What were the detachments actually doing? Separating the truth from the lie.
Detention of a suspicious element
It should be noted right away that the term "barrage detachment" itself is rather vague: "A barrage detachment, or a detachment of obstacles, is a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special mission." It is not clear from this definition by whom the detachment is formed, to whom it submits, what specific tasks it performs. In addition, in the course of the war, the departmental affiliation, composition and functions of the detachments changed several times.As you know, in early February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the NKVD itself and the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). At the same time, military counterintelligence, in accordance with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of February 8, 1941, was separated from the NKVD and transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy of the USSR, where the Third Directorates of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR were created.
On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense issues directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime. In particular, it provided for:
“Organization of mobile control and barrage detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command, with the inclusion of operational workers of the Third Directorate in their composition with the following tasks:a) detention of deserters;
b) the arrest of all suspicious element that has penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational workers of the organs of the Third Directorate of NCOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of the material together with the detainees by jurisdiction "(State security organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 2. Beginning. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. M., 2000. P.92–93).
As we can see, initially the barrage detachments were supposed to carry out only the detention of deserters, as well as a suspicious element hanging around the front line and conduct a preliminary investigation, after which they transfer the detainees to the appropriate judicial authorities.
In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were united. On July 17, 1941, by the decree of the State Defense Committee No. 187ss, the bodies of the Third Directorate of the NCO were transformed into special departments and also transferred to the subordination of the NKVD. Among other things, this contributed to the establishment of a closer connection between them and the territorial bodies of state security. At the same time, special departments are given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot (Ibid. Pp. 337–338).
The next day, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, in his directive No. 169, explained the tasks of the special departments as follows:
“The meaning of transforming the organs of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless struggle against spies, traitors, saboteurs, deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disorganizers.A ruthless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and defame the honor of the Red Army is just as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage ”(Ibid. P. 346).
To ensure operational measures, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed under special divisions of divisions and corps, separate rifle companies were formed under special divisions of the armies, separate rifle battalions manned by the NKVD troops were formed under special front divisions ( Ibid., P. 366).
Shooting of Estonian bandits
In carrying out their tasks, special departments, in particular, deployed barrage detachments in the rear of our troops.About their daily work in the first months of the war, a memorandum of the head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, divisional commissar Lebedev No. 21431 dated December 10, 1941, to the Military Council of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 2. Beginning Book 2. September 1 - December 31, 1941. M., 2000. pp. 397–401).
A defensive detachment under the 3rd Division of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was formed in June 1941. It was a maneuverable company equipped with vehicles. To strengthen it, on the initiative of the 3rd department, two homemade armored vehicles were manufactured at one of the enterprises in Tallinn.
Initially, the detachment operated on the territory of Estonia. In order to combat desertion, barriers were set up on the roads leading to Tallinn and Leningrad. However, since the land front at that time was far enough, there were few cases of desertion in the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility. In this regard, the main efforts of the detachment and the group of operatives attached to it were aimed at combating the gangs of Estonian nationalists hiding in the forests and swamps.
A significant number of small gangs, consisting mainly of members of the Kaitseliit organization, operated mainly on highways, attacking small units of the Red Army and individual military personnel. As a result of the work of the detachment in the first days of the war in the Loksa area, six bandits were caught, one of them was killed while trying to escape. According to intelligence reports, three people were arrested at the same time on charges of aiding the bandits.
Practice has shown that in the areas where gangs operate, it is very important to have informants in grocery stores, cafes and canteens of small settlements, since from time to time gangster groups were forced to buy food, matches, cartridges, etc., sending their own representatives. During one of these visits to a rural grocery store, four bandits were discovered by two scouts from the detachment. Despite the numerical superiority, the latter tried to delay them. As a result, one of the bandits was killed in a shootout, two managed to escape, the fourth, although, as it turned out, in the past he was the Estonian champion in running, did not manage to escape. He was wounded, captured and taken to the 3rd department.
The round-ups carried out by the detachment, combing the terrain, secrets and outposts significantly hampered the actions of the Estonian gangs, and the cases of armed attacks in those areas controlled by the detachment sharply decreased.
When the Virtsu peninsula was liberated as a result of the counterstrike of the 8th Army in mid-July 1941, a platoon of the blocking detachment and a group of operational workers left for this area to carry out an operation to clear the peninsula of persons hostile to Soviet power and assisting the Nazis. On the way to Virtsu, a detachment platoon suddenly crashed into a German outpost, located at a fork in the Virtsu-Pärnu roads, on the Karuse farm. The platoon was fired upon by enemy rifle-machine-gun and mortar fire, dismounted and took the battle. As a result of the battle, the Germans, leaving the anti-tank gun, machine gun and ammunition, hastily retreated. The losses of the detachment were 6 killed and 2 wounded.
Having transferred the defense of the repulsed area to the regular units, the detachment platoon arrived in Virtsu. The task force immediately began work, as a result of which the head of the local organization "Kaitseliit", two former members of this organization who were members of the "self-defense" formation created by the German command, the owner of a local restaurant who was used by the Germans as a translator, as well as a provocateur who betrayed the fascist authorities two agents of our border guard. Six informants were recruited among the population of Virtsu.
In the same period, an operation was carried out to clear the bands from Cape Varbla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnovsk district. Two platoons of the blocking detachment, reinforced with armored vehicles, together with a fighter battalion, seized the indicated settlements in battle, defeating the "self-defense" headquarters and capturing a heavy machine gun, 60 bicycles, over 10 telephones, several hunting rifles and rifles. Among the bandits there were killed and wounded, the captured 4 bandits were shot on the spot. Our losses are 1 killed. In Tallinn, a detachment uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary organization that was recruiting the local population into gangs. At the same time, weapons and explosives were seized.
In addition to the fight against banditry and desertion, the task force of the detachment launched work to send our agents into the German rear. Of the abandoned three agents, two returned. Having infiltrated the occupied city of Pärnu, they found out the location of German military installations. Using this information, the aviation of the Baltic Fleet bombed enemy targets, the results of the bombing were positive. In addition, information was collected about the local servants of the occupiers from among the Estonian nationalists.
During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and returned the retreating to the front, but also held the defensive lines. A particularly difficult situation developed on the afternoon of August 27. Separate parts of the 8th Army, having lost their leadership, leaving the last line of defense, fled. To restore order, not only a detachment was thrown, but the entire operational staff of the 3rd department. The retreating under the threat of weapons stopped and as a result of the counterattack threw the enemy back 7 kilometers. This played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn.
The fact that at the same time the NKVD fighters were not hiding behind other people's backs is evidenced by the losses incurred by the detachment during the battles for Tallinn - over 60% of the personnel, including almost all commanders.
Arriving in Kronstadt, the detachment immediately proceeded to replenishment and already on September 7, 1941 sent one platoon with two operatives to serve on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, and by September 18 the coast from Oranienbaum to the village. The mouth was fully serviced by the detachment.
In total, from the beginning of the war to November 22, 1941, the detachment detained over 900 people, of whom 77 were arrested and convicted. At the same time, 11 people were shot on the spot or in front of the formation.
Four percent of those arrested
By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation had deteriorated significantly. In this situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, by directive No. 001650 of September 5, 1941, satisfied the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko:
“The headquarters has read your memorandum and allows you to create barrage detachments in those divisions that have proven themselves to be unstable. The purpose of the barrage detachments is to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of flight to stop, using weapons if necessary "(State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Vol.2. Book 2. P.20).
A week later, a similar practice was extended to all fronts:
"Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 001919 to the commander of the fronts, armies, division commanders, the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction on the creation of barrage detachments in rifle divisions
September 12, 1941The experience of fighting German fascism has shown that in our rifle divisions there are many panicky and outright hostile elements, which at the very first pressure from the enemy throw down their weapons and begin to shout: "We are surrounded!" and carry away the rest of the fighters. As a result of such actions of these elements, the division takes flight, throws the material part and then begins to leave the forest alone. Similar phenomena are taking place on all fronts. If the commanders and commissars of such divisions were at the height of their task, the alarmist and hostile elements could not prevail in the division. But the trouble is that we do not have so many firm and stable commanders and commissars.
