The birth of the Prussian army, the monarchs who created it, the organization of infantry units, discipline, which has always been its strong point ... These topics are discussed in another book dedicated to the European armies of the 18th century. Here we will tell you about the famous horsemen of Prussia of the 18th century: hussars, dragoons, cuirassiers, lancers. After we touch on the Prussian artillery, the story will focus on the troops of other states that were part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. They will be discussed either in separate articles (Saxony and Bavaria), or simply mentioned in the captions under the illustrations.
The first hussars appeared in Prussia in 1721. In 1735 they were usually called "Prussian hussars" to distinguish them from another formation created in 1730 called "Berlin hussars" or "King's hussars".
During the reign of Frederick II, these two corps, deployed into regiments, received new names: the first became the regiment of Bronikovsky, the second - Ziten.
In order not to name the shelves shown in our illustrations by the names of their constantly changing chefs (this would force us to create endlessly complex and intricate captions), we used the numbering introduced in 1806 and based on the time of their creation.
The term “chief”, more or less corresponding to the French “colonel-owner,” denoted a person, most often a general, who was listed as the chief of a regiment, while the regiment was usually headed by its commander, most often a lieutenant colonel or major.
In this and the next two illustrations, in each group of diagrams, from left to right, the dolmen of an ordinary, non-commissioned officer, a trumpeter and an officer are depicted.
1st regiment: a) dolman, 1721-1732; b) dolman, 1732-1742 c) soldier saddle cloth; d) officer's saddlecloth: e) officer's daily and ceremonial tashki; next: officer's mentic; h) trumpeter dolman's cord and fringe; i) officer's cap; j) hussar cord (18 rows of cords for all); j) hussar of the 1st regiment, 1762; the sultan was installed for all regiments in 1762. Short trousers, covering the leg to mid-thigh, disappeared at the beginning of the Smiley War (1756-1763). Until 1740, these are peculiarities! 1st items of clothing were dark blue for both hussar regiments - Berlin and East Prussia, formed by the father of Frederick the Great, King Frederick William I; l) hussar of the 1st regiment, 1798 Kiver was adopted only in 1806
2nd regiment: a) a dolman and a trumpet player; b) cord (18 rows) and braid; c) trumpeter's myrliton cap; d) officer's tashka; f) Mirliton non-commissioned officer; f) the sleeves of a dolman and a non-commissioned officer's mentic: g) a dress officer's shirt; h) officer's saddlecloth; i, j, k) hussar (the mentik was trimmed with white fur), non-commissioned officer and standard bearer. It should be noted the braid (white for co; scha g, silver for non-commissioned officers and gold for officers), which edged the cords on the dolman and mentic. The famous Hans Joachim fo11 Cité is depicted in the center of the picture! I, nicknamed "the father of the Prussian hussars". His face is painted from the portrait of Terbuash (1769). The uniform shown here has the colors that the hussars wore in 1732 and 1807. In 1730-1731. dolman was white with a dark blue collar and cuffs, then light blue with a red collar and cuffs.
3rd regiment: the figure on the left depicts a trumpeter; a) a soldier's saddle cloth; b) officer's shafts pan; c) a variant of the officer's saddle cloth; d) soldier's tashka, e) officer's daily and ceremonial tashka; f) dolman cords (18 rows).
Most English-speaking historians and popular writers do not fully understand the historical characteristics of the armed forces of Brandenburg-Prussia. They gave rise to many myths, of which the most ridiculous and baseless myths relate to the Prussian light infantry of the Napoleonic wars. The task of this work is to clarify, finally, all these fables about the "tough" and "outdated" tactics of the Prussian army before 1807, as well as about the "new" tactics in 1812-1815.
The conventional wisdom is that the experience of the battles of the French Revolution and the 1806 campaign forced the Prussian army to treat light infantry with sufficient caution. In fact, light infantry appeared in Prussia under Frederick the Great (1740-1786) and continued to develop throughout the following years. During the Seven Years War, Friedrich was greatly impressed by the Austrian light infantry - the infantry of the border districts / Grenzregimenter ... The Prussian king wanted to form similar parts in himself. The experience of the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778-1779) confirmed this need. Three so-called were formed. "Volunteer regiment", and the strength of the corps "Foot rangers", armed with rifled weapons, was brought to ten companies.
IN 1787 year "Volunteer regiments" reorganized into fusilier battalions, which will be discussed.
Initially, the attitude towards light infantry was wary. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. The "volunteer battalions" during the Seven Years' War were poorly disciplined bands of robbers and had a high desertion rate. The aristocrats did not want to serve in these units, so they had to appoint officers of ignoble origin there. However, already the fusilier battalions formed on their base were considered elite units, they were well trained and disciplined. They were led by carefully selected young and educated officers.
Jaegers armed with rifled weapons have always been considered shock units. Their professionalism was generously rewarded with various privileges that were not known in the infantry regiments. Initially, they acted as column leaders. The number of gamekeepers grew from a small detachment to a full-blooded regiment (1806). They were recruited from among hunters and foresters. They knew how to shoot accurately and were armed with more accurate weapons. They were born light infantry, designed for stealth operations in the forests. Rangers often bought weapons at their own expense, their uniforms were green, traditional for hunters. The contrast between the jaegers and the "volunteer battalions" was very sharp, however, by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, they had merged, laying the foundation for the Prussian light infantry.
Initially, the light infantry was a very special branch of the army, having nothing to do with the line infantry. However, by the end of the 18th century, it was becoming more and more a “universal” infantry, that is, an infantry capable of operating both in scattered and close formation. An important step in this direction was the emergence March 3, 1787 years of ten riflemen (Schuetzen), armed with rifled guns, in each company of infantry regiments. They were selected soldiers, candidates for non-commissioned officers. FROM 1788 years they received the right to wear non-commissioned officers' insignia and stand in the ranks next to non-commissioned officers. FROM December 5, 1793 years, each infantry battalion received a bugler, whose job it was to transmit orders to the riflemen.
As mentioned above in 1787 year, fusilier battalions were formed, formed from three light regiments, five grenadier battalions, the 3rd battalion Leipzig Regiment (No. 3) and the elective companies of the garrison regiments. Fusilier battalions received their own combat regulations, published February 24, 1788 of the year.
The development of rifle squads in infantry regiments and fusilier battalions continued. Soon, the fusilier battalions formed their own rifle squads. The number of these branches in 1789 year brought up to 22 people. Some officers realized that the line regiments did not have enough riflemen. Therefore, in 1805 year in the Potsdam garrison, ten so-called "Reserve rifle" branches.
The attitude towards light infantry in Europe continued to be ambivalent. Some believed that in the future it was the skirmishers who would decide the outcome of the battle. Others favored the conservative tactics of the line infantry. As time has shown, both sides were somewhat right. Indeed, the light infantry had a rifled weapon - the weapon of the future. However, before the advent of breech-loading rifles, the process of loading rifled guns was extremely long. Therefore, soldiers armed with rifled weapons could not operate without the fire support of the line infantry. And until the middle of the 19th century, skirmishers did not represent an independent combat force. In addition, the tactics of the skirmishers required a high level of discipline from them. Despite the fact that the armies of the 18th century were staffed with recruits taken into military service by force, as well as mercenaries, the soldiers were inclined to desert at the first opportunity, and the tactics of skirmishers with its patrols and scattered formation provided such opportunities in abundance. However, during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, massive armies arose, many of whose soldiers served not for fear, but for conscience, driven by a sense of patriotism. In addition, with the introduction of universal conscription and the emergence of numerous armies with a high level of desertion, it was quite possible to put up with it. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the development of light infantry.
The armies of Brandenburg and Prussia took an intermediate path, gradually increasing the number of light infantry. The personnel for the rifle units were carefully selected, trained and received various privileges. The Fusiliers were so well trained that they soon began to look like real elite units in the eyes of those around them. A well-trained and promising soldier will not desert. In campaigns 1793 and 1794 years against the French in the Palatinate - a wooded and hilly part of Germany - the light infantry showed itself with better side... The Palatinate was ideal for light infantry. The campaign of 1806, which took place in open areas, developed according to a different scenario and the light infantry played a much smaller role in it.
During Bonaparte's Italian campaign, yet another trump card of light infantry came to light - the strong influence of a large number of allocated skirmishers on the enemy's morale. The most effective tactic of dealing with enemy skirmishers was to use their own infantry in loose formation. Usually a third of the infantry battalion (the last of the three ranks) was allocated for these purposes. Taken together in separate platoons, these soldiers could act as a reserve of the battalion, cover its flanks, and also form a chain of skirmishers or support it.
A similar practice was introduced in 1791 year Duke of Brunswick. IN 1797 year, Prince Hohenlohe wrote a series of rules for the Inspectorate of Lower Silesia, published on March 30, 1803 under the general title "On the use of the third rank as skirmishers" ( Vom Gebrauch des 3ten Gliedes zum Tiraillieren). (...) Thus, even before the appearance "Chains of skirmishers" During the Revolutionary Wars, a similar practice existed. Therefore, it is not clear why many historians dare to call this tactic of the Prussian army "Friedrichs", "inflexible" and "obsolete."
However, the Prussian light infantry did not have sufficient military experience by the beginning of the Napoleonic wars. (...)
Organization
Arrows / Schuetzen
By order from March 3, 1787 year, the presence of ten shooters in each company was determined. Thus, there were 120 riflemen in the infantry regiment. FROM May 5, 1793 year, a bugler appeared in each regiment, whose task was to transmit orders to the riflemen. In December of that year, buglers appeared in every battalion. IN 1798 year, the number of rifle divisions of fusilier companies was increased from 10 to 22 people. On November 23, 1806, the number of riflemen in the line infantry company was increased to 20. Later, the rifle squads were abandoned, moving to the practice of the “third rank”.
In March 1809, a separate Silesian Rifle Battalion was formed, and on June 20, 1814, the Guards Rifle Battalion appeared, staffed with volunteers from the Neufchâtel region, just annexed to the Prussian crown.
Fusiliers / Füsilier
Fusilier battalions appeared in 1787 year. Each battalion consisted of four companies and consisted of 19 officers. 48 sergeants, 13 musicians (each company had a drummer and bugler, plus a battalion bugler), 80 corporals, 440 privates and 40 reservists. The battalion support service consisted of a controller, a battalion quartermaster, four surgeons (including a battalion surgeon), and a gunsmith. The battalion had 40 riflemen. At some point, each fusilier battalion had a 3-pounder cannon with a crew. The strength of the wartime battalion was 680 privates and 56 non-combatants, including 46 convoy soldiers and four artillery crew assistants. The total strength of the fusilier battalion was 736 people.
IN 1787 year 20 battalions were formed, brought together in brigades. As of April 8, 1791, the structure was as follows:
1st Magdeburg Brigade: 1st, 2nd and 5th Battalions
2nd Magdeburg Brigade: 18th, 19th and 20th battalions
East Prussian brigade: 3rd, 6th, 11th and 12th battalions
West Prussian brigade: 4th, 16th and 17th battalions
Upper Silesian Brigade: 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Battalions
Lower Silesian Brigade: 13th, 14th and 15th Battalions
IN 1795 year, another battalion was formed. IN 1797 year the number of battalions reached 27. The battalions were consolidated into 9 brigades, each of which was headed by a colonel and approximately corresponded in status to a regiment.
FROM 1797 year, each fusilier battalion had eight sappers. However, in 1806 only 24 battalions remained, organized as follows:
Magdeburg brigade: No. 1 Kaiser-lingk, No. 2 Bila, No. 5 Graf Wedel
Westphalian Brigade: No. 18 Zobbe, No. 19 Ernest, No. 20 Ivernois
1st East Prussian Brigade: No. 3 Wakenitz, No. 6 Rembow, No. 11 Bergen
2nd East Prussian Brigade: No. 21 Stutterheim, No. 23 Schachtmeyer, No. 24 Bülow
1st Warsaw Brigade: No. 9 Borel du Verne, No. 12 Knorr, No. 17 Hinrichs
2nd Warsaw Brigade: No. 4 Greif-Fenberg, No. 8 Cloch, No. 16 Oswald
Upper Silesian Brigade: No. 7 Rosen, No. 10 Erichsen, No. 22 Boguslavsky
Lower Silesian Brigade: No. 13 Ra-beno, No. 14 Pelet, No. 15 Ryule
Along with the numbers are the names of the battalion commanders. In practice, the battalions were called by the last name of their commander, while the number was used only for formal reasons (...)
