was difficult, especially from the moment the emperor led the army in the field. Brusilov was irritated by the indecision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, because of which the fronts acted out of order - when the South-West attacked, the West and North stood still. Nikolai could not organize joint actions, force commanders to set common tasks above local ones. He asked, persuaded, the generals argued with him and bargained with him, and precious time wasted. The softness of the commander-in-chief cost his army dearly.

By the way, Brusilov was not alone in this relation to the last emperor. It is no coincidence that in February 1917 no one from the high command supported the staggering power. Almost at the same time, telegrams from all the front commanders (Sakharov, Brusilov, Evert, Ruzsky) arrived at Nikolai's headquarters carriage with a request to renounce the throne peacefully, after which he realized the futility of resistance. Even the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Mikhail Vasilyevich Alekseev, and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich saw no other way out. So can all of them be considered traitors? Maybe there really was no other option?

Image: World History Archive / Globallookpress.com

Brusilov accepted the February Revolution, if not enthusiastically, then at least with great optimism. From his point of view, the changes were supposed to contribute to an early victorious end of the war, but he did not particularly think about politics, believing that this issue could be postponed. At least that's what he writes in his memoirs.

General Alekseev was appointed commander-in-chief, and the army began to prepare for the summer offensive, which was to be victorious. At that time no one understood yet how destructive the influence of the revolution on the army would be, what a terrible disaster politicization would become, and how quickly the fighting efficiency of the unagitated units would fall to zero. Torn away from the capital, the generals and officers did not really understand the intricacies of the political struggle, did not understand which of the representatives of the new authorities wanted to help the front, and who, on the contrary, was trying to destroy it. When they figured it out, it was already too late - the soldiers actually went out of control. Power passed to the regimental committees, in which those who called for an immediate end to the war enjoyed the greatest authority. The unpunished killings of officers seeking to restore order became commonplace.

It cannot be said that the generals did not understand what was happening. But the hands of the military leaders were tied by the politicking of the civilian authorities, who, for populist purposes, tried to play democracy with the soldiers. Disciplinary and corporal punishment was abolished, and officers were severely punished for them. The only legal counterbalance that the command could afford was the creation of shock battalions, or death battalions. They voluntarily recruited the most persistent and, most importantly, those who wanted to carry out the orders of the soldiers. Brusilov was one of the initiators of this movement. But, of course, that was not enough.

In May, Alekseev was forced to leave Headquarters due to illness. There was no special discussion about who would replace him - the most popular and famous military leader for all was General Brusilov. He accepted the appointment with enthusiasm and hope of success. But the offensive was thwarted. The soldiers did not want to fight, held meetings or openly sabotaged orders. The desertion has become monstrous.

“Units of the 28th Infantry Division approached to take up their initial position only 4 hours before the attack, and only two and a half companies with 4 machine guns and 30 officers came from the 109th regiment; The 110th regiment arrived in half; two battalions of the 111th regiment, which occupied the cracks, abandoned the offensive; in the 112th regiment, dozens of soldiers went to the rear (...).

The units of the 29th division did not have time to take their starting position in time, as the soldiers, due to the changed mood, moved reluctantly forward. A quarter of an hour before the scheduled start of the attack, the 114th right-flank regiment refused to advance; the Erivan regiment had to be moved in its place from the corps reserve. For still unclear reasons, the 116th and 113th regiments also did not move on time (...). After the failure, the leakage of soldiers began to increase and by nightfall reached enormous proportions. The soldiers, tired, nervous, not accustomed to fighting and the rumble of guns after so many months of calm, inactivity, fraternization and rallies, left the trenches in droves, throwing machine guns, weapons and went to the rear (...).

Cowardice and indiscipline of some units reached the point that the commanders were forced to ask our artillery not to shoot, since the shooting of their guns caused panic among the soldiers.

(...) In some regiments, the battle line is occupied only by the regiment commander, with his own headquarters and several soldiers "(AI Denikin." Essays on Russian Troubles ")

The offensive failed. Brusilov traveled to the regiments, agitated, persuaded, but all was in vain. The army actually ceased to exist.

Then Brusilov turned to the Duma with a demand to allow the use of detachments and the use of weapons against deserters, as was the case during the "great retreat" of 1915. In response, Brusilov received a telegram stating that he was recalled to Petrograd, and Lavr Georgievich Kornilov was appointed commander-in-chief.

Image: RIA Novosti

Prisoners captured by Russian troops during the offensive operation on the Southwestern Front (Brusilov Breakthrough) during the First World War

This decision had purely political reasons. By the middle of summer, the balance in the capital began to tilt in favor of radical forces seeking to destabilize the situation. Populist slogans like “peace to the peoples”, “land to the peasants” or “factories to the workers”, with all their unrealizability, captured the uneducated masses. The only way to counter them was by forceful intervention by the army in the field, because the police no longer existed, and the Petrograd garrison was on the side of the Bolshevik City Council. Kerensky talked about this with Brusilov, but the old general flatly refused to fight with his people. Therefore, it was decided to remove him from command. Soon Kornilov made an attempt to deploy the army inland, but ... was betrayed by Kerensky himself, who feared for his power. The mutiny was suppressed, Kornilov was arrested.