In order to prevent the above undesirable phenomena at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
orders:
1. In each rifle division, have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (in the calculation of 1 company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at his disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.
2. The tasks of the barrage detachment are to consider direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, stopping the flight of servicemen obsessed with panic, without stopping before using weapons, eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, supporting the honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, but carried away by the general flight.
3. To oblige the workers of special departments and the political personnel of the divisions to provide all kinds of assistance to the commanders of divisions and barrage detachments in strengthening the order and discipline of the division.
4. To complete the creation of barrage detachments within five days from the date of receipt of this order.
5. Report on receipt and execution by the commander of the fronts and armies.
Headquarters of the Supreme Command
I. Stalin
B. Shaposhnikov "(Ibid. Pp. 85–86).
In contrast to the barrage detachments that continued to exist under the special departments of the NKVD, focused mainly on the detention of deserters and suspicious elements, army detachments were created in order to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of units. These units were much larger (battalion per division instead of platoon) and their personnel were recruited not from NKVD servicemen, but from ordinary Red Army men. They had the right to use weapons - not to shoot retreating units and subunits from machine guns, but to eliminate the initiators of panic and flight.
Some idea of \u200b\u200bthe functions of the barrage battalions is given by the decree of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00274 of September 18, 1941 "On strengthening the fight against desertion and the penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad." In this document, signed by the commander of the Leningrad Front, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov and members of the front military council, the 1st secretary of the Leningrad regional committee and the city committee of the CPSU (b) A.A. Zhdanov and the 2nd secretary A.A. Kuznetsov, in in particular, it is prescribed:
"five. To the chief of the OVT (Protection of the military rear - I.P.) of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade Stepanov should organize four barrage detachments to concentrate and check all the servicemen detained without documents.
The head of the rear of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General Comrade Mordvinov to organize feeding points at these barrage detachments ”(Ibid. P. 119).
The current denunciators of the totalitarian past assure us that the barrage detachments did nothing but shoot at their own people. In this case, it is completely incomprehensible why they should organize feeding stations with them? Is it really in order to feed those being shot before execution?
And here is the final document on the activities of the barrage detachments in the first months of the war:
“Report of the 3rd rank State Security Commissioner S. Milstein to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria on the actions of the Special Departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops of the USSR for the period from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941
Top secret
TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
To the General Commissioner of State Security
to comrade BERIA
REFERENCEFrom the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 servicemen were detained by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear.
Of the detainees, the Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the remaining 632,486 people were formed in units and sent back to the front.
Among those arrested by the Special Departments:
spies - 1505
saboteurs - 308
traitors - 2621
cowards and alarmists - 2643
deserters - 8772
distributors of provocative rumors - 3987
skirmishers - 1671
others - 4371
Total - 25,878
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10 201 people were shot, 3321 people were shot in front of the line.
Deputy Beginning Directorate of the OO NKVD of the USSR
State Commissioner security rank 3
Milstein
[October] 1941 "(Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. Moscow – St. Petersburg, 2002. P.439–440).
So, out of 657,364 people detained by barriers and operational barriers of special departments, only 25,878 people were arrested, that is, 4%.
In addition to barrage battalions as part of divisions and barrage detachments formed by special departments, similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD. So, in order to detain the Red Army men leaving the Kalinin front, on October 15, 1941, the UNKVD in the Kalinin region organized barrage detachments in the directions: Kalinin - Kushalino, Kushalino - Goritsy, Kushalino - Zaitsevo, Kimry - Kashin. All of them were subordinate to the 4th department of the NKVD in the Kalinin region.
From October 15 to December 9, 1941, these barrage detachments detained and transferred the 256th rifle division and other military units 6164 Red Army soldiers and 1498 people from the construction battalions. In addition, they detained and prosecuted under Art. 193 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR 172 deserters (State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Vol.2. Book 2. P.396).
As the situation at the front improved, the need for barrage battalions as part of the divisions disappeared.
Defending Stalingrad
A new stage in the history of the detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and the Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin was issued, which, in particular, prescribed:
“2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:
[...] b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot on the spot alarmists and cowards and so help honest fighters of divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland "(Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central archive of the FSB RF. M., 2000, p. 445).
In pursuance of this order, the commander of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant General V.N. Gordov, on August 1, 1942, issued his order No. 00162 / op, in which he prescribed:
"five. The commanders of the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62, 63, and 65th armies should form five barrage detachments within two days, and the commanders of the 1st and 4th tank armies - three barrage detachments of 200 people each.
Subordinate the defensive detachments to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. At the head of the barrage detachments to put the most experienced in a combat relation special officers.
The defensive detachments should be manned with the best selected fighters and commanders from the Far Eastern divisions.
Provide roadblocks with vehicles.
6. Within two days, restore in each rifle division the barrage battalions formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 01919.
To equip the defensive battalions of divisions with the best worthy fighters and commanders. Report about the execution by August 4, 1942 " (TsAMO. F.345. Op.5487. D.5. L.706).
From the message of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 "On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Panzer Army to it":
“In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the 414 SP, 18 SD, Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, chickened out, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by the barriers. by a detachment and a resolution of the Special Division, they were shot in front of the formation.
A Red Army soldier of the same regiment and division Ogorodnikov self-injured his left hand, was exposed for the crime, for which he was brought to trial by a military tribunal. [...]
On the basis of Order No. 227, three army detachments were formed, each with 200 men. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.
Operational workers of special departments were appointed as the heads of the detachments.
By the indicated detachments and barrage battalions on 7.8.42, in units and formations in the army sectors, 363 people were detained, of which: 93 people. left the encirclement, 146 - lagged behind their units, 52 - lost their units, 12 - came from captivity, 54 - fled from the battlefield, 2 - with dubious wounds.
As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 - to the staffing department, 73 - to special camps of the NKVD, 27 - to penal companies, 2 - to the medical commission, 6 people. - arrested and, as indicated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line "
(The Stalingrad epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation. M., 2000. P.181-182).
In accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, including 16 on the Stalingrad front armies) and 25 on the Donskoy.
At the same time, from August 1 to October 15, 1942, the detachments detained 140,755 servicemen who had escaped from the front line. Of those arrested, 3980 people were arrested, 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
The largest number of arrests and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points. On the Stalingrad front, 15649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
During the defense of Stalingrad, barrage detachments played an important role in putting things in order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the lines they occupied, and the return of a significant number of servicemen to the front line.
So, on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by the enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control, retreated in panic to the rear. A detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.
On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd Rifle Regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied the former lines of defense.
On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat. The actions of a detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces put things in order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and, on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same blocking detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.
At critical moments, barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught. So, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the chief of the detachment, Lieutenant of State Security Khlystov, took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of the enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.
On September 15-16, a detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought a battle with superior enemy forces in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad railway station for two days. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the attacks of the Germans, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses on the enemy in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th rifle division came to replace them.
In addition to the army detachments created in accordance with Order No. 227, during the Battle of Stalingrad, restored divisional barrage battalions operated, as well as small detachments staffed with NKVD servicemen under special divisions of divisions and armies. At the same time, army barrage detachments and divisional barrage battalions carried a barrage service directly behind the combat formations of units, preventing panic and mass exodus of servicemen from the battlefield, while security platoons of special divisions of divisions and companies under special divisions of armies were used to carry barrage services on the main communications of divisions and armies for the purpose of arresting cowards, alarmists, deserters and other criminal elements hiding in the army and front lines.
However, in an environment where the very concept of rear was very conditional, this "division of labor" was often violated. So, on October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle brigades. At the same time, among the leading command staff, there were repeated attempts to abandon their units and cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. In these conditions, to combat cowards and alarmists, a special department of the 62nd army created an operational group under the leadership of senior operative lieutenant of state security Ignatenko. Having united the remnants of the platoons of special divisions with the personnel of the 3rd Army Barrier Detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of putting things in order, arresting deserters, cowards and alarmists who, under various pretexts, tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga. Within 15 days, the operational group detained and returned to the battlefield up to 800 private and command personnel, and 15 servicemen were shot in front of the formation by order of the special agencies.