Jäger / Jä eger
Combat and combat training
In some works, you can see that their authors have a rather vague idea of \u200b\u200bhow the skirmishers acted. But they like to throw in terms like "skirmishers", "scattered formation" and "dissolve the formation." It was they who created the myth that the "free" French soldiers used the tactics of light infantry, while the "downtrodden" soldiers of the "despotic" regimes acted only in close formation to prevent desertion. Of course, as with any other myth, there is some truth in this myth. However, this grain of truth is buried under a pile of flowery, mind-boggling lies. In reality, any European army of that time had more or less numerous units of light infantry operating in scattered formation. And the main factor holding back the development of light infantry was not sociology or politics, but underdeveloped technology.
Smooth-bore flintlock rifles, loaded from the barrel, were too bulky, difficult to load and had low accuracy. Therefore, any significant results could be achieved only with a massive salvo. In addition, there were many other reasons, which will be discussed below, because of which the skirmishers had to act in close proximity to the main forces. To establish interaction between the dense formation of the line infantry and the scattered formation of the light infantry, a high level of experience of the commanders and the training of personnel was required.
Frederick the Great developed the first guidelines for the training of Prussian light infantry, published on December 5, 1783. According to these recommendations, the task of light infantry included conducting combat in settlements and forests, acting in the vanguard, rearguard and on the flanks, attacking enemy positions located on a hill, assault on artillery batteries and redoubts, as well as guarding carts and winter quarters. This activity was called "War of outposts"... As mentioned above, the volunteer regiments were the forerunners of the fusilier battalions, passing on their methods and methods of training to them.
The charter for the fusilier battalions has been published February 24, 1788 of the year. It retained its strength until the 1806/07 campaign and formed the basis for the 1812 Infantry Regulations. This light infantry charter prescribed the operation of light infantry, built in two lines, instead of the three usual for line infantry. Fusilier battalions fired volleys from two ranks, so that the first rank did not need to kneel. Two-rack tactics became widespread in the line infantry after the introduction of the charter of 1812. Each fusilier company consisted of four divisions - eight platoons. The 1st and 8th platoons acted as skirmishers, which accounted for a quarter of the total strength of the battalion. If necessary, they could be supported by the 5th and 7th platoons. The buglers could transmit the following signals: advance, stop, rally the ranks, open fire, cease fire, shift to the left, shift to the right, deploy the order, retreat, call for help. Of course, experienced officers who knew how to conduct a "war of outposts" meant more than any charter. And there were such officers in the Prussian army. The officer corps consisted of commanders of volunteer battalions, officers who had experience in the American Revolutionary War. Among them were very talented commanders: York, Bülow and Müffling. They were professionals with a high fighting spirit who showed their capabilities during the wars of the French Revolution.
The rifle squads of the line companies received their own charter February 26, 1789 of the year. Shooters armed with rifled weapons and having very special combat missions required separate training. For two weeks a year, the shooters practiced marksmanship. Specially appointed officers watched the firing. One of the 12 company non-commissioned officers was also a rifleman and was armed with a rifled musket. It was assumed that the shooters would act like rangers on foot.
The main emphasis was on marksmanship and the effective use of terrain features, primarily forests, small forests, ditches, rocks, crops, etc. In addition, the shooters could act as part of pickets and patrols, and also protect the main forces of the regiment on the march. During the attack on enemy positions, the arrows moved 100 steps forward. Their task was to upset the enemy's orders before the attack of the main forces of the battalion. During the retreat, the arrows acted in a similar way.
Light infantry performed well during the wars of the Revolutionary Wars. The experience gained during these wars has shown that the tactics are generally correct and only minor additions are needed. These additions were introduced by the charter of March 14, 1798 of the year. Rather than pushing flank platoons forward, fusilier battalions were ordered to push out the rifle squads of each platoon, which made it possible to quickly form a line of skirmishers. Fusiliers armed with smooth-bore weapons also began to look for a target. The number of shooters in the fusilier company was brought to 22. By order of June 18, 1801, the number of standard mountain signals reached 20, which brought order to the huge number of improvised signals used in practice. Although the light infantry was well trained and represented the elite of the Prussian army, during the 1806 campaign it became clear that their numbers were clearly insufficient. Very often the enemy won a victory only because of its overwhelming numbers. Many German military experts foresaw this situation even before the start of the 1806 campaign and tried to take any measures. In practice, the advancement of the third rank of infantry battalions was used to reinforce the light infantry. The Duke of Brunswick developed this maneuver for his 10th regiment back in 1791. Prince Hohenlohe also became interested in the idea, describing it in the instructions for the Lower Silesian inspection in 1797. The garrisons of Potsdam and Berlin were also trained to advance the third rank. Hohenlohe's instructions were published on March 30, 1803. Later statutes contained extensive quotations from this text. The Elector of Hesse, Field Marshal of Prussia and Inspector General of the Westphalian regiments, issued a similar order for his units on April 11, 1806. A similar order was issued on October 5, 1805 by the king of Prussia.
The deployment of the unit in a rifle chain did not at all mean that all the soldiers of the battalion acted as skirmishers. In reality, only some of the soldiers moved forward, while the main forces of the battalion maintained a close formation. The main reason why it was impossible to deploy the entire battalion in a chain was the insufficiently developed rifle technology. The infantryman's weapons at the time were too ineffective to ensure the safety of an individual soldier. It took too long to load. Even if the skirmishers acted in pairs - one shoots, the other loads - all the same, the practical rate of fire left much to be desired. The amount of ammunition carried by one soldier was limited, so it often happened that the infantryman used up all the cartridges before he had time to inflict any damage on the enemy. All this negatively affected the morale. Having quickly shot the ammunition, the soldier became completely defenseless on the battlefield, and the gun failed from overheating of the barrel. Finally, muzzle-loading rifles are most conveniently loaded while standing, so the infantryman had to stand up to his full height, representing a convenient target for the enemy.
The chain of skirmishers was especially vulnerable to enemy cavalry. If the cavalry managed to catch the shooters by surprise, then the entire chain could be destroyed. Platoons and squads of skirmishers changed each other. At the same time, not only fresh soldiers entered the battle, but the chain also acquired greater stability. Thus, the rifle line was an integral part of the infantry order. Only in rare and exceptional cases could the shooters decide the outcome of the battle on their own. As a rule, the arrows only struck up a battle, preparing the way for the line infantry.
Platoons of the third rank usually operated in two lines. If the entire line was involved in solving a combat mission at once, then it was headed by a captain specially trained for these purposes. Each platoon was led by a junior lieutenant and three non-commissioned officers. The lieutenant had a bugler at his disposal, who gave various commands to the soldiers. (...)
Armament
Among the models of muskets used by the light infantry are the following:
- Fusilier musket, model 1787;
- Fusilier musket, model 1796;
- "Old" Prussian rifled guns different types, including the sample of 1796;
- “New” case rifle, model 1810;
- Small rifle rifle model 1787;
- Various hunting rifles and carbines, rifled and smoothbore.
The third rank skirmishers were usually armed with the following types of standard infantry muskets:
- Sample of 1782;
- Sample of 1801 (Notard):
- Sample of 1809 (“new” Prussian musket).
Fusiliers
Initially, fusilier battalions were armed with fusilier muskets, but since 1808, the battalions began to use any weapon that they could get it - an acute shortage of small arms affected. Popular were the French Charleville muskets, as well as the “new” Prussian muskets.
Gamekeepers
Since the huntsmen were recruited from among the foresters and hunters, they took their own hunting rifles with them to the service, so it is very difficult to give any complete list of the huntsman weapons. Attempts were made several times to restore order: in 1744, 1796 and 1810. However, for a variety of reasons, all attempts have failed. (...)
The most important difference between a rifle and a musket is that the bore of the rifle barrel has several grooves, which give the bullet, which is emitted, rotation along the longitudinal axis. This increases the range and accuracy of fire. Unlike smooth-bore muskets, rifled rifles had a front sight and rear sight. (…) The disadvantage of rifled guns was their low rate of fire (it could take even a few minutes to load the gun), as well as the speed of fouling the bore. To improve accuracy, the lead bullet was wrapped with a felt wad, so that the bullet cut more densely into the grooves. To drive a bullet into the barrel, they hit the ramrod with a mallet. After a few shots, smaller caliber bullets were used as the barrel became dirty. Very quickly, the gun began to require a thorough cleaning. Therefore, the shooters carefully chose the target, trying to shoot only for sure. Several well-placed shooters could act as snipers, but the depressing rate of fire of rifled guns did not give them a chance to become widespread.
Arrows
Rifle squads in line and light infantry companies were armed with rifled guns of the 1787 model. The guns had a front sight and a rear sight, and the rear sight was calibrated at a distance of 150 and 300 steps. About 10,000 of these guns were made. A bayonet could be attached to the barrel of the gun. The Silesian infantry battalions did not have a single weapon, many Silesian riflemen had only infantry smooth-bore muskets.
Non-commissioned officers
In theory, non-commissioned officers were armed with rifled carbines. The non-commissioned officers did not fire in one volley with the privates. However, in practice they usually had the same guns as the privates. Sometimes non-commissioned officers used cavalry firearms. (...)
A uniform
Fusiliers
1789-1796
The Fusiliers wore dark green camisoles of the same cut as the foot soldiers, white vests, knee-length breeches, black leggings, eagle cap hats, black neckerchiefs, and white belts. The color of the collar, lapels, cuffs and buttons determined the battalion affiliation.
»Table /» Table
| Battalion No. | Applied color | Buttons |
| 1 | light green / hellgrün | yellow / gelb |
| 2 | pink / pinke | yellow / gelb |
| 3 | white / weiß | yellow / gelb |
| 4 | blue / hellblau | yellow / gelb |
| 5 | dark green / dunkelgrün | yellow / gelb |
| 6 | orange / orange | yellow / gelb |
| 7 | pink / pinke | white / weiß |
| 8 | light green / hellgrün | white / weiß |
| 9 | straw / stroh | white / weiß |
| 10 | straw / stroh | yellow / gelb |
| 11 | white / weiß | white / weiß |
| 12 | orange / orange | white / weiß |
| 13 | suede / sämisch | white / weiß |
| 14 | black / schwarz | yellow / gelb |
| 15 | suede / sämisch | yellow / gelb |
| 16 | black / schwarz | white / weiß |
| 17 | blue / hellblau | white / weiß |
| 18 | carmine / karmin | yellow / gelb |
| 19 | carmine / karmin | white / weiß |
| 20 | dark green / dunkelgrün | white / weiß |
Officers have dark green, black and carmine finishes
Was from velvet. The officer's cocked hats were decorated with a white and black plume, a cockade and a buckle with a small eagle.
Shoes are boots. The soldiers were armed with fusilier muskets and a short broadsword. Since 1793, the lanyard of the broadsword determined the belonging to the company: white, dark green, orange and purple. The officers were armed with a sword.
1797-1807
Instead of caps, they introduced the wearing of cocked hats with white piping. The battalions were distinguished by the color of the pom-pom:
White: 2, 6, 8, 10, 14, 17, 19.21
Red: 1,4,7,9, P. 15, 18,23
Yellow: 3,5,12,13,16,20,22,24
FROM August 24, 1801 the wearing of a cylindrical black felt shako was introduced. The shako was decorated with an eagle of the same color as the buttons, a plume of the same color as the pompom on the cocked hat and white piping along the upper edge,
IN 1797
a shortened camisole with a red lining appeared. Collar, lapels and cuffs are colored. Brigade "Kurmark" (since 1803 "Magdeburg") and "Magdeburg" (since 1803
of the year "Westfalia") had a raspberry finish. Brigade "Upper Silesia" and "Lower Silesia" - black finish, 1st and 2nd East Prussian brigades - light green. 1st Warsaw brigade and horshad "South Prussia" (battalions No. 7 and 8) - blue. 2nd Warsaw Brigade (battalions No. 4 and 16) - dark green. In 1800, the South Prussia brigade was disbanded, and its colors were transferred to the 2nd Warsaw Brigade (battalions No. 6, 8 and 16).