Neither red nor white

Brusilov asked permission to leave for Moscow, where his family lived. There, in Mansurovsky lane in the Ostozhenka area, he met the October Revolution. The very next day, street fighting began in Moscow - the officers who were in the city, as well as the cadets of the Alekseevsky and Alexandrovsky schools, did not reconcile themselves to the violent seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. A delegation from the Public Security Committee came to General Brusilov with a request to lead the troops of the rebels, but he refused. The Reds also tried to win him over to their side, but also to no avail. To fight against his own people seemed to the general an unworthy deed.

As a result, the red units shamelessly shot the opponents with cannons. They beat them with a large caliber from Vorobyovy Gory in the squares, not taking particular care of the civilians. One of the shells hit the house of Brusilov, who was seriously wounded in the leg in several places. Brusilov was urgently taken to the hospital of S.M. Rudnev, where he had to be treated for eight long months. Surprisingly: neither the Turkish scimitar nor the German bullet reached General Brusilov, but he suffered from a shell fired by his own artillerymen!

While Brusilov was on treatment, they continued to bombard him with offers. Old colleagues called him to the Don, where a volunteer army was being formed. Its origins were Brusilov's recent subordinates - Generals Alekseev, Kornilov, Denikin, Kaledin. The last three served on the South-Western Front, participated in the famous Brusilov breakthrough. Brusilov was also called to the Volga, where the remnants of the Provisional Government and Komuch were gathering strength. But Brusilov again refused to fight against his own.

As soon as the general left the hospital, he was arrested. The Chekists intercepted several letters from the British diplomat and intelligence officer Lockhart, which spoke of plans to make Brusilov the leader of the anti-Bolshevik forces. The general's son (Alexei Alekseevich Brusilov Jr.) and his brother Boris, a former state councilor, who had returned from the front with the rank of captain, were also arrested. He soon died in custody.

Brusilov spent several months in the Kremlin guardhouse, then he was transferred to house arrest. Perhaps the most terrible time began for the Brusilov family, who, like the rest of the Muscovites, had to experience the pangs of cold and hunger. The general had no sources of income, he was rescued by the help of former colleagues - the Knights of St. George. Someone brought potatoes and bacon from the village, someone helped with canned food. We somehow survived.

Alexey Jr. was mobilized into the Red Army. How much this was his voluntary decision remains a mystery, but he was entrusted with the command of the cavalry regiment. In 1919, he died under unclear circumstances. According to the official version, he was taken prisoner by the "Drozdovites" and was hanged, but there is information that he joined the White movement as a private, and later either died or died of typhus. It's scary to think what was going on in the soul of the old warrior. He lost absolutely everything: the Fatherland, the army to which he gave his whole life, his only son. All his merits and victories were stolen from him, because the new government did not need them. Over the course of several years, from a victorious commander, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, he turned into an unhappy starving old man with shaky health.

In the unforgiving millstones of history

The situation changed in 1920 when the Soviet-Polish war began. In the new conditions, Brusilov considered it possible for himself to return to the service, because now it was not about a civil war, but about the defense of the Motherland. On May 30, Pravda published the famous proclamation "To all former officers, wherever they are," under which Brusilov's signature was first, and then several other former generals. About 14 thousand officers who joined the Red Army responded to this call.

After some time, Brusilov, at the request of L.D. Trotsky made an appeal to the officers of the army of Baron Wrangel. The general was promised that those who surrender voluntarily will be given life and freedom. Some believed the military leader's authority and surrendered. Almost all of them were killed without trial. Brusilov was depressed, he took this tragedy hard.

Brusilov did not serve in the active Red Army, did not fight against his own. This was his condition. He lectured at the Academy of the Red Army and taught theoretical studies at the cavalry school. In 1923, 70-year-old Brusilov was appointed Inspector of the Red Army cavalry, but a year later he asked to be released for treatment in Czechoslovakia, where he spent the last years of his life. Aleksey Alekseevich died in 1926 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery with all military honors. Exactly 10 years have passed since the famous breakthrough, and it's scary to think how much the old warrior had to endure over the years.

Brusilov did not become his own in the Red Army, but the attitude towards him was at first quite respectful. It was his name that was most often used when talking about the experience of the World War. It is understandable, because the names of Alekseev, Denikin, Kornilov, Keller, Yudenich, Wrangel, Kolchak and many others could not even be mentioned, they were associated exclusively with the white movement. The attitude towards Brusilov changed after the Patriotic War, when it became known about the existence of the second volume of Brusilov's memoirs, in which he spoke rather impartially about the Soviet government and its leaders. It became clear that the old general did not accept the new order, but served only because he had no other way to survive. And this is also the great tragedy of this great man.