In a memo dated February 17, 1943 of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Don Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR "On the work of special agencies to combat cowards and alarmists in parts of the Don Front for the period from October 1, 1942 to February 1, 1943", a number of examples of actions are given barrage detachments:
“In the fight against cowards, alarmists and restoring order in units that showed instability in battles with the enemy, an exceptionally large role was played by army detachments and divisional barrage battalions.
So, on October 2, 1942, during the offensive of our troops, individual units of the 138th division, met with powerful artillery and mortar fire from the enemy, wavered and fled in panic through the battle formations of the 1st battalion 706 SP, 204 SD, which were in the second echelon.
By the measures taken by the command and the detachment battalion of the division, the situation was restored. 7 cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation, and the rest were returned to the front line.
On October 16, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, a group of Red Army men of 781 and 124 divisions, in the amount of 30 people, showed cowardice and in panic began to flee from the battlefield, dragging along other servicemen.
The army detachment of the 21st army located in this sector, liquidated the panic by force of arms and restored the previous position.
November 19, 1942, during the offensive of units of the 293st division, during the enemy's counterattack, two mortar platoons of 1306 joint venture together with platoon commanders, ml. Lieutenants Bogatyryov and Egorov, without an order from the command, left the occupied line and in panic, throwing their weapons, began to flee from the battlefield.
A platoon of submachine gunners of an army blocking detachment located in this area stopped the fleeing and, having shot two alarmists in front of the formation, returned the rest to their former lines, after which they successfully advanced forward.
On November 20, 1942, during a counterattack by the enemy, one of the companies of the 38th division, which was at the height, did not offer resistance to the enemy, without an order from the command, it began to indiscriminately withdraw from the occupied area.
The 83rd blocking detachment of the 64th Army, carrying the barrage service directly behind the battle formations of the 38th SD units, stopped the fleeing company in panic and returned it back to the previously occupied section of the height, after which the personnel of the company showed exceptional endurance and perseverance in battles with the enemy "(Stalingrad Epic. .. P.409-410).
End of the road
After the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad and the victory at the Kursk Bulge, a turning point came in the war. The strategic initiative passed to the Red Army. In this situation, the barrage detachments have lost their former significance. On August 25, 1944, the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A. Lobachev, sent to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel-General Shcherbakov, a memorandum "On the shortcomings of the activity of the front line detachments" with the following content:
“On my instructions, the front command control officers checked the activities of six detachments in August (a total of 8 detachments).
As a result of this work, it was established:1. The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrage detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, guard communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc. The activity of the 7th detachment of the 54th Army is characteristic in this respect. According to the list, the detachment consists of 124 people. They are used as follows: the 1st submachine gun platoon guards the 2nd echelon of the army headquarters; 2nd submachine gun platoon attached to 111th armament with the task of protecting communication lines from the corps to the army; a rifle platoon was attached to 7 sk with the same mission; the machine-gun platoon is in the reserve of the detachment commander; 9 people work in the departments of the army headquarters, including the platoon commander of Art. Lieutenant GONCHAR is the commandant of the rear services department of the army; the remaining 37 people are used at the headquarters of the detachment. Thus, the 7th detachment is not at all involved in the obstruction service. The same situation in other detachments (5, 6, 153, 21, 50)
In the 5th detachment of the 54th army of 189 people. staff only 90 people. are guarding the command post of the army and the barrage-service, and the remaining 99 people. used in various jobs: 41 people - in the service of the Army Headquarters AXO as cooks, shoemakers, tailors, storekeepers, clerks, etc .; 12 people - in the departments of the army headquarters as messengers and orderlies; 5 people - at the disposal of the commandant of the headquarters and 41 people. serve the headquarters of the detachment.
In the 6th detachment of 169 people. 90 fighters and sergeants are used to protect the command post and communication lines, and the rest are on chores.
2. In a number of detachments, the staffs of the headquarters were extremely swollen. Instead of the prescribed staff of 15 people. officer, sergeant and rank-and-file staff of the 5th detachment consists of 41 people; 7th detachment - 37 people, 6th detachment - 30 people, 153rd detachment - 30 people. etc.
3. The headquarters of the armies do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of the detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. In the 21st detachment of the 67th army, out of 199 people. 75% of the participants in the battles, many of them were awarded. In the 50th detachment, 52 people were awarded for military merit.
4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the detachments military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded. Over the past three months, 30 penalties were imposed on soldiers and sergeants in the 6th detachment for gross violations of military discipline. Not better in other units ...
5. Political departments and deputy. The chiefs of staffs of the armies for political reasons have forgotten about the existence of detachments, they are not in charge of party political work ...
On the revealed shortcomings in the activities of the detachments 15.8 reported to the Military Council of the front. At the same time, he gave instructions to the chiefs of the political departments of the armies about the need to radically improve party political and educational work in the detachments; revitalizing the internal party activities of party organizations, strengthening work with party and Komsomol activists, conducting lectures and reports for personnel, improving the cultural services for soldiers, sergeants and officers of detachments.
Conclusion: Most of the detachments do not fulfill the tasks defined by order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various economic work and assignments, the maintenance of commanders-chiefs, the supervision of the internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the functions of the detachments of the front troops.
I consider it necessary to raise the question before the People's Commissar of Defense on the reorganization or disbandment of the barrage detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the present situation "(Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. 1988. No. 8. P.79-80).
Two months later, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense JV Stalin No. 0349 of October 29, 1944 "On the disbandment of separate barrage detachments" was issued:
“In connection with the change in the general situation on the fronts, the need for further maintenance of the barrage detachments has disappeared.
I order:
1. Separate barrage detachments should be disbanded by November 13, 1944.
Use the personnel of the disbanded detachments to replenish rifle divisions.
2. To inform about the disbandment of the barrage detachments by November 20, 1944 ”(Ibid. P. 80).
So, the barrage detachments detained the deserters and a suspicious element in the rear of the front, stopped the retreating troops. In a critical situation, they often themselves engaged in battle with the Germans, and when the military situation changed in our favor, they began to perform the functions of commandant companies. Carrying out its direct tasks, the detachment could open fire over the heads of fleeing units or shoot cowards and alarmists in front of the formation - but certainly on an individual basis. However, none of the researchers has yet been able to find in the archives a single fact that would confirm that the barrage detachments fired to kill their troops.
Such cases are not cited in the memoirs of the front-line soldiers.
For example, in the "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal" article of the Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army P.N. Lashchenko, the following is said about this:
“Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own people, at least in our sector of the front. Already now I have requested archival documents in this regard, no such documents were found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy troops, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points.
I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact. "
In almost the same words, the knight of the Order of Alexander Nevsky A.G. Efremov described the activities of the blocking detachments in the newspaper Vladimirskie Vedomosti:
“Indeed, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some kind of monsters, but ordinary soldiers and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, they suppressed alarmism. When the turning point in the course of the war came, I did not see more of these units. "
If you wish, more than a dozen more memories of this kind can be cited, but those given along with the documents are quite enough to understand what the barrage units actually were.
The liberal media screams about the terrible and insidious detachments in the Red Army, which were shooting retreating soldiers with machine guns. This situation is depicted in some films about the war. In fact, these are nothing more than myths created to discredit the Stalinist period in Russian history. In this analytical article, you will find figures and facts from the state archives, video chronicles of those years, as well as the memories of the participants of the past battles in the Second World War themselves on the topic of the actions of the barrage detachments in relation to their own army.
The famous order of the NCO No. 227 of July 27, 1942, which was immediately named "Not a step back" among the soldiers, among other very tough measures to strengthen order and discipline at the front, prescribed the creation of the so-called. barrage detachments. In this order, Stalin demanded:
B) to form within the army 3 - 5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), put them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units to shoot on the spot alarmists and cowards and thus help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland; ...