IN 1806 year, the differences between battalions were carried out according to the following scheme:
| Brigade | Battalion No. | Applied color | Buttons |
| "Magdeburg" | 1,2,5 | carmine | yellow |
| "Westfalia" | 18,19,20 | carmine | white |
| 1st "East Prussia" | 3,6, 11 | light green | yellow |
| 2nd "East Prussia" | 21,23,24 | light green | white |
| 1st "Varshavskaya" | 4, 8, 16 | blue | yellow |
| 2nd "Varshavskaya" | 9, 12, 17 | blue | white |
| "Lower Silesia" | 13, 14, 15 | the black | yellow |
| "Upper Silesia" | 7, 10,22 | the black | white |
In 1800, the soldiers of the Silesian battalions received red scarves, while the officers continued to wear black scarves. The white “shemizet” vest was replaced by a green vest, which, in turn, in 1801 gave way to a white sleeveless jacket. Long white trousers were worn with black leggings. There were work trousers made of twill. The belts were black, the saber was hung from a waist belt, and not worn in a sling over the shoulder. The officer's tunic matched the jacket of a line infantry officer, but had coattails with red cuffs. A white vest, trousers and black boots complemented the officer's uniform. The officer's cocked hat was decorated with a white plume. A silver-black sash was worn over the tunic. A saber with a lanyard on a black sling. The raincoat and overcoat are green.
Gamekeepers
1789
In the foot jaeger regiment they wore a simple cap with a green plume for the privates and a black and white tip for the non-commissioned officers. Camisole with green cuffs and cuffs, green waistcoat, leather trousers and boots. V officers' plume is white with a black base, cockade and buckle. Otherwise, the uniform has not changed since the time of Frederick the Great.
1797-1807
A cocked hat with white and green cords, a black cockade and a gold buckle appeared. The plume remained the same. In 1800, they introduced the wearing of white cloth breeches to the knees and boots with high tops. In 1802, the color of the vest was changed from green to white. During the mobilization in 1805, the gamekeepers received long green work trousers with buttons. In 1806, a gray version of these trousers appeared. The green camisole retained the red cuffed collar and yellow woolen shoulder straps. The cuffs are green. Black velvet cravat with white tie. In 1806, it was planned to introduce the shako, but before the start of the war, this plan could not be implemented.
Publication: MILITARY HISTORICAL ALMANAC New SOLDIER №213
Editor: V. I. Kiselev
The text is abbreviated (...)!
The beginning of the 18th century was marked by the further evolution of military weapons, which had a huge impact on the development of the tactics and strategy of the European armies. The main type of weapon was the flint musket, replacing its wick predecessor, which prevailed during the previous century.
Muskets have been in service since 1525. The musket bullet initially weighed 1/8 of a pound and could hit up to 600 paces away and inflict extremely severe injuries. However, shooting was possible only from a bipod, and loading was extremely difficult and painstaking. The soldier needed up to 95 receptions to make a shot. The lock was originally a wick and operated in dry weather without failure, but the shooter had to operate with gunpowder, having 2 lit wicks - one in his hand, the other in the trigger, and premature shots and accidents were quite common. The musket was very heavy, and the infantrymen, in the second half of the 16th century, sought to acquire not a musket, but a lighter gun.
By the end of the 17th century, the flintlock was improved. In 1699, a bayonet was invented, which made it possible to combine cold and firearms in the hands of one infantryman. In 1670, a paper cartridge was introduced, which made it possible to stop measuring the amount of gunpowder required for loading. A little later, in 1718, an iron ramrod was invented, which made it possible to bring the rate of fire to 2-3 volleys per minute. The length of the musket barrel, usually faceted, could reach 65 calibers, that is, about 1400 mm, while the muzzle velocity of the bullet was 400-500 m / s, making it possible to defeat even a well-armored enemy at long distances - musket bullets pierced steel cuirasses at a distance of up to 200 meters. At the same time, the aiming range was small, about 50 meters for an individual live target - but the lack of accuracy was compensated for by the firing of multiple launch rocket launchers.
During the 18th century, the musket was already replaced everywhere by the flintlock, with which the wars of the 18th-19th centuries were fought. The basis of his combat work was a flint shock lock.
The impact lock, despite its advantages, supplanted the wick and wheel mechanisms only in the first third of the 17th century, and then was widely used for two centuries.
The ignition of gunpowder in a flintlock occurs from a spark produced by a spring-loaded trigger with a piece of flint or pyrite clamped in it. The flint should strike a spark by striking the grooved steel cover of the powder shelf (flint) and at the same time opening it slightly. The spark ignites a small amount of powder placed on the shelf, through the priming hole in the barrel, the flame will reach the main powder charge and a shot will be fired.
A flint lock did not need to be wound with a key, like a wheel lock, it was simpler and more technologically advanced, therefore, cheaper. By facilitating the process of loading the gun, the rate of fire increased to 2-3 rounds per minute or more. The Prussian infantry of the 18th century could fire about 5 shots per minute, and individual arrows and 7 shots with 6 loads. This was achieved by additional improvements to the castle and the gun and by lengthy training of soldiers.
At the same time, the shock-flint lock was prone to frequent misfires and therefore required attention and care. Common causes of misfire are worn out or loose flint, worn out flint, carbon-clogged priming hole.
Changes in small arms brought about a transformation of military affairs in Europe. First of all, this affected the quality of the armed forces. Since that time, there has been a clear division into the types and types of the armed forces.
In the infantry and cavalry, there are two types: line and light units. In the infantry, musketeers and grenadiers belonged to line units operating in line formation.
Infantrymen trained to operate with grenades, which were used in the assault on enemy fortifications and fortresses, were called grenadiers. The first hand grenades were like clay vessels filled with lime or incendiary mixture, which have been used since the 9th century. The first pomegranates were also made mainly of clay. In 1405, Konrad von Eichstadt first proposed using a cast-iron body for grenades, and creating a cavity in the center of the powder charge, which accelerated the combustion of the mixture and increased the likelihood of crushing the body into fragments. A hand grenade was ignited from a wick, which was inserted into a wooden plug that plugged the seed hole. Such a grenade could explode too early or too late, and during the English Civil War, Cromwell's soldiers improved the device by tying a bullet to the wick at the bottom (inside the grenade) and at the same time surrounding the wick with branches inserted into small holes that served as stabilizers. The wick remained facing back until the grenade hit the ground, when the bullet, continuing by inertia, pulled it inside the grenade. Grenades were used mainly in the siege and defense of fortresses, as well as at sea in boarding battles. There were also foundry, empty balls (about the size of a small ball), and walls of a quarter inch, made of three parts of copper with one part of tin.
Since the 17th century, grenades have been actively used in field combat. In 1667 in England, 4 people were allocated in a company for throwing grenades; they got the name "grenadiers". Within a few years, this new type of weapon was introduced to the main European armies. The British also introduced "grenadier" hats, in the form of tall caps with a copper top. There is a common misconception that such a cap was introduced due to the fact that the soldier's wide-brimmed hat, and then the cocked hat, interfered with the throw. In fact, the grenadier threw a grenade with a movement of his hand from the bottom up (and not over the top, as modern grenades are thrown), so that the hat could not interfere with him in any case.
In the XVIII century. the ignition tube for hand grenades was powder, like that of artillery. Also used were lighting grenades, made of cardboard, wood or tin, equipped with a Bengal fire and used in night combat. However, with the development of linear tactics, grenades lost their importance in field combat and by the middle of the 18th century. were removed from service with field armies, and the grenadiers became only an elite arm of the infantry. Grenades remained only in service with the fortress garrisons and in the navy. In European armies, as a rule, grenadiers made up selected companies, one per battalion.
The main composition of the infantry regiment of that time was represented by "fusiliers" (French fusilier - shooter from weapons) - infantry soldiers armed with a fuzee, one of the types of flint weapons. For example, in 1704 in the Russian army in the infantry regiment, there were 8 fusilier companies. In the middle of the 18th century, the fusilier companies were renamed the musketeer companies.
In the 40s of the XVIII century. huntsmen stand out as a separate type of infantry. The word "huntsman" comes from the German "Jager" - hunter. Jaegers called light infantry, trained to operate both in close and loose formation, in the preparation of which a special place was given to marksmanship.
Following the example of the Prussians, in the Russian army special jaeger teams in the musketeer regiments appeared in 1761 at the initiative of P.A.Rumyantsev. They performed reconnaissance functions and covered the flanks of the advancing columns. During the battle, enemy officers were destroyed with sniper fire, while retreating, they covered the retreat, setting up ambushes and disguising themselves in the terrain.
In the 80s. XVIII century from the jaeger teams, they formed battalions, which in 1797 were transformed into regiments.
In the cavalry as a branch of the army during the XVIII century. there were also changes that divided it into severe, medium and light. The cuirassiers belonged to the heavy cavalry since the 30s of the century. It was a kind of heavy cavalry, clad in cuirasses. They appeared in the 16th century in many European countries as heavy cavalry, created in order to compensate for the small number of knightly cavalry and dressed in relatively inexpensive incomplete armor that covered two-thirds of the body - from head to knee and called cuirassier, from which by the 19th century only helmet and cuirass. Initially, during their parallel coexistence with knights, the main weapon of cuirassiers was a knight's sword, but then it was replaced by a broadsword, and in some armies - by a heavy saber. Used horses of heavy breeds weighing 600-700 kg.
At the end of the 16th century, the so-called Scottish broadsword appeared in Scotland and later spread throughout Great Britain. A characteristic feature of the Scottish broadsword is a highly developed basket-like guard.
Cavalry
The inner surface of the basket was sometimes covered with leather; the head could be decorated with horse hair.
The broadsword, which has become widespread in the continental countries of Western Europe, is distinguished by an asymmetrical hilt with a highly developed hand protection in the form of a cross or a bowl with a whole system of arches. The Western European broadsword evolved from the heavy cavalry saddle sword. The first examples of the broadsword were called the Walloon sword.
During the 17th-18th centuries, there was a gradual unification of broadswords in the cavalry of the European armies. For service were adopted uniform models of weapons, first for individual regiments, and then for each type of cavalry.
In addition to cuirassiers, dragoons were also armed with broadswords, representing a special type of troops - the so-called "riding infantry".
The word "dragoon" appeared at the end of the 16th century. and meant a riding harquebusier. Then it was the second most common type of mercenary cavalry after the Reitar. By the end of the 18th century. the cheapest and most massive cavalry began to be called dragoons.
The dragoon acted both on horseback and on foot, and the gun was used only when dismounted. The strongest horses went to the cuirassiers - since the ram was a common technique of cavalry combat, the fastest were the hussars, and the dragoons were the rest.
A dragoon on horseback could conduct close combat, and, dismounted, hit the enemy at a distance of up to 200 meters. The rest of the cavalry, armed with pistols and blunderbuss (short shotguns for grape-shot), were only a few meters away.
Unlike the infantry, where almost until the end of the 18th century. other locks, except for the match locks, were not used in cavalry since the beginning of the 16th century. the wheel lock was adopted everywhere, in which the spark was produced not by blow, as in a flint lock, but by friction. The wheel lock, in contrast to the flint lock, had an almost closed mechanism, therefore, it was possible to shoot both in the wind and at a gallop. However, by 1700, the flintlock was widely adopted in armies as more suitable for mass production.
The dragoons' rifle was shorter and lighter than the infantry, but in the 18th century. for the unification of ammunition had the same caliber as that of the infantry. But the caliber was not strictly observed.
The word "dragoon" first appeared in history in the 16th century, when the French marshal Brissac, during the occupation of Piedmont (1550-1560), put the best, brave infantrymen on horses, gave this detachment the name "dragoons" and used it for quick raids. However, these dragoons fought on foot. The first general to give the dragoons their modern meaning was Gustav-Adolf. Dragoon regiments, properly organized, appeared in France under Louis XIV in 1668. in Germany, Austria, France and England, about 1/3 of all cavalry consisted of dragoons.
Dragoons first appeared in the Moscow army under Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov, when in 1631 the 1st Dragoon regiment was formed from recruited foreigners (the regiment of the "New (foreign) system"), which in 1632 was in Shein's army near Smolensk. Then the dragoons began to replenish with Russian eager people and newly baptized Tatars.