And somehow the information about these units immediately faded into the shadows. Nothing was written about them in the press either during the war or in the post-war years. Even at the time of "exposing the cult of Stalin's personality," they tried to bypass the topic of barrage detachments. Information about them was either simply hushed up, or they were blindly accused of the Stalinist regime. And again, without any details.
After the fall of the communist regime in our country, a lot of speculation appeared in the democratic press on the topic of barrage detachments. Taking advantage of the fact that people do not have any information on this issue, a number of pseudo-historians, who especially prefer to receive royalties in dollars from various foreign "democracy support funds", began to prove that the people did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, that only commissars were driving the Red Army into battle and machine guns of detachments. That on the conscience of the detachment detachment hundreds of thousands of ruined lives, that, instead of fighting at the front, the detachment detachments mowed down entire divisions with machine-gun fire, which in fact only helped the Germans.
And, again, without any evidence, documents, and more and more referring to the "memories" of very dubious personalities.
One of the most terrible myths of the Second World War is associated with the existence of detachments in the Red Army. Often in modern TV series about the war, you can see scenes with gloomy personalities in blue caps of the NKVD troops, shooting wounded soldiers out of battle with machine guns. By showing this, the authors take a great sin on their souls. None of the researchers have been able to find in the archives a single fact in support of this.
What happened?
Barrage detachments appeared in the Red Army from the first days of the war. Such formations were created by the military counterintelligence in the person of first the 3rd Directorate of the NKO of the USSR, and from July 17, 1941 - the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and subordinate bodies in the troops.
As the main tasks of the special departments for the period of the war, the decree of the State Defense Committee defined "a decisive struggle against espionage and betrayal in the units of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front zone." They received the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.
To ensure operational measures in special departments in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria by July 25, 1941 were formed: in divisions and corps - separate rifle platoons, in armies - separate rifle companies, in the fronts - separate rifle battalions. Using them, special departments organized a barrage service, setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on roads, refugee routes and other communications. Each detained commander, Red Army, Red Navy soldier was checked. If he was recognized as having escaped from the battlefield, then he was immediately arrested, and an operational (no more than 12-hour) investigation began on him to be brought to trial by a military tribunal as a deserter. Special departments were entrusted with the responsibility of enforcing the sentences of military tribunals, including before the formation. In "especially exceptional cases, when the situation requires decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front," the head of the special department had the right to shoot deserters on the spot, which he had to immediately report to the special department of the army and front (fleet). Servicemen who had lagged behind the unit for an objective reason, in an organized manner, accompanied by a representative of a special department, were sent to the headquarters of the nearest division.
The flow of servicemen who had lagged behind their units in a kaleidoscope of battles, when leaving numerous encirclements, or even deliberately deserted, was enormous. From the beginning of the war and until October 10, 1941, operational barriers of special departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops detained more than 650 thousand soldiers and commanders. The German agents also easily dissolved in the general mass. Thus, a group of spies, neutralized in the winter and spring of 1942, had the task of physically eliminating the command of the Western and Kalinin Fronts, including the commanding generals G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev.
Special departments struggled to cope with this volume of cases. The situation demanded the creation of special units that would directly deal with the prevention of unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions, the return of lagging servicemen to their units and subunits, and the detention of deserters.
The first initiative of this kind was shown by the military command. After the appeal of the commander of the Bryansk front, Lieutenant-General A.I. Eremenko to Stalin on September 5, 1941, he was allowed to create barrage detachments in "unstable" divisions, where there were repeated cases of leaving combat positions without orders. A week later, this practice was extended to the rifle divisions of the entire Red Army.
These barrage detachments (up to a battalion in number) had nothing to do with the NKVD troops, they operated as part of the Red Army rifle divisions, were recruited at the expense of their personnel and were subordinate to their commanders. At the same time, along with them, there were detachments formed either by military special departments or by territorial bodies of the NKVD. A typical example is the barrage detachments formed in October 1941 by the NKVD of the USSR, which, by order of the State Defense Committee, took under special protection the zone adjacent to Moscow from the west and south along the Kalinin - Rzhev - Mozhaisk - Tula - Kolomna - Kashira line. Already the first results showed how necessary these measures were. In just two weeks, from 15 to 28 October 1941, more than 75 thousand servicemen were detained in the Moscow zone.
From the very beginning, the barrage units, regardless of their departmental subordination, were not guided by the leadership towards mass executions and arrests. Meanwhile, today in the press we have to deal with similar accusations; Zagradotryadovtsy are sometimes called punishers. But here are the numbers. Of the more than 650 thousand servicemen detained by October 10, 1941, after an inspection, about 26 thousand people were arrested, among whom special departments were: spies - 1505, saboteurs - 308, traitors - 2621, cowards and alarmists - 2643, deserters - 8772, distributors of provocative rumors - 3987, self-gunners - 1671, others - 4371 people. 10201 people were shot, including 3321 people in front of the line. The overwhelming number is more than 632 thousand people, i.e. more than 96% were returned to the front.
As the front line stabilized, the activity of the barrage formations was curtailed by default. A new impetus was given to her by order number 227.
The detachments created in accordance with it, numbering up to 200 people, consisted of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, neither in uniform nor in weapons did they differ from the rest of the Red Army. Each of them had the status of a separate military unit and was subordinate not to the command of the division, behind the battle formations of which it was located, but to the command of the army through the OO NKVD. The detachment was led by a state security officer.
In total, by October 15, 1942, 193 barrage detachments were functioning in the units of the active army. First of all, the Stalinist order was carried out, of course, on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. Almost every fifth detachment - 41 units - was formed in the Stalingrad direction.
Initially, in accordance with the requirements of the People's Commissar of Defense, the barrage detachments were obliged to prevent unauthorized withdrawal of line units. However, in practice, the range of military affairs they dealt with turned out to be wider.
“The defensive detachments,” recalled General of the Army P. N. Lashchenko, who was deputy chief of staff of the 60th Army in the days of the publication of order No. 227, “were at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landing forces, detained deserters who , unfortunately, there were; they put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. "
Here is a document from the FSB archives. He is not able to illuminate the whole real picture of the barrage detachments, but he can lead to certain reflections. This is a summary report of the Directorate of Special Departments to the leadership of the NKVD. It is not dated, but a number of indirect signs indicate that it was written no earlier than October 15, 1942. From this it is clear that these are only the first results of the actions of the blocking detachments.
In accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227 in units operating in the Red Army as of October 15 of this year. 193 barrage detachments were formed.
Of these, 16 units were formed in the Stalingrad Front and 25 in the Donskoy Front, and only 41 detachments, which are subordinate to the Special Departments of the NKVD of the armies.
Since the beginning of their formation (from August 1 to October 15 this year), the defensive detachments have detained 140,755 servicemen who fled from the front line.
Of the detainees: 3980 people were arrested, 1189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
The largest number of arrests and arrests was carried out by the barrage detachments of the Don and Stalingrad fronts.
On the Don Front, 36,109 people were detained, 736 people were arrested, 433 people were shot, 1,056 people were sent to penal companies, 33 people were sent to penal battalions, 32,933 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
On the Stalingrad front, 15649 people were detained, 244 people were arrested, 278 people were shot, 218 people were sent to penal companies, 42 to penal battalions, 14,833 people were returned to their units and to transit points.
It should be noted that the barrage detachments, and especially the detachments on the Stalingrad and Don fronts (subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies) during the period of fierce battles with the enemy played a positive role in putting things in order in the units and preventing an unorganized withdrawal from the borders they occupied, returning a significant number of servicemen on the front line.
August 29 this year The headquarters of the 29th division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by the enemy tanks that had broken through, parts of the division, having lost control in panic, retreated to the rear. A barrier detachment operating behind the battle formations of the division's units (the head of the detachment is Lieutenant of State Security Filatov), \u200b\u200bhaving taken decisive measures, stopped the military personnel retreating in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense.
In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break into the depths of the defense. The detachment entered the battle and delayed the advance of the enemy.