By the end of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, there were already more than 11 thousand dragoons. These dragoons were armed with muskets, swords, reeds and short pikes.
Under Peter the Great, the number of dragoon regiments reached 33. Under him, teams of police dragoons were established in capitals and in some large cities, which existed until 1811.
To light cavalry in the 18th century. belonged to the hussars. In 1458, the Hungarian king Matthew Corvin (Matthias Korsh) ordered the formation of a new type of cavalry to participate in the wars with the Turks. This type of militia was made up of nobles. Every 20th nobleman with 1/20 of his armed men had to go to the hussars.
After the collapse of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1540, hussars began to spread throughout Europe, and hussar regiments began to appear in the armies of other countries. In Poland, the first hussar units were formed at the end of the 16th century. and were a select heavy cavalry formed by the nobles. In Austria, the first regular hussar units appeared in 1688. According to the Austrian model, the hussar troops were taken over by France, where the first hussar regiment was formed in 1693. Polish hussars initially appeared in Prussia - in 1629, who were in the royal military service. Under Frederick the Great, the Prussian hussars earned universal fame and fame. In England, hussar troops were formed in 1806.
The first hussar "squadrons" appeared in Russia during the reign of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich and consisted of recruited Germans and Poles. They were first mentioned in 1634. The diary of the Scotsman Gordon, taken by Peter I to the service, tells about 3 hussar companies that took part in the Kozhukhov campaign in 1694.
When Peter I made the Russian army a regular, the hussars disappeared from it and appeared again in 1723, when the Austrian Serb hussar regiments were formed. During the reign of Anna Ioannovna, Field Marshal Minich returned to the idea of \u200b\u200bforming hussar regiments. He began to recruit hussars from various countries to make them irregular border troops. Serbs, Hungarians, Vlachs, as well as Georgian nobles were recruited into hussars. During the reign of Anna Leopoldovna, the same Minich formed 5 hussar regiments from all the hussars, which were formed from a multi-tribal crowd of adventurers and did more harm than good. Under Elizaveta Petrovna, Macedonian, Georgian and Serbian hussar regiments appeared in Russia.
At the very beginning of the 17th century. several significant innovations were made that expanded the capabilities of artillery. So in the design of gun carriages, steel axles began to be used, and the wedge elevation mechanism was replaced with a screw.
At the same time, cast iron began to be used for casting gun barrels. In fact, cast iron in this capacity was worse than bronze, and cannons were made mainly of bronze until the middle of the 19th century. In any case, field guns, the weight requirements of which were the most stringent. But with the spread of iron casting, it became possible to produce masses of cheap weapons for equipping ships and fortresses.
In turn, the improvement of the bronze casting technique made it possible to cast more durable barrels. In the field artillery kulevrins in the first half of the 17th century. are supplanted by cannons, which, incidentally, was facilitated by the use of iron axles, since the recoil force is associated with the ratio of the barrel weight to the projectile weight. The cannons with this ratio, in comparison with the coulevrins, were less likely to destroy the carriage. During the XVII century. the material part of the artillery took the form that it retained until the middle of the 19th century.
Artillery as a branch of troops received during the XVIII century. division into regimental, field and siege, according to the type of weapons that have become widespread in the course of the century. Also, such a type of weapon as the howitzer was improved.
Regimental gun. The idea to give each regiment of infantry a pair of light cannons that would always accompany and support it with fire belongs to Gustav-Adolf. Thus, the first regimental cannons appeared at the beginning of the 17th century. in the Swedish kingdom.
Artillery
From the 17th century to the middle of the 19th century, the regimental guns remained almost unchanged. All of them had a caliber of 3-6 pounds (for a cast-iron ball), or 72-94 millimeters, fired a cannonball up to 600-700 m or buckshot up to 300-350 meters. The barrel was usually no longer than 12 gauges. The regimental cannon could fire 3 shots per minute - therefore, it fired much more often than the musketeer. The regiment usually had 2, less often 4 guns. Only the Russian Guard (Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments) had 6-8 guns each. This situation arose by accident. During the Narva battle, the Swedes got almost all the Russian artillery, but the Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky Guards regiments fought off the Swedes, retreated in perfect order. Usually regimental artillery made up about 60% of the entire artillery of the army.
The Swedish king Gustav-Adolphus used leather cannons as regimental guns for some time, but their strength turned out to be insufficient - the skin burned out. Although the task of reducing weight was solved in this way.
Buckshot served as a shell for regimental guns, the nucleus was either not used at all, or was used as an exception. Ricochets of light nuclei were unpredictable and ineffective.
Regimental guns had a caliber of 3-6 pounds (by weight of the cast iron core, 1 pound - 409.51241 g), that is, the inner diameter of the barrel was 72-94 mm. As ammunition, nuclei were used, the firing range of which reached 600-700 m. The fire was also conducted with buckshot, while the firing range was 300-350 meters. The barrel was usually no longer than 12 gauges. The calculation of the gun could produce up to 3 shots per minute (faster than a Fuzeler infantryman from a gun, who could make no more than two shots per minute). The regiment usually had 2, less often 4 guns.
Field artillery. Almost all field guns of the 17th and 19th centuries in Europe had a standard caliber: 12 pounds at a cast iron core, or 120 millimeters. The barrel was long
12-18 calibers, and the whole system weighed 250-350 times more than the projectile, that is, about 1500 kg. The initial velocity of the projectile reached 400 m / s, and the maximum range was 2700 m. In fact, however, the elevation of the barrel limited the firing range to a distance of 800-1000 m. Shooting at long distances was not practiced, since ricochets were possible only when shooting at a third of the maximum distance ... Shooting with buckshot from field guns was carried out at a distance of up to 400-500 meters. The cannon, like a good musketeer, did 1-1.5 rounds per minute, and buckshot from 150-200 meters could penetrate cuirasses.
The number of field guns per 10,000 infantry and cavalry in the 17th and early 19th centuries was 10-60 pieces, and it was gradually decreasing. The number of barrels was replaced by a maneuver on the battlefield. In addition to a cast-iron core and buckshot, an incendiary projectile could also be used.
The field guns were 12 pounds at a cast iron core, the bore was 120 millimeters, and the length was 12-18 calibers. The initial velocity of the core reached 400 m / s, and the maximum range (estimated 2700 m), due to the limitation of the elevation of the barrel, was within 800-1000 m. Buckshot from field guns was fired at a distance from 50 to 400-500 meters, on a gentle trajectory and direct fire.
Howitzers. Howitzers are weapons designed for firing along overhanging trajectories. In the field, light howitzers were used in a bomb caliber of 7-10 pounds, or 100-125 millimeters. In the Russian army, howitzers usually had a caliber of 12-18 pounds (up to 152 millimeters). Until the beginning of the 18th century. howitzers were used to a limited extent in the siege and defense of fortresses. Beginning in the 1700s, they began to be used in field warfare. In the European armies of the 18th-19th centuries, only light howitzers with a bomb caliber of 7-10 pounds, or 100-125 millimeters, were used. In the Russian army, howitzers were much more widespread, usually having a caliber of 12-18 pounds (up to 152 millimeters) and better ballistics. Count PI Shuvalov, the inventor of the "unicorns" - howitzers with an elongated barrel, which were in service with the Russian army from the middle of the 18th to the middle of the 19th century, was a great enthusiast of howitzers.
According to the idea of \u200b\u200bShuvalov himself, the unicorns were to completely replace all other artillery: regimental, field and siege. As well as sea and serf. It seemed that the long howitzers had all the prerequisites for this. Firstly, it was possible to use shells of all types known at that time: cannonballs, buckshot, brandskugels and bombs. Moreover, with the same dead weight as the cannon, the unicorn fired 1.5-2 times more buckshot, a heavier cannonball, and bombs. Secondly, because of the shorter barrel, it was possible to shoot more often, and because of the large elevation angles, it was also 1.5 times farther than the cannon could shoot. Thirdly, with unicorns, it turned out to be a possible tactic of battle, hitherto unknown - it was possible to shoot over the heads of your troops.
Characteristics of unicorns: system weight - about 150 shell weights (half that of a cannon); the initial velocity of the projectile is about 300 m / s (for the core); firing range
- up to 1500 m (for 150 mm systems, core). The characteristics of the Prussian howitzers were more modest: weight - about 80 projectile weights, muzzle velocity - 230 m / s (for a bomb), bomb firing range - 600-700 m (for 10 pounds).
In conclusion, it should be noted that artillery in the 18th century was used both for fire preparation of an offensive and in a defensive battle, and for fire support of its troops in an offensive. Supporting the attack of their infantry, the artillery moved with the forward lines of its battle formations and took up firing positions so that there were no troops between the enemy and the barrels of the guns. In this maneuver, mainly guns were used, since the howitzers were too heavy for this. And only the appearance of unicorns allowed the artillery to more effectively support their infantry during the offensive and fire at the enemy, over the heads of the battle formations of their troops, while remaining in the rear. In general, by the end of the 18th century, the evolution of smooth-bore artillery was completed and reached the peak of its development, both technically and tactically.
Army of the 18th century
The social conditions of eighteenth-century Europe, influencing the military system, were closely related to economic ones. The overwhelming majority of the non-noble European population was engaged in agriculture, the rest were employed in the craft or trade, in the state or military service. The soldiers were recruited mainly from the peasants, which sharply limited the mobilization capabilities of any country in the event of war: the recruitment of too many peasants immediately affected the amount of agricultural products produced. In addition, the weak capacities of industrial facilities - factories and manufactories that were not able to dress and arm a really large army - also imposed their own restrictions on the size of the armed forces. True, other categories of the population, from which any European army (except for the Russian), with the exception of the peasants, was recruited, belonged to the least productive social groups. The officers belonged to the noble class, and a fairly large percentage of the soldiers were voluntarily recruited scum of society, vagabonds, and the unemployed.
The recruitment was carried out as follows. The colonel (regiment commander) received money from the state treasury, which he distributed to company commanders - captains. Those, in turn, with the help of recruiters who were entitled to a certain percentage, carried out a campaign to recruit those willing to their units. For example, in France, a recruit signed a contract for a period of four years. He was paid 3 sous a day. Uniforms, weapons and food were provided at the expense of the state. Until the 1660s, colonels and captains recruited soldiers at their own expense, then receiving reimbursement from the treasury. This created a lot of abuses on the ground, when the real payroll of the unit did not match the payroll. When checking and carrying out inspections, colonels often resorted to the services of dummies. From 1667, the colonel was appointed by the king and was personally responsible to the monarch for the state of the unit entrusted to him.
In the Kingdom of Prussia, another method of recruiting for military service was carried out. Forced recruitment became a real scourge for the population of the country: the principle "the state is the army" was carried out here with true German consistency. Detachments of recruiters scouring Prussia could take under the royal banners the first counter representative of the "lower estates" - a peasant or a burgher, if his external data (primarily growth) met the requirements of military service.
Even under Frederick William I, the rule was established that only height below 168 centimeters can guarantee a person from recruiting. Frederick the Great further improved this rule by introducing a special law, according to which the peasant household was inherited by the smallest of the sons - everyone else had to be ready to join the ranks of the army.
War tactics in the 18th century
The recruitment procedure was extremely simple: a peasant who came voluntarily or caught by deceit or force was treated to a free mug of beer "at the expense of His Majesty" and announced to him that he would receive the next free drink in 20 years - when he was transferred to the reserve for seniority. Disguised Prussian recruiters (their chief was Colonel Colignon, a Frenchman in the Prussian service) flooded all of Germany. During the Seven Years' War, when Frederick II the Great was faced with the problem of high casualties in the rank and file, the Prussians came up with another recruiting method - simple-minded foreigners were offered patents for the ranks of lieutenants or captains in the kind of troops where the future recruit only wanted to get. Young people with "officer" patents in their pockets came to Magdeburg, where they were immediately, indiscriminately, enlisted as soldiers.
Linear tactics of warfare were developed in connection with equipping armies with firearms and increasing the role of fire in combat. The troops for the conduct of battle were located in a line consisting of several ranks (their number was determined depending on the rate of fire of the weapon), which made it possible to simultaneously fire from the largest number of guns. The tactics of the troops were reduced mainly to a frontal collision. The outcome of the battle was largely determined by the power of infantry fire.
Linear tactics in Western Europe originated in the late 16th and early 17th centuries in the Dutch infantry, where square columns were replaced by linear formations. It was introduced by the Dutch in the person of Moritz of Orange and his cousins \u200b\u200bWilhelm Ludwig of Nassau-Dillenburg and John of Nassau-Siegen. Raising discipline in the army, as well as improving the training of officers, to which Moritz paid special attention, allowed him to build his army in 10, and later in 6 ranks. In the Russian troops, elements of linear tactics were first used in the battle of Dobrynichi (1605). Linear tactics received full formalization in the Swedish army of Gustav II Adolf during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), and then was adopted in all European armies. This was facilitated by an increase in the rate of fire of the musket and the improvement of artillery. The superiority of the linear battle formation over the old battle formation of the columns was finally determined in the battles at Breitenfeld (1631) and Lutzen (1632), but at the same time the negative aspects of the linear battle formation were revealed. This is the impossibility of concentrating superior forces in the decisive sector of the battle, the ability to act only on open flat terrain, the weakness of the flanks and the difficulty of maneuvering the infantry, due to which the cavalry acquired decisive importance for the outcome of the battle. Hired soldiers were held in close lines with the help of stick discipline, and if the formation was violated, they fled from the battlefield. Linear tactics received classical forms in the 18th century, especially in the Prussian army of Frederick William I, and then Frederick II, who, with the most severe drill, brought the combat rate of fire of each line to 4.5-5 volleys per minute (this became possible after the introduction of innovations in the design guns - such as, for example, a one-sided ramrod). To eliminate the shortcomings of linear tactics, Frederick II introduced an oblique battle formation (battalions advanced in a ledge), consisting of 3 lines of battalions, each having 3 ranks. The cavalry was built in 3 lines. Artillery was placed in the intervals between battalions, light weapons were introduced, moving behind the cavalry, on the flanks and in front of the battle formation. A square was used. Despite the innovations introduced, the linear tactics of the troops of Frederick II continued to be stereotyped and inflexible.
A form of infantry specifically designed for the use of line tactics was called line infantry. For about two centuries, the line infantry constituted the bulk of the infantry of the countries of Europe.
Linear tactics were also used by some types of cavalry. At one time, heavily armed cavalry (Reitars, Horse Grenadiers and Cuirassiers) used linear tactics on horseback ("Reitar formation"). Later, dragoons and lancers began to use linear tactics, being on foot in defense. Accordingly, the name "line cavalry" passed from heavy cavalry to dragoons and lancers. Hussars in the XV-XVII centuries wore armor and often attacked in close formation, but later the hussars turned into light cavalry and stopped using linear tactics. The Cossacks never used linear tactics.
The tactics of warfare were identical in all armies of Europe. Usually, the warring parties deployed their battle formations against each other and began firefighting with almost complete absence of any maneuver. Long lines of infantry made it possible to develop maximum fire on the front, but they tied the army like shackles: the entire battle formation could only move as a whole and only on a completely flat terrain, like a parade ground, at a slow pace. Any obstacle encountered on the path of the movement of troops could break the formation and lead to the loss of control over them. Changing the battle formation and rebuilding during battle in response to a change in the situation was also considered impossible.
All this made the direct contact of enemy armies and hand-to-hand combat an extremely rare phenomenon: usually the enemies stopped at a short distance and opened volley fire at each other. Conducting rifle fire with a synchronous salvo was recognized as the main element of the rifle training of troops: it was believed that it was better to incapacitate 50 enemy soldiers at once than 200 at different times (this had a greater moral effect). At the same time, the whole battle turned into a dull skirmish, sometimes lasting for several hours.
Bayonets were used very rarely: if one army launched a slow and cautious offensive (as already mentioned, more fearful of breaking its own formation than reaching the enemy's), its counterpart always had more than enough time to leave the battlefield, admitting that way, their "defeat". Battles of a really large scale with stubborn hand-to-hand fighting and heavy losses at this time were extremely rare.
Russian army in the 18th century
In 1705, a new unified system of manning the army and navy was introduced in Russia - recruitment. In all the provinces of the country, special "stations" were set up - recruitment points that were in charge of recruiting soldiers and sailors. As a rule, 1 recruit was recruited from 500, less often from 300 and in exceptional cases from 100 male souls. The initial training of recruits was carried out directly in the regiments, but from 1706 training was introduced at recruit stations. The term of the soldier's service was not determined (for life). Those subject to conscription could put up a replacement for themselves. Only those who were completely unfit for service were fired.
The recruiting system established in the Russian army until the 1890s. was advanced in comparison with the system of manning the Western European armies. The latter were recruited by the rank and file and even command personnel through recruitment, which was legally voluntary, but in fact, to a large extent, compulsory recruitment. This system often gathered declassed elements of society under the banner of the army - vagrants, fugitives, criminals, deserters from the armies of other states, etc. - and was an unstable source of replenishment.
The most important advantage of the recruiting system adopted in Russia was that it formed a mass of soldiers, monolithic in their social and national composition, with high moral qualities inherent in the Russian peasant, who could be led into battle under the slogans of defending the Fatherland. Another significant advantage of the recruiting system was that it provided the state with the possibility of creating a large army and a relatively affordable way to compensate for the loss of personnel from its ranks.
The new Russian regular army was created according to the European model. The army was divided into divisions and brigades, which, however, did not have a permanent composition. The only permanent unit in the infantry and cavalry was the regiment. The infantry regiment until 1704 consisted of 12 companies, combined into two battalions, after 1704 - of 9 companies: 8 fusilier and 1 grenadier. Each company consisted of 4 chief officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, 140 privates and was divided into 4 plutongs (platoons). Each of the plutongs had 2 corporals. In 1708, grenadier regiments were created in the Russian army with great firepower.
The cavalry (dragoon) regiment consisted of 10 companies, including one horse grenadier. Every two companies made up a squadron. Each company had 3 chief officers, 8 non-commissioned officers and 92 dragoons.
In 1701, the first artillery regiment was formed in the Russian army. According to the state of 1712, it consisted of 6 companies (1 bombardment company, 4 gunner companies, 1 mine company) and engineering and pontoon teams. The total number of the armed forces of Russia by 1725 (the end of the reign of Peter I) reached 220 thousand people.
In the 30s of the XVIII century. in the Russian army, some reforms were carried out, initiated by Field Marshal B. Kh. Minikh. Cuirassier regiments (heavy cavalry) and hussar regiments were formed easily from the Georgians, Hungarians, Vlachs and Serbs who had left for Russia. The Sloboda Cossack army was organized on the southern border.
By the middle of the 18th century. the Russian army numbered 331 thousand people (including 172 thousand people in the field troops). Divisions and brigades became regular units, but had a different composition. For the period of the war, corps and armies were created. The infantry consisted of 46 army, 3 guards and 4 grenadier regiments, cavalry - 20 dragoon, 6 horse-grenadier and 6 cuirassier regiments. Light jaeger infantry appeared, which by the end of the 18th century. consisted of more than 40 battalions.
In the cavalry, in addition to the dragoon and cuirassier, hussar (light-window) regiments were formed. In 1751-1761. they were formed from Serbs, Moldavians and Vlachs and were of an irregular nature. After the liquidation of the Ukrainian Sloboda Cossack army, the so-called settled hussar regiments were created from the former Sloboda Cossacks. From 1783 hussar regiments became regular.
XVIII century was one of the most important stages of military affairs in Russia, the building of the Russian armed forces, the development of domestic military art. It turned out to be possible only with the help of powerful army and navy to solve the main foreign policy tasks of the state - to ensure the national interests of the country, the possibility of comprehensive economic and cultural ties with other peoples, to secure its own borders.
In the XVIII century. the process of the formation of the Russian regular army, which began in the 17th century, was completed, and a regular navy was created. This process included changes in all aspects of military affairs. A harmonious structure of the armed forces is taking shape. The legislation regulates the principles of conducting hostilities, combat training, the order of service, relationships between various command and control bodies, as well as between military personnel. A new procedure for manning and supplying troops is being introduced, a system of military education is being created, and military science is being developed. These reforms followed the general course of a profound reorganization of the state apparatus associated with the development of absolutism. They raised the armed forces to the level of the highest requirements of their time and allowed Russia to successfully solve foreign policy problems, and at the beginning of the 19th century. repel the invasion of the "great army" of Napoleon and his allies.
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18th century infantry and cavalry armament Updated: October 27, 2016 Posted by: admin
Tracing the origins of modern wars, we can conclude that they are based on two factors: the emergence of unitary states, with their tendency towards centralization; stability in the development of industry and trade, control of all income and ... invention of the bayonet. The first of these factors made it possible - or even inevitable - to organize regular armies on a permanent basis. The second made it possible to carry out the use of these armies using the strategy and tactics corresponding to the new types of weapons that were introduced into practice.
In a relatively short period of time, the entire art of war has changed completely. Wars no longer began with the gathering of gentlemen with servants and vassals at a certain place, or with the armament and equipment of detachments of barely trained militias. Yes, and weapons did not begin to forge only after the start of the war - it was already at the ready, sharpened and cleaned, next to the hand of its owner. And the commander no longer surveyed the future battlefield with a keen eye, choosing a better place where the mass of pikemen should be located, which would cover the ranks of the riflemen. Now the fire and the ramming strike were fused together. And the officers no longer worried that their rifle units could be scattered by cavalry, if they were without cover for the peak forest. Now, figuratively speaking, every musket has grown to itself a steel point and every musketeer has become a pikeman.
When the introduction of the improved flintlock musket in European armies was added to this stunning innovation, firepower on the battlefield became a decisive factor. Gone are the long burning wicks so dependent on wind and rain. And the temperamental wheel locks with their keys for the winding and hold-down springs withdrew to the same place. Now the musket, pistol and carbine all had the same mechanism, which could be kept in working order with the simplest tools. At the same time, not only did the rate of fire increase, but the elimination of the pikemen made it possible to double the number of muskets in battle formations. Steady, but constant progress was also made in relation to the design and technology of production of artillery pieces, as a result of which this branch of the military gradually became more and more mobile.
These were all new instruments of warfare that awaited the emergence of the great generals and brilliant soldiers of the 18th century. And these great generals appeared in many: Charles XII, Marlborough, Eugen, Sachs, Clive, Wolf, Washington, Suvorov and a whole galaxy of military leaders who wore a three-color cockade. Their fate and glory, gained by the soldiers they led, became part of the military traditions of their peoples. But if an impartial judge of military merit were asked to name the general and soldiers who have earned the highest reputation in this century, he would not hesitate to choose Frederick II - nicknamed the Great - and his incomparable Prussian army.
This choice of his would not mean a disdain for the generals and soldiers mentioned above. Frederick was not as successful on the battlefield as the Duke of Marlborough; nor was he more courageous than Charles XII. His Prussians did not surpass the bravery of the soldiers in red uniforms at Fontenoy, they were neither more persistent than the peasants of Count Alexander Suvorov, accustomed to difficulties, nor more patriotic than those soldiers of the army of Washington who died and froze in Valley Forge. But as a military machine trained to march and fire, maneuver and advance faster and better than any soldier of the past and present, they were second to none. And the man who led them - statesman, poet, strategist, social reformer, philosopher and organizer - was, beyond comparison, one of the greatest military leaders of all time.
The rise of Prussia is an excellent example of the potential power contained in a small semi-militarist state ruled by capable and hard-working people who think and care only about the security and consolidation of their state. The history of Prussia as a state, in fact, begins only in 1701, when Frederick I, Margrave of Brandenburg, crowned himself as King of Prussia. But long before that, the rulers of Brandenburg, with the help of wars, marriages and treaties, managed to preserve the integrity of their lands, and from time to time even increase them. This policy found its most vivid expression during the reign of the previous Margrave Frederick Wilhelm, famous for his major victory over the Swedes at Ferbellin and known as the "Great Elector" (the Margraves of Brandenburg were one of the nine princes who had the right to elect the emperor of the Great Roman Empire of the German nation) ... Firmly convinced that a strong army was as necessary in diplomacy as on the battlefield, the margrave wielded a sword as skillfully as a pen. With his rational government and a course of religious tolerance in the country, he not only earned the love of his people (a rather unusual feeling in Germany of those days), but also attracted thousands of Protestant emigrants from France and Holland to the country (who eventually became the purebred Teutonic ancestors of the master race) ...