September 14 this year the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th division of the 62nd Army, which were defending the city of Stalingrad. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd regiments began to retreat in panic, leaving the lines. The head of the detachment (junior lieutenant of state security Elman) ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating. As a result, the personnel of these regiments was stopped, and after 2 hours the regiments occupied their previous lines of defense.
September 20 of this year the enemy occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The composite brigade, under the onslaught of the enemy, began an unauthorized retreat to another line. The actions of a detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade occupied the previous lines and, on the initiative of the political commander of the company of the same blocking detachment, Pestov, by joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was thrown back from Melekhovskaya.
At critical moments, when support was required to hold the occupied lines, the barrage detachments entered directly into battle with the enemy, successfully restraining his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.
On September 13 of this year, the 112-page division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line. A detachment detachment of the 62nd army under the leadership of the chief of the detachment (lieutenant of state security Khlystov) took up defensive positions on the approaches to an important height. For 4 days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy machine gunners and inflicted heavy losses on them. The detachment held the line until the arrival of the military units.
September 15-16 this year the blocking detachment of the 62nd army for 2 days successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the railway area. railway station in Stalingrad. Despite its small number, the detachment not only repulsed the enemy's attacks, but also attacked him, causing him significant losses in manpower. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th front division came to replace it.
A number of facts were noted when the barrage detachments were used incorrectly by individual commanders of the formations. A significant number of barrage detachments were sent into battle on a par with line subunits, which suffered losses, as a result of which they were diverted for reorganization and the barrage service was not carried out.
September 19 p. The command of the 240-page division of the Voronezh Front of one of the companies of the blocking detachment of the 38th Army gave a combat mission to clear the grove of a group of German submachine gunners. In the battles for the grove, this company lost 31 people, 18 of them were killed.
The defensive detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front, being in operational subordination to the commander of the 246th division, was used as a combat unit. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it was re-formed.
According to the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, according to the order of the Military Council of the Army, 2 barrage detachments on September 4 of this year. were attached to 174 pp. division and put into battle. As a result, the detachments in battle lost up to 70% of their personnel, the remaining soldiers of these detachments were transferred to the named division and thus disbanded.
3rd detachment of the same army on September 10 this year. was put on the defensive.
In the 1st Guards Army of the Don Front, by order of the commander of the army 59 Chistyakov and a member of the Military Council 60 Abramov, 2 barrage detachments were repeatedly sent into battle, like ordinary units. As a result, the detachments lost more than 65% of their personnel and were subsequently disbanded. In this regard, the order of the Front Military Council on the transfer of 5 barrage detachments to the subordination of the 24th Army was not fulfilled.
Signature (Kazakevich)
General of the Army Hero of the Soviet Union P.N.Lashchenko:
Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I do not know that any of them fired at their own people, at least in our sector of the front. Already now I have requested archival documents in this regard, no such documents were found. The detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy troops, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; put things in order at the crossings, sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received replenishment, of course, not fired, as they say, not sniffing gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, which consisted exclusively of soldiers already fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, a reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the detachments found themselves face to face with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.
First of all, from this eloquent document it becomes clear why the topic of barrage detachments was hushed up during the Soviet era. We were all brought up on the postulates of a nationwide rebuff to the enemy, the selfless devotion of the Soviet people to their Motherland, the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers.
These ideological attitudes somehow begin to erode when you read in this document that only within the Stalingrad front, by mid-October 1942, the detachments detained more than 15 thousand fugitives from the front, and more than 140 thousand along the entire line of the Soviet-German front, i.e. e. by the number of more than ten full-blooded divisions. At the same time, it is quite clear that not everyone who fled from the front has been detained. At best, half.
It remains only to be surprised that such detachments were not created back in 1941. After all, before my eyes there was an excellent example of the Wehrmacht, which had a field gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerie) in its structure, which, having professionally trained officers and soldiers, was engaged in catching fugitives, identifying simulators and crossbows, restoring order in the rear, and cleansing the rear units from excess soldiers.
Getting acquainted with the figures of the report, you come to the inevitable conclusion that the creation of the detachments was a necessary and greatly delayed measure. The liberalism of Stalin and his party entourage, instead of harsh disciplinary measures that were fully justified in war conditions, led to attempts to use indoctrination and, in fact, persuading soldiers with the help of an outrageously bloated and extremely ineffective political apparatus, and led us to the banks of the Volga. Who knows, if, instead of reviving the institute of military commissars, in the summer of 1941, they created barriers, then Stalingrad would have remained a distant rear city on the Volga.
Note that soon after the creation of the barrage detachments, the institution of military commissars was finally abolished.
Whatever one may say, but associations suggest itself: there are commissars, there are no victories, there are no commissars, but there are detachments - there are victories.
More interesting numbers. Out of 140,755 detained servicemen, only 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies (i.e. soldiers and sergeants), penalty battalions of 185 people (i.e. officers), returned to their units and to transit points 131094 person. A very soft attitude towards those who fled from the front. In total, 9.5 thousand of 141 thousand worthy of the most severe measures were repressed.
Well, if it was necessary, the barrage detachments themselves entered into battle with the Germans, often saving the situation.
As many participants in the war testify, the detachments did not exist everywhere. According to Marshal of the Soviet Union DT Yazov, they were generally absent on a number of fronts operating in the northern and northwestern directions.
The versions that the barrage detachments were "guarding" the penal units do not stand up to criticism either. The company commander of the 8th separate penal battalion of the 1st Belorussian Front, retired colonel A.V. Pyltsyn, who fought from 1943 until the Victory itself, claims: “Under no circumstances were there any barriers behind our battalion, and others were not used. frightening measures. It’s just that there’s never been such a need. ”
The famous writer Hero of the Soviet Union V.V. Karpov, who fought in the 45th separate penal company on the Kalinin Front, also denies the presence of detachments behind the combat formations of their unit.
In reality, the outposts of the army detachment were located at a distance of 1.5-2 km from the front line, intercepting communications in the immediate rear. They did not specialize in penalty boxes, but checked and detained everyone whose stay outside the military unit aroused suspicion.
Did the barrage detachments use weapons to prevent the unauthorized withdrawal of line units from their positions? This aspect of their combat activities is sometimes highly speculatively covered.
The documents show how the combat practice of the barrage detachments developed during one of the most intense periods of the war, in the summer and autumn of 1942. From August 1 (the moment of formation) to October 15, they detained 140,755 servicemen who "fled from the front line." Of these: 3980 were arrested, 1189 were shot, 2776 were sent to penal companies, 185 were sent to penal battalions, the overwhelming number of detainees was returned to their units and to transit points - 131 094 people. The above statistics show that the absolute majority of servicemen, who had previously left the frontline for various reasons - more than 91% - were able to continue fighting without any loss of rights.
War participant Mikhail Borisovich Levin:
The order is extremely cruel, terrible in its essence, but to be honest, in my opinion, it was necessary ...
This order "sobered" many, made them come to their senses ...
As for the detachments, I only once encountered their "activity" at the front. In one of the battles in the Kuban, our right flank trembled and ran, so the detachment opened fire, where it was across the road, where it was directly at the running ... After that I never saw the detachment near the forward detachment. If a critical situation arose in a battle, then in the rifle regiment the functions of the barriers - to stop the panicked people - were performed by a reserve rifle company or a regimental company of submachine gunners.
Memory book. - Infantrymen. Levin Mikhail Borisovich. Hero of the Second World War. Project I Remember
Participant in the war A. Dergaev:
Now they talk a lot about the detachments. We were in the immediate rear. Directly behind the infantry, but I did not see them. That is, they must have been somewhere, perhaps even further behind us. But we have not encountered them. Several years ago we were invited to a Rosenbaum concert at the Oktyabrsky Concert Hall. He sings a song in which these words: “... we dug a trench at full height. The German hits us right in the forehead, and behind the barrage ... ". I was sitting on the balcony and could not bear to jump up and shout: “Shame! A shame!" And the whole audience swallowed. During a break, I tell them: "They are mocking you, but you are silent." He sings these songs even now. In general, we did not see women at the front, nor did the NKVD.