Under Frederick, the army continued to grow in numbers, and the Prussian forces gained an enviable reputation on the fields of the War of the Spanish Succession.
In 1713 he was succeeded by his son, Friedrich Wilhelm. This monarch remained in history as a fanatical despot - rude and cruel, with an unbalanced disposition - but at the same time as a major organizer and an extraordinary worker on the throne, fanatically devoted to the idea of \u200b\u200braising the Hohenzollerns and expanding the power of Prussia. The finances he had amassed through the austerity he introduced in every area of \u200b\u200bgovernment — including the cost of the royal court (the queen was forced to make do with only one lady of the court) —he spent mainly on the army. Its number was increased from 50,000 to 80,000, recruited mainly by forced recruitment. Sluggish recruiters and gangs of crooks-scammers became as familiar surroundings in all Prussian possessions as in English ports during the war, and any gap between these methods of attracting new recruits to the army was filled with some form of conscription. All aristocrats were obliged to serve as officers, which connected the feudal nobility with the crown by close and tough military ties. Their young sons attended military schools, and this cadet corps of young cadets was a cadre reserve for officers of an ever-growing army. His special hobby, to which he indulged with all passion, was a regiment of grenadiers, whom he lured with money or even kidnapped from all over Europe. According to General Fuller, an Italian abbot, well above average height, was kidnapped while celebrating mass in one of the Italian churches. The tall girls obtained in the same way were to become worthy friends of these warrior-monsters. These "long guys" loved by Frederick never made it to the battlefield, and Frederick II disbanded this extremely expensive collection with one of his first decrees.
As one would expect from such a diligent working monarch, there were fourteen princes and princesses in the royal family. But death sees no difference between a prince and a beggar, and only the fourth son of the king, Karl-Friedrich, became the heir to the throne - and, as one could see, this title was more of a burden to him than a joy. Frederick Wilhelm, who allowed himself to beat even the queen with a cane, not to mention any of the subjects who fell under his hot hand, be it the Chancellor of the Empire or a lackey, did not spare the rod for raising his children. Unfortunately, the sensitive child destined to become the heir to the throne was the exact opposite of what the good king thought a future ruler should be. Few of the children had such a difficult childhood as the young Karl-Friedrich. Cruel flogging, half-starved existence, insults, humiliation and deliberate cruelty accompanied him until the very day of his father's death. Twice the king, in blind rage, almost killed him - once he tried to strangle him with a cord from the curtain, and the other time he barely managed to take the blade of his father's sword away from the boy.
Driven almost to insanity by this treatment, the young prince conceived an escape. His plan reached his father's ears, and the young man was arrested, convicted of desertion and, at the insistence of his father, sentenced to death. Only the intervention of many famous personalities, including the emperor himself, prompted the old tyrant to pardon his son. The prince, however, was forced to attend the execution of his closest friend, a young lieutenant, who helped him prepare his escape.
Prussian equestrian grenadier
It seems simply a miracle that, having such a monster as a father, the young prince retained in his character the moderation and common sense that he usually showed in relation to those with whom he communicated. His actions as a statesman, on the contrary, were marked by such a stamp of cynicism, ruthlessness, deceit and outright fraud, which was rarely found even among the crowned heads of Europe.
But a thorough comprehension of everything related to the Prussian possessions, from the construction of dams to the breeding of pigs - and all this knowledge was hammered into a young man who resisted such knowledge by force or by force - gave the young prince such knowledge of his future kingdom, which rarely any monarch could boast. In addition, a strong sense of affection and respect has gradually developed between the prince and his people - which will become a very important factor when the kingdom is almost conquered by enemies.
In the last years of the reign of the old king, a kind of truce was concluded between father and son, who, in fulfillment of his duty as the future monarch, married the bride of his choice and began to show interest and even zeal in the study of various sovereign aspects of the Prussian state. He was allowed to have his own small courtyard at his Reinsberg castle. Here he immersed himself in his literary pursuits, played the flute and indulged in philosophical reflections with his friends, many of whom were French. (It was this francophilia that sometimes made his father fall into an almost uncontrollable rage.) Such a hedonistic existence, which, as Frederick often used to say, was the happiest period of his life, deceived many of his contemporaries, who assumed the flourishing of a new great era of culture and enlightenment in Prussia when the young poet and philosopher inherits the throne. How wrong they were!
Just six and a half months after his ascension to the throne, he deliberately pulled the kingdom into war. The conflict that Frederick so coolly began was not due to a misunderstanding or the outburst of anger of the young monarch. On the contrary, it was a deliberate and calculated act of a man who carefully weighed all the odds. And the incentive that most prompted him to take this step was the very foundations on which the Prussian state was built: a reasonable and healthy financial system and an army. Thanks to his father's strictest financial measures, the treasury was swollen with money, and the army was a brilliantly organized force of 80,000 men, trained in a way a soldier had never been trained.
Prussian infantryman
The military drill was so harsh - with flogging, beatings and other forms of corporal punishment for the slightest violation of discipline or delay in following orders - that it was a blessed relief to take part in the fighting. Not a single soldier in those days was treated otherwise than a being of a definitely lower class, but the relationship between the ignorant, rude, limited nobility and even the more ignorant peasantry, from which the rank and file of the Prussian army was formed, was, as far as one can judge, especially bad. For the officers, the Prussian soldier was not a human being, but a piece of clay clad in a blue uniform, which was to be turned into an insensitive robot, incapable of independent thinking, by beatings and drill. (“If my soldiers start thinking,” Frederick once remarked, “there will be none left in the ranks.”) His own position on soldiers and the relationship between officers and privates was: “All a soldier should be given is instill in him a sense of the honor of the uniform, that is, the highest reverence for his regiment, which stands above all other armed forces in the country. Since the officers will have to lead him towards the greatest dangers (and he cannot be driven by a sense of pride), he must feel more fear of his own officer than of the danger he is exposed to. "
The brilliantly trained Prussian soldier, however, should not be squandered unnecessarily. He was a pawn in the big war game and in sovereign politics, and one that is difficult to replace. Frederick wrote: "To shed the blood of a soldier when it is not necessary is to inhumanely lead him to the slaughter." On the other hand, like any good general, he, without stint, threw them into battle when it served his purposes, and then the soldier's blood flowed like a river.
No matter how inhumane the Prussian system of drilling and combat training was, it gave great advantages on the battlefield. The tactics of that time did not at all encourage the personal initiative of a soldier or officer - on the contrary, it demanded unconditional obedience to the will of a superior commander and literally automatic execution of the given order. The movements of loading and firing weapons were repeated countless times until the soldier began to execute them with machine-like precision under any circumstance. Close formation maneuvers with an emphasis on movement speed and maintaining the formation were practiced right up to the very day of the battle, when complex movements were already carried out in the smoke and confusion of the battle, when cannonballs mowed down the ranks of soldiers, and half of the officers and sergeants were killed.
The Prussian cavalry - entirely large men on strong and hardy horses - was trained in accordance with the views on the tactics of cavalry, which then dominated in Europe, that is, the movement of a continuous avalanche on horseback and the advance at a slow trot, with firing from pistols and carbines. This did not correspond to the style of fighting inherent in Frederick, and after his first military campaign, he retrained his horsemen to maneuver at high speed and attack with all available forces with sabers in hand. The use of firearms by riders in the saddle was prohibited, and weapons and equipment were lightened. All possible measures were taken to ensure that the cavalry could move faster, while maintaining the established formation and alignment in the ranks.
A contemporary, narrating about the excellent condition in which Frederick had brought his cavalry, wrote: “Only in Prussia there is such a situation in which the horsemen and their officers have such confidence, such skill in handling their horses that they literally merge with them and revive in memory of the myths about the centaurs. Only there one can see how sixty or eighty squadrons, each of which has from 130 to 140 horsemen, maneuver so harmoniously that the entire cavalry flank can be perfectly controlled on the battlefield. Only here can you see 8,000 or 10,000 cavalrymen rushing into a general attack at a distance of several hundred yards and, having struck, immediately stop in perfect order and immediately proceed to the next maneuver against a new line of enemy troops that has just appeared on the field battle ".
In implementing this stunning change in the accepted tactics of the cavalry, Frederick received the full cooperation of two generals from the cavalry, Seydlitz and Zieten, who directly led the Prussian horsemen from victory to victory, and completely discredited the old methods. Another military author of the same time wrote: "I had never seen anything like this before, but in the course of the battles before my very eyes, the squadrons relying on their firearms were repeatedly overturned and defeated by the squadrons that attacked at speed and did not fire.
Colonel George Taylor Denison, a Canadian author, admitted in his History of the Cavalry: “Never before in ancient or modern history, even during the wars of Hannibal or Alexander the Great, have cavalry performed such brilliant operations that could be compared to the deeds of horsemen. Frederick the Great in his last wars. The secret of their success lay in the careful preparation of the individual soldier, in the constant maneuvers of large masses of cavalry, in confidence in the saber and in fiery energy, as well as in the careful calculation of the great commanders who commanded it. "
He also mentions one of Frederick's notes in the margins of his memo on cavalry tactics. "N. B. If it is found that some soldier refuses to fulfill his duty or wants to escape, then the very first officer or non-commissioned officer who noticed this must hit him with his saber "- a healing measure that has been preserved in the name of maintaining discipline from the very beginning of history and appears to be preserved in the future. A single coward can drag an entire company with him, and an unreliable company can lead to defeat in battle. The reprisal against a cowardly soldier right on the battlefield is a painful decision that may have to be made at one moment by any officer or non-commissioned officer. There are times, however, when even the fear of death cannot keep people in the ranks (which largely determines why most people still remain in the ranks, although all instincts command them to flee). At such moments, the realization that in front of them, perhaps, an honorable death awaits, and behind - death inevitable, and dishonorable, keeps them in place.
The Prussian cavalry was divided into three types: cuirassiers, dragoons and hussars.
Since the beginning of history, the cavalry has always been divided into three more or less separate groups - light, medium and heavy. The light cavalry was designed for reconnaissance, reconnaissance, and rapid attacks. Medium, more heavily armed and better protected by armor, still retained the speed of maneuver. Heavy - large warriors on large horses, often completely clad in armor - was much slower, but defeated the enemy with a shock blow at the expense of its mass. During the time of Frederick the Great, this division was further exacerbated by the use of firearms. There were cuirassiers who still retained a breastplate and breastplate, armed with two huge pistols and a heavy broadsword; dragoons, both heavy and light, were armed with a short musket with a bayonet and a saber and were able to fight on foot, if circumstances required; mounted grenadiers, whose functions almost coincided with those of heavy dragoons; hussars - light cavalry - armed with a saber and an even shorter musket called a carbine; in some parts lancers, heavy and light.
Headdresses of the Hussar Regiment "Dead Head" and the 2nd Hussar Regiment
However, from the very beginning of such a variety of types of cavalry, there was an ever-increasing tendency (especially in the Prussian units) to use light dragoons and hussars in one formation with the regiments of heavy cavalry. This trend became especially evident over the next century, and by the time the cavalry disappeared from the battlefields, there was almost no difference in armament, equipment and use between the different types of cavalry regiments.
Friedrich's cuirassiers and dragoons were brought into regiments of five squadrons, consisting of two companies of seventy men each. Each regiment numbered seventy-five officers and twelve trumpeters. The hussar regiments, which were light cavalry, consisted of ten squadrons each. The squadron formation, adopted on the eve of the Seven Years' War, consisted of two ranks, and for the attack the regiment formed two lines, squadrons in the first line were built at small intervals, and in the second, or reserve, line - in a freer order.
Since the cavalrymen were often used in small groups, or pickets, which gave great opportunities for desertion, the cavalry was recruited with a certain analysis, the sons of prosperous farmers or owners of small land plots enjoyed special preference. In the event of a son's desertion, his parents were responsible for the loss of both the soldier and the horse.
To support the masses of cavalry in battle, Frederick created the first units of horse artillery, light weapons carried by horse traction, and cannon limbers with mounted cannons. This measure opened the way for new possibilities for cavalry tactics. For the first time, the firepower of the artillery combined with the striking power of the attacking horsemen. Until that time, the attacking cavalry, right up to the moment of direct contact with the enemy, was exposed to enemy artillery fire and suffered severe losses, sitting on horseback hour after hour, under the striking enemy fire, unable to respond to it.