Memory book. - The gunners. Dergaev Andrey Andreevich. Hero of the Second World War
As for the criminals, the most severe measures were applied to them. This concerned deserters, defectors, imaginary patients, self-gunners. They did it - and they shot them in front of the formation. But the decision to enforce this extreme measure was not made by the commander of the detachment, but by the military tribunal of the division (not lower) or, in some cases previously agreed upon, by the head of the special department of the army.
In exceptional situations, the soldiers of the barrage detachments could open fire over the heads of the retreating ones. We admit that individual cases of shooting at people in the heat of battle could have taken place: the soldiers and commanders of the blocking detachments in a difficult situation could have changed their restraint. But there is no reason to assert that this was the daily practice. Cowards and alarmists were shot in front of the formation on an individual basis. Karali, as a rule, are only initiators of panic and flight.
Here are some typical examples from the history of the battle on the Volga. On September 14, 1942, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Rifle Division of the 62nd Army. When the soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic, the chief of the detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Elman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating ones. This forced the personnel to stop, and two hours later the regiments occupied the previous lines of defense.
On October 15, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off from the main forces of the 62nd Army the remnants of the 112th Infantry Division, as well as three (115, 124 and 149th) separate rifle brigades. Suffering to panic, a number of servicemen, including commanders of various levels, tried to abandon their units and, under various pretexts, cross over to the eastern bank of the Volga. To prevent this, the task force under the leadership of the senior operative lieutenant of the state security Ignatenko, created by the special department of the 62nd army, put up a screen. For 15 days, up to 800 private and command personnel were detained and returned to the battlefield, 15 alarmists, cowards and deserters were shot in front of the line. The detachments acted similarly later.
As the documents testify, it was necessary to propping up the subunits and units that had faltered and backed away, to intervene in the course of the battle themselves in order to bring a turning point in it, according to the documents. The replenishment arriving at the front was, of course, not fired at, and in this situation the barrage detachments, formed from staunch, fired, commanders and fighters with strong front-line hardening, provided a reliable shoulder to the line units.
Thus, during the defense of Stalingrad on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th rifle division of the 64th army was surrounded by penetrated enemy tanks. The detachment not only stopped the retreating servicemen in disorder and returned them to the previously occupied lines of defense, but also entered the battle itself. The enemy was driven back.
On September 13, when the 112th Rifle Division, under pressure from the enemy, withdrew from the occupied line, a detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov took up the defense. For several days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled the attacks of enemy submachine gunners, until the approaching units took up the defense. This was the case in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.
With a turning point in the situation that followed the victory at Stalingrad, the participation of barrage formations in battles more and more turned out to be not only spontaneous, dictated by a dynamically changing situation, but also the result of a decision made in advance by the command. The commanders tried to use the detachments left without "work" with maximum benefit in matters not related to the barrage service.
The facts of this kind in mid-October 1942 were reported to Moscow by State Security Major V.M. Kazakevich. For example, on the Voronezh front, by order of the military council of the 6th army, two barrage detachments were attached to the 174th rifle division and entered into battle. As a result, they lost up to 70% of the personnel, the fighters remaining in the ranks were transferred to replenish the named division, and the detachments had to be disbanded. The commander of the 246th Infantry Division, in whose operational subordination the detachment was, was used as a linear unit by a detachment of the 29th Army of the Western Front. Taking part in one of the attacks, a detachment of 118 personnel lost 109 people killed and wounded, in connection with which it had to be formed anew.
The reasons for the objections from the special departments are clear. But, as it seems, it was not by chance that from the very beginning the barrage detachments were subordinated to the army command, and not to the military counterintelligence bodies. The People's Commissar of Defense, of course, had in mind that the barrage formations would and should be used not only as a barrier for retreating units, but also as an important reserve for direct combat operations.
As the situation on the fronts changed, with the transition to the Red Army of the strategic initiative and the beginning of the mass expulsion of the invaders from the territory of the USSR, the need for detachments began to decline sharply. The order "Not one step back!" finally lost its former meaning. On October 29, 1944, Stalin issued an order in which it was recognized that "due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of the barrage detachments has disappeared." By November 15, 1944, they were disbanded, and the personnel of the detachments were sent to replenish the rifle divisions.
Thus, the barrage detachments not only acted as a barrier that prevented deserters, alarmists, and German agents from penetrating into the rear, not only returned servicemen who were lagging behind their units to the front line, but they themselves waged direct hostilities with the enemy, contributing to the achievement of victory over fascist Germany.
ORDER No. 227
Order No. 227 or "NOT A STEP BACK", as it is also called. And it is also called the most controversial and the most terrible ... Was it "controversial" and even more so "terrible"?
It was rather a forced measure and no doubt timely. Our homeland was attacked in 1941 by the most powerful army in the world. For the military industry of the fascist
The economy of half of Europe worked in Germany, representatives of many European nations joined the ranks of the Wehrmacht. We then found ourselves face to face with a powerful and ruthless enemy, and his goal was the destruction of our country and us as a people.
I asked myself the question, what would I do as a commander, in a combat situation, when the enemy is advancing and my task, as a commander, to carry out an order and stop the enemy?
Of course, I would have obeyed the order. But some soldier or officer showed cowardice and has a destructive effect on the personnel. Most likely I would have performed it on the spot.
Cruelty has nothing to do with it. One ran, the other did not want to rise to the attack ...
Now about the order itself and the situation then prevailing. Our country and its Red Army withstood the monstrous first blow of the German military machine. However, it was still far from victory. By June 1942, the Soviet army had lost almost half of its potential. There were many enterprises behind the front line. A huge territory was occupied, where about 80 million people lived before the war, 70% of pig iron, coal and steel were produced. 40% of the railways were located. Half of the livestock and acreage. Moscow was defended, but the enemy was still 150 km away. From the capital. Leningrad is in a terrible blockade, after a long siege Sevastopol is lost. The enemy captured the North Caucasus and rushed to the Volga. The situation was close to disaster. The Wehrmacht mobilized and redoubled its efforts in an attempt to win. At the same time, panic and defeatist moods arose on the fronts, a fall in discipline. It was necessary to take emergency measures and they were taken.
It was then that I.V. Stalin's order No. 227 of July 28, 1942 appeared, known as
"NO STEP BACK". The order was extraordinary and contained, in addition to harsh measures, also frank words.
“Every commander, every Red Army soldier ... must understand that our means are not unlimited ... The territory of the USSR, which the enemy seized and seeks to seize, is bread and other products for the army and rear, metal and fuel for industry, factories, factories supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, railways... After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltics, Donbass and other regions, we have less territory, therefore, it has become much less people, bread, metal, factories, factories ... We no longer have a preponderance over the Germans either in human resources or in grain reserves. Retreating further means ruining yourself and ruining our Motherland at the same time. "
Before that, Soviet propaganda described the successes and successes of the USSR in the war, in every possible way emphasized the strengths of our army. It's time to tell the truth. This was done with the utmost frankness. The country faced mortal danger, it seemed that disaster was inevitable.
“Each new piece of territory we have left will strengthen the enemy in every way and weaken our defense and our Motherland in every possible way. Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally suppress conversations that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is large and rich, there is a lot of population, and there will always be an abundance of bread. Such conversations are deceitful and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop retreating, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and plants, without railways. "
"To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and our Motherland"
Already in early August, the order of the People's Commissar for Defense No. 227 was read out to the entire personnel of the fronts and armies. The same order also indicated the path to salvation. It was necessary to stop the enemy at any cost, no matter what it cost, not to let them go to the Volga. "There is not enough order and discipline ... - the leader explained in the order - this is now our main drawback. The commanders and commissars, political workers of the unit and formations of which leave their combat positions, can no longer be tolerated." The order contained not only moral appeals for perseverance. The current situation demanded the adoption of harsh and even cruel measures. "From now on, retreating from combat positions without orders from above are traitors to the Motherland." According to the order of July 28, 1942, commanders guilty of retreating without an order were supposed to be removed from their posts and brought to trial by a military tribunal. For those guilty of violating military discipline, penal companies were created, where soldiers and penal battalions were sent for officers who violated military duty. According to order number 227«
those guilty of violating discipline out of cowardice or instability "must be put on difficult sectors of the army in order to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland with blood."
From this moment, until the very end of the war, the front will not do without penalty units. From the day the order was issued, 65 penal battalions and 1,048 penal companies were formed. Until the end of 1945, 428,000 people passed through the "variable composition" of these units. The contingent was certainly the most diverse. However, everyone who ended up in penal units had a chance to atone for their guilt, return their military rank and the respect of their comrades. Two penal battalions even took part in the war with Japan. However, one should not overestimate the contribution of penalties to the victory. They played a prominent role, but by no means the main one. Of the total, they accounted for about 1% in relation to all people drafted into the army. Of the total number of people on the front line, no more than 3-4%.
In addition to the creation of penal units, a special part of Order No. 227 also contained the creation of barrage detachments. Stalin's order demanded "to place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and to oblige them, in the event of panic and indiscriminate withdrawal of divisional units, to shoot panic-mongers and cowards on the spot and thus help honest soldiers to fulfill their duty to the Motherland." The first detachments were formed during the retreat in 1941, but it was Order 227 that introduced them into general practice... By the fall of 1942, 193 defensive detachments were already operating on the front line. During the Battle of Stalingrad, 41 barrage detachments took part. Here, such a detachment had to directly fight the enemy, and not only carry out their direct tasks. The fact that the barrage detachments did not fight is a myth. So in the besieged Stalingrad, the detachment of the 62nd army was almost completely killed in fierce battles with the enemy.
In the fall of 1944, according to Stalin's new order, the detachments were disbanded.
In anticipation of the final victory, the need for them disappeared. The defensive detachments certainly played a role in strengthening discipline and order among the troops.
Order No. 227 made a great impression on all Soviet citizens, it directly contributed to the suppression of panic. Although it was not published in the press, but was communicated directly to the military, the civilians, of course, found out about it. The meaning of the order became clear to all Soviet people. The enemy, of course, quickly learned about this order and made completely correct conclusions; now, in the new conditions, he will have to face the ever-growing resistance of the Red Army and the entire Soviet people. And so it happened in the end. But the USSR won not so much thanks to brutal orders, detachments, a special department and the "atrocities" of the NKVD. Does anyone really think that the Soviet people were "forced" to win? These are harmful and anti-Soviet statements, but according to whoever thinks so, ST. 58 p. 10 crying. The order "Not a step back" first of all indicated the position of the leadership. The quintessence of this order is unity, victory by common efforts, strict observance of the order, perseverance and courage. In the rear, the entire Soviet people worked for victory, but in the field, in the mine, in the mines, factories and factories. The design bureau created new types of weapons. Once upon a time, I read the memoirs of the designer of artillery systems Pogodin about the work of his team during the war years. What a colossal tension it was, you had to go directly to the front to personally see how your creations work, talk to the personnel, listen and take into account all the comments and, if necessary, make changes. After all, as you know, the criterion of truth is practice. Hitler thought that he would fight Stalin, and the entire Soviet people came out against the aggressor, inspired to victory by their government, the heroism of their soldiers and faith in victory. Not all of course. There were traitors, but against them there was the NKVD, special departments. State security structures are needed. Such as Vlasov received at one time from the enemies of our country their barrel of jam and a basket of cookies. Then, as a legal result, he, together with his staff, received a noose and a bench. I am sure that this is correct.
The defensive detachments of the Red Army became one of the darkest symbols of the Great Patriotic War. Songs in the spirit of "In 43rd this company was shot by a detachment", films depicting bloody security officers driving soldiers into an attack, and similar cultural artifacts will easily be remembered by many fellow citizens. Meanwhile, the real history of the detachments is much more dramatic ...
The first detachments were created not by the ominous People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but by army logistics in the summer of 1941 in Belarus. Then, the Soviet troops defeated at the border were rolling back to the east of Minsk.
Confused soldiers and officers walked along the roads, often deprived of leadership and having lost their weapons. It was in order to collect them and restore control that the first detachments were created. From the indiscriminately retreating soldiers and commanders, battle groups were assembled and sent to the front.
The experience of the first detachments was considered successful. In July 1941, such detachments began to put together already centrally. The defeated army of the Red Army was pursued by those troubles that befell the vanquished at all times: panic, psychological scrapping and disorganization. Detaining deserters, collecting scattered units is dirty work, but it certainly had to be done. 
Indicative, for example, is the report on the work of the blocking detachment of the 310th rifle division in the fall of 1941 near Leningrad:
“During this period, the defensive detachment of the 310th Infantry Division detained 740 soldiers and junior commanders who left the battlefield, following to the rear: 14 of them were sent to special divisions of the divisions, the rest were returned to their units in an organized manner ... The defensive detachments are replenished with random people. 310 sd. Soldiers detained in the rear of the division by the same detachment are sent to replenish the detachment. "
More than 600 thousand people passed through the detachments during 1941, and it is easy to guess that they were not usually shot. More than 96% of the soldiers detained by the detachments simply went back to their units. The rest were sent under arrest, brought to trial, and about a third of them actually went to be shot.
However, one should not think that the victims were sentenced to harsh punishments just like that. Desertion flourished, and those who fled from the front line easily turned into robbers. The documents describe, for example, an incident that occurred in the rear of the Leningrad Front already during the blockade.
An armed deserter was captured in an attack on a grocery store. During the arrest, he actively shot back. On the Volkhov front in February 1942, a deserter was caught who left with the entrusted car and rifle. In the forest, he made himself a dugout and hunted theft of cattle, and during his arrest he killed a man. 
The image of an NKVD worker driving a soldier into an attack with a pistol is vivid, but in fact is incorrect. This stereotype is not devoid of a real basis: often the core of the detachment was made up of the survivors, but the border guards who were left without work. The border troops belonged specifically to the NKVD troops, and this is how the stereotype of the Chekists with revolvers was born.
In reality, the detachments were most often subordinate not to the NKVD, but to the army command. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs had its own detachments that guarded communications, but never reached - neither in number nor in importance - the level of the army.
It should be noted that this measure is by no means unique to the Soviet Union. Back in 1915, during the Great Retreat of the Russian Army in the First World War, the order of General Brusilov was published, which read:
"... Behind you need to have especially reliable people and machine guns, in order, if necessary, to force the weak-minded to go forward." An order of a similar nature was published in his army by General of the old army Danilov: "It is the duty of every soldier loyal to Russia who notices an attempt to fraternize, to immediately shoot at the traitors." 
In the summer of 1942, the country came close to a total military disaster. One of the measures to restore order in the military rear was the withdrawal of the detachments to a new level of organization. This is how the famous Order No. 227, commonly known as "Not a Step Back", appeared.
The detachments, as we can see, already existed and operated, and the notorious order streamlined and widened the already established practice. Their functions remained the same: catching deserters, returning to the front lines of those leaving to the rear, and stopping uncontrolled retreats.
Has it ever happened that the detachments opened fire on their own? Yes, documents and memoirs recorded several cases when the flight of units from the battlefield was prohibited by fire, and someone really fell under this fire.
Hero of the Soviet Union, General Pyotr Laschenko, already in the 80s tried to clarify the issue of firing barrage detachments at his troops. As a result, such cases, as expected, were not found, although the meticulous military leader requested documents from the then closed archives. 
Much more often, the detachment could be found on the front line.
Despite the formally privileged status, during the campaigns of 1941 and 1942, the detachments often had to engage in battle. The very structure of the detachments - mobile, well-equipped with automatic weapons and transport units - provoked their use as a mobile reserve. For example, the commander of the legendary 316th division, Panfilov, used his detachment of 150 men precisely as his own reserve.
In general, in practice, the commanders of the formations often viewed the detachment as an extra opportunity to reinforce the units on the front line. This was seen as undesirable, but necessary in the absence of reserves.