Artillery already played a prominent role in the wars of the 18th century, and Frederick's armies included a significant number of 3-, 6-, 12- and 24-pounder guns. Frederick also made extensive use of 18-pound howitzers, which could send a projectile in a hinged trajectory over an obstacle, such as a hill, and hit enemy troops hiding behind it.
The artillery shell, however, although it appeared in the 16th century, did not undergo changes for the better - and it was not capable of changes to such an extent as to become a decisive factor on the battlefield. The explosive charge in it was too small, and the fuses were too unreliable - to such an extent that the core sometimes exploded in the barrel of the gun, or, which happened more often, did not explode at all. These shells became effective only with the advent of guns with a rifled barrel, firing cylindrical shells with percussion fuses. The main weapon of destruction was shrapnel, which remained so until the end of the American Civil War.
The infantry regiments of the Prussian army consisted of two battalions, each with eight companies. Of the latter, one company was a grenadier company. True, the grenades themselves were now used only in case of siege operations, but special companies, formed from the tallest and strongest warriors, nevertheless remained, although their personnel were armed with muskets. Such a company was considered the elite company of the regiment and often wore distinctive uniforms or special headgear. For the battle, the battalions formed a combat formation of three men in depth.
The Prussian soldier was armed with a metal ramrod, although at that time other armies used wood ramrods. The weight and reliability of the metal ramrod gave advantages when loading, but only as a result of endless training could the Prussian infantry fire five volleys per minute, while the command of other armies was happy if their soldiers managed to fire twice during the same time.
Such clarity in the handling of weapons was rare in any armies, if at all could be compared with the Prussian. It was achieved only in professional armies, with long-serving soldiers who spent a fair share of their lives on such a drill. At the time of the Battle of Waterloo, musket fire from the British infantry was considered the most deadly in the whole world. Military training required British soldiers to load a musket and fire fifteen times in three and three quarters of a minute - that is, four times a minute. But even at this rate of fire, their fire could not match the rate of fire of Frederick's Prussians; except that the British were slightly more accurate, as the British soldiers were trained to aim before pulling the trigger.
The fire was carried out in cocks, not in ranks, and began from both flanks of the battalion. When the commander, who was on the flank of the company, gave the command "Fire!", The commander of the next company commanded his subordinates "Get ready!" - and so on to the center. When the two companies standing in the center fired a volley, the flanking companies were already finishing reloading their muskets and were preparing to fire. When advancing, each company moved forward several steps before opening fire. Thus, the battalion's offensive consisted of successive advances of individual companies, slowly marching forward and spewing fire and smoke at three-second intervals. At a distance of thirty paces from the enemy ranks, or more, if the front line was losing formation under a hail of lead, a command was given, and the soldiers went on the offensive with bayonets attached.
It has already been said that small arms of that period, that is, before the adoption of a rifled musket, was fully consistent with the tactics of that time. Or, it would be more accurate to say that the tactics of that period, like that of any other period in history, were determined by the weapons that existed at that time. By modern standards this weapon looked rather primitive. The main weapon of the infantry was a smooth-bore musket. Since this type of firearm was used by all countries until the second quarter of the 19th century, it makes sense to describe it in detail.
The flintlock, which replaced the 17th century match and wheeled gun, was a much more efficient mechanism than its predecessors. His lock was more reliable, it could be much easier to maintain and repair. The charge was ignited from a flint fixed in the trigger holder, which produced sparks when the flint struck a steel plate with a notch, called a float. If the gun was properly loaded, and the flint was in good condition (the soldier had spare flints. The British received three flints for every sixty shots) and correctly installed, the powder on the seed shelf was dry, and the seed hole was not clogged with carbon, the gun served its owner faithfully.
Musket "Brown Bess" with a percussion flintlock
One officer complained in 1796 that “the unreliability of the musket, and in particular the seed shelf lid of his castle, is causing what the soldiers call a misfire. They happen so often that if you take any number of people at random, then after ten or twelve volleys you will see that at least one fifth of the rounds has not been used. Consequently, one person out of five practically did not participate in the shelling of the enemy. This is what we see every day during the fighting over and over again; I myself have repeatedly seen how after the command “fire” the soldiers try to shoot, but in vain ... ”.
Based on the number of operations required to fire a shot, it can be said that the flintlock could be reloaded and manufactured to fire a new shot rather quickly; the duration of this process entirely depended on the preparedness and self-control of each soldier individually. The Tower Musket, which became world famous under the nickname "Brown Bess", was a weapon that was widespread in all armies. Like other examples of modern weapons, it has remained virtually unchanged since the beginning of the 18th century. Its weight was eleven pounds and four ounces, not counting the weight of the bayonet, while the spherical bullet itself weighed one ounce. The bullet, along with the powder charge, was stored in a paper cartridge, the end of which the soldier bit off before firing and, pouring some of the powder onto the seed shelf, poured the rest into the barrel. Then a bullet was driven into the barrel with a ramrod. Having left the barrel, the bullet followed in the direction that the last blow gave it when leaving the muzzle. With such internal ballistics, there was no need to talk about any hit accuracy at a distance of more than several meters. A single person at such a distance had a fairly significant chance of surviving. Accuracy dropped so quickly at great distances that any hit at the 137-meter line was just a miracle. A famous shooter, a major in the British army during the days of the American Revolutionary War, wrote: “A soldier's musket, if only its barrel is properly drilled and not bent, which happens very often, makes it possible to hit a person's figure at a distance of up to 73 meters - and sometimes even up to 91.5 meters. But the truly exceptional loser will be the soldier who is wounded from a conventional musket at a distance of 137 meters; as for shooting at a person at a distance of 183 meters, you can just as well shoot at the moon and hope to hit it. "
In many ways, it was a pretty bad weapon. It is true that it was reliable and easy to use, and therefore was a perfectly suitable comrade for a strong and narrow-minded peasant armed with it. It also provided a very useful support for the bayonet, by means of which the outcome of many battles was still decided, but as a firearm it left much to be desired.
If the soldier was equipped with weapons, the effective range of which did not exceed 36.5 or 45.7 meters, then it is not surprising that in many attacks he went with an unloaded musket, using only the steel of his bayonet. There was, however, another reason for bayonet attacks. It consists in the fact that it is not so easy to inspire significant masses of people to such an extent as to induce them to attack under heavy enemy fire, especially if they have already been in battle and suffered damage from this fire. The drums can beat out the roll, and the officers scream and swing their sabers, but this can not always defeat a certain hesitation from those who are in the first line and must take the first step. Therefore, if the formation has already begun to move, then it is very important that this movement is not interrupted until contact with the enemy has occurred. If the first line stops for a volley, there is always the possibility that the attack will turn into a firefight, and the blow it delivers will lose its power.
Peace in warsReturning to Frederick, I must say that in May 1740 old Frederick William died and an essayist and poet with a superbly trained army and a tightly packed treasury was on the throne. There was also a temptation in the form of a weak neighbor - and not only a weak one, but not even a neighbor, but a neighbor, and a beautiful one.
When the figurehead of the rather loose Holy Roman Empire, Charles VI, died in October 1740, he had no male heirs - only a daughter, Maria Theresa. An agreement was drawn up, called the Pragmatic Sanction, which guaranteed its inheritance. This treaty was recognized by all states, with the exception of Bavaria alone. Frederick, who was also bound by this very important agreement, set his sights on the wealthy province of Silesia. He made the decision to capture her, justifying such an action with very shaky and half-forgotten rights. But for propaganda purposes, these rights were extracted from ancient acts and inflated in every possible way (the king was a master of such actions). He secretly confessed that "ambitions, interests and desires to encourage people to talk about me brought closer the day when I decided to go to war."
The king sent a message to the Archduchess with a proposal, in exchange for legalizing his claims to the seized territories, to organize the defense of the rest of her possessions from the encroachments of any other power. Such an offer, very reminiscent of the mafia offer of a "roof", was indignantly rejected, and the Austrians began to prepare for war. But Frederick so suddenly threw thousands of his soldiers across the border of Silesia that the young Archduchess found out about it only when this province of her was already captured. Completely unprepared for such a turn of events, her troops stationed in Silesia were quickly withdrawn from there. The capture of Silesia had far-reaching consequences. To quote the English historian McCauley: “The whole world took up arms. On the head of Frederick fell all the blood that was shed in the war that raged furiously for many years and in every corner of the world, the blood of the soldiers' columns at Fontenoy, the blood of the highlanders who died in the massacre at Culloden. The troubles created by his evil trick also swept over those countries in which the name of Prussia was not even heard; and so that he could plunder the areas he had promised to protect, the blacks fought on the Coromandel coast, and the red warriors scalped each other off the Great Lakes of North America. ”
Rarely has the career of an outstanding general started so unfavorably as in the case of Frederick. The first big battle took place at Mollwitz (April 10, 1741). The Prussian cavalry was then still not in its best shape, which it later achieved, so the blow of the more numerous Austrian cavalry drove it out of the battlefield. The king was convinced that the battle was lost, and hastily left the battlefield. The Austrian cavalry then attacked again, this time at the center of the Prussian forces, but the valiant Prussian infantry under the command of the veteran Marshal Schwerin was difficult to impress with any cavalry in the world. The brave Austrians attacked her five times, but each time musket fire threw them back. The Austrian infantry had no more success than the cavalry, and finally the marshal gave his soldiers the order to go on the attack. In orderly rows, to the music of their orchestras, the Prussians marched on the enemy, and the Austrians, unable to bear it, retreated, abandoning nine guns. The king, as Voltaire quipped, "covered himself with glory - and powder."
The war continued. Secret agreements were signed, separate worlds were concluded, invasions, retreats and betrayals were made. The Prussians won several significant battles - at Hotusitz, Hohenfriedberg and Kesseldorf, which raised the prestige of their weapons even higher. In addition, Silesia became the possession of the Prussian crown for a long time.
For 11 years (1745-1756) peace reigned in Prussia, and Frederick was able to devote himself to the problems of the country. Buildings and bridges were designed and erected, swamps were drained, agriculture developed, industry was encouraged, the decayed Academy of Sciences was revived, and public education expanded. As one might expect, a lot of attention was paid to the army. Its strength increased to 160,000, and by the beginning of the Seven Years' War, the army was the most trained and equipped military force in the world.
1 - officer cuirassier; 2 - broadsword; 3 - sling with a tashka; 4 - cuirass made of plain steel of an ordinary cuirassier
This famous conflict, during which Prussia more than once found itself on the brink of destruction, was a direct consequence of the role played by Frederick in the preceding war. Maria Theresa could not forget and forgive the rejection of Silesia; France, although a traditional enemy of Austria, was concerned about the rise of Prussia (in addition, many of Frederick's stinging remarks were directed at Madame de Pompadour, then the true ruler of France). With his caustic remarks, he did not spare the Russian Tsarina Elizabeth either; one of her nicknames given to her was "papal witch." Mary had to reclaim Silesia; in exchange for France's help, she was promised Austrian possessions in the Netherlands; the queen was to get East Prussia; Saxony was promised Magdeburg and Sweden with Pomerania. Thus, Frederick turned against himself all the states of the continent, and he could only count on the support of the British fleet and British money, since England automatically became an ally of the opponents of France. In fact, the battles between the two powers in their overseas possessions - in India, Canada and the West Indies - never stopped.
The insidious Frederick, without waiting for all his opponents to unite, struck first. Leaving some of the troops to look after the Russians and Swedes, he invaded Saxony (in August 1756), took Dresden and defeated the Austrian army at Lobozitz. The following spring, he defeated the Austrians again, began to besiege Prague, and recklessly attacked an Austrian army nearly twice his own strength at Colin. Here the king suffered a serious defeat - he lost about 40 percent of the personnel of his army. After that, an unprecedented concentration of the armed forces of various states began with the aim of crushing Prussia. The Russians invaded Prussia, occupying Berlin with a small part of their forces, and received 300,000 thalers in ransom for leaving it safe and sound. Meanwhile, Frederick, quickly maneuvering, tried to restrain the advance of his opponents, but in the end came face to face with the united Franco-Austrian army at Rosbach.