For example, it was the blocking detachment of the 62nd Army in Stalingrad that fought for the station for two days at the critical moment of the first assault on the city on September 15-16. During the fighting north of Stalingrad, two detachments had to be disbanded altogether due to losses that reached 60-70% of the composition. 
In the second half of the war, the detachments lost their former importance. It was necessary to restore the rear of the defeated units less and less. In addition, the activities of the blocking detachments were duplicated by other formations, such as units for the protection of the rear.
In 1944, the activities of the blocking detachments lost their meaning. Their tasks were duplicated by other formations - including troops for the protection of the rear, belonging to the NKVD, commandant units. In the summer of 1944, the head of the Political Directorate of the 3rd Baltic Front, spreading his arms, reported to the command:
“The detachments do not fulfill their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the blocking detachments are used to protect the headquarters of the armies, guard communication lines, roads, combing forests, etc.
In a number of detachments, the staffs of the headquarters were extremely swollen. The headquarters of the armies do not exercise control over the activities of the detachments, left them to themselves, reduced the role of the detachments to the position of ordinary commandant companies. Meanwhile, the personnel of the detachments were selected from the best, proven fighters and sergeants, participants in many battles, awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union. " 
The only really useful function of the blocking detachments at this stage was the cleaning of the rear from the remnants of the German encirclement, the capture of former policemen and officials of the occupation administration who were trying to legalize or take cover.
Of course, this situation did not suit the high command. Thousands of experienced, well-armed fighters would look much more appropriate on the front lines. On October 29, 1944, the Red Army detachments were disbanded.
But the activity of the German field gendarmerie sharply increased. In the spring of 1945 in Germany one could see people hanged with plaques on their chests: "I am hanging here because I did not believe the Fuehrer" or "All traitors die like me."
The most important terrible secret of the barrage detachments was that there was no terrible secret. The detachments are nothing more than the well-known military police, their functions throughout the war were just like that.
Ultimately, the soldiers of the barrage detachments are ordinary soldiers of the most terrible war in the world, fulfilling their combat missions. It makes no sense to idealize them, but the demonization of these formations does not bring any benefit and ultimately only leads us away from the real idea of \u200b\u200bthe Great Patriotic War.
One of the elements of the formation of the propaganda image "USSR \u003d Evil Empire" and "Stalin \u003d bloody tyrant" are endless horror stories about "detachments that stood behind and shot the retreating soldiers."
I do not know of a single Western liberal who would deny himself the pleasure of replicating this nonsense. Guys, these detachments of yours were invented in enlightened Europe, and not even in the twentieth century, but much earlier.
Here's a quote:
A feature of the Prussian army was a system of wingmen and wing-company. Mass armies were staffed with forced recruits and unreliable mercenaries, so desertion was their sore spot. To prevent desertion, the Prussians placed on the edge of the platoon line of special overseers - wingmen, who killed the fleeing; the flanks of the regiment were occupied by special wing companies. Squeezed by wing companies, Prussian soldiers did not think about flight and fought to the last.
German historian Franz Mehring wrote:
In three ranks, shoulder to shoulder, foot to foot, with platoon officers on the sides, and behind the closing officers who could stab each evader, these soldiers moved, firing a volley on command and rushing directly into the enemy fire until the command was heard again.
“Going forward, my soldier half risks his life, going back, he loses it for sure,” said Frederick II.
But the presence of such detachments is characteristic not only of the Germans. The "sophisticated" French also practiced barriers. At least since the Great French Revolution, for sure. And in the days of Napoleon, behind unreliable regiments, for example, the Spanish, were placed defensive field guns with buckshot.
Here it is necessary to make a digression towards another myth, about "one rifle for three people." After the French Revolution, general conscription (Levee en masse) was introduced in France, the training of troops was extremely low and there was not enough weapons. Therefore, the famous "Napoleonic" (in fact, it was invented by Carnot) tactics of attacking columns was invented. Poorly trained soldiers could not keep formation and shoot harmoniously, therefore, in the typical linear battle at that time, they were constantly losing to disciplined English and Austrian soldiers. Therefore, they were lined up in columns and thrown into a bayonet attack. The first ranks perished almost totally, but the rest were struggling to hand-to-hand.
Carnot wrote to Robespierre:
It is necessary to wage a war with masses of people: send as many troops and artillery as possible to the points of attack; demand that the generals are constantly at the head of the soldiers. To teach those and others never to count the enemy, but to rush at him headlong, with a bayonet at the ready, not thinking about a firefight or about maneuvering, to which the French soldiers are completely unaccustomed.
And, by the way, the firearms were sorely lacking, so the rear rows were massively armed with spears. Spears, Karl!
But back to the detachments. In the twentieth century, the picture has not changed much. Numerous archival, literary and even photographic sources tell us that under the same Verdun, French sergeants and officers followed behind the advancing units and mercilessly shot the fleeing soldiers.
And according to the memoirs of the participants in the events, behind the Russian Corps in France there were French detachments of machine guns and artillery (by the way, it must be said that they were not needed, since the Russians showed massive heroism and each time overtook the French when they went on the attack).
But to be fair, it must be said that obstacle detachments were also used in the army of the Russian Empire. True, not centralized, but on the initiative of individual generals.
From the order for the second army (tsarist), signed by General Smirnov, dated December 19, 1914: “Immediately report those who surrendered to their homeland so that their relatives know about their shameful act and that the granting of benefits to the families of those who surrendered would be immediately stopped. I also order: any commander who sees the surrender of our troops, without waiting for any instructions, immediately open gun, machine-gun and rifle fire on those surrendering. "
There should be no mercy for the faint-hearted, surrendering or leaving the line. Rifle, machine-gun and cannon fire should be directed at those surrendering, even with a ceasefire at the enemy, at those retreating or fleeing to act in the same way, and if necessary, not to stop before the mass execution.
Damn commies, huh ?!
Well, in World War II, the Wehrmacht were the first to use the barrage, and by no means the Red Army. It was the Wehrmacht who was the first to form about a hundred penal companies, consisting of fighters who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, put them on dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to "redeem with blood." It was the Wehrmacht who first "formed about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, deprived them of their orders and placed them on the most dangerous sectors of the front."
And it was the Wehrmacht who was the first to "form special barrage detachments, put them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot alarmists on the spot in case of an attempt to unauthorized abandonment of positions and in case of an attempt to surrender." All this is not my speculation, but quotes from military archives.
By the way, the Soviet detachments, contrary to Western and liberal propaganda, did not shoot anyone with machine guns. Yes, and they were not directly on the front line, they were located in the front-line zone and protected the rear from saboteurs and, yes, they were catching dither. In the overwhelming majority of cases, they were caught, for the tribunal, and not "shot in the back."
From a certificate on the NKVD of October 1941:
From the beginning of the war to October 10 of this year, the special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 servicemen who had lagged behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 servicemen were detained by the barrage detachments of the NKVD Troops for the protection of the rear.
Of the detainees, the Special Departments arrested 25,878 people, the remaining 632,486 people were formed in units and sent back to the front.
Among those arrested by the Special Departments:
spies - 1505
saboteurs - 308
traitors - 2621
cowards and alarmists - 2643
deserters - 8772
distributors of provocative rumors - 3987
skirmishers - 1671
others - 4371
Total - 25,878
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the sentences of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, of which 3321 people were shot in front of the line.
As you can see, the overwhelming majority of retreating soldiers were simply reorganized into new units and returned to the front. They shot only spies (of which there were actually many, mainly from among the White emigres), saboteurs and outright deserters (often with accompanying crimes such as robberies).
And, by the way, no matter how much I once delved into the archives and memoirs of eyewitnesses, I did not find a single case of "those who flee were shot in the back by the NKVD with machine guns". No one.
But the so-called "liberals" are not interested in Truth. Their task is to denigrate Russia, try to instill in Russians the idea of \u200b\u200binferiority and flaw in their history, and justify Western attacks on the USSR / Russia.
They will never shout "In France, England and Germany there were barriers and concentration camps, these countries do not deserve to exist, they must pay and repent." Liberals will not be paid for this ...