The French numbered about 30,000 soldiers in their ranks, significantly inferior in their fighting qualities to those who at one time marched to victories under the leadership of Moritz of Saxony. One of their own officers, quite unkindly, described them as "killers who deserve to be broken on the wheel," and predicted that at the first shot they would turn their backs on the enemy and flee the battlefield. It is possible that the 11,000 soldiers of the Austrian troops were no better than their colleagues. Frederick was able to collect only 21,000 soldiers, but they were all tested veterans, and the king himself led them to fight.
Hussar sabers
The Battle of Rosbach (November 5, 1757), one of Frederick's most famous battles, took place on an open plain with two small hills that can hardly be called hills. The Prussians were just encamped directly in front of them when they saw their opponents moving in large forces in such a way as to attack the king's army in the flank and in the rear. The Prussian camp was immediately raised on alert, and the cavalry in the amount of thirty-eight squadrons under the command of Seydlitz began to advance under the cover of the hills to meet the enemy. The infantry and artillery followed her. The allies, deciding that these rapid movements meant the withdrawal of the Prussians, continued the offensive with three parallel columns. Now the attackers, not yet realizing it, exposed their unprotected flank to the Prussians. As soon as the dense columns were in front of the low hills, Seidditz, whose squadrons were waiting for the enemy, hiding behind the hills, unexpectedly gave them the order to attack, crossing over the tops of the hills. Captured by surprise, the enemy cavalry, marching at the head of the columns, barely had time to turn into battle formation when "the Prussian cavalry, advancing in close formation, like a wall, and with incredible speed, cut into their ranks." After a fierce battle, the Allied cavalry squadrons were driven back and put to flight. Having lost the flank cover of the cavalry, the densely knocked down columns of infantry came under heavy fire from the Prussian artillery, and seven battalions of the Prussian infantry, advancing down the slope, entered into battle with the forward regiments of the Allies. The infantry columns, having come under artillery fire and volleys of the advancing Prussian infantry, began to retreat in confusion. Unable to turn around in battle formation, they strayed into a dense crowd when Seydlitz and his cavalrymen struck them in the rear. The allied forces wavered and fled, and Seydlitz's soldiers escorted them with musket volleys in their backs. The losses of the allies amounted to 7,700 people, while the victors lost only 550 people.
In this battle, the superiority of Prussian military training was convincingly demonstrated. The speed with which the camp was raised on alert and built in columns (within half an hour), as well as the speed with which the Prussians moved, became Frederick's great advantage. The superiority of the Prussian cavalry was evident. She not only won the primary fight, but then kept discipline to such an extent that at any moment she was ready to strike a decisive blow. The artillery servants of a battery of eighteen heavy guns did a lot to disrupt all attempts of enemy columns to attack up the hillside, in which they were greatly aided by the speed and effectiveness of musket fire from seven infantry battalions (the only infantry units that took part in the battle from the Prussian side) ...
A month later, the battle of Leuthen took place (December 5, 1757), which became another brilliant example of Frederick's tactics and the courage of the Prussian soldiers. The balance of forces at Leuthen was even more not in favor of the king - 33,000 against 82,000. The formation of the Austrian and Saxon forces was too stretched, but covered by natural obstacles, the allies had about two hundred guns, mostly light. Frederick's plan was to move along the front of the enemy army and strike at its left flank, conducting a preliminary diversion with small forces, which was supposed to look like a blow on the right flank. In accordance with this plan, the Prussian army in a close-knit formation approached the right flank of the Austrians, and then, finding itself under the cover of a small hill on the field, turned right, reorganized into two columns and moved at a rapid pace along the front of the Austrian troops. The Austrians, who, it seems, did not give themselves the trouble of tracking the Prussian maneuvers, continued to strengthen their right flank, expecting an attack on it. Columns of the Prussians, maintaining perfect alignment and distance, appeared on their left flank and rebuilt from marching columns into a battle line. Each battalion carried a 6-pounder cannon, and a battery of 10 heavy siege mortars was brought up along with the attacking columns.
Now these mortars began to destroy with their fire the notches from the fallen tree trunks, with which the Austrians fortified their front, after which the Prussian battalions went on the attack. They advanced in an oblique formation, known since the time of Epaminondas, in this case the battalions marched at a distance of fifty yards from each other and in such a way that the right flank of each of them was closer to the enemy, and the left one seemed to lag behind. This attack swept through the Austrian positions from left to right. The Austrian reserves, located in the hamlet of Leuthen, fought desperately; reinforcements came from the right flank of the Austrians, and they made an attempt to align the front line. The mass of people concentrated here was so great that in some places the defenders stood a hundred people in depth. Battalion after battalion of the Prussians went to storm the Austrian system, but not before the reserve battalions were thrown into battle, the village was finally cleared of the Austrians. The offensive, supported by heavy artillery fire, continued. The commander of the Austrian left flank abandoned all the cavalry concentrated here in a desperate attempt to repel the stubborn advance of the Prussian infantry. But forty squadrons of Prussian cavalry, emerging from camouflaged shelters, intercepted them with a blow from the front, flank and rear. The Austrian horsemen scattered, and the triumphant Prussians on their horses attacked the rear of the Austrian infantry. As the day began to wane, the Austrians wavered and ran, pursued by the cavalry. Others began to abandon their weapons and surrender, the army ceased to exist as a fighting force. The losses of the Austrians numbered up to 10,000 people, about 21,000 were captured, 116 guns, 51 banners and thousands of carts with supplies were captured. As if in addition to this triumph two weeks later, Breslau surrendered to Frederick along with 17,000 soldiers and 81 guns.
“The Battle of Leuthen,” wrote Napoleon, “is a masterpiece of march, maneuver and analysis. This alone would have been enough to immortalize the name of Frederick and bring him into the ranks of the greatest generals. "
Prussian hussars of the era of Frederick the Great. Private and officer
But the continuous campaigns wore out the Prussian army. Many of the best parts fell on the battlefield; losses in the battles of Prague and Kolín were extremely heavy. Such victories as at Zorndorf (August 25, 1758), where the Prussians first had to test the fortitude and fighting spirit of the Russians, came at a high price. Along with victories, at Kunersdorf (August 11, 1759) Frederick suffered a crushing defeat, losing about 20,000 killed and wounded (almost 50 percent of the army) and 178 guns. Morale and discipline in the Prussian army continued to be excellent, but veterans were largely replaced by newly recruited warriors or soldiers of enemy states, many of whom, after surrender, were en massed to serve in the Prussian army. Although coordinated into combat units by strict Prussian discipline, they were still not the kind of warriors who could march calmly as if on parade under a shower of shrapnel and musket bullets or fire from their muskets at a speed of five rounds per minute. Discipline, caste spirit, and faith in their generals made up for the lack of training; and although desertion, this plague of all the armies of that period, became a serious problem, the command still managed to compensate for the loss of rank and file. Moreover, these troops, although there were many recruits among the rank and file, were still capable of such attacks as at Torgau (November 3, 1760), when they stormed the entrenched enemy with six hundred guns, spewing a downpour of buckshot at advancing until, out of six thousand grenadiers in one of the columns, only six hundred remained on their feet.
Nevertheless, the war left the country so depopulated that by the end of 1761 the Prussian army had been reduced to 60,000 men. The complete catastrophe was prevented only by the death of the Russian tsarina and the accession to the throne of her heir, the Germanophile Peter III. This "worthy" monarch not only proposed to conclude an immediate peace, but also returned to Frederick Pomerania, and also ordered to put at his disposal a Russian army of 18,000 people. On news of this, Sweden immediately withdrew from the alliance. Saxony was completely defeated, Austria and France were exhausted to the limit. The latter, in addition to defeats in the fields of Europe, lost Canada and India. Peace was finally concluded in 1763.
Prussia lay in ruins. According to contemporaries, four-fifths of all men who served in the army during this time were killed or wounded, and a little more than half of the people who lived there before the war remained in the cities. Nevertheless, the kingdom was able to weather this storm and even emerge victorious from the war. All the power of Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, Sweden and Saxony was not enough to wrest at least one acre of space from the Prussian king. With forces incomparably smaller in numbers than his opponents, he waged an unequal struggle for seven long years. Having learned the bitterness of accidental defeats and sometimes forced to retreat, he won many glorious battles. His glory overshadowed the glory of any other general of that time, and the slavish copying of everything Prussian by military leaders around the world was just another evidence of the reputation of the Prussian army and the Prussian soldier.
This soldier could be imperturbable and unimaginative; he may have lacked personal initiative, and without a firm, guiding hand, he was lost. But he had a habit of obedience and an innate resilience that prompted him to do his duty at any cost. To a large extent, the creation of this habit was influenced by the brutal system of Prussian drilling. Yes, she was extremely cruel, and the non-commissioned officers were ruthless and knew their job; but something more than fear of punishment drove the columns of soldiers to attack at the Battle of Leuthen, singing the old German anthem to the sound of drums and howling flutes, or throwing the Prussian grenadiers over and over again on the blood-drenched hillsides near Torgau.
European armies in the 18th century
In the 18th century, the composition of all European armies was approximately the same. They consisted of the main branches of the infantry, cavalry and artillery. Most of any of the armies were infantrymen, mostly in the musketeer or fusilier regiments. Prussian regiments were usually divided into two battalions and numbered approximately 1,700 men. In the Austrian army, three battalions made up a regiment of approximately 2,100 men. The Austrian army did not have guards regiments, but there were grenadier battalions, which were usually consolidated units made up of grenadier companies of musketeer and fusilier regiments. The use of light infantry - rangers and Croatian pandurs - was an innovation. The most dangerous adversaries were the Austrian Croats, recruited from the wild eastern borders of the empire.
The life of the foot soldiers was harsh. The battles were fought only from time to time, and therefore they were either on the march, or procured food for themselves, or, if time permitted, participated in training. During the camps, the ration was usually insufficient, but on the march the situation was even worse. Due to bad weather and disease, the army suffered almost the same losses as during the fighting. The next largest (and much more attractive) branch of the army was the cavalry, considered the heir of the traditions of medieval chivalry. There were three categories of cavalry: heavy (cuirassiers), medium (dragoons), and light (hussars, light dragoons and chevolezhers). The regiment usually included four squadrons (although their number often increased to 10). The squadron had an average of 80 soldiers. The heavy cavalry was the main striking force of the army. Cuirassiers rode large powerful horses and had to break through enemy lines in battle. Dragoons were trained as riding infantry, but they were often used as heavy cavalry as well. The most famous light cavalry were the hussars. Their tasks included conducting reconnaissance and operations behind enemy lines. Artillery was the third largest, but a very important part of any army. During the battle, artillery operated in batteries of 6-10 guns. The caliber of a cannon was determined by the weight of the projectile it fired. The most common field weapon was the 6-pounder cannon. The most powerful cannons - up to 24 pounds - were most commonly used in sieges. The guns were heavy and could not be quickly moved from place to place. Therefore, the artillery deployed at the positions was vulnerable to counter-battery fire of the enemy, his light troops and cavalry.
The armies traditionally consisted of the first line, the second line and the reserve. Usually the infantry was located in the center, where the artillery was located, and the cavalry was located on the flanks. Linear formation allowed the infantry regiment to make the most efficient use of its firepower. The order of actions could change, but usually the front rank would fire a volley, then retreat back to reload the guns and allow the second rank to fire. Well-trained troops with this tactic could produce 3-5 volleys per minute. A prudent commander always had a reserve, which, if necessary, could strengthen the first line. The cavalry on the battlefield was to fight the enemy's cavalry. However, if she was able to outflank the infantry, she could disperse the infantry before they could rebuild to counter the threat. The artillery was supposed to support the main defensive positions or attack and inflict the maximum possible losses on the enemy. The artillery performed these tasks by firing cannonballs - round iron balls. Shrapnel could also be used, which contained many small bullets. The range of such projectiles ranged from 400 to 800 meters. Another important factor influencing the outcome of the battle is the terrain conditions. The commander had to take care to select a terrain that would allow him to deploy his troops properly and satisfy the requirements of each of the branches of the military. Among the many factors that had to be considered were, for example, hills and forests that were difficult for the enemy to overcome, and therefore provided cover for the troops or made it possible to secure the flank.
